THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

33rd EUROPEAN REGIONAL MEETING
16-18 OCTOBER 2009, OSLO/NORWAY

NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL MEETING
6-8 NOVEMBER 2009, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Commemorating...

1989
THE YEAR THAT CHANGED
THE MAP OF EUROPE
(And Thereby The World)

Polish Round Table
Talks open on February 6th

Austria-Hungarian border:
Iron Curtain dismantled on May 2nd

Berlin Wall falls
on November 9th
EDITOR’S NOTE

« 1989-2009 »

“1989 was the best moment in European history, for it was possibly the last time at which Europe was at the centre of History.”

Timothy Garton Ash
Burgtheater, Vienna in February/March 2009
“20 Years after 1989”, IWMpost

“The best time for Europe has yet to come.”

Carl Bildt
Foreign Minister of Sweden in the EU Chair
At the Austro-Hungarian border on August 19th, 2009

When The Trilateral Commission meets in the autumn of 2009 at its regular regional meetings, it will have been a mere twenty years since the momentous and historic events of 1989 that gripped Europe and the world. It is not too soon for Commission members and associates to reflect on this seminal moment of history.

This commemorative brochure recalls the events of 1989 as seen through the lens of the Commission activity in 1989/1990 and reflects on the significance of those events only twenty years earlier.

The attention of our readers is drawn to the visit of the Commission’s Task Force Authors on East-West Relations – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Henry Kissinger and Yasuhiro Nakasone – who, accompanied by the Commission’s leadership, undertook a mission to Moscow in January 1989 to meet Soviet leaders, including the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev. The recent opening of the Soviet/Russian archives has now revealed their hosts’ views and interpretations of this special visit of the Trilateral Commission to the Kremlin.

The Trilateral Commission has a three decades-long record of addressing the USSR/Russia in its reports, starting with its 1977 report on Collaboration with Communist Countries in Managing Global Problems: An Examination of Options and most recently in its report on Engaging with Russia: The Next Phase.

The co-authors of this latest 2006 report – Roderic Lyne, Strobe Talbott and Koji Watanabe – underlined that “the best interests of their three regions will be served by pursuing a patient, long-term, and, to the extent possible, constructive policy of engagement”. In this vein, the Commission continues to conduct regular sessions on Russian political, strategic and economic developments at plenary and regional meetings featuring notable speakers and guests from Russia.

Particular attention also continues to be rendered to developments in the former “Soviet Bloc” countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As a highlight, the Commission met in plenary in Warsaw in 2004, the year these countries “returned to Europe” and joined the European Union.

What [the Commission] did in the 1970s was to accommodate a rising Japan (...) And I think the second great historical achievement essentially was the integration of Eastern Europe after the Cold War into Europe, both within the EU, but also within the informal networks of the Trilateral Commission.”

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
North American Chairman, The Trilateral Commission
Executive Committee Meeting, Washington, DC, April 25th, 2008
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The National Security Archive publishes its fourth installment of the 1989 diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, the man who was behind some of the most momentous transformations in the Soviet foreign policy in the end of the 1980s in his role as Mikhail Gorbachev main foreign policy aide. In addition to his contributions to perestroika and new thinking, Anatoly Sergeevich was and remains a paragon of openness and transparency providing his diaries and notes to historians who are trying to understand the end of the Cold War.

Washington, DC, May 26, 2009

Abstracts of the Chernyaev Diary with references to the Trilateral Commission meeting on January 18, 1989 (11h00-13h30) with CPSU SG Mikhail Gorbachev at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee HQ


I was called back from my vacation and for several days I applied all my strength and energy to the treatise for M.S.’ meeting with the trilateral commission (Kissinger, Giscard, Nakasone, Rockefeller), 40 pages plus references. I like it. I wonder how he will use this...


M.S. brilliantly conducted the “Trilateral Commission” meeting, he practically did not use my notes.

On the evening before, on the 17th, he asked me to stay after a meeting with the advisers and again (as he alternated between gesticulating and moving around the office and sitting in front of me on the back of a reclining chair) expounded his idea for the new book about the year 1988—the turning point year. At the meeting he stated his intention to have a “personal” election campaign (Ukraine, Moscow State University, Zvyozdniy Gorodok—about the Scientific-Technical Revolution) and divided up assignments to prepare his speeches.

To return to the “Trilateral Commission.” He interpreted the idea of coexistence as the adaptation of capitalism and socialism to each other, not only as a realistic approach to international politics at the state level. This is something new!

The next day M.S. said nothing to me and Yakovlev. E.A. left for Vienna. M.S. led the “Trilateral Commission” and then had a Defense Council meeting until late at night. Today I read a ciphered telegram from Kabul: Kryuchkov, Zaikov, and Vorontsov report directly to M.S. that “a method to help Kandahar without a storm brigade was found.”
Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo Session

Anatoly Chernyaev's notes from the Politburo session on comments by Gorbachev on his meeting with the Trilateral Commission regarding the integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy and the possibility of a united Europe

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Central Committee
21 January 1989

Gorbachev is speaking about the Trilateral Commission, with which he met (former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone). It [the commission] is interested in everything that is going on, especially in our country. It is working on all issues of European world policy. I would emphasize two issues.

First is how are you—meaning we, the Soviet Union—going to integrate into the world economy? These issues are [being] considered in the Trilateral Commission. If you are going to integrate, we should be ready for it, they said to me.

Giscard told me directly that for us (the USSR) this problem would be extremely difficult, but for them as well.

Second issue. They are coming to the conclusion that the biggest fights of perestroika are still ahead of us. And in the international sphere the main problems for us will emerge in the Third World. They think that the West “lets the Third World live,” and the Third World, in turn, “lets the West live.” But how are we going to deal with the Third World? They believe that in 10-20 years we all will have to deal with a federation of states named Europe.

Kissinger just shrugged at this statement by Giscard, and asked me a direct question: How are you going to react if Eastern Europe wants to join the European Commission? It is not an accident that they asked me about it. They know that our friends are already knocking on the door. And we should also look at what processes are going on there now—the economic and the political—and where they are drifting.

What is going on in Hungary, for example? An opposition party led by Miklos Nemeth has emerged there. Hungary is on the eve of a serious choice. Of course, it will be different. And I think that every country should have, and has, its own face. And we will continue to be friends, because the socialist basis will be preserved in all of them. The roads of our development will be very diverse, while we will preserve our commonality. We need a mechanism that will ensure our mutual understanding and interaction. There will be a lot of political, economic, and military-political questions. We should consider them in the Central Committee’s Commission on Eastern Europe. We should undertake situational analysis with scholars. For example, how would we react if Hungary left for the EC? Comrades, we are on the eve of very serious things; Because we cannot give them more than we are giving them now. And they need new technologies. If we do not deal with that, there will be a split, and they will run away.

And then there is the question of what we should present to the working groups of the leaders of the socialist countries. By the way, let the Commission give us a substantiated answer whether we need this meeting at all. Before it, we should work out what we can give to our friends, and compare it with what the West can give them.

The answer to this question, I am sure, lies with our perestroika, with its success. And we
should try to involve our friends, to get them interested in our economic reforms. Let
[Aleksandr] Yakovlev, with scholars, look at it. We are facing a serious problem there.

The peoples of those countries will ask: what about the C[ommunist] P[arty of the] S[oviet]
U[nion], what kind of leash will it use to keep our countries in line? They simply do not know
that if they pulled this leash harder, it would break.

It is time to transfer our relations to the forms that we practice in our relationship with
China, but we can get to such forms only via the market, and, of course, via technological and
scientific developments in our own country.

In that case, we would break the old rule that we keep them attached to us only by means of
energy resources.

At the same time, we cannot just tell them that we would cut the deliveries. That would be a
betrayal.

Kisa hinted at the idea of a USSR-US condominium over Europe. He was hinting that Japan,
Germany, Spain, and South Korea were on the rise, and so, let us make an agreement so that
the “Europeans do not misbehave.”

We should work on this range of issues also, but in such a way that it would not leak, because
in Europe they are most afraid of that what they understand the Reykjavik summit means.
And if you remember, in Reykjavik they saw an effort at conspiracy between the USSR and
the USA over Europe.

My impression from the meeting with the Trilateral Commission is the following: they
understood in the West that the world needs a peaceful breathing spell from the arms race,
from the nuclear psychosis, as much as we need it. However, we need to know it all in detail
in order not to make mistakes. They want to channel the processes in such a way as to limit as
much as possible our influence on the world situation, they are trying to seize the initiative
from us, present criteria of trust as tests: if the Soviet Union would not want to agree to
something, we would act in a way to gain more points.

That is why we have to keep the initiative. This is our main advantage.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation (Moscow), f. 2, op. 2.
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive).

Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Meeting with His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Wednesday, January 18, 1989 - 11:00-1:30

Amicable, self confident,
soft spoken

GISCARD - Says Gorbachev has indicated there has been a delay in
economic measures. Will they be changed or just delayed? The
economic element will be decisive in East-West relations. To do
this, change will be essential. Can they take place in the near
future? What do you expect from us? On what basis? Between
state and state? What about convertibility?

G - How do you regard the prospects?

GISCARD - We always hoped the USSR could become a full economic
partner including the burdens. This means convertibility of
currency, international trade. We are willing to cooperate if
these conditions can be met. Joining the international
institutions.

NAKASONE - What is the pace and blueprint at which they hope to
take part in the international economy and joining GATT, IMF,
OECD, World Bank. When will they be able to satisfy the
conditions. Internal reform must take place first.

HENRY - Was present at the UN for G's historic speech. His new
vision of international relations was a big departure from
history. Some will say this was propaganda, but we must know
how it will work when cooperation is substituted for competition.
This will be a big change.

What about the future of Europe, concept of Europe from
the Urals to the Atlantic. How does this affect the USSR and the
US? We hope both can play a constructive role in the building
of Europe. Could some Eastern European states become part of
the EEC.

The defensive nature of military forces was also
revolutionary in concept. How can this be achieved in concrete
arrangements? We all want to make a constructive contribution
in this respect.
His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev

G - The fact that we are sitting in the room of the Central Committee of the Communist Party shows how things have changed.

Lenin said without sorting out general questions specifics cannot be dealt with. We must deal with these general questions now.

All can agree the world is going through an important evolution, all of us are the objects of these changes. No one is in possession of the ultimate truth. The questions you have raised deal with how the USSR is going to change. But it is also important to know how you are going to change in your attitude toward the USSR. We are all at a crucial stage - both capitalism and socialism. How can we turn away from conflict to deal with the issues? We need a new intellectual breakthrough. We mustn't shy away from difficult questions. This is a painful process. The USSR does not claim to have a monopoly on the truth. We are all exploring new approaches. The goal is to build a new type of international relations. We must put aside polemics. How do we build on the experience of the past? Now we have new problems. We must find new solutions based on lessons of the past. Old approaches have led us astray in terms of arms races and the economy.

We need to give new life and new meaning to the idea of coexistence. We must take account of threatening realities and the fact of greater interdependence. Confrontation and military solutions would be very dangerous. The two systems should show they can adapt to new conditions. Capitalism has borrowed some ideas from socialism in social areas. We have borrowed ideas from capitalism. Both of these are facts. Primitive stereotypes must be abandoned. Capitalism has adapted to changing conditions. So has socialism. A new understanding is necessary. USSR will stick to its choice and will stick with socialism while improving it through Perestroika. Neither side should ask the other to abandon their social philosophies. Not all of the past was bad. We must build on the past. New negotiating patterns have already been developed. (Henry would still like to deal with old methods including intimidation.) There are positive new approaches to regional conflicts. This has already been helpful in solving some old problems. Political approaches must be substituted for military.

The UN must be used much more. The time was not right for 40 years, but now is the time.
His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev

G agrees with Giscard that an overall satisfactory relationship depends on an economic relationship. This is also the most complicated task. We are being pushed towards an internationalization of the world economy. New ways to harmonize relations between Capitalist and Socialist countries and between both of them and the Third World must be found.

Why are industrialists concerned about their workers but capitalist countries are not concerned about conditions in Third World countries. All of us must explore solutions to these problems.

In Japan, one can say everything is O.K. - therefore why change. But one must think about the future of the rest of the world if we are serious about living together. They, too, must play a role.

How should the USSR become integrated in the world economy. Answer is through scientific and technological progress. We are now going through the most difficult stage. More products cannot be introduced without structural changes. Supporters have said support will be lost if consumers do not have more products. G says they cannot abandon R&D for scientific development in electronics etc. These expenditures are increasing rapidly. The press in USSR only wants negative stories. (Giscard says that is the beginning of internationalization.) But G says headway is being made in several fields including farm machinery, trucks, aircraft, etc. This is leading to better cooperation and joint ventures.

Changing approaches to foreign trade is another field. Liberalization is taking place to permit individual industries to deal directly abroad rather than through the Ministry of Foreign Trade. COMECON type of restrictions are being removed.

The West must lift its restrictions on international markets. This would not be a favor to the USSR. The West would also benefit from more trade.

Internal convertibility will be the first step toward convertibility. Individual industries will be able to buy foreign currencies at auction. It will be difficult to say when the Ruble will be convertible. Probably in the next five-year period.
His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev

On the question of joining international organizations, so far the West has not been sympathetic. We are studying this but they too will have to make some adaptation.

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On Europe, all Europeans want to be able to deal with the whole continent. We have no desire to push the US out. There is also a dialectical and philosophical question. Harmonizing relations in a new Europe is not easy. The Helsinki process must continue. European stability, economic and political, is essential. This is not a simple process. Eastern Europe is now undergoing the same sort of process experienced a few years ago in Western Europe.

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How to implement the arms reduction program proposed at the UN. Armed forces being reduced by 13%, budget by 14%, other things by 19%.

Flexible defense will depend on what is being done in the West.

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On relations with Eastern European countries. These relationships have their history. This has been discussed with the leaders of Eastern Europe and the principles on which relations exist. Equality, independence, non-interference, friendship and cooperation are the five principles. These principles will continue.

Western Europe should avoid seeking an advantage in new relations in Eastern Europe. (This point was made in an ominous tone.)

GISCARD - Western Europe is in favor of Perestroika. USSR must expect to deal with a Western European united region. Some countries like Scandinavia may also want to join. This could come soon. We understand the need not to play a game regarding security. This would be dangerous to try to destabilize certain countries. But while still keeping their security links with the USSR they could develop economic links with Western Europe.
G - It would be a violation of our relations with the Eastern European countries if I were to discuss the question.

On the question of developing better economic relations with the USSR, a change in old relations must be developed. The USSR favors more joint ventures. As they modernize their economy and develop a convertible currency, relations will improve first with Europe but also with the U.S. We need to learn how to work together more effectively as we develop our own internal economy.
MEMORANDUM

The Trilateral Commission
Paris, February 3, 1989

to : Sir Julian BULLARD
from : Paul Révay
subject : EAST/WEST TASK FORCE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION:
SUMMARY (near verbatim) OF THE MEETING AT THE
USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MOSCOW, JANUARY 16, 1989

with

Viktor KULIKOV (*), Marshall of the Soviet Union;
First Deputy Minister of Defense;
CIC, Troops of Warsaw Treaty Organisation

and

Colonel-General Nikolaï CHERVOV,
Colonel-General Makhmut GAREEV,
Colonel-General V. LITOVCHENKO,
Colonel-General Dmitrii VOLKOGONOVA, Head, Soviet Institute
of Military History

(other senior General officers were present - not identified).

(*) retired end of January 1989

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Marshall KULIKOV is the most senior active officer in the USSR Defense Ministry. He is a particular witness to the evolution in the life of military affairs within the Soviet Union.

Marshall KULIKOV (VK) introduced the meeting by stressing where the efforts of the Ministry focus upon: not to wage but to prevent war, this is our goal. Our effort is to bring down military groupings which confront each other on the world scene. The Military is guided by the New Thinking defined by the Government and which is the latest approach of the political leaders. In sum, the threat of war will not originate from our country.

In recent times, extensive efforts have been done by the USA and Western Europe as well as the Socialist East to prevent and reduce the threat of war. It is with great satisfaction that the INF Treaty was signed as well as other agreements. The use of armed forces is unnecessary.

Of great historical importance is General Secretary Gorbachev's recent address to the UN General Assembly. The objective of this speech was to underline that the USSR will reduce unilaterally its forces in Europe and hopes that other countries will accompany these actions in the West. People say that it is difficult to see whether these reductions are significant or not, but the weapons and troops reductions represent the equivalent of all the West German forces, i.e.
500,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,000 artillery pieces and 800 combat aircraft. This step was a good example of the USSR, which now calls upon others to follow. Similar actions are being taken within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), work is presently going on.

Henry Kissinger (HK) then requested some clarification on the figures related to Soviet force reductions. Mention was made of reductions amounting to 10,000 and another 5,000 tanks as well as to 500,000 troops: where and how will these tanks and troops be reduced and demobilised?

VK answered that 10,000 Soviet tanks will be pulled out from Europe as well as an additional 5,000 WTO tanks deployed in the European Socialist countries. We are pulling out tanks from foreign territories and part of them will be physically destroyed. Another part of new-type tanks will be deployed in new organisational structures, i.e. new units with a defensive character. A certain portion of tanks which will leave Eastern Europe will be deployed beyond the Urals. When Mikhail Gorbachev talked about these reductions, he had in mind tanks in Eastern Europe. Of course, this USSR initiative was pre-arranged with the WTO allies. Now the WTO is considering reducing likewise military equipment and troops in Eastern Europe, provided "reasonable sufficiency" is maintained.
Valéry GISCARD d'Estaing (VGE) asked at this point whether these measures will be publicized and how. VK answered without any doubt: as soon as the plans are completed, all details will be given. If Western countries do the same, that is unilateral disarmament measures, then joint verification panels could be set up. Some units have already been mentioned in these reductions: 4 divisions from GSF in the GDR (Soviet Army); 1 division from the Central Group; 1 tank division from the Southern Group and a few units from Poland.

VK pursued: being a military man, undertaking action to reduce tank forces and assault & landing units is very important. I want to stress that these measures follow the implementation of the political line of the WTO, i.e. to give and impart the defensive character of the WTO as well as of the Soviet military doctrine.

A General intervened to underline that after all, the USSR has decided to reduce 6 tank divisions from the European theater, which represents 6,000 tanks and also reduce the number of tanks left in each division: this makes the divisions potentially inadequate for attack purposes and thus gives them a defensive character. The tank divisions remaining in Europe will be bereft by 40% of their fire power and will be given at organisational and tactical levels a defensive character. On the whole, our entire military Group in Eastern Europe will be devolved of an attacking capability.
HK then put forward additional questions: Firstly, and referring to past conversations with Marshall Akhromeev, a reduction by 25% of Soviet military capabilities on the Central front will not impair the combat capacity of the troops provided they remain in the Western military district (Minsk). Secondly, some critics of the USSR in the US signal that getting rid of old tanks cannot be qualified as a "disarmament" programme but as a "modernisation" programme!

VK answered firstly to the latter question: there might be different approaches to these issues, but that the outset, I believe in good faith. The USSR and the WTO are not getting rid of obsolete tanks as a result of these disarmament measures. Proof can be given when looking at the tank divisions stationed in Eastern Europe which have always possessed the most up-to-date equipment. The question can therefore be closed as they are British, US and French military missions in the GDR who to our knowledge do not report that the divisions are filled with obsolete tanks! (HK reaction: "too bad"!)

VK pursued how one can afford to undertake such unilateral actions. VK referred at this stage to the CSCE talks: both sides are speaking in favour of reductions on both sides. We have also critics at home who recall unilateral actions of the USSR in the GDR: those actions were unresponded to. There must be someone who begins the process of reduction: what we took is a bold political step.
As to the Akhromeev remark, the situation is now different: the units will be dissolved. This is the most important new aspect. This does not imply that we shall reduce the combat capabilities/forces of our units but the situation is different: we are in front of attractive prospects (... HK intervention, what Marxism calls "objective necessity"...).

VGE then requested to go back to the concept of the "European House". The Soviet moves are perceived in the West with scepticism. This is natural as one has always to remain careful when looking at defense issues. The question therefore is: when do you think significant change in the offensive posture of Soviet forces will occur, and how long will it take to change?

VK answered at the outset by underlining that to demobilise, redeploy or restation such vast numbers of troops and equipment will need very serious efforts on our part. Year 1989 will be very active as we shall implement all these measures following our unilateral initiative. As Mikhail Gorbachev has said, these measures will take two years: appropriate measures will be taken according to the "situation" and to the plans to be worked out. A number of problems have to be solved such as the restationing of personnel, with WTO consultations. Reductions concern the USSR and the Socialist allies with the goal of giving a defensive character to the military posture of the USSR and its allies.
Furthermore, the reduction posture concerns the military not only in Europe but also in Far Eastern Asia and in Mongolia, although the situation in Asia/Pacific is far from quiet and stable where the military situation tends to become more and more active. Before May 1989, troops and weapons will have started to be reduced in Europe.

William HYLAND (WH) asked what has led the USSR to shed its previous offensive operational doctrine and to implement a "defensive defense" doctrine. VK answered that this new doctrinal switch was not encouraged by outside forces: our actions were governed by "common sense". With every passing year, life teaches us that human ends are not achieved through offensive actions. A nuclear war cannot be won, and more and more conventional weapons are getting even more lethal and coming closer to the destructive capability of nuclear weapons.

Turning to the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine, one should recall Lenin who after the Revolution stressed the necessity of the young Republic in possessing the capabilities of defending itself from outside aggression. Furthermore, the history of the USSR shows that it has never resorted the first to offensive operations against outside powers. All this shows the defensive nature of our doctrine which is the essence of our military policy and remains true to conducting this policy today. A military policy has two aspects: a political as well as a military-technical aspect. The political aspect is defined
by the readiness to conduct a "defensive defense" doctrine. The military aspect is defined by the necessity to maintain an "offensive" potential because of the possibility of war. Every military power must base its thinking on these two aspects. We have to meet our ends to destroy potential adversaries through the possibility of counter-attack operations.

Colonel-General GAREEV then opened the discussion on military doctrine: it is a system of ideas and dreams, that is why we need to compare the doctrines of different countries.

Politically, the defensive character of our doctrine was embedded since 1917, i.e. not to attack other powers but make every step to defend our gains. Today, the army is changing under two factors: new political thinking and under the features of advanced military weapons. These factors have an impact on our doctrine for the future: our military doctrine is evolving in its defensive character but also in its technical aspects. To the question "why change to 'defensive defense' now?", the USSR is encouraged by three developments/factors: (1) the political which is that force has demonstrated its impotence in Vietnam and has resulted in an arms race, as well as in Afghanistan, which explains that we are pulling out; (2) the spiritual/historical: some leaderships were motivated by immoral policies, i.e. arms political lines devoid of false moral values - the political must be linked to the moral aspect of our philosophy; (3) the economy: frankly
speaking, we do not have the capability of implementing Perestroika if we do not switch some funds from the military to the civilian economy.

WH then asked if VK expects the West to emulate Soviet unilateral reductions and to what extent? VK responded that he looks forward to reductions in the NATO countries to levels leading to equal security with equal potentials which do not imply resorting to equal numbers alone. VK recalled the WTO Budapest proposal on force reductions (a cut by 100 000 troops) later a WTO proposal of a 25% force reduction. After Gorbachev's UN speech, half a million troops will be reduced which has yet not been responded to by the West. NATO continues its military programmes, imbalances are visible on NATO's part (navy & combat aircrafts). The USSR is waiting for a positive response. WH asked at this point whether reductions are conditional on a Western response. VK restated that the USSR looks forward to a positive response from the West such as in the field of the 430 000 US troops in Europe during exercises in addition to the permanent presence of 500 000 US troops as well as 5 to 7 aircraft carriers in the seasoned oceans and its combat aircrafts. The US/NATO contingent of aircrafts is contributing to the worsening of the world situation and goes against the common sense. The Vienna conference (MBFR?) has finished its work: now we have in our hands all the chances to negotiate on these issues within the new Conventional Stability Talks (CST).
VGE stressed that the new reason on the Soviet side for the defensive posture rests upon the economy. The question of delay is important. Former arms reduction negotiations took many years, but the economy can no longer wait. With the opening of the CST negotiations, how long could this delay be shortened?

VK answered that, judging by negotiating experience with the USA, problems of this kind can nowadays be more and more quickly solved. A time framework can yet not be given, but after the START mandate, the CST mandate is clear. The second phase will be faster resolved in these reduction measures (as compared to MBFR?). The prospective reductions will be a two-way process. VGE pursued that certain problems need technical help and cannot only be solved by political will: so what is the realistic timetable? VK answered that technical problems are not the only points: political developments outside our country are likewise important. An example: the 500 000 troop reductions were implemented after we studied NATO reductions which led us to make a quicker decision. However, we refuse to beleive that we will make always more and more unilateral force reductions.

Yoshio OKAWARA then asked the Soviet position on force reductions in Asia and in Outer Mongolia: what do you mean by the afore mentioned "more active military build-up in Asia"? VK stresses that we should differentiate between reductions in Outer Mongolia as agreed upon between USSR and China before
Gorbachev's UN speech: measures have already been implemented in this sector. Furthermore, Outer Mongolia was covered in the UN speech. Turning to Asia/Pacific, the build-up is visible in naval power: the rate of joint US naval manoeuvres/exercises with other navies (e.g. "Team Spirit") in the Pacific area is increasing, which is of special concern to us. Gorbachev made an opening as regards Vladivostock which will lead to the departure of the Soviet fleet base in this harbour: we need however time and resources for restationing some bases in the Kamchatka. Good faith should be rendered to Gorbachev's statement. In any case, the Soviet Pacific fleet will remain stationed in the Pacific.

Colonel-General VOLKOGONOV, after having described himself as a philosopher and a historian, intervened on the general question of warfare: we are witnessing the shaping of global thinking which rejects the concepts of forceful resolution of conflicts. This approach is no longer utopia: as witnessed by deeds, specialists are negotiating reductions in the number of weapons, from nuclear to conventional i.e. to the minimum level of 100 nuclear delivery vehicles in each the USSR and US forces and the overall destruction of remaining vehicles. VGE at this point of the discussion stressed that we are evacuating the concept of "world war" in the decades to come. If you look at military history, the trend has been from waging local wars, then national wars, continental and recently two world wars: now this movement is over, also indicated by
signs and attitudes given by the present USSR leadership.

VGE put forward two questions: on the concept of "reasonable sufficiency", how can this new military doctrine apply to East/West relations? The past 40 years shows that is was impossible to engage in serious discussions of doctrinal nature on both sides. In sum, is it possible to have in military terms an East/West discussion on the "reasonable sufficiency" doctrine? VK answered that he believes this is one task that we set for ourselves, i.e. that we engage in exchanges, the sooner the better. Some years ago, I had a meeting with General Rogers (former NATO CIC): we wanted that meeting but he refused. I hear that General Galvin is interested to have a meeting with me but once he has a political decision for such a meeting. The question of doctrine should be a military to military exchange of views.

A General intervened to recall three recent meetings between the US and USSR defense ministers: the most part of their discussions was related to political and military-political aspects. During five days, Marshall Akhromeev discussed in the USA with his counterpart, Admiral Crowe. Having attended these meetings, I can say that they were useful and helpful in understanding each other. Recently at a WTO meeting in Berlin, a proposal was advanced to initiate meetings with the NATO military on these issues. We hope and believe that in the future they will go ahead. Now, it is the turn of Admiral
Crowe to come to Moscow: he writes that he looks forward to discussing military doctrine on this occasion. These discussions should be expanded to NATO/WTO. In the UN speech of Mikhaïl Gorbachev, a proposal is put forward to create an international centre which would devote its work on discussing military doctrine such as on drafting common military criteria as regards the measurement of combat power or the imbalances in weapon categories - naval and air power for NATO, land power for the USSR.

VGE concluded that in the future (and on these military issues), the USSR will have European interlocutors to discuss with and VK closed the session by saying that we also have something to say to France and other Europeans who possess armed forces. VK's final words were that we the military are standing for détente.
Gorbachev Promises Big Cut in Military Spending

By BILL KELLER, Special to the New York Times

Mikhail S. Gorbachev told a visiting Western delegation today that the Soviet Union will reduce its military budget by 14.2 percent and cut production of weapons and military hardware by 19.5 percent.

In his most detailed report to date of the retrenchment he has in mind for the Soviet armed services, the Soviet leader also said the approximately 55,000 Soviet troops in Mongolia, near the Chinese border, would by reduced by three-fourths.

Mr. Gorbachev's remarks were reported tonight by Tass, the state press agency, and confirmed by a member of the private Western delegation, who spoke on the condition he not be named.

The Soviet leader left several key questions unanswered, including the current levels of military spending that will be affected and how soon the cuts would be made. "He was very vague, and no one pressed him," the participant said.

Trilateral Commission Group

Mr. Gorbachev's remarks came in a meeting with members of the Trilateral Commission, a private international policy organization in New York, including former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, and former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France.

The Soviet leader's comments were the latest in a series of pledges to cut the Soviet military that began Dec. 7 when he told the United Nations General Assembly of plans to demobilize 500,000 troops and scrap 10,000 tanks. Last week Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze said Moscow would begin scrapping its chemical weapons.

As with the other measures, Mr. Gorbachev indicated the cuts in military spending would not be conditioned on reciprocal cuts in the West. Moscow publicly discloses only a fraction of its total military spending, the cost of maintaining its military manpower - about $34 billion at the current exchange rate. The much larger sums spent on arms production and research are scattered through such ostensibly civilian ministries.

Western specialists generally decline to put a figure on the total budget, but they estimate that it amounts to at least 15 percent of the gross national product. This would make Soviet military spending roughly equivalent to the $300 billion American military budget.
If Mr. Gorbachev meant that total annual military spending would be cut 14.2 percent, as he seemed to, the cutbacks would go a long way toward eliminating the Soviet budget deficit. The Soviet leader has said the top priority should be investing in new industrial technology, especially in food and other consumer goods industries to remedy the shortages that have generated widespread discontent.

The Soviet leader's remarks reportedly came in response to a question from Mr. Kissinger. According to a participant, he read from a list of figures, saying, "The defense budget will be reduced by 14.2 percent, the production of armaments and military hardware by 19.5 percent."

Mr. Gorbachev also provided new details of the planned troop cuts announced at the United Nations, which are to be carried out by January 1991.

He said the cuts of 500,000 men would include 240,000 from the European part of the Soviet Union, 200,000 from the east, and 60,000 from the south.

Mr. Gorbachev has said that the reductions he pledged at the General Assembly would include withdrawal of 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks from Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary starting in April.

Mr. Gorbachev said today that the troop cuts would amount to 12 percent of military manpower. This would mean that current Soviet military manpower is 4.2 million men.

Mr. Gorbachev said the 10,000 tanks he has promised to scrap will include many of the most modern in service.

"They are putting out a version in the West that alleges we will get rid of only outdated tanks," the Soviet leader said. "So we are withdrawing 5,300 of the most advanced tanks from our troop groups."

The Soviet leader said the cuts in Mongolia would begin soon, removing 75 percent of ground forces and all Soviet Air Force troops in that country.
"East-West Relations" is the title of the other task force report to the Trilateral Commission discussed in draft form at the Paris meeting. The report was prepared by former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Yoshio Okawara, Japanese Deputy Chairman of the Trilateral Commission and Executive Advisor of the Keidanren, read prepared remarks by Mr. Nakasone, who was unable to attend the meeting.

The following are excerpts from the final report:

SOVIET TRENDS

...In Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviet Union has found an exceptional leader, quite unlike any of his predecessors. In his personal style and flair, Mr. Gorbachev has embraced reform more quickly and comprehensively than another leader might have done. We are persuaded, however, that it is the objective necessities confronting the Soviet Union which establish both the need for change as well as its direction. Were Mr. Gorbachev to leave the scene, these realities would probably sustain his general course and direction, albeit at a slower pace and with a less ebullient style.

For any Soviet leader would have had to try to revitalize the economy and overcome the persistent social malaise. Similarly, the deployment—contrary to Soviet expectations—of U.S. intermediate nuclear forces in Western Europe in response to the Soviet military build-up, the extended crisis in Poland, the long dispute with China, the chilly relationship with Japan, and the failure of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan—have combined to impose a reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy.

Our countries need to define a strategy based on a correct assessment of the necessities propelling the Soviet Union toward sweeping domestic reform and reduced confrontation with the West. We believe that these changes are likely to occur more quickly under Mr. Gorbachev’s continued leadership than they would were his known political rivals in charge.

At the same time, quite different equilibria between economic and political reforms could occur. Conceivably, accelerated effort to meet popular aspirations for improvement in standard of living could be compensated by a reinforcement of central political authority, on the Chinese pattern.

The new Soviet diplomacy has an unprecedented sweep. It addresses not only the standard military
issues, but political and regional concerns. In addition to arms control issues, the Soviets have sought accommodations in some regional conflicts, notably Afghanistan. The combination, if implemented, amounts to a new concept of security. The West can do no less than develop its own coherent policy and security agenda.

Mr. Gorbachev has stated in public, and has reaffirmed to us, his belief that if it is to carry out its domestic reform program, the Soviet Union needs to improve its relations with the outside world. The high priority given to domestic reform in the Soviet agenda is, in fact, of greater significance for our countries than whether or not these reforms actually succeed. For the priority of domestic reform, if nothing else, defec'ts energies from the traditional Cold War agenda.

The importance of the reform program derives in part from the crisis of confidence that is so evident in the Soviet Union today. Past Soviet leaders had little doubt about the ultimate superiority of the socialist economic system; despite the large gap between Soviet and Western living standards, they believed that it was only a matter of time before Communism caught up to and surpassed the advanced capitalist countries. The collapse of this hope—reinforced by the daily comparisons afforded by instantaneous global communications—rendered unavoidable the change of course introduced by Mr. Gorbachev. Even two years ago, perestroika (restructuring) was just starting, there was great expectation that the economy would quickly respond to the reforms envisaged by Mr. Gorbachev. As it turned out, the difficulties of implementing the reform program, its complexity, and the long lag between reforms and concrete results were greatly underestimated.

The Soviet Union we saw in January of this year was much more somber. The optimism of past years has vanished; we found a new, more realistic, awareness of the enormous difficulties the Soviets face merely to achieve growth, much less to begin to close the gap with the capitalist democracies. This backdrop of pervasive pessimism impels Mr. Gorbachev to reinvigorate the Soviet economy by accelerating restructuring. This dilemma rather than some abstract pacifist philosophy is driving the Soviet leader to reduce tensions in international relations. He has every incentive to reduce the share of military spending in Soviet GNP and to seek beneficial economic relationships, including foreign investment, with the non-socialist countries.

Foreign Policy
...The USSR will remain a major military power in Eurasia. So long as its relative military advantages persist, the threat of force will remain a significant factor in international relations. The democracies have a common interest in resisting the strategy of pushing the United States back to the Western Hemisphere. For were it to prove successful, the Soviet Union could then use its central geographic position to weaken and divide its neighbors one by one. Certain aspects of current Soviet policy, especially in Europe, are consistent with this long-term objective.

Thus, the democracies must learn to deal with Gorbachev's style, which is to flood the Western decision-making process with a rapid series of unilateral moves, some of them involving genuine concessions, others relying largely on psychological warfare. If real progress is to be made, Western policy must winnow the real concessions from the propagandistic overtures, and respond on two levels: the substance, and the public relations aspect. We must develop our own initiatives and policies and put forth our own ideas that reflect what our countries understand by a peaceful world and which reflect the aspirations of our people for progress and democracy.

THE TRILATERAL AGENDA
The Strategic Relationship
...[T]he democracies should welcome making arms reduction a central theme of the East-West dialogue provided they keep in mind that reductions are not an end in themselves. What made the start of reductions possible was the willingness of the democracies to maintain an adequate deterrent posture. What will sustain the process of reductions is the willingness to ensure that at every level of reductions, deterrence is maintained and preferably strengthened. Such a concept of "deterrent disarmament" must meet two strict criteria: first—to restate the basic concept—Western deterrence must be maintained with no less credibility or capacity than before each stage of reductions; and, second, the capability for a conventional defense must not be weakened, and preferably should be strengthened, as a result of force reductions on both sides....
The Future of Europe

...We are committed to see progress toward enabling the peoples of Eastern Europe to determine their own future. But we do not wish to provide a pretext for new Soviet intervention that would set back the evolution toward liberty in Eastern Europe and strengthen more conservative forces in the Soviet Union. Clearly, we should continue to stress the differences between democracy in the West and the way political systems actually function in the East. We should give support to any movement toward market economies and democratic institutions. We should continue a strong effort to break down the barriers to the freer flow of people and ideas across the center of Europe. And we must insist on the removal of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which has been used to justify Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Gorbachev's phrase, "a Common European House" ignores the fundamental differences between Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On one level, we can recognize in this phrase the desire for a more open and peaceful pattern of relationships, a framework provided for in the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents. In that sense, there is scope for collaboration in some practical areas. Environmental problems, including nuclear safety, and improvements in communications and transport are examples deserving of high priority.

On another level, the concept of a "European House" can be interpreted as an effort to dissociate the United States from Europe. We categorically reject any such policy....

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a special character. They are members of the Warsaw Pact and as such participants in conventional arms control negotiations between East and West. At the same time, they have historically been part of Europe and they have a growing wish to participate in certain aspects at least of European unification, as well as to achieve greater control over their national political destinies.

For these countries, it is therefore important to devise a category of association with the European Community based on Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. This kind of association should be regarded as a new type of relationship adapted to the special circumstances of the countries concerned. This relationship will not include, for the foreseeable future, any political or security dimension. But such an agreement should be accompanied by a full commitment to implement all the obligations of the Helsinki accord and subsequent agreements regarding human rights together with effective provisions for monitoring them.

We suggest that the European Council (the Heads of State and Government of the European Community) should announce its intention to embark on an examination of the modalities of such an arrange-
ment. This should not be linked specifically with the case of any single East European country, but should provide the framework for the kind of association which could ultimately be negotiated in detail with those countries which manifest their interest and meet the necessary conditions....

East-West Economic Relations

...It is in the common interest of the Western countries to avoid periodic massive injections of credit into the Soviet Union: for the Soviet Union it would mean a situation of lasting indebtedness; for the industrialized democracies it would amount to opened support for an unbalanced economy—without the necessary fundamental reforms in prices, freer enterprises, and convertibility of the ruble—and a potentially irresponsible conduct of affairs. Thus, we advise against embarking on a global financing of the Soviet Union. But, in an environment of reduced international tensions, we do envisage supporting specific economic and social changes and reforms. If the Soviet Union reduces its military expenditures significantly and behaves responsibly in regional conflicts, we propose that our countries support activities that would promote economic change tending towards market economics and democratic institutions.

Specifically:
- The spread of Joint Ventures for the purpose of producing consumer goods should be encouraged....
- Financial support could be given to new institutions set up in the Soviet Union to provide finance or training for small businesses, new service industries and the private sector of agriculture;
- We favor that the Soviet Union be offered observer status in international institutions, such as GATT and the IMF. This may make it easier for the Soviet Union to adapt its own rules to normal international practice....

Concluding Remarks

The opportunity to put East-West relations on a new foundation is before our countries. To seize this opportunity, our countries must act on the basis of careful analysis, not wishful thinking. We need to recognize that qualitative changes are occurring in the Soviet Union, but be realistic about the limits and uncertainties of change. Our countries should enhance their consultations on the developments occurring in the Soviet Union and their implications, and our countries should increase their efforts to develop a common strategy for the West. We should make it clear to our publics that on this basis we are prepared to make every effort and explore every possibility toward achieving a constructive East-West partnership in the search for peace.

The full published report is available from the New York, Tokyo and Paris offices of the Trilateral Commission.
A common thread running through most of our discussions in Paris has been our effort to grasp the nature and meaning of change—in East-West relations, in the international financial system, and in each of our three regions.

Our discussion of the remarkable changes in East-West relations was given focus by a report to the Commission prepared by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Henry Kissinger. We agree with the authors that the opportunity to put East-West relations on a new foundation is before our countries—an opportunity to be seized on the basis of careful analysis, not wishful thinking.

It is vital that our countries work together and give coordinated political leadership in developing a positive agenda—a task we hope the report will advance. We need to articulate a way forward in East-West relations that is feasible, for both sides, in the search for a more peaceful world. Our discussion indicates that among the elements of this way forward will be:

1. An approach to arms control which welcomes reductions while recognizing that they are not simply an end in themselves but a means to maintain and hopefully enhance deterrence.

2. An approach to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe while, while recognizing legitimate Soviet security interests, allows the political and economic evolution of these societies.

3. An approach to East-West economic relations that includes encouragement of economic changes tending toward market economies and democratic institutions, while not involving general, indiscriminate financing for the Soviet Union.

4. An openness to a more constructive involvement of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific area if its military presence is reduced and if it adopts a positive approach to the resolution of outstanding and unresolved issues in the region, including Japan’s four northern islands.

The Secretary-General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, made a welcome contribution to our Paris discussions.

The changes in the international financial system are remarkable in their reach and in their implications for national economic management. Here too our Paris discussions were guided by a task force report—on the policy challenges of international financial integration, prepared by Shijuro Ogata, Richard Cooper, and Horst Schulmann. The report points to the tension between the globalization of financial markets and national arrangements for taxation and the regulation of fi-
nancial activity. To deal more adequately with this tension, the authors argue for fuller collaboration among governments. Some reduction of differences in taxation and in regulation of capital flows is seen as necessary to limit tax avoidance and the international distortion of economic activity.

We agree with the authors that reasonable stability in a world of growing financial integration will depend crucially on the ability of our countries to come to grips with the above problems, with growing inflationary pressures, and with the enormous underlying current account imbalances which continue to afflict the world economy.

The drive toward a single internal market in the European Community by the end of 1992 was high on the agenda of our Paris meeting, at which the discussion on this issue was led by Jacques Delors, President of the E.C. Commission. The broad political importance of 1992 was indicated by its presence in our East-West discussions, in that the dynamism and economic prospects are a powerful source of attraction to the Community’s neighbors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

* * *

It has been a strong belief of the leaders of the Trilateral Commission from our beginnings in the early 1970s that a more unified, more successful, and outward-looking European Community will play a wider and more constructive role on the global stage. We see the drive toward 1992 in this light.

Our Paris discussions included the concerns of many Japanese and North Americans (and Europeans) about aspects of 1992—for instance, about “reciprocity” and about the possible trade-distortive effects of various standards. It was suggested that these concerns reflect more the anxieties of others than the intentions of Europeans, but there are a wide range of changes in detailed arrangements about which the leaders of the process will need to be vigilant in order to ensure that the broader purposes of 1992 are served. The importance of a successful outcome of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was stressed.

* * *

The consciousness of changes in Japanese society has been heightened by the passage to the new Heisei era following the death of Emperor Hirohito, with public reflection on the path Japan has pursued and on its future directions. There is now broader discussions of new alternatives and philosophies on which to base national policy and Japan’s growing international role and responsibilities.

* * *

The change in the United States is the beginning of the Bush Administration, while the Canadian election has brought continuation in power of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s Government after a volatile election campaign focussed on the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. The greater emphasis of President George Bush on bipartisan cooperation with the Democratic Congress was welcomed in the Paris discussions. The inability of the American government to come to grips with its enormous budget deficits continued, however, to be a cause of serious concern.

* * *

We all look forward to the results of the July summit meeting of the seven leading industrialized democracies in Paris, which should provide an important opportunity to develop a more coherent and common approach to the Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as to address the leading current challenges of international economic management.

Georges Berthoin
David Rockefeller
Isamu Yamashita

Paris, April 10, 1989
International Herald Tribune

FOREIGN AFFAIRS;
The Red-Eye Disease

By Flora Lewis

Sunday, April 16, 1989

In Moscow recently, a veteran American expert made a comparison. Americans want "to keep up with the Joneses," even if it means a frenetic rat race. Russians worry about "keeping the Joneskis at our level; why should they get ahead?" Concern about "unjustifiable inequality and excessive privilege," as a Trilateral Commission report noted, is a major source of resistance to Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms from the general population.

Economic revival has to start somewhere. If the venturesome are held back for the slowest, nothing will move. The Chinese call it "the red-eye disease," envy. Along with fears of inflation, it holds a social threat that led Peking to decide to slow down on the bumpy road to a largely market economy.

Mr. Gorbachev has lectured his compatriots against "leveling," a grass-roots obstacle to releasing the energies needed to make reforms work. But the painful fact is that the idea of egalitarianism is about all that is left of the early vision in Communist societies. It is hard to give it up when there is nothing else on the shelf.

The failure of Communism to produce for its people and its denial of democracy are now widely recognized. There is reason to exult in the West. The pudding has been proved. Still, Mr. Gorbachev's talk about recognizing the East-West need for "common security" goes on to predict an eventual competition between the systems for popular support. This isn't Nikita Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence." It goes much further and doesn't presume to tell the West that "we will bury you" with Soviet achievements.

But it shouldn't be dismissed as idle nonsense while we gloat about our success. I am convinced that the only way Communist societies have a chance to catch up is by gradual transformation so profound that they would no longer recognize themselves as Communists. That doesn't mean they are bound to copy all our failings and never stop chasing the Joneses.

What will we have done in the meantime? The decisive question won't be what marginal help the West provides the Soviets and their allies to emerge from their distress. It will be how societies compare in decency and justice if they succeed in their aspirations.

The tension between yearning for equality and social justice, on one side, and for individual advance, even greed, on the other is an ancient human problem. It hasn't been resolved. Certainly, Communism has shown that denying individual rights, forcing submission to an abstract idea of collective welfare, is a formula for disaster.

But the Western system has failed to cope adequately with outstanding needs. Crime, corruption, the shame of homelessness, the drug plague, the underclass are too rampant in the U.S. to permit complacency about the society race if the arms race and the consumer goods race are ever left behind. There are blatant signs of what Marx called alienation, rejection of society by people who feel they can win no stake in it.
Some pains of the capitalist system seem to be inevitable concomitants of a market economy flexible enough to grow, adapt and produce efficiently. Communist states have begun to accept, at least in theory, that a certain degree of unemployment, bankruptcy, uneven distribution of material rewards to assure incentives is necessary to make the market hum. How much?

They don't know. But the long-term bet Gorbachev and Marxist reformers are trying to make now is that they can find a much lower level than prevails in the U.S. that will prove compatible with prosperity and satisfaction of the majority. This is the future challenge from Moscow to America.

The recipe for utopia was an ugly delusion. Soviet enthusiasts for Mr. Gorbachev point out that Stalin used the egalitarian definition of social justice as a tool to amass absolute power. People were encouraged to denounce neighbors who managed to be a bit better off, and this provided a basis for cruel repression putting everybody down. Human envy was exploited to the utmost.

America's task ahead is to show that our system can prevent a similar exploitation of greed, that it doesn't automatically produce masses of human rejects along with its glittering material output. In this sense, domestic and foreign affairs are as intimately linked in the U.S. as Mr. Gorbachev says they are in his plans for the Russians. Capitalist democracy won the cold war round. It will take a different kind of commitment to win the next.
Transcripts From Malta U.S.-Soviet Summit

Off the coast of Malta in a Soviet ship named the Maxim Gorky, U.S. President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met within weeks of the fall of the Berlin Wall to discuss the rapid changes in Europe. Bush expressed support for perestroika and other reforms in the Eastern bloc, and both men recognized the lessening of tensions that had defined the Cold War. No agreements were signed at the summit, but to some it marked the end of the Cold War. Following are excerpted transcripts of conversations between Bush and Gorbachev on December 2-3, 1989.

December 3, 1989

Mikhail Gorbachev: I reaffirmed our principle position regarding the U.S. role in Europe on purpose. There are too many speculations on this issue. They are fed to you, and to us. We should be absolutely clear on such important matters. Now about the changes in Europe: they really are of fundamental character, and not only in Eastern Europe -- in Western Europe too.

I received the representatives of the Trilateral Commission.

After one of our conversations, Giscard d'Estaing, who was the speaker, addressed me, and said in a very meaningful way: "Be ready to deal with a united federal state of Western Europe." By saying that, I think, he meant that when the European integration reaches the qualitatively new level in 1992 that would be accompanied by a deep restructuring of the political structures, which would also reach a stage of federation.

Therefore, all Europe is on the move, and it is moving in the direction of something new. We also consider ourselves Europeans, as we associate the idea of the common European home with this movement. I would like to ask E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker to discuss the idea in depth, because, I think, it is in the interests of both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. We should act -- and interact -- in a more responsible and balanced way in this period when entire Europe is undergoing such dynamic changes.

George Bush: I agree with you.

Source: http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/transcripts_from_malta_summit.htm
Somebody coming from Poland now, and having to speak about the future of Europe, could be considered as a representative of a very provincial point of view. But I do not think so. I think that the future of Europe and the future of the world now depend largely on the situation in Central and Eastern Europe.

When yesterday morning I asked Count Lambsdorff about some dangers that I see on the political horizon concerning Russia and Germany, he rightly said to me, “It is a very Polish question.” I would add that these two Polish headaches—the German one and the Russian one—could become yours. And I would add a third one. Central Europe is coming back to Europe and to the free world. I think that is a very happy situation for everybody, but Central Europe is coming back with some very peculiar problems. Foremost among them is, perhaps, not so much the economic situation, but the nationalities question. The national heritage of Central Europe could become the third headache of the world.

My first message is that the answer to these three problems is Europe and European integration. To be clear, from my Polish point of view, German unification is happy news and we consider it as one of the most optimistic events in recent history. The Berlin Wall was not only a shame of the world but it was also a sign of the division of Europe, in which Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other countries had to belong to the Soviet Empire. The philosophy of action of European integration after Yalta and the division of Europe was that Eastern and Central Europe were to be left out of the European horizon. This European integration sought to preserve the peace of Europe and the material prosperity of Western Europe. One should ask if this European peace and material prosperity can now be preserved only in this very small Europe of the Twelve.

The return to the market economy is a tremendous challenge for Eastern and Central Europe. In this effort to rebuild the market economy and free enterprise in our countries we are helped by the Western world, but we cannot see a real commitment to this wider
philosophy of action for European integration. We sometimes have the feeling that the European Common Market is a moving train whose doors are already closing and that we are considered as an obstacle—or a possible obstacle—to European economic and political integration.

Association with the European Community is a step in the right direction. We have the feeling that with association, countries like Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia can really be involved in European integration. But may I ask a question: Why is the problem of membership in the European Community not treated now in political terms? It is not only a question of money, investment or economic integration, but it is also a question of the political future of Europe and the world.

Yes, the question of money is obvious. In our return to the market economy we need assistance. First, we need investment—not only private investment, but also public investment. In our countries investment is risky, and under these circumstances the state institutions should be involved. Second, we need European investment. It would be bad for Poland and Germany if investment in Poland is majority German. (In the joint ventures field more than 40 percent of investments are German.) It would be better to see British, Italian, and French capital invested in Eastern and Central Europe, and, better yet, to see European capital—European economic institutions—involved in this process. And finally, we think that the question of debt is not just a short-term problem, but an economic issue that strikes at the hopes of our people. We should give to our citizens not only the hope that reform efforts will go well in the short term, but, above all, the hope that we are able to build a new and sane economy. With this charge of debt, that is impossible.

But dealing with the new realities of Eastern and Central Europe is also a question of security, stability and political integration. We are aware of the fact that we should see our place in a different and new European political architecture. We think that CSCE can play a role, but I agree with Mr. Delors that it would be a mistake to view this conference as a solution to the security problem. Neither should one forget that this CSCE formula introduces the United States into the European architecture. And I would say, frankly and openly, that we should be interested in the presence of the United States in the European architecture. It would be a paradox if, after the events of 1989, the new political architecture would be a "common house" with a place for the Soviet Union but no place for the United States. So this formula brings us an important message—the possibility and the necessity of the U.S. presence in Europe.

The Council of Europe is cited as one of the new structures for European security. Everybody has heard about the Council of Europe, but what is its purpose? Can the Council of Europe be the real institution of European integration? Why are countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland still waiting for a clear answer concerning their membership in the Council of Europe? I think it is proof that the Western world, although having great sympathy for changes taking place in the former Eastern bloc, until now is very slow in responding to this challenge.

The question of this new political architecture should be considered not only in the dimension of Europe, but also in the context of the political heritage of the cold war. And the political heritage of the cold war is, first of all, the East-West division. Can we break free of this East-West division? Can we find another form of alliance? Can we find another political structure? In some talks concerning the future of Europe we found the idea being advanced that the Berlin Wall can now be put on the Oder-Neisse border. The situation would stay the same in political terms, only the geographical borders would be changed.

The question is how to think in other terms. In a recent American newspaper I found a political proposal for the future presenting Europe still divided into spheres of influence. My fellow Poles would be amazed to see Poland in the Russian zone of influence into the 21st century. That is the result of very old political thinking—being unable to consume the change of 1989.

How do we break free of this thinking? I would propose that my country re-orient its foreign policy, its economic policy, as well as its cultural, education and political policy, to the North. We have common interests around the Baltic Sea. I can imagine us organizing an alliance of Baltic countries, in which the Baltic
Replicas of the Soviet Union will have their place, and Germany will also have a place. Czechoslovakia could play a role as a bridge between this new Northern alliance and the Southern alliance, the Danubian-Adriatic Alliance of five countries. In this sense, Europe's future political architecture and future economic ties can be considered in different terms—but on one condition, that the ultimate purpose of this would be eventual integration into the European Community.

I am aware of the fact that European integration—this integration of the Twelve—is in the interest of the greater Europe, and in the interest of European security. The question is how to integrate the greater Europe. I think the answer can be found in two points. First, some sort of agenda for action, some sort of calendar should be set for membership of our countries—Eastern and Central European countries—in the European Community. And second, during the period in which we will wait for normal membership in the European Community, our countries—Eastern and Central European countries—should organize structures of cooperation which bring membership in the European Community closer to us.

Finally, it should be noted that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, having a common fate, are oriented toward not only the West, but also toward the rich countries because we are not interested in building alliances with poor neighbors. The point is that we should have an idea of our hoped-for future and, in very pragmatic terms, an agenda for change.

In concluding, I would like to say that the question for our countries is how to invest, in a pragmatic way, all the sympathy that we have from the world and how to transform it into a real investment of money and movement of goods and people. For the Western world, the question is how to keep the momentum—political and economic—going and how to take the historical responsibility for the future of the world.

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For a period of 40 years Europe found itself in a controlled but constant crisis. Germany and all of Europe were divided. Heavily armed military forces stood face to face at the dividing line between East and West. The right of the peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe to self-determination was disregarded. Democratic rights, social pluralism, individual freedoms and human rights were sacrificed to the dictatorships of Parties that laid claim to absolute truth and undivided power.

There was no prospect of resolving this conflict as long as the Soviet Union remained determined to enforce its hegemonial claims by almost every means available to it, and as long as it continued to satisfy its security needs at the expense of its neighbors.

Due to the firmness of the Western Alliance and the determination shown by the United States and Canada to shoulder their responsibility within the Alliance, Western Europe was able to preserve freedom, democracy and its right to self-determination.

Divided Germany stood at the center of this conflict. But this is not new. Germany's relationship with its neighbors has always been strongly influenced by security concerns. Experience with Bismarck's Germany and the horrible consequences of the ruthless imperialism of the Third Reich reinforced these fears in our neighbors. After the Second World War the problem of integrating Germany into a European security and peace order was pushed into the background by the East-West conflict, and by the division of Germany and the integration of its two parts into different security alliances. As such, the Germans no longer posed a security risk. Seeing to it that this remains so is a key factor in the policies currently being pursued by all of the countries in Europe. It is only on this basis that the Germans will be able to achieve national unity.

The Western powers gave the Federal Republic of Germany the opportunity to take part in building up the integrated Western system. The Federal Republic took advantage of this opportunity and today is firmly anchored in the Western community of democratic
nations, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The fact that we are firmly integrated in these contexts is in keeping with both our convictions and our interests. It has brought the Federal Republic of Germany freedom, self-determination and economic recovery. Beyond this, it has provided the country an opportunity to promote its political and economic interests as an equal partner on a solid and internationally recognized basis.

This new form of integration, aimed at mutual confidence, mutual dependency and cooperation, guarantees those involved maximum protection against egoistic and nationalist trends, such as dominant political thinking in the 19th century. The principles of the successfully integrated Western system can serve as a basis for restructuring an all-European peace order. The unification of Germany will be achieved in this framework.

Integration in the European Community and close cooperation with our European Community partners is a central element of our foreign policy. A very special role attaches in this context to Franco-German friendship. Without its membership in the European Community, the Federal Republic of Germany's economic and political development would not have been possible.

With the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987, the European Community acquired a new and dynamic dimension. The European Community countries bindingly agreed to complete freedom of movement for goods, services, capital and people within the Community by the end of 1992. In economic terms this means considerable new impetus towards integration and the activation of growth reserves for all of Europe and the global economy.

It can already be said that the process of economic and political integration in the European Community is irreversible. For any of the member states, dropping out of the integration process or failure of the Community to integrate would be connected with political and economic losses infinitely greater than the burdens that the integration process brings with it.

We want to work actively to support the continued development of the European Community towards a European Union. This will mean a progressive transfer of national sovereignty to a democratic European government. Based on the experience we Germans have had with our own governments, it will be easier for us to give up national sovereignty than for most other Europeans. Moving ahead in the process of integration, including the transfer of sovereign national rights, is in the interest of our European partners, and they may know this. For our partners in the European Community, the advantage of integration into structures of this kind is that it will make it increasingly difficult and, in the long run, impossible for individual countries to steer unilateral courses. Those who have security-related reservations about others in Europe will necessarily support the cause of European union.

A united Germany integrated in a European union will no longer pose security risks.

For our partners, Germany's integration in Europe means their being tied to Germany. This may not always be a comfortable proposition. In comparison with all the other solutions that have been attempted in the course of history, this is the only one that provides reliable and long-term solutions to the security problems Germany can pose. But Germany's integration in a European structure will only succeed to the extent that the other partners are willing to integrate themselves into the European Community.

For decades, the West has clung to the conviction that one day human rights, democracy, the right to self-determination and freedom would prevail in Eastern Europe. The Germans have always associated the hope of achieving the unity of Germany with this conviction. The preamble to our constitution, which we refer to in our country as the "Basic Law," codifies this as a mandate for the Germans, combining it with the responsibility to serve the cause of peace in the world as an equal member in a united Europe. Both these factors, national unity and the preservation of peace in Europe, are constitutional mandates.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

The restructuring of Eastern and Southeastern Europe will only succeed if the security question is resolved to the satisfaction of all the countries concerned. Germany is at the center of this complex problem, due to its geographic situation, its size and the membership
of its two parts in different alliance systems. It is important that no unilateral advantages for one of the two sides derive from the changes taking place in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. We do not seek security in a confrontational context. The aim of German unification must be to contribute toward stability in Europe. What is needed is to make use of the ongoing process of change to move from confrontation towards cooperation, in order to transform the alliances into elements of a new and cooperative all-European security system.

The CSCE process is the framework in which this problem will have to be solved. The momentum this process has taken on since the Stockholm agreement on initial confidence-building measures, since the INF Treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles and, in particular, since the conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference at the beginning of 1989, must be made use of and maintained.

On the basis of the resolutions approved with regard to human rights and civil rights, the Vienna CSCE Conference made a major contribution towards the peaceful revolution that took place in Eastern Europe. The conference also initiated the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe. The progress that has been made thus far in this conference justifies the hope that it will be possible to conclude major disarmament agreements before the end of this year, agreements that will bring us closer to the objective of guaranteeing and verifying a non-capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. This objective cannot yet be attained in the framework of the mandate for the first Vienna round of talks. Thus, at the conclusion of this round of talks, a mandate will have to be formulated for a new Vienna round that will lead to new and radical disarmament measures. The CSCE summit conference scheduled to take place before the end of this year will need to issue this mandate and, in addition, decide on a framework for the institutionalization of the CSCE process. There are already a large number of interests and tasks the two alliance systems could pursue jointly, such as monitoring the disarmament process, confidence building, resolving regional conflicts within the alliances, and developments on

the outer peripheries of the two alliance systems. To the extent that it proves possible to reduce the military potentials of the two alliance systems and, at the same time, to expand mutual confidence, it will be possible to create the prerequisites needed to place joint security in Europe on a new treaty-related and institutional basis extending beyond the existing alliances and, possibly, replacing them.

NATO—in connection with a strengthening of its political component—might serve as a basis for a new security system. The inclusion of North America in any European security system will continue to be indispensable. The CSCE summit will need to pave the way for establishing institutional structures in the CSCE context and for developing a contractual framework for an all-European peace and security system. As long as this basis does not exist, NATO will continue to be indispensable and Germany will have to remain integrated in NATO.

In the interest of stability in Europe, we want German unity, not as a neutral nation-state, but rather as a member of the European Community, and as a member of the Western Alliance. We are willing to take justified security interests into account. However, we attribute importance to our doing this as an equal partner.

The integration of Germany in the Western Alliance and its involvement in the continuing process of European Community integration is an important factor for stability in Central Europe. We understand the concerns of the Soviet Union that the inclusion of a united Germany in the integrated Western system must not lead to an expansion of Western Alliance forces beyond present-day borders. As such, we feel that it is right that neither NATO troops nor German troops assigned to NATO be stationed on what is currently GDR territory. It will be necessary to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union regarding the continued presence of Soviet troops on GDR territory, until such time as the prerequisites to be established in the context of the disarmament process for the withdrawal of Soviet troops have been satisfied.

Never before in the history of this century have the prospects for a durable peace order in Europe been as good as they are now. The progress being made in the
disarmament talks justifies the hope that it will be possible to reduce military forces in Europe in the foreseeable future and to structure them in such a way that it will no longer be possible to employ them as a means of attaining political ends.

In the two alliance systems there is a growing awareness that conflicting interests are being replaced to an increasing extent by converging interests. This process is still a long way from being completed and it is not without risks. The risk factors include potential developments in the Soviet Union. In addition, a united Germany in Central Europe will reawaken fears rooted in the past. In order to do justice to both problems, there will be a need for a strong commitment on the part of the United States and Canada in Europe. This will include the presence of an appropriately large troop contingent in Europe.

Freedom, democracy and human rights achieved a historical victory in Europe last year. We are all responsible for seeing to it that this new situation is guaranteed in the long-term, both in the interest of Europe and in the interest of America.

* Otto Graf Lambsdorff is Chairman of the Free Democratic Party and former West German Economics Minister.
I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE A NORTH American response to the discussion of implications of change in Europe. It seems to me that three issues are likely to be of increasing importance to the United States and Canada. The first issue pertains to the North American-European security connection in the setting of emerging and increasing European unity, but also in the setting of the inevitably declining U.S. security presence on the European continent. The second issue pertains to the longer term dilemmas of Central European post-Communist reconstruction and renewal, and particularly as it pertains to the question whether this reconstruction is taking East-Central Europe toward Strasbourg or towards Sarajevo. And the third involves the intensifying crisis within the Soviet Union—which is beginning to assume a dynamic character. Each of these issues poses serious dilemmas and will require serious thought and response.

U.S.-EUROPEAN SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

I start with a premise that the security connection between the United States and Europe remains in our mutual interest. I believe that most Americans wish to be part of the European security arrangement, and that most Europeans—West and East—similarly so desire.

But I, for one, believe that we cannot assume the durability of the post German-unification security arrangements. We can more or less anticipate what they will be. They will involve, in one fashion or another, a united Germany remaining a member of NATO—with some special security arrangements for continued Soviet presence in what is today called East Germany. But I wonder how long that arrangement can endure.

Proposals are already on the table pertaining to the reduction of Eastern and Western forces, scaling down the U.S. presence to 195,000 troops in the central region. But this hardly is the end of the debate. Significant spokesmen on the defense issue in the United States are already postulating the desirability—as well as probably the inevitability—of a further drastic reduction. Senator Nunn, for example, has suggested a
reduction down to 75,000. And I strongly feel that he is, in fact, correctly anticipating the thrust of events. Beyond that are the dynamic uncertainties connected with the CFE process, which will, in all probability, lead to agreements pertaining to reduction of forces. There is the process of political change in Eastern Europe, which will terminate, before too long, any Soviet presence in such countries as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and inevitably also Poland. There is the possibility of the Soviet Union itself choosing to disengage, and inviting the West to disengage from Central Europe. And, in any case, one has to anticipate fundamental discontinuities in the future in the outlook of the Germans themselves on the security problem.

Let me say that I consider the Germans to be good allies and true Europeans. When I say this, I do not wish to signal some German trend towards neutralism. But I do think that we have to anticipate major discontinuities in the course of this decade, just as we have experienced fundamental discontinuities in the last half decade. Surely, one cannot expect a reunified Germany—a good member of the European Community and solid member of NATO—to be ready to remain indefinitely the only occupied country in the heart of Europe.

At some point before too long a reunified Germany, either because of a precipitating Soviet initiative or on its own, will say to its allies that it wishes to remain a member of NATO, that it has proven itself to be a good participant in the European process and that, therefore, the time has come—let us say 50 years after the end of World War II—for Germany to have a military status not different from that of Norway or France or Spain. That is to say, without foreign troops on its soil.

In other words, we have to start thinking of new arrangements for the more distant future—but not so distant any more—regarding the U.S.-European security connection. It is unlikely to remain based indefinitely on the notion of large U.S. combat force deployments on European soil. We will have to think of arrangements for prepositioning of equipment, for, perhaps, some air and naval bases and, in all probability, for joint maneuvers involving the rapid deployment of American combat formations to Europe for joint maneuvers with NATO forces. We have to think of an arrangement which is quite different from the one that exists today, but one which, nonetheless, continues to tie the United States to Europe’s security.

I happen to believe that the CSCE will become a European security system only when there is no insecurity. But if there is insecurity, much more than the CSCE will be needed. The chances are that insecurity will linger, especially given the third great uncertainty of which I will speak in a minute, namely, internal Soviet developments. And thus, it is not too early for us to start reflecting on the need for fundamental changes in the long-run character of the U.S.-European security connection.

**The Future of East-Central Europe**

I sense that there is some inclination in the West to underestimate the difficulties of that transition taking place in Eastern and Central Europe. That transition is going to be prolonged; it will last years; it is going to be difficult; and it is going to be disruptive. East Germany is a special case, which will be handled by the Germans. And without minimizing the difficulties of the integration of East Germany into Germany, it is likely to be worked out given the resources and the commitment of the Germans. But the rest of East-Central Europe will be much more difficult.

We have no precedents for the successful transition from a communist system to a democratic free-market system. The road is a new one. Poland is right now the spearhead and pioneer. It is making a massive and bold reform effort, and the others are watching and waiting. Neither Hungary nor Czechoslovakia is moving as rapidly. And the countries further south—Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia—are experiencing increasing disruptions, and are not yet even in the stage of reconstruction. There is the danger that the road for some of them will not be to Strasbourg, but to Sarajevo—the increasing ethnic conflicts, national collisions, and internal disruptions.

Thus, it will be particularly important for the West to remain engaged; for the United States and, in particular, for U.S. private business to carve out a bigger role—and in so doing to try to promote not only the reconstruction of the region, but closer internal coop-
eration within that region. The West Europeans have had 40 years of experience in increasingly institutionalized cooperation. The East Europeans have had none. And the Communist experience has intensified rather than diluted their nationalism. This is why it is important that cooperation in East Europe take on tangible institutionalized forms.

I would like to see all of us promote, for example, Eastern European cooperation on the ecological issue, for it is a fruitful area for institutionalized cooperation between the East European countries. There is the need for German-Polish reconciliation to match the Franco-German reconciliation. But that, too, needs to be institutionalized and made tangible. The Coal and Steel Community that provided the foundation for Franco-German reconciliation could be matched in some new fashion through German-Polish cooperation that is concrete and focused on tangible objectives and creates, in a sense, a framework of Franco-German and German-Polish reconciliation in the heart of Europe.

These are major strategic tasks for us regarding which we in the Trilateral countries need to think a great deal and to remain and become increasingly engaged.

DEEPENING CRISIS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Much has been said on this subject and much has been written. I do not have much to add, but let me just register some general propositions.

In my view, this deepening crisis is not a transitional crisis; it is a historic crisis. A transitional crisis, by way of example, was the American experience with the New Deal—that was a transitional crisis of the American system. The crisis of the Soviet Union is a historic crisis like the crisis of the Ottoman Empire, for example. It is a crisis of stagnation, of attrition, of demoralization, of fragmentation, and of intensified potential for violence.

As I look to the future, I am very doubtful that this crisis will soon be terminated or that in fact there is a solution for the crisis within the framework of the existing Soviet Union. More likely, in my judgement, is either a (1) dramatic turn, at some point, towards some attempt at a reassertion of empire—based not on an ideology, for it is gone, but on the single basis for such an empire: Great Russian nationalism, or (2) a process of continued fragmentation, particularly through the dynamic of national conflict, of which Lithuania is the litmus test, or (3) in part as a combination of the other two, and I have only in recent weeks started feeling this way, there looms on the horizon the possibility of a major central upheaval of a Romanian type, assuming a strongly anti-Communist character.

For what strikes me from my contacts with the Soviets, particularly with the Russians, is the polarization in the public mood on political issues. This extremely sharp polarization is increasingly defined in ideological hostility, particularly in a growing hatred within large segments of Russian society for the communist experience and for the very word "communism." And that has the makings for considerable instability.

All of that to me means that we should, at the very least, try to begin to spell out some tangibly beneficial consequences for the Soviet Union if it transforms itself into some form of a Commonwealth and undertakes political and economic reforms that bring it closer to Europe. I happen to believe that a massive aid program for the Soviet Union at this stage is premature. But it is not premature to start charting an attractive vision of the future, so that those who wish to transform the Soviet Union into something more palatable would have a viable option, even in the context of this deepening crisis.

Let me conclude by stating my three conclusions very succinctly. With regard to the U.S.-European security relationship in the context of a changing Europe, there will be the need for the definition of new arrangements defined less in terms of numbers of U.S. combat forces stationed in Europe. With regard to the second issue, it will become increasingly important for us to be aware of the fork in the road which could take some of the East European states to Sarajevo and only some to Strasbourg. And we should strive to take the entire region towards Strasbourg. With regard to the third issue, I am convinced that in the years to come domestic Soviet problems will increasingly become foreign policy dilemmas for us all. There is going to be a closer junction between the dynamics of the very critical and difficult internal change in the Soviet Union and Western policy towards the Soviet Union.

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NEW-YORK, DECEMBER 1980 - I get tired - and "getting tired" is a mild way of putting it - of all the talk about "what are the Germans doing ? " for the following three reasons: First, the record of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Atlantic Alliance speaks for itself. The quality of our army, our military expenditures, the way we honored every single agreement reached within NATO - we have lived up to our obligations. Second, our allies in the past have signed treaties upon treaties, issued communiqués upon communiqués, telling us they would help in bringing about German unity. Was it all just words? We are nowadays asking for much less than that. We know that, as things stand, there will continue to be two German states: We know that only if the division of Europe ends sometime in the future, the Germans may (or may not) decide to enter into a closer association - in the cultural field, for instance, where it would seem most natural. In any case, that will be long after my time and must be left to the generations to come. I become emotional when I see the hypocrisy of those who, having "promised" the Germans their national unity, object when those same Germans, in the context of a divided nation, try at least to make it possible for the members of divided families to visit each other. Thirdly, there has been much talk recently about human rights. That starts at home! During my term as Mayor of Berlin, nobody could help me when the wall was brought up - as a result of Yalta, a division line was drawn not only through a country, but through a city, violating that basic right of the citizens of one city to live together. We do not ask for German reunification; we have merely been trying to alleviate in a modest way these human conditions, make visits possible and what not; knowing very well all along that all this will disappear if the overall situation between East and West makes it impossible to continue on this road.

Willy Brandt
(from an interview for "Trialogue" #25).

BELGRADE, SEPTEMBER 20 and 21, 1983 - One such prejudice is that communism will disappear with the Soviet Union. Absolutely not! Communism will survive the Soviet Union - not necessarily this variety of Leninism, but whatever form of utopian teaching humanity will come up with. Utopia seems to be very much a part of human nature; it is also deeply rooted in Christianity - and communism does have some roots in Christianity; See this idea of fraternity, equality and brotherhood, also found in the utopian aspects of the French Revolution.... Communism as an idea may be unrealistic, but it is also inspiring, as is every utopian teaching. The Soviet Union and its system may well disintegrate one day, but a new form of utopian thinking is doomed to arise - in China, in Europe, or elsewhere. This is one of the reasons why I think the danger today is not communism as such, but the Soviet Union and its expansionism; and why to identify the idea of communism with the Soviet Union actually helps to enlarge and strengthen the very basis of the Soviet Union.

This is not to say that non-communist political leaders or thinkers should not fight ideologically against communism; the ideological struggle must, of course, go on. It is important to explain the communist system and the Soviet system. But I repeat: What is essential is Soviet expansionism, not communism in and of itself. In this regard, I think Solzhenitsyn is wrong when he assimilates all communisms, from China to Yugoslavia, to one unique devilish idea.

Milovan Djilas
(from an interview for "Trialogue" #54).
WASHINGTON D.C., OCTOBER 13, 1983 - I do not want to fit what the Pope is trying to achieve into this picture – I know it would result, three weeks from now, in a new attack in Pravda to the effect that the Pope and I are orchestrating some kind of joint strategy. (As you know, I have been accused by the Soviets of having had something to do with the selection of the Pope.) Therefore, what I am advocating has to be seen as totally separate from what appears to me the Pope is doing.

What he is doing is, I think, historically fundamental. He views the West as beset by growing hedonism and materialism, and in need of genuine spiritual revival. He sees the East as dominated by a bankrupt ideology and potentially very ripe for a genuine spiritual revival far beyond the frontiers of Eastern Europe and including Orthodox Russia. In other words, my impression is that the Pope's vision is an extraordinarily dynamic and optimistic one. Too many Western observers, in my judgement, have focused exclusively on his interest in Poland. I believe that his interests are far broader than that and historically very ambitious. A remarkable book has been published on the last days of Cardinal Wyszynski, when he was dying in Warsaw, which includes some conversations he had by telephone with the Pope. It was rather interesting to see the extent to which Cardinal Wyszynski too, while dying, was expressing the view that the East is becoming ripe for a spiritual renaissance. Right or wrong, and these views may be too optimistic, I think the Pope sees today's West and East as terrains for new missionary zeal – a zeal not in relationship to a very remote task but a zeal in relation to genuine potential.

Zhigiew Brzezinski
(from an interview for "Triadogue" #34).

MOSCOW, FALL 1978 - In contrast to the imperative nature of the majority of political philosophies, the ideology of human rights is in essence pluralistic, allowing various possible forms of social organization and their coexistence. It also offers the individual a maximum freedom of choice. And I am convinced that precisely this kind of freedom, and not the pressures exerted by dogmas, authority, traditions, state power or public opinion, can insure a sound and just solution to those endlessly difficult and contradictory problems which unexpectedly appear in personal, social, cultural, and many other aspects of life. Only this kind of liberty can give people a direct sense of personal happiness, which after all comprises the primal meaning of human existence. I am likewise convinced that a worldwide defense of human rights is a necessary foundation for international trust and security; it is a factor which can deter destructive military conflicts, even global thermonuclear conflicts which threaten the very existence of humanity.

Andrei Sakharov
(from a contribution to "Triadogue" #19).

COPENHAGEN, APRIL 23, 1995 -

Kōichi Miyazawa: This is a very critical moment. You mentioned about "stones falling upon our heads". At the Budapest OSCE meeting in December, President Yeltsin mentioned something to the effect that the termination of the Cold War may end up being a "Cold Peace". Do you feel the same way now?

Andrei Kozyrev: I think what President Yeltsin did was warn – he sent a warning – that, yes, there is a chance, there is a danger of the "Cold Peace" rather than the full-scale and full-fledged effort to create a united Europe, if we continue going on without answers to urgent questions, and if we continue to go along without strategy of a real united Europe. And as I said, yes, the stones are already falling. In internal politics in Russia, the nationalists are using the unclear purpose of debate of hastily enlargement of NATO to demonstrate the failure of the present government – including myself. Because it only demonstrates that instead of creating something new (which we promised the Russian people) with our natural partners and allies (democratic countries in Europe and the United States), we are met with the extension of an old mechanism, of a mechanism which was created to counter the Soviet threat. So we need clear answers: we need clear strategy. And then we will avoid the Cold Peace – which is not our preference, not a threat to other countries. But this is something which we could face if we fail to elaborate, agree upon, and effectively install the strategy of united Europe and united world.

Henry Kissinger: You asked what is it that could be done in the enlargement of NATO now being discussed that could not be done in Partnership? What could be done is to give political guarantees against military pressure or aggression. If the idea of partnership
Communism could not satisfy the material needs of Eastern Europe, still less its cultural and political aspirations. Post-World War II history is replete with efforts by East European countries to change this unnatural relationship by revolution or by more subtle means designed to avoid a Soviet counteraction.

Gorbachev's perestroika constitutes an admission that the Soviet Communist economic system has not worked for the Soviet Union, least of all for Eastern Europe; glasnost implies that this fact can and must be openly admitted. The economic inefficiency and challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist parties are more starkly evident than ever. This underlying reality is the cause of growing ferment.

Our countries face a dilemma in their policies toward Eastern Europe. We are committed to see progress toward enabling the peoples of Eastern Europe to determine their own future. But we do not wish to provide a pretext for new Soviet intervention which would set back the evolution toward liberty in Eastern Europe and strengthen the economic and political forces in the Western part of Europe. Clearly, we should continue to stress the difference between democracy in the West and the way its political systems actually function in the East. We should give support to any movement toward market economies and democratic institutions. We should continue a strong effort to break down the barriers to the freer flow of people and ideas across the center of Europe. And we must insist on the removal of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which has been used to justify Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Gorbachev's phrase "a Common European House" ignores the fundamental differences between Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On one level, we can recognize in this phrase the desire for a more common and peaceful pattern of relationships, a framework provided for in the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents. In that sense, there is scope for collaboration in some practical areas. Environmental problems, including nuclear safety, and improvements in communications and transport are examples deserving of high priority.

On another level, the concept of a "European House" can be interpreted as an effort to dissociate the United States from Europe. We categorically reject any such policy. Our European policy should, therefore, distinguish among three separate European realities:

(1) Western Europe, composed of the 12 EC countries increasingly integrated into a single European Community with its own system of external relations, together with the EFTA countries.

(2) The Soviet Union, extending far into Asia and therefore not a fully European country.

(3) The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a special character. They are members of the Warsaw Pact and as such participants in conventional arms control negotiations between East and West. At the same time, they have historically been part of Europe and they have a growing wish to participate in certain aspects at least of European unification, as well as to achieve greater control over their national political destinies.

For these countries, it is therefore important to devise a category of association with the European Community based on Article 258 of the Treaty of Rome. This kind of association should be regarded as a new type of relationship adapted to the special circumstances of the countries concerned. This relationship will not include, for the foreseeable future, any political or security dimension. But such an agreement should be accompanied by a full commitment to implement all the obligations of the Helsinki accord and subsequent agreements regarding human rights together with effective provisions for monitoring them.

We suggest that the European Council (the Heads of State and Government of the European Community) should announce its intention to embark on an examination of the modalities of such an arrangement. This should not be linked specifically with the case of any single East European country, but should provide the framework for the kind of association which could ultimately be negotiated in detail with those countries which manifest their interest and meet the necessary conditions.

As to the relationship of Eastern Europe with the USSR, the key question is whether the USSR is prepared to undertake a reappraisal of its security interests in Eastern Europe. We note Gorbachev's statement that "security can no longer be assured by military means." We should seek new patterns in Eastern and Central Europe that would allow a political and economic evolution reflecting popular aspirations.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing
Yasuhiro Nakasone
Henry A. Kissinger


Встреча М. С. Горбачева с представителями «Трехсторонней комиссии»
is developed in the sense that you propose, then Russia will join NATO — that’s the logical evolution. NATO gives no guarantees internally to member states that might be in conflict with each other. And then one could argue (if one has old-fashioned thinking) that one would face a situation of a country of 180 million, extending over eleven time zones, surrounded by a group of small, relatively impotent countries — no longer guaranteed by any arrangement because they would now be part of a general system of collective security. And to the exponents of old-fashioned thinking, this might look, in the hands of less enlightened Russian leaders, as a device for what used to be called hegemony. Now is that a totally unfriendly way to analyze the problem — that it would dissolve an alliance into a vague system of collective security which has no internal guarantees and in which the specific weight of the individual members would become dominant.

Andrei Kozyrev That’s exactly: it seems to me, the self-fulfilling prophecy — not only of the Cold Peace, but probably of a new confrontation. Because, again, who is conceivably putting a threat of aggression to a Central European state — like Poland, for instance?

History was mentioned, that both of our countries should not forget history. A historian would probably point to Napoleon, imperial Germany, imperial Russia. What else? No more than that probably. But the question is: Do we really want to re-create the structure in Europe which would presuppose that Germany again becomes an aggressor — or Russia again becomes an aggressor against Poland? Or do we want to create a structure, to create a mechanism which would engage Germany, Russia, Poland, everybody in a constructive effort to overcome historical anxieties and suspicions — and, yes, into a new collective security mechanism.

My answer is the second. Let’s try, however difficult and however new this challenge is, to conceive a model of security, and resources and a mechanism for that, which would engage us in a new effort and exclude by itself the coming back of aggressive or imperial Russia or imperial Germany or even imperial France. Otherwise we are doing exactly the wrong thing.

That is exactly the message which is read by a larger part of Russian public opinion: “What do they enlarge for? Who is the potential aggressor?” Russia? Why? Because it’s communist? No. It is not communist. And it will probably not fall into communism at the next elections. I do believe that we have the potential and that we will sustain democratic movement at the new elections, which are coming at the end of this year.

But nationalists, of course, they do use this argument. They say: “Whatever you do here in Russia... Even if you, stupid Kozyrev, contributed to overthrowing communism and the empire, and recognized Estonia, even if you withdraw all your troops from abroad, whatever you do... Even if you sign the agreement cutting the nuclear arsenals with the United States (like START II), even if you de-target the warheads, whatever you do, you will still be regarded as an enemy. And they will still create and enlarge the military alliance against you. That’s the answer to your stupidity, in domestic and in foreign policy. And that’s why Mr. Zhurnalovskiy’s right: that they will always see us as an enemy, and that we have to mobilize. And while we still have the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, let’s stop the cutting the stupid democrats imposed on us — and rather reinforce the military arsenal.”

That’s the question we face at the elections; and that’s why we are so alarmed and we are so concerned; and that’s why I try to explain to everybody why the stones are already falling. They are already falling — right on my head here — very personally. I would hate to write in my memoirs, probably in the Gulag, that we missed the opportunity.

(from a discussion with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the Tripartite Commission’s 1995 Plenary meeting in Copenhagen).

OXFORD, NOVEMBER 1983 — There are a number of aspects of Sovietism which make it utterly incompatible with Polish cultural tradition and have resulted in the instinctive rejection of the graft by the overwhelming majority of the Polish population, quite aside from all the atrocities suffered by the Poles at the hands of the Soviets during the war. Poland has never produced despotic forms of government unless they were imposed from outside (e.g., by Catherine II or Stalin); it developed, not unlike Western Europe, the concept of the autonomy of law and thereby the concept of freedom as defined by a legal order. This concept emerged mainly as a result of conflicts within the privileged classes, yet it was strong enough to make Poland probably the most tolerant country of Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century; it was never forgotten in much worse historical periods, and remained active later on in the preparation of the (very democratic by the European standards of the time) Constitution of 1791 (which was never enforced because of partitions). Sovietism means, among other things, the abolition of law — not only as a matter of actual practice, but in terms of the definition of communism by its very founders, notably Lenin and Trotsky. The degree of repressiveness might vary, to be sure, but the basic principle according to which individuals are entirely in the hands of the state and have no protection against it, remain intact. Of course, there are legal rules in the Soviet system, but there is no law in the sense of a mediating device between citizens and the state, and no legal barrier to limit the omnipotence of the state in dealing with its subjects. No people brought up for centuries in the tradition of European legal ideas and the spirit of Western Christianity can reconcile itself with institutions that convert human persons into state property.

Leszek Kolakowski
(from an interview for "Triologue" #34).
Autumn 2009,
Twenty Years Later...

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... Reminiscences & Reflections

from

Members, Associates & Friends

of

The Trilateral Commission
Jerzy Baczyński
20 years after, 50 years before

When General Jaruzelski introduced Martial Law in Poland on 13 December 1981, I happened to be on a journalistic scholarship in France. All communication with Poland was cut off; telephones went dead. Several dozen activists of the de-legalised “Solidarity” trade union gathered at the Polish church in Paris immediately decided to form an aid committee for our thousands of colleagues imprisoned in Poland and their families. Parisians quickly started arriving, hundreds of them with offers of gifts: food, medicines, money. It was the same in Germany, England and Italy - a true explosion of solidarity. I remember talking to an elderly man who had volunteered to pack parcels being sent to Poland by Church charitable organizations - Don’t worry, the Soviet Empire will fall like all the others, give it 50-60 years at most ...

It fell 8 years later.

What happened in those awful 1980s to make history accelerate so? Historians have already partly analysed the mechanism. And so, we had the hopeless Soviet war in Afghanistan, the onset of Gorbachev’s pierestroika, Ronald Reagan’s star wars and the pontificate of a Polish Pope; we had the dissident movements, samizdat, a permanent economic crisis in the Eastern Bloc and the rebellious moods of the people. I would just add two more factors fundamental for me, resident in a country behind the Iron Curtain.

First was the ever more numerous and then mass departures of my countrymen and citizens of other “real socialist countries” for the West. This had already started in the 1970s. The communist authorities felt sufficiently secure and sure of themselves to allow citizens to go and work, visit families and friends. They even organized tourist trips for a state allocation (in Poland) of 100 dollars every two years. For millions hitherto under lock and key this was to be intoxication with freedom, with a colourful, rich world in dramatic contrast to the grey life, poverty and humiliations that had to be borne at home. This aroused dreams and anger.

The second gesture by the regimes, suicidal as it turned out, was to gradually forsake violence against their own citizens. This violence was present in different forms until 1989, and even later: oppositionists were still imprisoned, but no longer killed. The authorities allowed themselves to be dragged into the so-called Helsinki Process, which offered economic cooperation in exchange for declarations of respect for human rights. Sharp reactions by “Western partners” to persecution of dissidents forced a tempering of habits. This in turn emboldened the opposition, which acted ever more openly. The Polish finale was the creation of the great “Solidarity” trade union with 10 million members, independent of the authorities and with Lech Wałęsa as its icon. The Martial Law repressions were a last attempt to used naked force to stifle social rebellion. This attempt gave the authorities nothing but isolation, hatred and economic catastrophe. The communist regime passed into a phase of decomposition. At this time, Gorbachev was trying to reform the Soviet Union. We know the rest.

The way to deal with the Cold War turned out to be controlled warming. The Iron Curtain had, or so it seemed from our side, corroded. At that time and in that bipolar world, the West (perhaps more strictly the trilateral countries) was more cohesive and capable of conducting joint policy towards a common enemy. Today, “there is no way back to Helsinki” so

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1 Editor-in-Chief, Polityka, Warsaw
as to soften hostile regimes; but is there a way back to the idea of a West capable of acting as a community of values?

The end of the Cold War, symbolized by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, did not yet mean a lasting change of order - as the Yanayev putsch dramatically reminded us. Countries of the former empire performing more or less velvet revolutions still had Red Army units stationed there. Witness to the scale of disruption is that Poland, earlier bordering only with the GDR, USSR and Czechoslovakia, saw all its neighbours change. New states needed a new security formula, new economic and social systems. This was the start of a period of great and dangerous transformations, with no precedents or theoretical models.

Moves towards the West, NATO and the European Union were more a reflex than a rational choice, at least in Central Europe. But this aspiration had to meet a readiness by both organizations to expand to take in new, unknown neighbours, retarded in terms of civilization and poor. I remember differences of opinion about this, at Trilateral Commission meetings as well, and an understandable unease about costs and consequences of expansion. There were also strong fears on the eastern side of the former Iron Curtain, about colonization of poor, post-communist economies by stronger and more experienced partners. Radical politicians also suggested loss of freshly regained political sovereignty and cultural identity. Strong and responsible leadership could be the only reply to such social fears. Fortunately, it was not lacking at this particular time. This great historical operation might not succeed today...

For several years now, most of the new democracies are simultaneously members of NATO and the European Union. It could be said we were just in time. Memory of Cold War has been obliterated by hot war against terror and new global challenges: climate change, paroxysms on raw materials markets, weakening of trans-Atlantic ties, new world powers appearing (China especially), and finally the deepest financial crisis for decades. There is reaction after years of difficult but ultimately successful transformation in our part of Europe: populist, anti-liberal and often nationally tinged parties have grown in strength. Many of them feed on each manifestation of egoism or protectionism by the "old Europe". Neither 1989 nor 2004 (the main EU expansion) saw any end of history.

The last 20 years give no sure reply how to behave towards our common challenges, which are as banal as they are difficult: integration, cooperation, leadership, imagination, boldness, solidarity. That is as necessary today as it was then. Even if it seems that we will not resolve some global problems earlier than in 50-60 years from now.

Georges Berthoin²

East/West Fragments

Spring 1953, Luxembourg

My boss, Jean Monnet asks me to have an informal conversation with Soviet diplomats. They want to know why Monnet does not use anti-Soviet rhetoric. Our answer: "The European unity process does not depend on Soviet moods. Our aim is peace in Europe. To make it a lasting reality, we are creating a new type of relationship between countries based upon democratic freedom of choice, non-discrimination and mutual respect. Our first step must be

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² International Honorary Chairman, European Movement; Honorary Chairman, The Jean Monnet Association; Honorary European Chairman, The Trilateral Commission, Paris
reconciliation between Germany and its former victims. With this method, unity on our continent might lead one day to unity of the world. We are on the winning side of History. Communism has no future”.

1956, Paris

Monnet has conversations with Herbert Wehner, a left-wing leader of the SPD to become later Federal Minister for Pan-German Affairs, who feels that deeper integration of West Germany into European Community might weaken chances of reunification. A special protocol on “German internal trade” is annexed to the Rome Treaties. It gives privileged status to East Germany and paves the way to possible evolutions.

August 1961, Moscow

The very week the Berlin wall is being built, dinner at the British Embassy with our former Trilateral colleague, Sir Frank Roberts (who was at the Yalta conference). Soviet guests were jubilant. “Western powers will not dare to react. To, die for Berlin might not be very popular with your people”. In spite of not being an historian, I ventured, “for the first time a wall is built by a government against its own people. One day this very people will destroy it”; Polite smiles around the table.

Spring 1988, Moscow

An intensive week of brainstorming at relevant levels of expertise and political responsibilities; How a Frenchman would react to German reunification. I answer: as a European. I am in favour without any restriction. The Germans know that their present and future national interest is to remain utmost loyal members of the European Community and behave accordingly. So, the Soviets, like all of us, should welcome a strong European unity as a guarantee of stability.

December 1988, United Nations New York

To the United Nations General Assembly, Gorbachev declares: “Further world progress is now possible only through the search for a consensus of all mankind, in movement toward a new world order”. This is indeed an epoch making speech which inspires the New York Times the following comment: "Perhaps not since Woodrow Wilson presented his Fourteen Points in 1918 or since Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill promulgated the Atlantic Charter in 1941 has a world figure demonstrated the vision Mikhail Gorbachev displayed yesterday at the United Nations”.

January 1989, Moscow at the CPSU Central Committee in the Politburo boardroom

The body language of Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Akhromeyev showed approval to Gorbachev’s military reduction announcements, even though he was going to take his own life after the aborted coup in 1991. Later on, Marshall Kulikov, military Head of the Warsaw Pact, surrounded by half a dozen of colleague-generals, went even further. “Moscow would not use force to interfere with Socialist countries’ sovereignty. Or even could not. Afghanistan was a more traumatic experience than Vietnam for the US Army. After all, the Brezhnev doctrine did not limit the freedom of allies”. This was one of the points made emphatically by Gorbachev when he welcomed our Trilateral Commission delegation. On one side of the long table: power, Russian patriots and Communist reformers trying to introduce openness, truth and flexibility into the rigidity of a secretive system and into a worldwide revolutionary messianic zeal. On the other, influence, the seven of us, “concerned private citizens” from major democratic societies converging on the essential and free to explore ways and means to manage the end of deadly confrontation. Our host wished to elaborate on his New York UN speech in addition to announcing impressive military withdrawals. “Third world countries
would not be able to play East against West anymore. We should become partners in building a new world order. Europe should organize itself on a wider basis”. I have the feeling that he wanted to emphasize, to us and through us, a drastic change in Soviet foreign policy as it was not taken seriously enough. As somebody who was present in 1950-52 at the European Community’s creation, I could easily recognize beyond a good will gesture a real first step of a new strategy which would change History. Consciously or not, he was suggesting respect for national sovereignty combined with recognition that common interest existed and should be managed in common by mankind freed from Cold War limitations and dangers.

9 November 1989, Berlin

No new fundamental departure or intellectual, diplomatic projections can become irreversible realities without the people’s consent either through a vote or, if not available, through action in the streets. It happened on 11/9, when Berliners crashed through the Wall and changed history with their own hands.

December 1989, on a battle ship in a powerful Mediterranean storm

Gorbachev meets Bush senior in order to bring Yalta to an end. He had taken our January Trilateral visit seriously as he mentioned it to President George Bush who summarized their discussion: "We can realize a lasting peace and transform the East-West relationship to one of enduring co-operation. That is the future that Chairman Gorbachev and I began right here in Malta."

October 1990, United Nations New York

George Bush senior, speaks to the UN General Assembly: “...I see a world building on the emerging new model of European Unity, not just Europe but the whole world whole and free”. But Gorbachev was losing authority at home which illustrates Tocqueville’s quotation: “The most dangerous moment for bad government is when it begins to reform”.

Autumn 2009

Twenty years ago, Berliners did more than destroy their wall: they destroyed all our walls. A window of opportunity was opened ajar. A historical rendez-vous was however missed: no synchronization between the desirable and the politically feasible came about.

The Obama election and the nature of the present challenges invite the art of politics to transform present worries and uncertainties into a new world harmony considered legitimate and fair to and by all.

Does the G20 show us the way?
Béla Kádár

Twenty years after – Remembrance on 1989

1989 was in many ways a miraculous year for Hungary, Europe and the World. It was the year of big expectations, remembrances and developments. The 200th anniversary of the French Revolution and the 50th anniversary of the World War II deforming the development in Central Europe inspired big historic changes. The summer of 1989 is a source of particular pride for Hungary since a small country in the given historic moment could play an important role in the acceleration of positive international developments.

As a delayed benefit of the 1956 national revolution Hungary in the form of „goulash communism” could leave behind most in Central Europe the Yalta heritage of the Stalinist model. No wonder that the germs of the 1989 developments here emerged first and in the most visible way. The cutting to pieces of the Iron Curtain dividing Europe more than four decades long became the symbol of farewell to a historic period.

Political changes cannot be judged through their visibility. The symbolic step of the „wire-shears” operation at the Austro-Hungarian border had naturally also some precedents. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Miklós Németh at the end of 1988 deleted from the budget the maintenance costs of the Iron Curtain, then testing the Soviet leadership informed Michael Gorbachev about the elimination of the Iron Curtain. That was taken notice. That time the world press neglected the fact that the removal of the Iron Curtain started already the 2nd of May, 1989, the Hungarian border guards let an increasing number of East-German tourists to cross the border. After the Pan-European picnic and accommodation of the East-German refugees the concerning agreement between the German Democratic Republic and Hungary was officially terminated and the departure of the GDR citizens was made possible.

The opening of the Austro-Hungarian border represented a catalytic symbol since the Iron Curtain had never been a defence perimeter but an efficient prison wall holding back the population by force. During the period 1966-88 14 thousand escape attempts were registered and barely 2% of these were successful. In European context the opening of the border was an overt for the demolition of the Berlin wall, collapse of the Soviet-block, German reunification and the elimination of the European dividedness. A chance emerged for a new European renaissance, the realization of an European model based on the mental, emotional, behavioral similarities polished together during centuries as well as on the European culture developed by the Jewish-Greek-Roman spirituality, Roman and Saxon law, Gothic arts, Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, constitutional legal system and market economy.

1989 was the herald of big expectations and coming changes. In Hungary, the most „cheerful barric” of the „socialist camp”, the population was waiting four decades long for the elimination of the Yalta heritage, the freedom of international movement and the most familiar Austrian model of a fair living standard combined with smaller stress. The big dream of the politically conscious intellectuals was the participation in the European integration, escape from the market and resource constraints of a small economy, rapid catch up to Western Europe, leaving behind the historic traumas of the 20th century and improvement of the relations with the neighbouring countries as a result of the European normalization.

3 Member of the Hungarian Academy, Budapest; Member of the Monetary Council of the National Bank; President of the Hungarian Economic Association; Former Ambassador of Hungary to the O.E.C.D., Paris; former Hungarian Minister of International Economic Relations and Member of Parliament
In the retrospective of twenty years it might be of some interest to cast a glance at the fulfillment of the expectations of that time, using the title of a famous Maugham roman, at the dimension of „now and then”. Despite the very onerous post-war economic heritage Hungary effected in the nineties a successful systemic change in regional comparison. The transition performances were reflected in the dynamic development of the institutional system and infrastructure of the market economy, attraction of FDI, strong improvement of the relative international economic positions, outstanding growth of productivity, accession to the NATO and EU. Quite many dreams have come true.

Today, however, one can refer without exaggeration to the Shakespearean words „the flame is dead, the thrill has gone. The glorious summer of 1989 was followed by the winter of our bad mood. Diminishing interest for public life, emergence of political apathy, euroscptic, anticapitalist or populist tendencies are, however, not recent crisis products but reactions to bad governance, transitional distortions left without remedy.

The non-violent character of the systemic change in Hungary benefited stability, on the other hand diminished discontinuity of the power structures. Pre-transition political positions were converted into economic ones, favourite sons and daughters of the socialist system, descendants of post-war collectivising fathers became the core of the new private ownership, one time ardent Marxists became fundamentalist neo-liberal preachers. The earlier value-centric confrontation with the given “socialism” was followed by one-sided interest motivation; consumption and money became primary values to the detriment of public welfare. The old-new political class lacking political, moral and performance-based credibility tried to buy at the expense of the taxpayers’ sympathies and support of the voters through ill-founded promises and income allocations. These expensive political operations generated unsustainable financial disequilibria, indebtedness and with a time-lag restrictive economic policies, disillusioning growth performances as well as social frustrations.

The globalisation, the development of strong positions of the trans-national enterprises have been very instrumental in the modernization, European and global integration of the Hungarian economy. Although the organisational and behavioural culture of the foreign enterprises indicates strong differences certain generalising negative value-judgements have also emerged. Many foreign enterprises have established very close cooperation with the representatives of the old “nomenclature” and have supported unfair practices to make a fortune. These attitudes also raised doubts with the credibility of the systemic change. Cleptocracy, confidence and poor performances are strongly correlated and raised doubts about the credibility of systemic changes. The visible deficit of social responsibility of a large part of the Hungarian business, questionable loyalties and support given to ill-qualified politicians generated tensions in addition to equilibrium and cyclical problems.

All this is naturally not a Hungarian speciality but due to the earlier and stronger openness of the Hungarian economy these impacts appeared sooner and more vigorously than in many other countries of the region. The recognition was not too fortunate either, that some EU member countries are more even in the decision-making structures than the others and the Union seems to be unconcerned in quite many decisive problems of the Central-European region. There is an increasing view that now Hungary is closer to the EU in legal, institutional and structural sense but in socio-psychic aspect the gap has widened. So the balance of twenty years cannot be considered as fully favourable.

A crisis is always a chance for renewal. The rise and renaissance of Europe is a fundamental interest of the central-European countries. The present situation offers also new possibilities but at the same time requires new approaches. The hope has not been given up that the big dream twenty years ago might come yet true.
Sergey A. Karaganov

Twenty Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall
A Personal Vision from Russia

First, some reminiscences: To me, the fall of the Berlin Wall came as the greatest personal shock.

I knew that my country, the Soviet Union, was not prepared for the fall of the Iron Curtain and the ensuing developments. Gorbachev sincerely believed in the illusory possibility of saving socialism by limited liberation. His followers in the foreign policy establishment assumed that the fall would “let out the steam” and thus save the system. The opposing conservatives called for a last-ditch fight. And no one expected that a breach in the Wall might bring down the entire rotten Communist system and its core – the Soviet Union.

I wouldn’t brag that I foreknew that the fall of the Berlin Wall would bring disintegration of my country, the Russian Empire, the USSR, but I certainly felt it intuitively.

During the historic events I was in London and my anxiety was enhanced when I was invited to the House of Commons of the British Parliament. I stood before three-dozen MPs, many of who were well-known experts. Not an adherent of the old system myself, I was attacked by – all but rude – accusations of the irresponsibility of Soviets, “who forgot the lessons of the past and connive at Germany’s reunification.” My humble objections that Germans had learnt the lessons of the past and were different now were almost contemptuously swept away. (It is rather pleasant now that in the hindsight I proved to be right. Germans are now a symbol of what is best in the new European culture, while the reunification paved the way to historical reconciliation between Russians and Germans, despite the worst record of enmity in the 20th century.) But 20 years ago I saw – with increased anxiety – that not only Russians were unprepared for the breakdown of the old system. The West was not ready, either.

Then history developed at a steady gait. Within a year, “the socialist camp” actually broke up, Germany reunited. This was followed by the collapse of Communism in Russia and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Thoughtful Russians were happy to get rid of the costly subsidy-demanding socialist camp. Also, the Soviet huge nuclear arsenal had long eliminated any serious threat from the West and made the camp redundant in terms of security.

To do away with the sickening Communist system, or seize power by replacing Gorbachev and the old Nomenklatura, the new elites were even ready to abandon part of their country. In essence, they were the main initiators of the USSR’s disintegration. And after the breakup of the socialist camp and their own country they felt not being losers but victors – over Communism. They believed they had much more contributed to its collapse than the people and the elites of East – European countries, or the West.

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4 Dean of the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs of the State University — Higher School of Economics (SU – HSE); Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Member of the Advisory Council of the MFA of Russian Federation since before the collapse of the USSR; Member of the Presidential Council during the Yeltsin Administration.
Russia’s new elite thought it was leaving Central and Eastern Europe with banners flying and hence could count on honorable peace and integration with Europe in a “common European home,” or a “united and free Europe” (as put by George H.W. Bush). It was not just a starry-eyed self-deception – creation of this kind of Europe was on the lips with almost everyone. Moscow sincerely believed in the pledges given to Gorbachev during Germany’s reunification: NATO would never expand to the territories set free by the USSR.

The five years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall should enter history annals as a period of hopes. Despite hard deprivations, the majority of active Russians were striving for democracy and a free market, which in those times was commonly associated with Europe. Admittedly, if Russia had been offered integration with the West as a junior yet respectable partner, it would have accepted the offer. The then Russian leaders said straight out that Russia was willing to enter major Western organizations – NATO (Yeltsin) and the EU (Chernomyrdin).

Lost Opportunity

It seems that a historical bifurcation point was missed in the mid-1990s, the time when the decision was made by NATO not “to get out the area”, but to expand. If the West had taken the first path, there might have been no threat of a new division of Europe, and Russia and NATO member states could have been able to jointly avert rapidly accumulating challenges. And the past 15 years would not have been lost for strengthening international security.

Of course, there is no more systemic confrontation in Europe, but it was largely perfunctory already in the late days of the Cold War. Of course, people in Europe are much freer now. Russians despite their present peculiar political system, fell free as never before. However, the world beyond Europe is becoming visibly more dangerous than 20 years ago – for objective reasons; but also due to the negligence and triumphalism of the old West, and the failure of larger Europe, including Russia, to deal effectively with new challenges. Moreover, Europe is balancing on the brink of a new division. The division during the Cold War was largely based on ideological and military confrontation; geopolitical division of the continent was practically never mentioned. However, when ideology and military threat were gone, the old geopolitics surfaced again. Russia was weak and her protests against NATO’s enlargement were ignored.

During the first waves of the enlargement, I repeatedly asked senior Western experts: “Do you not understand that the large country with a great history will revive and will never agree to NATO’s expansion to its historical territories?” My interlocutors politely agreed or looked away in the vain hope that the “moment of truth” would never come and the great country would never think of its vital interests and security again.

Today I would dare state that NATO’s enlargement has become the main threat to European security, at least for a Russian. It has not only brought back old fears and mentality, but it also hampers cooperation in addressing new – mostly external – threats to security. The seeds of trust and hope were uprooted by NATO’s expansion at least on the Russian side. The conservatives regarded the expansion as a vindication of the West’s perpetual aggressiveness; but worst, later it was also seen as a betrayal by most of the pro-Western liberals. The bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO in 1999 dealt the coup de grace to trust and hope. Most people in the West saw it as a part of humanitarian operation, but for most Russians it was as a direct threat by proxy. And many went to their churches, mosques or synagogues to thank the Almighty that Russia still had a powerful nuclear arsenal.

The Cold War, unfinished in the minds of the political classes, including the Russian one, has not been finished institutionally and organizationally, either. Cold War institutions, above all NATO and even the OSCE have been recreating confrontation again and again.
In the mid-2000s, the part of the American establishment that was not interested in the final stabilization and consolidation of Europe again started to push for NATO’s expansion, this time to Ukraine. To add more fuel to the division of the Old World, a decision was made to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Central Europe. Russia put up fierce resistance – above all, because it realized the vital need to stop confrontation in Europe on new frontiers.

I do hope that the Tbilisi’s attack on South Ossetia and Russia’s response to it will prove to be a “moment of truth” and a fruitful episode in the historical perspective. The sacrifice – the Ossetians, Russians and Georgians who died in that war – may not be in vain. Russian troops gave a strong military rebuff to the logic of NATO’s infinite expansion which, if not stopped, would have inevitably brought about a big war – not in Georgia but around Ukraine, almost in the heart of Europe.

Of course, one could pretend that the issue of NATO’s expansion is not on the table any more. Indeed, it does not look realistic for the time being. Especially, as Russia made it clear that it is prepared to fight – even with arms – for her interests, withstanding any criticism. But that expansion is still hanging in the air, undermining trust and cooperation.

**The Unfinished Business of the Cold War**

The experience of the twenty years unequivocally testifies, at least for me, that Greater Europe, which includes Russia and the U.S., badly needs a new “peace treaty” and a new architecture that would draw a line not only under the Cold War, but also under World War II. Actually, the Yalta and Potsdam Accords did not turn out to be treaties that established peace, but provisional agreements on the division of Europe.

In the larger part of Europe, World War II ended in a peace treaty. The Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC was actually such a treaty. Russia and the West have never signed such a document.

The unfinished nature of the Cold War and World War II is creating a dangerous vacuum.

Today, in the period of acute mistrust and of the global economic crisis, it is not easy to speak about ideal constructs. I am a Russian. Yet we must think about an optimal structure of relations in the Euro-Atlantic region. We need a new pan-European treaty on collective European security. All countries that are not included in the current security systems should be able to join in the treaty and receive multilateral guarantees. NATO’s enlargement would be frozen de facto. The future treaty must reiterate the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act on the inviolability of the borders in order to prevent the further fragmentation of states or their reunification with the use of force. Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia must become the last states that broke away through force. This “Pandora’s box” must be shut, at least in Europe.

The jubilant Berliners started the post-Cold War period – of more freedom of new instability and of squandered opportunities. We should start a post-post-Cold War period of mature cooperation.
Otto Graf Lambsdorff

The year 1989 was indeed an annus mirabilis: It saw the coming into being of events deemed unimaginable hitherto, the fall of the Berlin Wall being the most important day of my political life. Miracles, however, although they seem to fall from heaven, have their roots. The ruin of communism, the main characteristic of 1989, had many causes; they interacted and showed mutually reinforcing effects. Poland with its Solidarnosc, supported by the Vatican, had big merits, as had Hungary with its readiness to cut holes in the Iron Curtain. The United States greatly contributed with its policy, sometimes using soft, sometimes hard power and often combining both. The decisive factor, in my view, was, however, Russia in the shape of the Soviet Union: Gorbachev’s perestrojka set free forces which started various processes that, in their turn, developed a dynamics of their own and had effects not intended by the authors of that policy.

Germans on both sides of the frontier which had separated West and East Germany since the fifties were also conducive to the miracles of the year 1989: They, too, took part in the creation of the political and social framework which led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent unification of Germany. The contribution of the Federal Republic consisted in the very essence of its foreign but in the final instance also its domestic policy: creating trust on the side of its near and far-away neighbours, in the West as well as in the East. This policy, sustained since 1949 throughout the decades and supported by the readiness of the West Germans to live up to their historic responsibility (historische Verantwortung), proved successful: Our neighbours became more and more confident that the horrors of the Nazi era would never be repeated and that thinking in great-power terms was definitely gone in Germany. Without that trust 1989 and the turn of history would never have happened: It was trust, in Germany and the Germans, in its political class as well as the man in the street that earned us the unconditional support of President Bush which in the final instance made unification possible. It was trust of the Western world as a whole that overcame reservations on the side of Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand who did not hide their scepticism with regard to the developments. And it was finally trust on the side of General Secretary Gorbachev based on his conviction that a united Germany would not constitute a threat to Russia that led him to consent to a process which resulted in German unification.

Germans living in the GDR contributed to the year 1989 in the same way as the Poles, the Hungarians, the Czechs and Slovaks, and they themselves had done before when they got to the streets of their cities demanding the observation of their basic rights: in 1953, 1956, 1968 and 1980. It was not, as some still tend to think, the longing for the wellbeing of life in the West that motivated them. It was their faith in the significance of human freedom. In 1989 people in Eastern Germany showed that their desire for freedom was unbroken after 40 years of life in a dictatorship. They did it in a way nobody will ever forget who saw the demonstrations of hundreds of thousands in the streets of Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden.

The international networking of the Trilateral Commission definitely contributed to the creation of trust within the West as well as with regard to the East, thus fostering a process which culminated in the peaceful revolutions of the year 1989. I myself experienced this trust when the European Group of the Trilateral Commission elected me its chairman in 1991. This was by no means a matter of course. For me, it proved that the foundation of the Federal Republic’s foreign and domestic policy was sound and that its main aim – creating trust – had been achieved to a wide extent. Thus, the merits of my election also belong to those German

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politicians, coming from all democratic parties, who in the first four decades of the existence of the Federal Republic had laid this foundation.

What has happened ever since?

Quite a few people have voiced scepticism as to the success of the transition process and have shown signs of deep discontent. According to them the last 20 years have only brought misfortune and mistakes. It is true: Not everything went as it should and could have. Nevertheless I agree with Polish writer Adam Michnik: With the possible exception of the Balkans and Russia the post-communist states in contemporary history have never experienced such positive 20 years. For these states it was not 1945, as for the luckier countries of Western Europe, but the year 1989 that marked the end of the Second World War, more than four decades late. Thus, the 20 years that have passed since the annus mirabilis for Poland and Czechoslovakia, for Hungary, the Baltics and the other states of Central-Europe have been the first decades of peace after the Great War. Moreover, these two decades brought what rightly has been called the reunification of Europe – an act of historical justice. This unified Europe is gaining in strength and coherence; it has begun to flourish and it will continue to do so, one or the other relapse notwithstanding. This gives us cause for gratitude and satisfaction as well as for the conviction that the days are gone when some liked to see a “new” and an “old” Europe: What we are facing is the unified “old continent”, is Europe - without any adjectives or qualifications.

There is, however, cause for concern. I am afraid the European code of values, once strong, has been weakened. Liberal values are under threat; cynicism, which undermines any system of values, is widely spread. Thus, the danger of egoism, nihilism and fear is rising. We even face the possibility of conflicts between EU-member in the centre of Europe. Last but not least: There is an urgent need for a common energy policy, but national egoism has been an insurmountable obstacle. Thus, strong European leadership is urgently needed more than ever before.

The biggest cause for concern, however, is Russia.

To that country I have what you could call a special relationship. It is based on family ties: My ancestors, originally coming from Germany, from the 14th century on had belonged to the landed gentry in what today is Latvia and Estonia and as such later on for centuries had been subjects of the Russian Empire which they loyally served in various high positions, mostly in the military and the administration of the state on different levels, one Lambsdorff even becoming minister of foreign affairs at the beginning of last century. That this was possible - Germans serving the Russian Empire - was due to the fact that Russia was one of the rare cases and may be the only one where an Empire adopts elites of its colonies, be it the Baltic region or the Caucasus, and entrusts them to important tasks of the state.

The transition period in Russia is over. Its result has not been, as so many had hoped, a democratic state. In another example of what is called path dependency the Russian elites again have given way to the authoritarian temptation and created a system where a small group of people not accountable to anyone takes all the important decisions. In Russia, we do not have the rule of law; instead, we have the rule of men. And these men do not only govern the country - they own it and use it for their own benefit. At the same time, Russian rulers pretend that they are building democracy. In reality, however, democracy exists only on paper: There is no separation of powers in Russia, no rule of law, no freedom of speech in the electronic media, no real political parties, no political competition, to name but the most important characteristics of democracy.

A country’s foreign policy is determined by what kind of state it is. Accordingly, Russia’s current authoritarianism has consequences not only for the Russian society but also for Russia’s relationship to its neighbours and to the world as a whole. What the Kremlin calls
“managed democracy” is in reality a soft variant of the Soviet system. And as the Soviet Union needed the West so today’s Russia needs it in many aspects without, however, being ready to accept Western values and policy concepts: because this would threaten the very existence of the Kremlin’s system of power. That is why Moscow is pursuing two contradictory goals at once: admittance into Western society, and opposition to the West whenever possible. That is also why the Kremlin strongly opposes the formation of democratic states in its neighbourhood: They, too, are a threat for Moscow. A safe environment for the current Russian leaders is an environment of political systems similar to Russia’s. The idea that flourishing democratic countries on its borders are in Russia’s best interest seems to be alien to the Kremlin. And the fact that the Baltics, Ukraine and the South-Caucasian states are now independent does not seem to have been internalized by everyone within the Russian political class.

Russia undoubtedly is part of European culture and civilization. And Russian society is receptive to what Europe is standing for. But the majority of Russia’s political class, its elite, and most of all the Kremlin, i.e. the highest echelons of power, do not share European values. Moreover, they refuse to accept responsibility for wrong done to other countries as well as to Russian citizens themselves during Stalin’s reign and thereafter. Russian history again is being written by the state – in its own interest. Again, Russia has become a one-dimensional- power, its political influence this time based not on military might but on the new power currency: oil and gas. How an important state like Russia can cope with the many tasks it is facing, from domestic reform to holding the country together, by relying almost exclusively on this segment of power remains an open question. One cannot but quote Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin who, not hiding his scepticism in this regard, likens Russia to a bird flying with only one wing.

We have, as the Trilateral Commission put it in one of its reports, important business to conduct with Russia. Therefore, we should indeed not abandon the long- term goal of partnership. But we have to deal with Russia as it is, not as we might ideally wish it to be. In this perspective the often-quoted “strategic partnership” with Russia – a concept which severely suffers from over-use and under-definition – is not a viable approach. Neither is the so-called “modernization partnership” advocated in particular by German political circles. Instead, we should base our dealings with Russia on a concept called “pragmatic engagement” by the Trilateral Commission: cooperate in areas where it is possible but stick to our values and to the essence of our interests wherever it is necessary.

We would like to see a strong Russia emerging, but a Russia whose strength is mitigated and channelled by democratic procedures. In order to become strong and not only wealthy Russia has, however, to extricate herself from the many burdens it has been carrying, the heaviest and most relentless of all being the weight of her past.
Chris Patten

The End of the Cold War

Where were you when the Berlin Wall came down?

A friend of mine was attending a meeting of the German-British Forum at the Wilton Park Conference Centre in southern England on 9th November 1989. That afternoon, a distinguished retired British ambassador gave a lecture in which he said that it was possible that the Wall would be knocked down over the following decade and just conceivable that we would see a re-united Germany in our life-time. That evening the German crowds began, stone by stone, to demolish the Wall which had literally and figuratively divided Europe.

What happened is of course often explained by political science as the inevitable result of long-running trends – for example, economic stagnation and political over-reach in Russia and its European empire. But like so many events in history – Luther in Wittenberg, Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo – it is people who change history fast and decisively, a point convincingly made by Professor Archie Brown in his recent magisterial book on “The Rise and Fall of Communism”. There would have been no destruction of Communism in 1989 without Mikhail Gorbachev; no swift re-unification of Germany without Helmut Kohl; no disintegration of tyranny without countless individual acts of bravery and witness.

Ideas matter, too. Communist party-states in Central and Eastern Europe could probably have survived longer; repressive regimes are difficult to shift and if Mr. Gorbachev had shared the opinions of Yuri Andropov, maybe the Communist grip could have lasted a few more years, helped in due course by rising energy prices. Yet somehow the fact that at the heart of the Communist ruling dogma there was such a gaping void was bound sooner or later to suck the whole governing apparatus into a deep black hole. What, after all, had happened to belief in the Marxist goal? Where were the states that were going to wither away, and who would be the first to enjoy the Garden of Eden joys of real communism? The only agenda for Communist party-states was survival, and that involved sacrifices of the prosperity as well as the freedom enjoyed by the citizens of plural, welfare capitalist democracies.

Nationalism mattered also. Taken to extremes, we in Europe had twice seen in the twentieth century what bloody dramas it could create. De-clawed, it still remained a potent political force especially perhaps in those states like Poland and Lithuania where it was sustained by religion. In Europe we have civilised nationalism – mostly; but we have not eliminated nationalist loyalties and impulses.

There are surely three lessons in what happened twenty years ago for the conduct of foreign policy today.

First, many question the introduction of concerns about human rights, the assertion of values, into serious diplomacy. It is said to be a wishy-washy feel-good issue which will always be put on one side when political or commercial matters are in dispute from China to Libya. Human rights are for NGOs not foreign ministries. Yet it was the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act that gave sustenance to dissidents in the Soviet Union and its empire, legitimising their concerns and obliging Moscow to do better on ground where it was extremely uncomfortable. No wonder Russian hard-liners like Suslov and Andropov were so suspicious of the Helsinki agreement. It made clear that regard for human rights was a significant component of international peace.

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What is required of foreign policy is not selective grand-standing on human rights, with the power or weakness of a country largely determining how much of a role values play in shaping a policy towards it. Setting out clearly and consistently qualitative and value-based differences with others is not to deny respect nor to descend into finger-wagging hectoring. The European Union has been less good at following this approach than it should have been, not least given the success of the Helsinki Process which Western Europe strongly supported with more lukewarm American involvement. The European Union pursuit of the human rights agenda has been patchy in the Mediterranean, largely invisible in Russia and fitful in China. Plainly the European Union should have as good a relationship as possible with China, but it is bound to be qualitatively different from our relationship with India which shares our values.

A second lesson twenty years on is the importance of engagement. The end of the Cold War was naturally in part the result of decades of principled containment of Soviet power. But at the end, it was the engagement of Reagan’s second term not the “evil empire” rhetoric of his first which drew Gorbachev and his foreign policy team along the road to a fundamental change of East-West relations. President Reagan discovered that, as Margaret Thatcher had predicted, the Soviet President was a man with whom the West could do business. Reagan slaughtered a few Republican sacred cows in the process. Intelligent engagement, even with those who disagree with you, is always more sensible than the Bush doctrine that you could only talk to people if they agreed with you first.

The third lesson, especially for the European Union, points up the most significant achievement in the Union’s foreign policy, the promotion of stability around our borders in Europe through drawing potentially unstable neighbours into our extraordinary exercise in sovereignty-sharing. We in the European Union had tried this before, when Spain, Portugal and Greece threw off authoritarian fascist regimes. The consolidation of democracy in these countries was assisted by fast-tracking their entry into the European Union once they had accepted the rules of the club.

Enlargement played a similar role in helping to bed down pluralist democracy, welfare capitalism and the rule of law in central and eastern Europe after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It could not be taken for granted that this would be such a smooth and peaceful process. With Helmut Kohl’s handling of reunification pointing the way – the former German Chancellor must surely rate as one of the greatest political leaders of the last half century – the European Union gave the newly freed European countries a perspective for their new politics and a way of achieving their political and economic objectives. Only in dismembered Yugoslavia did things go badly wrong, partly because the European Union could not decide what it wanted to happen and was – as so often before and since – often trapped in the “no-man’s land” between the assertion of an objective and the requirement to use force to achieve it.

When eventually Europe stumbled into a workable policy, it depended again on the promise of membership of the European Union. This proved to be the best way of triggering a reform process which encouraged the countries of South-East Europe (frequently hesitantly) to stick to their commitments to the rule of law by promising them that one day they too could be part of the widening Union.

No other policy pursued by the European Union beyond our borders has been so successful. Enlargement has nurtured stability. Resilient from the policy now could do the opposite. Enlargement fatigue could tip some Balkan countries back into conflict and into the arms of organised crime. Our ambiguity over Ukraine’s European “vocation” – never quite translated into acceptance of it as a potential European Union member – has destabilised both that country and neighbouring Moldova. The Turkish question remains the touchiest of all. Can the European Union really expect to be taken seriously as a geo-strategic player in the
world if we turn our back on Turkey’s aspirations, whatever the Turks do to satisfy our demands for reform?

The European Union has arguably been more successful than America or any group of countries in promoting regime change peacefully and through example, by our attitude to human rights, engagement and enlargement. We should not give up on any of these lessons of the last half century in shaping policy for the next.

Serge Schmemann

The Night the Wall Came Down

The dates we come to celebrate as epochal are not always recognized as such until later. Certainly there was nothing for most of that gray, chilly Thursday in Berlin that presaged the fame and glory that the 9th of November, 1989, would acquire. Even when the crowds surged through the Berlin Wall shortly before midnight, it was not because of any momentous decision or heroic action; it was simply because of a bad translation and a confused cop. History works in mysterious ways.

To be sure, it had been a heady time in the East in the days, months and years before. The Soviet bloc had been in turmoil already for more than four years, from the time that Mikhail Gorbachev had come to power in March of 1985 proclaiming a new era of glasnost and perestroika. In the summer of 1989 the pace of change had rapidly accelerated: In June, Polish Communists were trounced in the first free elections in postwar East Europe; in August, Hungary declared it would no longer keep its borders with Austria sealed, opening a fissure through which East Germans began to head West in droves. As pressures mounted on the old guard in East Berlin, the Communists found no help in Moscow—to the contrary, when Gorbachev came to visit in October he warned the comrades that if they failed to change, they would find themselves stranded on the wrong side of history.

I had been following this great tectonic shift first from Moscow, where I was the New York Times bureau chief, then from Berlin—which is where I was working on that November day. The tension was palpable, the action constant as the embattled East German Communists struggled for survival. They were still dangerous; later we would learn that in September they had almost opened fire on marchers in Leipzig. But they were also in retreat, desperately trying to stem the exodus to the West and the clamor for change. On that November 9, we were told that the East German government would announce major changes in travel regulations in the hope that East Germans would stop feeling imprisoned and would cease fleeing West.

I crossed into East Berlin for a press conference, at which Günter Schabowski, a member of the East German Politburo, announced the new travel regulations. As soon as he finished, I rushed back to get through Checkpoint Charlie ahead of the mob of newsmen, and soon I was writing in my hotel room in West Berlin.

Sometime around midnight, there was a knock on the door. It was Victor Homola, my translator from East Berlin.

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7 Editor, Editorial Page, The International Herald Tribune, Paris
“I’m busy, Victor,” I snapped. “Grab something from the minibar and wait.”
“But, Serge...”
“Not now! Not now...”
“Wait! Victor was an East German. He was not allowed to cross into the West! He’d never been to the West! And it was midnight.”
“Victr, what on earth are you doing here?”
“That’s what I’m trying to tell you, Serge. The Wall is open!”

After the press conference, it turned out Schabowski had been asked to elaborate on the new rules. Did he mean to say, he was asked in English, that the Wall was open? Schabowski was not fluent in English, and it’s not clear whether he understood the question. In any case, he answered “Yes.” Within minutes, this was all over West German television and radio, and soon a huge crowd gathered on both sides of the crossings, with East Berliners pressing dangerously against the barriers. Victor was among them, at the Bornholmer crossing. The officer in charge there anxiously waited for orders—either shoot, let people get crushed against the barrier, or open it. At 11:14 p.m.—about four hours after Schabowski’s fateful “yes”—the officer ordered the barrier opened. Victor was among the first ones through; before long, divided Berlin was in the throes of one grand party.

The narrative we have devised since that day suggests that the Cold War ended there and here. But let’s be honest: back then none of the experts—not reporters, not politicians, not diplomats, not analysts—imagined that the mighty Communist edifice, with its great armies, its vast networks of secret police and informers, its elaborate controls on information and its privileged castes, would fall anytime soon. Remember: Gorbachev had launched perestroika to strengthen Communist rule, not destroy it. And the Berlin Wall was opened, as the writer Peter Schneider noted at the time, for the same reason it was built 28 years earlier—to keep East Germans from fleeing West. The dissidents of East Berlin dreamed only of socialism with a human face, of freer travel, of a touch more economic freedom. Reunification was in the air, to be sure, but not today, not tomorrow, not for a decade or so.

Let’s be more honest still: We in the West found a degree of comfort in the Wall. It made us feel superior, it divided our universe into manageable blocs. There have been new revelations lately about Margaret Thatcher’s efforts to prevent Germany from uniting, but they come as no surprise. She made no secret of her sentiments, and she was not alone.

But once the Wall was breached, the days of Communist rule in East Europe were numbered. The Germanys united in less than a year, and then the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics itself fizzled out. I was back in Russia by then; it was December 25, 1991, our Christmas, but I was at work because Gorbachev had resigned that morning. My wife and children went off to Red Square under a light snow. Suddenly my wife called from a phone booth: The red Soviet flag with its hammer and sickle was being lowered over the Kremlin, and at 7:32 p.m. the white, blue and red flag of old Russia rose in its place. “There was no ceremony,” I wrote that evening in my obituary for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, “only the tolling of chimes from the Spassky Gate, cheers from a handful of surprised foreigners, and an angry tirade from a lonely war veteran.”

Yet it is not the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the breach of the Berlin Wall that history has ordained as the symbolic end of the Cold War. Might it be because we prefer to see the collapse of Communism as a grand triumph of the human longing for freedom, and not the messy and incomplete collapse of a failed empire?

Certainly the world that has evolved in the past 20 years is more complicated than we anticipated. The United States has fared badly in the role of sole superpower; Russia has reverted to many of its unsavoury habits; Europe has yet to find its new identity and purpose. Terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose new dangers.
Yet when I look back on that night 20 years ago—when I rushed from my hotel to the Wall with my two assistants, East German and West German, with the woman driving the taxi yelling at the celebrating throng to make way—"Ich habe hier drei Pressefritzen!"—I can still feel the exhilaration, the extraordinary and elemental spirit of liberation that we witnessed across East Europe in those years, in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, on Prague’s Wenceslas Square, in Timisoara, at the barricades outside Moscow’s “White House” and in so many other places. The crowds streaming through the Wall on November 9, 1989, were perhaps the purest manifestation of that spirit.

To have been there is to have known a moment when all the calculations of power and politics were overwhelmed by a single-minded quest. It may sound mawkish, but call it freedom.

Strobe Talbott

If Russia is the Problem, Europe is the Solution

In 1949, George F. Kennan, then the director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, sent a memo to his boss, the recently appointed Secretary of State Dean Acheson. "There is no solution of the German problem in terms of Germany," he wrote. "There is only a solution in terms of Europe." Kennan’s insight—which was both a warning and a prescription—applied to that other colossus he knew well: Russia.

Twelve years later, in August 1961, an overnight construction project in Berlin dramatized the difference between the two historically problematic states. While the Federal Republic of Germany had used the 1950s to make itself not only a beneficiary but a driving force of European integration, the leaders in the Kremlin had so abysmally failed to make Communism serve the interests of its subjects that they had to erect a wall between East and West Berlin to stanch mass defections.

Nearly a quarter of a century later, in 1985, the top post in Moscow passed to a Soviet politician who intuitively understood the weakness of the system over which he presided. Mikhail Gorbachev thought he could save the USSR by reforming it. He began to replace the mailed fist of authoritarianism with a degree of decentralization and democratization, the Big Lie with glasnost, and, in Soviet foreign policy, ideological confrontation and military competition with “partnership.”

Gorbachev believed that the economic and security needs of his country could be reconciled with the precepts of governance and international relations that were already well rooted in the political West, where sovereign states had formed a consensual community of shared interests and values—in marked contrast to COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Another factor was the role of Solidarity movement in Poland and Charter 77 initiative in Czechoslovakia, which put pressure from below on those regimes to open up.

On a visit to Prague in 1987, Gorbachev asserted that his country and its satellites belonged to a “Common European Home”—a formulation implicitly at odds with the very premise of Soviet rule.

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Gorbachev did not recognize—and it was a good thing he didn’t—that the Soviet system depended for its survival on force, fear, lies, and walls.

That was the backdrop for what happened in Berlin twenty years ago, on November 9, 1989. Never has there been a more dramatic and consequential example of creative destruction. Gorbachev’s predecessors had unwittingly contributed to the symbolism of the day by using too much sand and water when they built the barrier 28 years earlier. As a result, the brittle concrete gave way easily when raucous crowds attacked it with sledgehammers, pickaxes and electric drills.

The Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain proved equally vulnerable to an upwelling of public repudiation. With their collapse, the European Project of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman took on new life and new scope. It was, as Russians say, no accident that that the Soviet Union dissolved, on Christmas Day 1991, six weeks before the European Union came into existence with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

Maastricht was a big step forward in what Europeans call the “deepening” of the process of integration, through the formation of a political union. But it occurred at moment of opportunity for the “broadening” of the process as well, thanks to the almost simultaneous end of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the cold war.

U.S. Presidents had long been actively committed to the proposition that the European Community was part of a transatlantic community, and that the European Project was an American Project. The U.S. had not only made European integration possible—its leaders, during the Truman administration, had insisted on it as a condition for assistance from the Marshall Plan and protection from a North Atlantic alliance. There was no point in the United States investing in a better future for Western Europe and unless the Western Europeans themselves—particularly the French and the Germans—broke out of their history of deadly rivalries and transformed their blood-soaked region into a zone of peace, prosperity, and, crucially, pluralistic democracy. In terms that Joe Nye has made famous, if Western Europe was going to turn its energies to being a paragon of soft power, the U.S. would provide the bulk of the hard power necessary to deter the threat from the East.

Thus, the European Coal and Steel Community, a forerunner of the EC and the EU, were part of a single vision and a grand bargain involving the creation of NATO.

The logic of that arrangement did not disappear with the end of the cold war. Even if the USSR or its largest post-Soviet successor state, the Russian Federation, continued on a reformist path—which was by no means a certainty—the transatlantic community would still need a security structure that discouraged the uglier, more violent forms of nationalism that had flared into major war every generation since the seventeenth century. Therefore leaders in Washington were determined not just to maintain NATO but to give it a post-cold war mission—and a post-cold war membership. Quite simply, if the EU was going to “broaden”—i.e., expand—so must NATO.

The President, George H. W. Bush, never explicitly propounded that proposition. However, he established it in principle by insisting, over Gorbachev’s objections, on keeping a unified the FRG inside the alliance, thereby absorbing the defunct GDR into it as well. Bill Clinton built on that precedent by opening NATO’s door to other former Soviet satellites and ensuring that former republics would be eligible in the future.

That policy was controversial, among Clinton’s European colleagues and in prominent circles in the U.S. NATO enlargement had no more passionate and prestigious opponent that George Kennan himself, who called it, in a New York Times op-ed article, “strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions.” (Those of us who were involved in the policy and revered
Kennan could take some solace in recalling that Kennan had opposed the formation of NATO in the first place.

Fortunately, NATO enlargement had a staunch supporter in Chancellor Helmut Kohl. I remember a conversation in his office in Bonn in January 1997. He said that in order to inoculate his country fully against the pathologies of racism and militarism that had cursed it in the past, Germany needed to be “embedded” in the West, rather than remain on the edge of an embattled frontier. That meant bringing Poland into the EU. He believed that the EU would not expand unless NATO led the way, since security is a precondition for the peace in which democracy and prosperity can flourish.

While refuting Kennan on the issue at hand, Kohl was echoing—and updating—Kennan’s concept of the European solution to the German problem. But Kohl was doing so with the changing nature of the Russian problem very much in mind. Now that it had begun to liberate itself from its Soviet past, that country, too, might be drawn into the gravitational field of European norms, values, and institutions.

The mechanisms for including Russia as much as possible in the European Project included enhancing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which the USSR had been a founding member; bringing Russia to the table of the G-7; and forging partnerships that linked it to the EU and NATO. These were goals that Kohl worked closely with Clinton to advance, especially in their personal dealings with Boris Yeltsin.

When George W. Bush moved into the Oval Office, he reversed, altered, or downplayed many of the policies he inherited from Clinton—and from earlier predecessors too. For example, during his first term in particular, Bush was distinctly cool to the very idea of the EU. But he left intact the twin strategies of expanding transatlantic institutions and developing partnerships with Russia. The same happened when Barack Obama succeeded Bush in January this year: dramatic change on many fronts, but continuity in American support for Russia’s integration into a system based on basic norms of national governance and international behavior embodied by the EU.

The big change—the major discontinuity—has been on the Russian side. Vladimir Putin personifies a variant of the historic Russian problem for which Europe is still the most promising and plausible solution.

When I first encountered Putin in the late 90s, he had only recently moved to Moscow, and he was still using the vocabulary of a St. Petersburg reformer. I was particularly struck by his references to zapadnichestvo, which roughly translates as Russia’s “Western vocation.” The word is redolent of Peter the Great and the westernizers of the 19th century. But soon Putin showed his flare for Orwellian terminology that featured “managed democracy,” “the vertical of power,” and “the dictatorship of law.” These phrases were more than rhetoric; Putin translated them into authoritarian legislation and administrative measures, as well as restrictions on civil society and the media.

As always, Russian policy abroad—especially in the “near abroad,” which Russia claims as a “sphere of privileged interest”—has reflected the nature of its internal regime. During the Putin years, Moscow has increased its reliance on Gazprom as an instrument for exerting pressure on other countries, the resort to cyberwarfare against Estonia, and, in August 2008, the invasion, occupation, and annexation of Georgian territory.

Yet despite these atavistic and ominous trends, Russia today is not the Soviet Union. It does not even pretend to embody or promulgate an alternative model of political and economic management of a modern society; it has no real allies, even—and perhaps especially—in its own neighborhood; and despite its formidable nuclear arsenal, it is no longer
a military superpower. The use that Russian armored columns made of the Roki tunnel between North and South Ossetia in August 2008 bears little resemblance to the scenario of World War III beginning when the Soviet Army might pour through the Fulda Gap.

Moreover, Russia today is significantly different from the country it was before the global economic crisis. It is in acute financial distress—and much of its ruling elite knows it. To be sure, a Russia that is less cocky, more self-consciously vulnerable about its standing in an interconnected world, could go one of two directions: it might become more repressive at home and bellicose beyond its borders, or it might learn, over time, to make a virtue out of the necessity of integration.

The challenge for the European and American leaders is to encourage the latter consequence. What use is made of NATO will, once again, be of vital importance. In the first instance, that will require NATO proving itself up to the daunting task it faces in Afghanistan.

At the same time, the NATO-Russia Council should be revitalized in a way that will require an exertion of political will on both sides of the hyphen. The time for that is ripe. The resumption (or “resetting”) of arms control as a priority piece of business between Washington and Moscow creates an opportunity for addressing issues such as short-range nuclear systems, the strategic potential of conventional weaponry, and missile defenses. The chance for progress on that last issue is greater now that the Obama administration has scrapped its predecessors’ plan for interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic and is committed instead to a system more clearly designed to counter a threat from Iran.

Use of the NATO-Russia Council to make progress in arms control would be valuable in its own right, and it could have the ancillary benefit of ameliorating Russia’s neuralgia about the alliance. The Council can have that effect by demonstrating, in practical ways, that NATO is part of a larger latticework of cooperative structures that share a commitment to transparency, cooperation, mutual benefit, and common solutions to common problems.

For this strategy to work, there must be more coherence and consensus within the West about what is happening in Russia and what it means, as well as how to handle the issue of NATO and EU enlargement. Since those two processes will always be organically linked, they must continue in a synchronized, careful fashion. In the case of NATO, “careful” means expanding it in a way that’s faithful to the original purpose of enlargement. That purpose was twofold: to enhance the security of the alliance as a whole and to extend the European democratic peace eastward. But being “careful” must not mean refusing to support the European aspirations of Russia’s neighbors. Nor should it mean giving up on such aspirations among many Russians. After all, they are Europeans too.
The picnic that changed Europe

Twenty years ago a picnic was held that went down in history as the event that would play a decisive role in the fall of the Iron Curtain. On 19 August 2009, leaders from eastern and western Europe met in Sopron in Hungary to take part in celebrations to commemorate this historic day.

1989 - Hungary's foreign minister Gyula Horn, right, together with his Austrian counterpart, Alois Mock, photographed in Sopron, Hungary, cutting open a barbed wire fence that formed part of the Iron Curtain marking the border between East and West.

The origins of what came to be known as the **Pan-European picnic** lay in a demonstration that took place in June 1989, when the then Austrian foreign minister Alois Mock and his Hungarian colleague Gyula Horn symbolically cut open the barrier between the two countries. In August of the same year another demonstration was held, this time organised by the Hungarian opposition, in collaboration with the Pan-European Union. In the same place as the Austrian and Hungarian foreign ministers had cut the border fence, a border crossing was to be held open for three hours - this, too, was a symbolic act. The demonstration turned into the largest flight from Eastern Europe since the Berlin Wall was erected. More than 600 East Germans took the short-lived opportunity while the Iron Curtain was open to flee across the border to Austria. This resulted in East Germany closing off its borders. The seething discontent spread, and protests against the GDR regime grew, resulting in the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November.
Speech by Carl Bildt

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden chairing the EU
at Sopron, Hungary, on 19th August 2009

It was in 1989 that the new future of Europe really started.

What happened right here – on these very fields - was a central part of that European revolution of freedom, democracy and coming together that continues to shape our part of the world and inspire so many other parts of it.

I have my own memories of crossing – privileged with a Western passport – through the gates of the Iron Curtain right here in Sopron years before the revolutions of 1989. I vividly remember the watchtowers and the barbed wire. And I am proud that a now member of the Swedish Parliament – Walburga Douglas Habsburg – was one of the organizers of the Pan-European Picnic we are celebrating today.

It was a very different Europe.

There was the European Community of 12 states – justly proud of its achievement of prosperity in the western and southern parts of our Europe. But this was not Europe – only pieces of it.

Since then, 15 other European states as well as the east of Germany, with some 150 million people, have joined them in what is today the European Union – dedicated to the peace and prosperity of our Europe, and founded on the firm foundation of freedom, democracy and open societies. Hungary. Austria. Sweden. And 12 other states from Finland to Cyprus.

The European revolution of 1989 paved the way for the European miracle that we have seen since then. Seen in the perspective of the history of our continent, it has truly been a miracle. Our Europe has not been transformed – as so often in the past – by soldiers, weapons and war. It has been transformed by the free choice of free nations to come together in structures and policies of integration in a way without parallel in human history. That this has meant much for our Europe goes nearly without saying. It is not only the absence of barbed wire – we do not even have to show a passport when passing these old borders. We have achieved what few then ever dared to dream about.

But we should not forget what it has meant also in the wider global context.

Not that long ago, Europe exported wars and totalitarian ideologies to the rest of the world. One war across the world. One totalitarian ideology. Another totalitarian ideology. Another war across the world.
But our Europe of today is no longer spreading war – but instead inspiring peace. By showing that nations can work together. That division can be overcome. That the idea of freedom sooner or later breaks all bounds. Of that we as well we can justly be proud.

But this does not mean that the historic tasks that opened themselves up in 1989 – here in Sopron, in Warsaw, in Leipzig and Berlin, in Prague and Timisoara - have been fulfilled or all its challenges met. That we can now just rest on our laurels. Far from it – our Union remains work in progress, built day-by-day by Europeans coming together, working together and shaping the future together. In a world of increasing interdependence there is simply no other way. And for all the success of enlargement during the past decade, we must not forget those still knocking on our doors, and wanting to be part of our freedom, our integration and our security.

It was by tearing down the walls and divisions, and opening up our societies and economies, that we began to build a new European era. The brave men and women of 1989 rejected the divisions, the oppressions and the walls of the past. It was the dreams of a better future – a future in freedom – that drove those that organized this picnic – and those that so dramatically used the opportunity it gave.

That dream should fundamentally be as important to us today as it was to them then. We must remain an open Europe of open societies and open minds – open to other Europeans beyond our present Union boundaries, open to others from wherever they might come within our own societies, open to partnership with the rest of the world.

We have every reason here today to remember and celebrate what happened here two decades ago. But history did not end. It continues to unfold. We must continue to shape it - through the European Union we have built after the revolution of 1989 and the miracles of the years since then. And we must do this inspired by the same dreams of coming together and same ideals of freedom, democracy, open societies and an open Europe.

The best time for Europe is yet to come.

Source: www.se2009.eu
В октябре 1973 года в Токио была создана Трёхсторонняя Комиссия. Она является международным, внеправительственным обществом, которое своей целью поставило осуществление разнообразных анализов и исследований, направленных на гармонизацию политических, экономических, социальных и культурных отношений между Западной Европой, Северной Америкой и Японией—трёмя демократическими регионами с высоко развитой промышленностью и рыночным хозяйством.

At the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow on 18 January 1989

[From left to right] David Rockefeller, Georges Berthoin, Mikhail Gorbachev, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Henry Kissinger, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Yoshio Okawara