TRILATERAL LEADERS DISCUSS GLOBAL REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND PROBLEMS OF TRILATERAL COMMUNITY, MEET WITH MIKI AND MIYAZAWA

The first plenary meetings of the Trilateral Commission were held in Kyoto, Japan on May 30-31. The group consulted with Prime Minister Takeo Miki in Tokyo on May 29. Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa gave the concluding conference address on May 31. Commission discussions were organized around two principal themes—global redistribution of power (May 30) and problems of the trilateral community (May 31). The main address on global redistribution was given by Saburo Okita, President of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. The trilateral community discussions centered on a controversial draft task force report on “The Governability of Democracies” in modern trilateral societies. Ralf Dahrendorf, now head of the London School of Economics, provided the opening commentary. Zbigniew Brzezinski drew together both themes in a tour d’horizon on the final afternoon.

Continuing Commission interest in the Middle East and management of oil-related financial flows also found ex-
Commodities

The sixth of Okita’s factors was the increasing role played by natural resources in influencing power. And it was to this issue context that discussion was particularly directed, as Okita’s remarks were joined with consideration of the interim report of the task force on access to supplies, entitled “Striking a Bargain on Commodity Supplies.” After some discussion of the nature of the problem, the task force report took some preliminary steps toward policy recommendations and possible elements of an overall bargain. The problem was posed initially as one of “shortages” or constraints on supplies. Four categories of constraints were elaborated, from “physical” shortages and “cyclical” ones to “contrived” constraints (e.g., OPEC price-hiking) and “derived” or “indirect” ones (e.g., from investment and taxation policies in producer countries). It is in response to these problems of constraints on supplies that the need for a “bargain” was presented. In its interim report, the task force presents only some preliminary thoughts on what an overall “package” might contain. One concession offered producing states would be removal by consuming countries of “escalating” tariff barriers, which discriminate against further processing of raw materials in producing countries. Consuming countries should also be more forthcoming on international income redistribution and more flexible on international commodity agreements, but the task force argued that, while these two matters will clearly be linked in negotiation of a “package,” redistribution should be operated separately from commodity agreements, which would aim at smoothing out market fluctuations without suppressing longer-term market trends.

Presentation of the interim task force report was made by Carl Beige, North American rapporteur. In the discussion which followed the Okita and Beige remarks, some further attention was given to the nature and need for a global economic “bargain.” One participant saw an encouraging trend in development programs toward meeting “minimum human needs.” He argued, among other things, for a new emphasis on the internal distribution of income in poor countries as an essential part of a bargain for greater aid flows. There was some debate and difference of view about whether the bargaining power of Third World raw material producers is indeed increasing. Some thought this not the case, and felt it is primarily a “moral imperative” that presents itself to trilateral societies to be responsive to Third and Fourth World demands. One participant stressed that the supplies report needs to come to grips much more directly with the redistribution issue, and he suggested that Third World producers would not look favorably upon the separation of commodity stabilization and redistributive machinery. Other participants emphasized the practical difficulties so far in operating successful commodity agreements, and hoped the final report would be very specific in any commodity agreement recommendations it might make.

It was pointed out that a number of developed countries are themselves major raw material exporters. A study now underway in Germany was mentioned which indicates that, aside from energy and food commodities, 60% of the
When the Trilateral Commission was launched, it was a welcome development for Japan because this was the first such private international undertaking in which Japan was an original founding member, unlike other cases of similar efforts where Japan was added to the membership almost as an afterthought. We had felt all along the importance of such an international dialogue by private citizens, envisaged in the idea for the Trilateral Commission, where members could deal with common problems and pursue their solutions with a broader and more historical perspective than governments could afford to have, as they are inevitably concerned with immediate interests. For Japan grappling with the new increasing responsibility of assuming a greater role in the international community and trying to define such a role in its dialogue with other nations, the Trilateral Commission has come to provide us with new opportunities and, at the same time, new challenges.

International developments in the past months have dramatically heightened awareness among all of us of the ever-increasing interdependence among the world's nations. Even in the short period since the creation of the Trilateral Commission, crises have occurred which have had a great impact on the whole international system. Such situations in which we find ourselves today, seem to require an entirely new re-evaluation and reorientation of the international system. Such a reevaluation, however, has to be undertaken not unilaterally by any single nation or region, but with multilateral consultations among all of us. In this context, the Trilateral Commission is not seeking to exclude the other regions of the world but is rather conscious of its responsibility to first encourage the three regions to ‘set its own house in order’ not only for their own sake but for the sake of the rest of the world as well. The Commission believes that it can contribute toward this goal by playing an important role in helping to bring about intensive consultations among the three regions.

In working together in the past year and a half in this Commission, we have been frequently reminded of various constraints in each region working against establishing a smoother dialogue among us. The three regions are quite different from each other in historical background and international setting. The political systems, social structures, culture, and customs of the three regions and the countries within them are varied and Japan still maintains certain conditions which continue to make her inaccessible and insular from the outside world. Nevertheless, I personally feel that the intensity with which our activities have been carried out is unique among the many non-governmental international projects involving Japan in recent years.

Takeshi Watanabe
Excerpts from Opening Remarks to Kyoto Conference
world's raw materials comes from six countries (U.S., Canada, U.S.S.R., China, Australia, South Africa). One participant noted the need for a "bargain" among trilateral countries themselves, given that some are major raw material exporters. This participant felt the task force report needed to be more balanced in recognizing producer rights.

On the more general redistributive trends described in Okita's address, one participant emphasized the increasing importance of China as a major factor in any such analysis. Another participant found the content of calls for a "new order" in the international system rather ambiguous. He contended that the existing international system offers considerable room for positive action.

Ocean Resources
Current developments in the law of the sea involve substantial resource issues, often cast in a North-South mold. The next phase of the Kyoto discussion of global redistribution and resources was a presentation of the interim report of the Commission's oceans task force. Johan Holst, Norwegian rapporteur, and Shigeru Oda, Japanese rapporteur, both addressed the group.

The "politics of acquisition" is the "order of the day" in oceans affairs, it was stated. The Law of the Sea Conference, which finished its latest phase in May in

SABURO OKITA
Global Redistribution of Power
(excerpts)
May 30, 1975

When we look back across the thirty years since the end of World War II, we find two kinds of change: those drastic changes that all notice, and the more gradual, evolutionary developments that have, perhaps in an even more profound historical sense, introduced new elements into relations both among advanced nations and between the developed and developing countries.

It is the second category that I would like to discuss today. I want to focus especially on six factors that I consider of special importance. They are: 1) the decrease in the relative weight of the U.S. economy, 2) the increasing role played by natural resources in influencing power, 3) the shifts in relationships between greater and lesser powers, 4) the increasing assertiveness of the poorer nations, 5) the growing importance of global issues and 6) the new developments in the international division of labor.

The first of these is the long-term decline in the relative position of the United States economy. Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States' GNP equaled more than half that of the entire world excluding communist countries. Its share was equivalent to the proportion now held by Japan, the United States and Western Germany together. But today it has declined to a point where it occupies about one-third of the total world GNP excluding communist countries. At the end of 1945, the United States' balance of short-term foreign debts was $6.9 billion, while its gold reserves amounted to $20 billion. It had a concentration of economic power that made it the pillar of the IMF system, a system that was itself based on dollars and gold. But as the economies of Japan and Europe recovered and grew, the relative preponderance of the United States in the world economic decreased. The United States was unable to free itself quickly of the worldwide commitment that it had taken on as the greatest economic power at the end of the war. As its economic power declined, it found itself over-extended. And as a result, a large volume of gold flowed out of the United States and the dollar grew weaker. At the end of 1974, the balance of short-term foreign debts had grown to $116.8 billion, while gold reserves had declined to only $11.8 billion. This became a major destabilizing factor in the international economic system. The decrease in the relative strength of the U.S. economy and the concomitant relative decline of its political and military influence has resulted in a multipolar structure. This is probably one of the main factors in the global redistribution of power.

The second factor is the new-found role of natural resources in influencing power relationships. The ability to supply energy and food is becoming more and more important in shaping the global redistribution of power. The United States has vast quantities of domestic resources at its disposal, and, as a result, it should be technically feasible for that country—despite the relative decline in its GNP—to pursue a policy of self-sufficiency in energy and at the same time to export grains amounting to several tens of million tons from its annual grain production. In this respect Europe and Japan are in much weaker positions. Among the developing countries, the Mideastern nations have come to world power by virtue of possessing oil resources. They are now capable of exerting a tremendous impact on the world economy—so much so that their relative position in international society at large has greatly strengthened. We have witnessed a new trend during the past several years in which countries possessing vital natural resources have become fully aware of just how those resources can be used as a tool for exercising power.

The third factor is the change in the relationships between greater and lesser powers. The progress of human society has long been accompanied by calls for increased respect for the rights of the weak. These calls have now been extended to the international arena, where smaller countries and economically weak nations are being given a greater say. This shows up in the United Nations, where each country, regardless of its size or power, has an equal vote. International democracy is historically significant as the antithesis to chauvinism or domination by the great powers. It is increasingly difficult for these powers to control or prevent autonomous and independent initiatives on the part of the smaller nations. And the great powers are less and less capable of influencing internal changes within these smaller nations. This trend is shown in the recent events in Vietnam.

The fourth factor is closely related to the third. It is the
Geneva, has "proved enormously cumbersome." To prevent total deadlock, the Chairmen of the three main Conference committees were empowered to elaborate unified negotiating texts. These texts may, however, serve rather to signal unilateral action on the issues involved. Movement to 200-mile national economic zones would mean national acquisition of about one-third of ocean space. There will be a bandwagon let loose in this direction if major developed countries now unilaterally claim such zones, and some of these countries are under much pressure to do so. The international revenue-sharing being considered for the outer reaches of these national zones is unfortunately only in token amounts.

OKITA (continued)

increase in the demands of poor countries that their rights be recognized. Issues such as the "North-South problem" were hardly ever raised before the Second World War. But they have become increasingly dominant since then. The process in which the weak criticize the strong is another example of the expansion of egalitarian thinking to the international level. The world today includes both people who get sick from consuming too much food and those who starve to death because they do not have enough to eat. One result of this situation has been the emergence of scathing criticism of the existing order and of the market forces that control it. The idea of free competition may be seen in power, says the critics, but when the gap between levels of power becomes too great, a situation results where the weak merely get weaker while the strong grow stronger. Criticisms of this sort in international circles have been increasing ever since Raúl Prebisch delivered a report to the first meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. They are aimed at the market economy and free competition, and they usually involve support for the idea that planning should become a part of both national and international economies.

The fifth factor is related to the increasing concern with the global issues. Since the world community has been affected by economic and technological developments in many areas, such as transportation and communication, it has become necessary to develop a global approach in many different fields. An important, distinctive feature of the seventies has been the convening of a number of international conferences on such problems as the environment, the oceans, food and population—conferences intended to grapple with these problems from the global perspective. These conferences indicate a heightened awareness of the limitations that exist in the resources, environment and land of the earth, as well as a growing consciousness of the need to manage these problems on a global level.

Despite this awareness, the truth is that international politics still tend to be premised on the belief that national sovereignty is paramount, a situation that makes it quite difficult for domestic welfare policy to go beyond national borders. In other words, technology and economics require a global approach. Yet the United Nations is not strong enough to assure such an approach and no other international institution is designed to do so. As always, the realities of international politics remain mainly predicated on national interests. Nevertheless, in today's environment, not even the great powers can formulate national policies without taking global considerations into account. The conflict between global and national interests is, in other words, becoming increasingly important in influencing the global distribution of power.

The sixth factor relates to new developments in the international division of labor. Both labor shortages and high wages in the industrialized nations have given the developing countries a comparative advantage in the labor-intensive sector. They have an excess labor force, and, as a result, the labor-intensive sector is shifting rapidly to the developing nations. In addition, the growth of resource nationalism means that the processing industries will be expanded in those countries that have resources. As this trend progresses, the result will be a reallocation of industrial production. And as industry and technology are distributed throughout the world, the dominance of today's industrial nations will decrease, and international power will be further dispersed. As that happens, the industrialized nations may introduce import restrictions against the cheaper products made by the developing countries with their abundant labor forces. They would do this to protect employment and high wage levels in their own labor forces, but it would mean the victimization of the poorer labor forces in the impoverished nations. So what might be considered a "welfare policy" domestically would be seen as an "anti-welfare measure" internationally. An increasing awareness of this paradox among the developing countries will lead to more and more criticism of the policies of the industrialized nations.

Each of the problems that I have enumerated points to a need for a new international economic order. One of the Trilateral Commission's important tasks is to understand the basic nature of the North-South problem—both from a long-range perspective and in the context of enlightened self-interest. We must be mutually aware of the interdependence that exists today between the developing nations and the Trilateral World. And, as a result of that awareness, each of our countries must adjust its policy formulations to fit a global framework built on cooperation rather than confrontation.
noted in his earlier address, "the world today includes both people who get sick from consuming too much food and those who starve to death because they do not have enough to eat." A special presentation on the world food problem was made to the conference by John Schnitker, former U.S. Undersecretary of Agriculture. Mr. Schnitker is rather optimistic about the adequacy of aggregate grain production over the next decade or two, assuming normal weather patterns. He noted that half the world's grain is fed to livestock and poultry each year, and "this represents a massive buffer against serious famine." In the United States this year, Mr. Schnitker stated, grain-feeding to livestock is being reduced by 20% from last year in order to continue a normal supply of food grain for people." Countries such as India and Bangladesh, however, feed little grain to animals and thus do not have such buffers under their jurisdictions. It is adequate distribution in these areas that will present the greatest difficulty over the next 25 years, rather than adequate aggregate world production.

While discussions of national and international reserves are important, Schnitker argued that "the real action will be on the farms and with national parliaments and legislatures. If crops are very good for 2-3 years, and if governments will support farm prices at levels that permit accumulation of stocks, some reserves will be in the world's granaries by about 1978. If agricultural prices are allowed to collapse world-wide, larger grain crops will again be used up in the new round of increased feeding to animals and poultry, agricultural development will lag, and there will be no buffer against crop failure . . . Without some good crop years, international negotiations will not be able to produce any reserves. With good crops, reserves will be assured, although their disposition will be uncertain."

**Middle East and "Recycling"**

The December 1974 Washington meeting of the Trilateral Commission's Executive Committee had concentrated on international aspects of the energy-financial crisis, and given some attention to political problems in the Middle East. The Kyoto meeting followed up these concerns with an afternoon session on approaches to peace in the Middle East, and a presentation updating the Commission on oil-dollar recycling and related financial problems.

**Middle East Peace**

The discussion of peace prospects in the Middle East focussed primarily on a proposal presented by Francois Duchene, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Kiichi Saeki, not in a Commission paper but in an article since published in the summer 1975 issue of Foreign Policy. The article had been circulated to all Kyoto participants, preceded by a short memorandum for discussion from the authors, who also offered introductory remarks. Their presentations were preceded by an address by Gerhard Schröder on "Prospects for Peace for the Middle East."

Schröder, former Foreign Minister of the German Federal Republic, stressed that now "the ones who carry most weight on the Arab side are prepared to recognize Israel's existence as a state." He found a "besieged fortress" mentality untenable for Israel in the long run. Demographic trends, he noted, might make the Israelis a minority in their own country within a few decades. In the long run, it is less likely Israel would be "driven into the sea" than "overflooded, like an island by a tidal wave."

Schröder emphasized the need for constructive peace plans for the Middle East region, looking beyond a political settlement to regional cooperation, perhaps in such fields as seawater desalination and rural development. "A better tomorrow must be discussed and thought out today."

The Brzezinski-Duchene-Saeki proposal, as stated in their memorandum for discussion, called for the United States to "take the initiative in more overtly outlining the nature of an eventual settlement." Outside initiative is needed, it was argued, because "the parties to the conflict cannot spontaneously and simultaneously reach agreement." And "that initiative should rivet attention of the parties concerned on the substance of an eventual settlement, following which it would be easier to consider the question of the requisite stages towards such a settlement." As for the Soviet Union, it "should be engaged in assuring the stability of such a settlement, for otherwise it is given an incentive to block it and/or to subvert it."

Six key elements of an eventual settlement were presented in the memorandum for discussion. One of these was internationally guaranteed borders, with international security patrols including U.S. and Soviet participation.

In the discussion following the opening presentations, a number of participants expressed doubt about Soviet willingness to cooperate and the advisability of militarily involving the U.S.S.R. in the region through security patrols. Others doubted the domestic political feasibility of an overt, broad American initiative, and had visions of the Administration plan being repudiated by Congress. One participant felt that, after Indochina, the U.S. should move very slowly and allow time for its credibility to be restored.

Aside from these problems, some participants doubted the advisability of the main proposition. A "detailed statement" of overall peace terms, stated one, would "bring to the surface all the most difficult elements." The basic problem in the Middle East, this participant argued, is "psychological adjustment," and he was not sure this process would be hastened now by an initiative presenting the "stark realities" to both sides. From being a friend of both sides, the U.S. would become an enemy of both. It is "absolutely impossible" to put forward a mutually-acceptable detailed plan, and that is why Secretary Kissinger has chosen the step-by-step approach. Another participant wondered if an overt U.S. initiative outlining a settlement would not complicate Soviet cooperation in guaranteeing that settlement. Another argued that now is not the time for an overall initiative, but rather a time for the U.S. to stay "completely flexible."

In reply, one member noted that foreign policy decisions are often a choice between disagreeable alternatives. He could sympathize with objections to the proposal, but what
is the alternative? There is no evidence of time working for us, this member emphasized, and dangers are great of another war. The United States must use its leverage to bring the parties to a settlement.

Also in reply, another participant argued that there is now an international consensus developing on the broad outlines of an international settlement, and this vision would be given more weight if the U.S. explicitly associated itself with it. This participant is very worried about the renewal of hostilities next year. Israel may be expelled from the General Assembly this fall. With time not on our side, such a U.S. initiative is called for. In fact, it is already late. As for the Soviet Union, this member argued that it is a matter of engaging its interests. The Soviets may be seeing that the current "no war—no peace" situation is no longer viable, and may themselves now feel uncomfortable about the choices that might be thrust upon them in a new war. The U.S.S.R. is already militarily engaged in the Middle East, it was stated. A settlement might actually erode the political base for this military involvement.

Recycling

The update on oil-dollar recycling was provided by Yusuke Kashiwagi of the Bank of Tokyo. He recalled the "extremely depressed and pessimistic" outlook last year among the oil-importing industrialized countries, apparent-

RALF DAHRENDORF
Excerpts of Remarks on the "Governing of Democracies" Study
May 31, 1975

I

Governability presumably refers to the ability of governments to give direction to the economies, societies, and political communities in which they govern, and to do so effectively. Could it not be argued that one of the traditional characteristics of democracies is that we do not ask governments to give direction to the economies, societies, and political communities, at least not to the extent to which non-democratic societies are doing this? Might it not be argued, therefore, that by raising the question of governability in relation to democracies, one is in fact raising the question of whether the power of government should be increased rather than the question of whether the power of government should be restored? Is it not misleading to imply that governments in democracies had all those powers in the past which are now demanded for them? Should we not perhaps check ourselves every now and again and remember that one of the things democracy is about is to enable people, to enable groups to operate in what might be called a market environment rather than an environment which is largely determined by directives issuing from government and political institutions?

II

In the concluding chapter of the governability study, you find a number of remarkable statements about the relationship between democracy and economic growth. "The promotion of economic growth, taking into careful consideration the effects of such growth on resource exhaustion and environmental pollution, consequently must be top priority on the agenda of democracy . . . . Political democracy requires economic growth . . . depends upon effective democratic planning." Important, and as you will admit, far-reaching statements. It is clearly desirable, at least that is my view, that economic growth should continue. Yet there may be a point in asking

a number of questions in relation to these statements. And there may be a point in discussing them at some length. Why should it be so that democracy is to some extent dependent on economic growth? Is there anything in the concept of democracy that relates it to economic growth? Is democracy unthinkable without it? Is it actually true that those countries in which economic growth was least effective were also the countries in which democratic institutions were least effective? Could it not be said that it is the one-party socialist states above all which are in trouble without economic growth? Is not the link between the assumption of economic growth and political organization in fact much closer in the communist countries, and is that not one of the reasons why they are worried at a time when, for them too, economic growth is by no means a certainty? Does not perhaps Mr. Brezhnev have much more reason to worry about the future of economic growth than Mr. Ford? I should have thought that it would be useful to examine these questions in the study, although I am not at all sure that I would be able to give a proper answer to them. If I were to try to give an answer, I would like to add another question which I believe is and should be of major concern for anybody who is thinking about the future of industrial societies under liberal conditions. Is growth presumably growth of a gross national product? Is this the only kind of expansion of human life chances which we can think of in free societies? Are there not perhaps other forms of growth and improvement of human lives? Is it really necessary to assume that we have to continue along the lines which have been characteristic for the last 25 years in order to maintain democratic institutions? The important and prima facie plausible statements about democracy and economic growth would warrant and perhaps require a rather more elaborate reasoning.

III

My next point relates to governability more or less directly. The paper for discussion here is in my view an important and in many ways convincing analysis of a difficult and changing political, social and economic situation. I would like to underline an aspect of the problem which I believe is of overriding importance.

I start with three simple things—simple to put in words but much less simple to cope with in fact. First, there is a
ly faced with ballooning payments deficits which would be very difficult to finance. It appeared the dollar would gain strength relatively given greater indigenous energy supplies in the United States and international monetary reform, as being planned in the IMF Committee of 20, was in effect “shelved.”

In January of this year, agreements were completed for the OECD financial “safety net” and the enlarged IMF oil facility. “Both were sure to take some time to be implemented,” Mr. Kashivagi noted, “in addition to being apparently insufficient, but they at least helped to calm down the extreme uneasiness prevailing in the international monetary and financial markets at that time, because the former meant the establishment of a last resort of international liquidity for OECD member countries and the latter, though small in size, was meaningful for developing countries affected by the oil crisis.”

January of this year also brought substantially revised estimates of oil-exporter financial accumulations. The change was first analyzed and forecast, Mr. Kashivagi noted, by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company in New York. Lowered estimates were “due mainly to larger purchases and investments by OPEC countries.” From Kashivagi’s own observations in the Middle East, he has the impression the Morgan estimates are “quite reasonable.” He emphasized, however, that “this optimistic view depends on the public which we assumed was the real basis of democratic institutions in the past. Instead of there being an effective political public in democratic countries from which representative institutions emerge and to which representatives are answerable, there is a fragmented public, in part a nonexistent public. There is a rather chaotic picture in the political communities of many democratic countries. A public of citizens who cast their votes from individual interests and thereby influence the choice of representatives who in turn feel their responsibility to an identified public has to some considerable extent disappeared. To that extent, representative government has become very different indeed from the sort of creature that was described in the Federalist Papers, or by John Stuart Mill, or by many others before and after.

I would argue that the main thing to think about is what we can do to reestablish an effective general political public under the changed conditions in which we are living today. One would have to discuss the ways in which the legitimate demand for immediate individual participation can be linked to national and international decisions. One would have to discuss what in this Commission has been called the renovation of the international system, not only in terms of the effectiveness of new international institutions but also in terms of their democratic quality. This would raise familiar and yet new problems of the relation between representation and expertise, between democratic election and knowledge of those standing for election.

I am quite certain that a number of things must not happen if we want to reestablish an effective political public (or perhaps establish an effective political public for a very large number of citizens for the first time in the history of democratic countries). I for one believe that one of the things that must not happen under any condition is a deliberate policy of educational retrenchment—a policy in which educational institutions are once again linked to economic output and economic performance rather than to the need to give every individual a chance to take part in the political process. I also believe that one of the things that must not happen is that we establish any greater dependence of the media on governments. On the contrary, I believe that the media in most of our democratic societies are in need of protection. They are endangered by a number of processes, some of them economic. At the same time I believe they are
smooth progress of the social and economic development of the OPEC countries." Industrialized countries should cooperate in these development efforts.

Contrary to expectations, the U.S. dollar has not particularly strengthened, Mr. Kashiwagi noted, and "seems to be rather weakening at present." It is "not too soon," he argued, to start once again with our efforts at international monetary reform. Calling for "practical reforms to strengthen the present system rather than some theoretical grand design to achieve a perfect system," he stressed three concluding points. First, it is important "to keep the external value of the dollar stable and attractive for non-residents to hold and use. . . . Moves away from the dollar may lead in the future to some disruption and confusion in the international markets." Secondly, "although maintenance of the value of the dollar can only be implemented by efforts of the United States herself, the other major industrialized countries must also try to share in this responsibility more fully with the United States." There is a "need for them to take over a larger role in the international financial picture through greater use of their currencies internationally." Finally, there is "much room for needed dialogue and consultation" among the tripartite countries on energy and related monetary problems. "A common front on the oil question will surely help to lead to better financial stability in the world economy."

Dahrendorf (continued)

some of the main media of expression for what is left of a general political public, and we should keep them that way.

My main point here is that as we think about a political public in our day, we cannot simply think of a political public of individual citizens exercising their common sense interests on the market place, as it were. In rethinking the notion of the political public, we have to accept the fact that most human beings today are both individual citizens and members of large organizations. We have to accept the fact that most individuals see their interests cared for not only by an immediate expression of their citizenship rights (or even by political parties which organize groups of interests) but also by organizations which at this moment act outside the immediate political framework and which will continue to act whether governments like it or not. And I believe, therefore, somewhat reluctantly, that in thinking about the political public of tomorrow we shall have to think of a public in which representative parliamentary institutions are somehow linked with institutions which in themselves are neither representative nor parliamentary. I think it is useful to discuss the exact meaning of something like an effective social contract, or perhaps a Concerted Action, or Conseil Economique et Social for the political institutions of advanced democracies. I do not believe that free collective bargaining is an indispensable element of a free and democratic society. I do believe, however, that we have to recognize that people are organized in trade unions, that there are large enterprises, that economic interests have been discussed somewhere, and that there has got to be a negotiation about some of the guidelines by which our economies are functioning. This discussion should be related to representative institutions. There may be a need for reconsidering some of our institutions in this light, not to convert our countries into corporate states, certainly not, but to convert them into countries which in a democratic fashion recognize some of the new developments which have made the effective political public so much less effective in recent years.

IV

I am not, contrary to many others today, pessimistic about the future of democracy. Indeed, it seems to me that a number of recent social developments are likely to make life much more difficult for the dictatorships of this world. Like many of you, however, I notice with dismay that it seems to be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to liberalize a dictatorship within a short period of time and convert it into a free and democratic country. There is a sad dialectic of dictatorships in which any attempt to liberalize them rapidly seems to lead to another kind of authoritarianism.

I do think that in order for democracies to cope with new types of problems with which they are faced, they have to avoid a number of mistakes. They must avoid the belief that the very progress which they made possible for a large number of citizens must now be undone because it feels uncomfortable for some. They have to avoid the belief that a little more unemployment, a little less education, a little more deliberate discipline and a little less freedom of expression would make the world a better place, in which it is possible to govern effectively. Indeed, I think, this attempt to turn back the wheels of history to try to recreate the state which we have fortunately and deliberately left is in many ways as uncivilized, indeed primitive, as the belief that all we need is nationalized ownership, public planning, and worker control. Either of these mistakes must be avoided if we hope to manage to create democratic conditions and maintain them, conditions which offer the largest number of the largest chance for their life.

In my view, what we have to do above all is to maintain that flexibility of democratic institutions which is in some ways their greatest virtue: the ability of democratic institutions to implement and effect change without revolution—the ability to rethink assumptions—the ability to react to new problems in new ways—the ability to develop institutions rather than change them all the time—the ability to keep the lines of communication open between the leaders and the led—the ability to make individuals count above all.

We talk about the trilateral societies, and certainly they have a lot in common, but there are many differences between them also, and some have so far managed better than others to cope with the problems which I indicated. I have to confess that at this time, at this time in particular, I belong to those who believe that it is the North American societies above all which have managed to maintain the kind of flexibility which holds out hope for democracy everywhere.
Trilateral Community

The main theme of the final day of Kyoto discussions was "The Trilateral Community: Key Problems and Prospects." The principal discussion was organized around the draft task force report on "The Governability of Democracies," which proved controversial and generated a lively discussion.*

Governability of Democracies

After a long period of rather steady progress, the democratic political systems in the trilateral regions have entered a more difficult and uncertain phase, according to the task force study, particularly in Europe and the United States. "The demands on democratic government grow," the report states, "while the capacity of democratic government stagnates." This is the dilemma of governability which calls for analysis and action.

The authors see the overall problem to some extent in terms of changing environments. A "happy congruence of circumstances" for democracy—economic growth, social assimilation, clear-cut international alignments and challenges—has faded. Aside from these "environment" changes, however, many problems have arisen which are seen as an intrinsic part of democracy itself. The pursuit of the democratic virtues of individualism and equality has brought a general "delegitimation" of authority. The democratic expansion of political participation has created an "overload" of demands on government. The political competition essential to democracy has intensified, making the aggregation of interests more difficult and bringing about the decline and fragmentation of political parties. Responsiveness to domestic societal pressures has encouraged parochialism in international affairs. Given existing trends, it is the overall conclusion of the study that "in Western Europe and the United States, the balance has tilted too far against governments." These two regions "consequently need to restore a more equitable relationship between governmental authority and popular control, and Japan will probably face this necessity in the not-too-distant future." The study concludes with elaboration of seven "arenas for action," including "strengthening the institutions of political leadership," "reinvigorating of political parties," and "restoring a balance between government and media."

In the discussion which surrounded the task force study, a number of participants disagreed with aspects of the analysis and recommendations. The session opened with comments from Ralf Dahrendorf, a partial transcript of which is printed in this newsletter. Dahrendorf raised several questions about the study. He cautioned against attempts "to turn back the wheels of history . . . to recreate the state which we have fortunately and deliberately left." Democracies must "avoid the belief that the very progress which they made possible for a large number of citizens must now be undone because it feels uncomfortable for some." Dahrendorf is "not, contrary to many others today, pessimistic about the future of democracy."

A number of American participants argued that, in the United States at least, the problem is less one of "governability" than of the protection of democratic rights and freedoms. It would be a "tragedy," stated one, to see the problem as one of "too much democracy." Another suggested that "excesses" of the "governors" might more appropriately be examined than supposed excesses of the governed. In the United States, in particular, alternative diagnoses concentrated on the failure of leadership and inadequate government performance. Particular exception was taken by some to the recommendation on "restoring a balance" between the media and government.

Among European participants in the discussion, none argued with the study's conclusion that democracies in Western Europe are now the most vulnerable of those in the trilateral regions. Some expressed great disappointment in the lack of progress of European integration. The weakness of executive authority in the constitutional systems of some smaller European states was raised, as was the uncertain situation in Italy. Comments on Britain, in contrast, emphasized its democratic resilience and strength in spite of great economic difficulties and social strain.

The chapter on Japan in the task force study is the most optimistic of the three. One Japanese participant related the cohesive strength of the Japanese political system to the high capability of middle-level leadership in the society, though this may be in decline. Other participants saw a number of problems for Japanese democracy, and looked ahead with somewhat more pessimism than the report.

The democracies study is the first the Commission has attempted on problems of modern industrialized democratic societies. Despite the critical comments, much respect was expressed for the ambition and scope of the project and the quality of the work; and much emphasis was placed on future Commission efforts in this general field.

Trilateral Relations in a Global Context

On the afternoon of the final day, discussion shifted to trilateral relations, in a world community context. Zbigniew Brzezinski opened the session with an address noted earlier in this newsletter. Brzezinski recalled that when the Commission was being formed, difficulties in trilateral relations were of primary concern. Since that time, however, the world has to a large extent changed, and the Commission's work has evolved accordingly, as indicated in the themes of the Kyoto conference. "Our own work in this Commission, it is increasingly clear, is that of developing sustained trilateral thought on the nature and character of the needed (continued on page 14)
When this Commission was no more than a gleam in a few people’s eyes, it was the time of the so-called Nixon shocks. It was a time of great uncertainty and faltering in the American-European relationship. It was a time of very little dialogue between Japan and Western Europe. It was also a time when the United States was profoundly absorbed in detente and seemed to be giving a higher priority to its relations with the Soviet Union and China than to its relations with its friends. It was in this setting that the Commission was conceived and born.

I think it is worthwhile to note the extent to which the world has since changed. Our own deliberations I think show this, for the inter-related theme of our two-day session has been the questions of global redistribution of power and the nature of liberal modern democracy. In my remarks today, I would like to reflect a little on these two aspects. They indicate the extent of change and they seem to me to dictate a new path or a new set of directions for our own work.

It seems evident from our own deliberations that there is widespread recognition that the existing international system can no longer cope with new demands and with the presence of many new participants. I suppose if there was a single year which was a watershed in stimulating widespread global awareness of this new reality, it was the year 1973. That year, in the minds of men and leaders of the Third World is as important an historical watershed as the year 1905 was for the fathers of many of the new nations. A striking aspect of the memoirs of leaders like Sukarno, Gandhi, Nehru, Nkrumah and others is the extent to which they confess to have been deeply affected by the year 1905, which was the year in which, for the first time, a non-European power defeated a European power in direct political conflict. This, according to their testimony, gave them a new sense of confidence and new sense of identity. The year 1973 was the year in which for the first time the new nations—the Afro-Asian nations, so to speak—inflicted a political reversal on the advanced world, and this has generated too a new sense of confidence, a new sense of awareness and a new set of aspirations. As such it marks a very basic change in the character of the world we live in, a change which is political and psychological, the aftereffects of which are going to be felt for a long time to come. In some respects, if 1945 was the beginning of the existing international system, 1973 marked the beginning of its end and hopefully the beginning of its renovation and readjustment. And that readjustment is badly needed, for the world has changed profoundly in the course of the last thirty years. The system in which we have operated for the last quarter of a century was a system created largely by European-American initiative right after World War II. It was a system which embraced at most 40 states, many of which were client states. Today the world community is composed of some 150 states, dominated by a sense of nationalism, by an awareness of national aspirations, and it is a community with remarkable inequality in social and economic conditions.

Today, in a world much more alive with political
BRZEZINSKI (continued)
demands, the greatest single awareness is that of the inequity and inequality of the human condition. If I were to generalize broadly, I would say that the 19th century was dominated by the passion for liberty, while today the demand for equity is the dominant political force in the world. And well it should be, for the world is truly extraordinarily unequal. The community of 150 or so states contains only five (with a population of only some 240 million) where per capita income is over $5000. It contains fifteen states (with roughly 13% of world population—550 million) where per capita annual income is over $2500; fifteen more states (with a similar population) with incomes over $1500; and 25 states (with almost 10% of the world’s population) where income is over $500 per year. Finally, over 90 states, comprising close to 60% of the world’s population, have annual per capita incomes under $500. And I may add, of these 90 states, as of last year, only 25 were growing at an annual rate higher than 5% per annum.

This is a grossly unequal world, and a world which is becoming more unequal because of a factor of which politically alert individuals have to become increasingly conscious—namely population growth. For population growth is expanding this inequality. It is widening the margin of human injustice. It is making it more and more difficult to cope with the problem of inequity. We are all familiar with the dimensions of population growth, but I think it is useful to remind ourselves of these dimensions. Between 1800 and 1850, the population of the world grew by 270 million people; between 1850 and 1900, it grew by 430 million; between 1900 and 1950, it grew by 880 million; and between 1950 and 1975, which is only a quarter of a century, it grew by 1500 million. This is a staggering rate of increase. It imposes ever-growing strains on the social and political fabric of organized society. It widens the inequities in existence and imposes increasing strains on the existing international system.

It is a consequence of these factors—both the specific events of 1973 as well as the more general forces at work—that today we find the international scene dominated on its overt plane more by conflict between the advanced world and the developing world than by conflict between trilateral democracies and the communist states. The main axis of conflict at most international conferences is between the most advanced societies and the most articulate spokesmen for the developing world. This does not mean that East-West competition has ended, but it operates on a more covert plane. It is less direct and less immediate, though nonetheless still significant, as events in Portugal or Vietnam recently bear out.

The character of the new conflicts in the world scene, the changing position of the advanced world, the new aspirations of the Third and Fourth Worlds united together seems to me to pose a very major threat to the nature of the international system and ultimately to our own societies. That threat is the threat of denial of cooperation. It is a negative threat which the poor nations have in economic bargaining, in political power. In military ratios they are much weaker, but they do have the capacity to make the world collectively much less stable, much less progressive, much more violent, and in that sense cooperation with them is the decisive imperative of our time, moral considerations apart. Unless such cooperation is deliberately engendered by our own societies, by our own elites, I think we will witness more social and political fragmentation in many of the Third and Fourth World countries and, by a process of political contagion, eventually in our own countries as well.

The present situation is aggravated, moreover, by a crisis of a cultural and philosophical type in our own liberal democracies. There is a sense of uncertainty in our own societies. There is a sense of uneasiness about the viability and in some cases even the relevance of democratic institutions. This saps our own confidence, it makes us toy more with theories which are essentially pessimistic and uncertain. I do not think it is an accident that the most widely read political document in our time is what could be appropriately called a pessimist manifesto, The Limits to Growth. There is an awareness, particularly among younger people, that something very profound is changing in our time—that our societies are not fully responsive to the problems of our times, and that the existing values and institutions are in need of very profound change. This produces uncertainties and ambiguities which have been expressed better, as usually is the case, by a literary figure than by a social scientist. Hermann Hesse, in Steppenwolf, a book very popular with the younger generation, conveys what I am trying to say much better than any social science report: “Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap. There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence.” I believe this captures the spirit of our time quite well, and it further inhibits effective responses by our own societies to the global problems which we now confront.

Yet these responses are needed, and the need for the response stems, as I have argued, from both political and moral considerations. Farsighted statesmen have recognized this some time ago. Our honored participant and colleague, Kiichi Miyazawa, writing in his private notebooks more than ten years ago, said the following: “The movements of the developing countries are like a gathering stream. Though it might take a while, they will most certainly press us to the wall.” And he goes on to say, “Although it may sometimes seem the demands of the developing nations are rather emotional, we should be thankful after all that mankind has progressed to a point where none of the advanced nations would respond to these demands with military force.” This seems to me to indicate growing awareness within our own societies of the need to respond comprehensively and cooperatively. Our own work in this Commission, it is increasingly clear, is that of developing sustained trilateral thought on the nature and character of
the needed renovated international system. I believe we recognize that the situation today is in some ways like that prevailing in 1945, when creative men did shape a system which worked, with imperfections, but worked nonetheless, for thirty years. Today we have to engage a larger number of nations and participants in this process. And therefore the question arises, what ought to be our priorities and how do we go about it?

In this connection, let me say a word or two about the role of the communist states in this process. I think it is essential that they be engaged. We have to seek cooperation with the communist states, pointing eventually to a political and ultimately even philosophical accommodation with them. The differences that divide us are the products of 19th century thought, increasingly less relevant to the conditions of the 20th, not to speak of the 21st century. But at the same time, we have to be aware of realistic limits to the scope of possible cooperation with communist states at this time in history. In my own view, neither they nor we are historically or philosophically prepared to engage jointly in a global architectural effort. We still have to seek cooperation step by step, functionally and regionally, as opportunity permits it. The fact of the matter is that in different ways both China and the Soviet Union still entertain a relatively Manichean perspective on world affairs. They both expect fundamental change, in which they see themselves at the forefront. The Chinese still see the world involving a process of change in which the cities of the world are enveloped by the villages of the world. And the Soviets have lately developed a rather interesting view of the global situation, somewhat at variance with their predominant perspective of the last fifteen years. For the last fifteen years or so, since Khruschev, they tended to share the view that national liberation struggles would be the basis for world change. Lately, however, they have been articulating much more explicitly the proposition that there is a general crisis of capitalism, particularly in the advanced parts of the world, and that indeed the vortex of revolution has again returned to the advanced world from the developing world. Soviet analyses of the world make no secret of the fact that they expect fundamental changes to take place in societies such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France. To cite all of this is not to argue against cooperation, but to suggest that there are limits to its effectiveness—to suggest that regional and functional cooperation is more likely to be productive now, and that it is what should be sought. I welcome the expansion in Japanese-Chinese relations. I hope for much more movement in American-Chinese relations. I would like to see the beginnings of a process of four-power discussion involving Japan, China, the United States and the Soviet Union on the questions of stability and peace in the Korean peninsula. The moment may be right for some joint American-Soviet arrangements in the Middle East. Certainly in SALT the strategic relationship is being codified by the United States and the Soviet Union. And there is room for much more trade with the communist states.

But when it comes to the large, immediate, architectural issues of the day, it seems to me that the first priority still is that of trilateral relations. It is here where the philosophical basis for mutual understanding, where the political preconditions for cooperation surely exist. It is clear, it seems to me, that here is the opportunity for real architecture and initiative. I thus see, in the emerging world, our three regions still representing the more cooperative, the more vital center. I would hope that because of this we would fashion new or additional procedures for more effective consultations, for the shaping of joint initiatives for the central and global problems of our times. I would hope to see the emergence of new political caucuses spanning our trilateral regions in some existing international institutions. But I would argue that the focus of much of this must be on the fashioning of a more just and equitable world order. In other words, the focus must not be the preservation of the status quo, but arrangements which increasingly co-opt and embrace the Third and Fourth Worlds in a cooperative endeavor.

This will be a very prolonged process. The international system created in 1945 was, so to speak, created through an act of will and human initiative in a relatively restricted period of time. This was possible because one power had overwhelming might and influence, and others were closely associated with it. In contrast, a renovated international system will now require a process of creation—much longer, much more complex—a process in which prolonged negotiations will have to be engaged and developed. It will require a process which recognizes the need for global adjustment in wealth, while creating additional wealth. It will, in any case, be a slow process. If we assume 1) no limit to world food production, 2) the developing world maintains 5% per annum economic growth, 3) the growth of per capita incomes in developed countries is only approximately 3%, and 4) low U.N. projections of population growth, then the present 13:1 gap in wealth between the top 10% of the world and the lowest 10% of the world will be reduced to a 6:1 gap in 40 years. The process will clearly be a long one, and one has to anticipate enormous difficulties along the way.

Nonetheless, we confront today an era of extraordinary opportunity, and an era to which democracies particularly ought to look forward with confidence. For all of the travails of our time, this century has been one of unprecedented progress. At the beginning of this century, approximately 1% of the world's population lived in conditions above those of minimum human survival. Today, with a population three times higher, 30% of the world's population has reached that level, and modern democracies have pioneered much of that progress. In 1945, existing democracies shaped an international system which has been particularly efficient and desirable from the standpoint of trilateral democracies. Today the challenge which we ought to welcome is to shape a system which embraces the entire global community, and our trilateral regions can find a special opportunity in moving towards that end.
renovated international system." This must be "a system which embraces the entire global community, and our trilateral regions can find a special opportunity in moving toward that end."

Discussion after the Brzezinski address ranged over a number of issues raised in that address and earlier in the conference. Francois Duchene then offered a "joint report" on the session, reiterating the major themes and main points made in discussion. The conference concluded with an address by Kiichi Miyazawa, Foreign Minister of Japan. Mr. Miyazawa, who was a founding member of the Commission and part of its Executive Committee, had just returned from high-level OECD-IEA discussions in Paris.

In a speech entitled "The Basic Issues in Japanese Diplomacy," Foreign Minister Miyazawa described Japanese diplomacy as "cultivating friendship and cooperation with all countries in the world, regardless of differences in ideological or political systems, with Japanese-American friendship and cooperation as the key element." He noted his government's current effort to secure ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and "urged all nations to take positive measures at every opportunity to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, I appeal to all nuclear weapon states to recognize the legitimate anxiety of non-nuclear weapon states for their own security."

"Touching on some distinctive aspects of decision-making in Japanese diplomacy," Foreign Minister Miyazawa noted that "a traditional social ethic called 'WA,' to be translated as 'Harmony' or 'Concord,' compels the Japanese to spend a great deal of time to create a policy consensus before arriving at and executing a policy. Through this time-consuming process, we make ourselves familiar with the details of the specific measures to be taken. Consequently, once a decision is taken, we can put it into practice quite expeditiously. This Japanese tradition of policy-making, coupled with the habit to resort to expressions often consciously inarticulate to ensure the 'WA' of people involved, often causes misunderstanding between the Japanese and their Western friends. In this manner, however, we deal with complex issues without causing serious social tension inside Japan and even without losing sight of priorities."

The Foreign Minister emphasized that "geographically Japan is immediately surrounded by countries of different political and economic beliefs and systems, such as the Soviet Union and China, and also by countries which are at considerably different stages of economic development. Therefore, Japan is required to pay careful attention to its neighbors and the policies reflecting this often evade the easy understanding of the peoples of Europe and North America."

"The complexity and diversity of Asia was stressed in Mr. Miyazawa’s address, and the fact that "the situation in Asia is in flux" after recent developments in Indochina. "Stabilization of Asia is the urgent need for us all," he stated. "Yet, the situation is such that it is extremely difficult to work out a viable international framework that can embrace the whole of Asia and guarantee its long-term stability."

PRESS COVERAGE OF THE JAPAN MEETINGS

The Trilateral Commission meetings in Japan were very extensively reported in the Japanese press. Aside from articles on the sessions themselves, several papers took the opportunity to interview distinguished visitors for special articles. Two television panels were broadcast as well. In his regular Japan Times column, for June 16, Kazushige Hiratsuka noted that Prime Minister Miki had hosted a luncheon at his residence the previous day for principal Commission members. "The Prime Minister," Hiratsuka wrote, "shows special interest in the purpose of the Trilateral Commission."

The Kyoto conference was the occasion for several articles in North American newspapers and magazines. In a full-page article in the June 16 Newsweek, "Robert Christopher wrote of the theme which "loomed largest," in the Kyoto discussions: "Somehow the present international system must be changed so as to accommodate, in some degree the increasingly insistent demands of the 'poor nations for a greater share of the world's wealth and power."

The move-makers gathered in Kyoto had found themselves largely in agreement in their diagnosis of the world's central political problem. As a group, they were in a rare position to press this diagnosis on the world's policymakers. And a diagnosis, after all, is a necessary preliminary to any cure. In his Washington Post column of June 6, Stephen Rosenfeld noted that the Commission "on most issues . . . seems to take up a stance of positive enlightened reformism," though he termed it an organization of the "multinational establishment." C.L. Sulpzberger took up the governability of democracies study in his New York Times column of June 16. "So did the Boston Globe in a long lead editorial on Sunday, June 14. "Democracy as a 'threat to itself' is a provocative concept," the Globe stated, "but there are other causes of our malaise." Commenting in particular on the United States, it was written that "perhaps it was not so much that the democratic surge led to the weakening of our government and institutions as it was that the government and institutions had been corrupted from within . . . We have to expect democracy to have its rough times, especially after it has been betrayed at the top."

In his New York Times column of June 17, entitled "Japan Reaches Out", Peter Grose used the Kyoto meeting of the Commission as an example of current Japanese "readiness to reach out and join the global mainstream." "Two notable things happened in Kyoto," he wrote. "European and Japanese participants spoke out in amazement realization that they have ignored each other much too long . . . More astonishing, even to the Tokyo executives of the commission, was the enthusiasm and abandon with which the Japanese participants entered into the fray."

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JAPAN SEMINARS

It had been noted a number of times by Japanese participants in the Trilateral Commission that the Commission serves not only as a means for discussion of specific policy issues with distinguished private citizens of the other regions, but also as a bridge to the other regions in a more general sense of developing communication and mutual understanding. There is a reciprocal sense in the other regions, certainly, about the Commission’s role in building bridges to Japan.

In pursuit of these broader aims, the Japanese office of the Commission organized 2½ days of high-level seminars on Japan for North American and Western European participants in the Japan events. Held in Tokyo just before the Kyoto conference, each seminar was led by a panel of Japanese experts. The five major sessions covered a range of topics, from political trends and socio-economic issues in Japan to issues in external relations and the expression of cultural and sociological perspectives in these relations.

A volume of papers provided further background for seminar participants. One of the most interesting of the papers was Masao Kunihiro’s “Indigenous Barriers to Communication,” the summary of a paper he had prepared for the Third Japanese-American Assembly, in Shimoda in 1972.

“One major reason for ‘discommunication’ between Japan and the United States,” Kunihiro wrote, “lies in the great dissimilarity between the two countries in importance and use of nonverbal communication and unarticulated attitudes. In Japan, language, or communication through language, has not received the same emphasis as in the West. Rather than an expression of one’s own will or thoughts, language has been a way of casually throwing the other guy a ball in order to get a reaction from him on which to base one’s next action. It has been considered poor policy to use words as a tool to express one’s views, to persuade the other fellow or to establish any depth of understanding. Language as an instrument of debate or argument is considered even more disagreeable and is accordingly avoided. Thus, in Japanese society, use of words becomes a sort of ritual, not often to be taken at face value. It is only one possible means of communication, not the means of communication as is often the case among English speakers . . . .

“Contempt for language can also be seen in the attitude of even the most progressive Japanese companies toward contracts. It is still quite common to have unwritten contracts between large manufacturers and trading firms; often contracts seem to exist only for the purpose of specifying stipulations that are an exception to the rule. Often an escape clause such as ‘All other problems will be settled through consultation’ is very useful in the end.

“What are the reasons behind such distrust of language? Also, what goes into this Japanese ‘community of emotion’ in which words are so sparingly used? Part of the explanation is the unparalleled homogeneity of this island country.

There have been few, if any, nations in the world where a single ethnic group has lived for such a long time using the same language throughout its history. Furthermore, Japanese unity is a natural product of its special geographical and historical conditions; its independence as an ethnic entity or state, therefore, has been maintained by natural rather than political forces. With such a degree of natural unity, understanding among the members of the society, too, is highly sensitive. They share common lifestyles, attitudes, superstructure and substructure. These conditions make it possible for the same kind of communication that exists within a family to prevail throughout society as a whole . . . .

“A second reason for the Japanese contempt for language is the hierarchic structure of Japanese society, not entirely unrelated to the so-called family system. In this hierarchy the will of those further up the ladder is conveyed downward, but it is unpardonable for someone on a lower rung to give free and uninhibited expression to his opinions. In Japan the family-based principle of ‘vertical society,’ as Professor Nakane Chie has called it, creates the bond in human relations, exerting a frightful degree of compulsion on the individual . . . .

“Our language fosters the same kind of aesthetic vagueness that springs from sparing use of the medium. It is often difficult to ascertain what noun a particular adjective is supposed to modify. In addition, there is no distinction between singular and plural for nouns, the comparative degree is seldom used and the number of relative expressions is very small. In traditional Japanese a single word—kinu (liver) or harawata (entrails)—stood for all of the human internal organs, and the word kokoro (heart) represented not only chi (wisdom), jo (emotion), and i (will), but also the series of concepts which are today differentiated through the use of terms coined for translation purposes such as riset (reason), goset (wisdom, reason), and sesshin (spirit). Even highly educated Japanese naturally use the traditional terms in daily life instead of their more specific counterparts. . . . (The first step in improving U.S.-Japanese communication should be for Americans to discard the idea that Western logic is the universal thought structure for all the inhabitants of this globe . . . .

“To the extent that Japan’s social structure determines its mode of external communication, there is little possibility that the latter will undergo any drastic change. Japanese leadership will continue to disparage articulate self-expression. Instead, they will retain experts in external communication to present their cases ‘logically,’ conforming to conscious norms. If the analyses offered by these experts are not always accurate, there may be misunderstanding on the other side of the ocean. There is the further risk that, since these experts are not necessarily involved with decision-making, their pronouncements and the subconscious norms which guide the behavior of Japanese leaders will have little or nothing in common . . . .

“The tendency of the Japanese to regard international relations as an extension of hierarchic interpersonal
The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together among these regions.

relations at home...has a direct bearing on U.S.-Japan relations. Japan will continue to regard the United States as its superior on the totem pole and to 'second-guess' U.S. intentions by playing the game of reading into the countenance of America. Likewise, Japanese leaders will continue to assume that the United States will understand their country through a 'transference of thought,' even when they do not make their views explicit. This ability is, after all, one of the prerequisites to being a 'superior.' Americans may regard this expectation by Japanese as oppressive; however, if the 'big brother-little brother' syndrome derives from the structure of Japanese society (compounded by postwar relations between the two countries), then it may be unrealistic to expect any radical change overnight. Indeed, should the U.S. choose to disregard Japan's expectations, once and for all, the disappointment of the Japanese would be enormous and, in the absence of a sufficient cooling-off period, could touch off the desire to return to a dangerous exclusionism and chauvinism which once played havoc with Japan's external relations.

EUROPE-JAPAN TIES

Among the trilateral regions, ties between Western Europe and North America are relatively strong, as are those between Japan and North America. Ties between Western Europe and Japan have been the weakest in the "triangle" of three regions, and the occasion of the Trilateral Commission meetings in Japan was taken to organize a special Euro-Japanese conference. The directors of a number of key institutes and other organizations from both regions were among the twenty or so participants. After exploring the background to Europe-Japan relations, and the principles upon which the cultivation of more extensive linkages should be based, the meeting developed various concrete suggestions for moving forward. Much more effort will be given, for one thing, to developing the "infrastructure" of exchanges and intellectual contact. A Japanese delegation will visit Europe this fall to work further along these lines.