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TRIALOGUE

S/Fall 1983

2 Georges Berthoin: Editorial

3 Leszek Kolakowski: The Graft Rejected

8 Ernst Kux: Europe's Schism

14 Zbigniew Brzezinski: Undoing the Historical Legacy of Yalta

18 From Berlin: Richard von Weizsäcker

22 Czeslaw Milosz: A Nation

24 From Vienna: Bruno Kreisky

28 From Belgrade: Milovan Djilas

36 Yoshiya Kato: A Japanese Perspective on Eastern Europe

40 Robert A.D. Ford: The Soviet Union in the Coming Decade

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A quick look at the political map of Europe suggests a divided continent. But present geopolitical realities, compelling as they are, overshadow a fundamental reality: Empires come and go, people remain and change very slowly.

Any European knows by instinct and experience, both acquired through the ups and downs of history, how to disassociate himself from the hazards of global politics. Hence, a remarkable gift for survival under any circumstances. Present and past examples of such a gift do not need to be recalled.

This issue discusses aspects of that reality. It provides the reader a new opportunity to integrate in his geopolitical assessment of Europe and of the world the importance of a community of culture, memories and hopes which remain so much alive right in the center of Europe.

One might then understand better that any global strategy that ignores this reality would always be flawed.

Those in Western Europe who, since the end of World War II, are striving for the integrity and dignity of this continent, never lost sight of such an essential fact in their actions.

"Mitteleuropa" was and remains the heart of Europe.
What is usually and carelessly called "Eastern Europe" is of course Central Europe, both in geographical and, more importantly, in cultural terms. The distinction is of significance, for if we do not keep it in mind, we lump together the entire territory between the Elbe and the Ural Mountains, and thus miss a crucial aspect of the incurable conflict which has torn asunder the communist world and will stay with us in the future. The graft of Sovietism in Central Europe has not taken—or it has remained on the surface of a body which is incapable of absorbing something that is not simply oppressive, politically unacceptable and morally wrong, but is in addition an alien civilization.

Sharp distinctions in such matters are notoriously dubious, to be sure. The spatial boundaries between neighboring civilizations can never be drawn with precision, and none of them is ever immune to the influence of the others. The difficulty is somewhat similar to linguistic boundaries: There are mutual influences, mixed forms and, in some cases, uncertainty about whether a linguistic unit is a dialect or a separate tongue. In most cases, however, the linguists can reach an agreement: Alsatian, for instance, might have been influenced by French, Yiddish by Polish, but there is no doubt that both belong to the Germanic, and not the Romance or Slavonic, family of languages. The question is clearly more complicated when civilization units are under scrutiny, since there is no agreement on what is constitutive and essential in their description. Still, in many cases, there is little room for doubt. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia belong histor-

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The second intolerable aspect of Sovietism is the open mendacity of public language. The adjective "open" needs to be stressed here. The point is not that the official verbage is full of lies, but that its ostensible content is not really supposed to have a semantic value in the first place; it belongs to a realm of reality which has little to do with the daily life or daily speech; its function is not to inform but always to order, to regulate human behavior, to threaten, to encourage, to forbid, etc. People who have properly assimilated the usage of the "newspeak" are not even expected to believe that it is conveying something that might be true or false in the normal sense: They are expected to behave according to the rulers' wishes. The language of politics in the Western world may of course be infected with lies, hypocritical, stupid or brutal; it still remains a language with its normal function. The language of Sovietism has changed ontologically, as it were: It has become an element of the practical execution of power and has nearly lost other functions; it has become as a-semantic as music. This degeneration of language is naturally experienced by Poles as a kind of cultural expropriation; it is countered by cynicism and derision and can never be accepted as a part of normal life.

The third characteristic of Sovietism which must be mentioned in this context is the secular authorities' claims to complete control of minds, of human beliefs and ideas, not to speak of the amount of information people are allowed to get. This ideological despotism too is unacceptable to nations which, through centuries of conflict, have elaborated various forms of separation of the state from the church. However imperfect this separation might have been throughout the historical vicissitudes of Poland, the secular and ecclesiastic powers have never coalesced and secular authorities have never made claims to the full control of human conscience and thinking. The communist caesaropapism clearly collides with the cultural legacy of Central Europe.

I insist here on general and specific characteristics of Sovietism, and not on killing, torture, concentration camps, censorship and other manifestations which are not specific to this system and appear in it as derivative of the basic totalitarian principle. Neither do I want to dwell on the long-debated question of the specifically Russian roots of Soviet civilization, except for a brief remark. However important the contribution of the aboriginal Russian tradition might have been in shaping the fabric of Sovietism, the latter cannot be attributed to an eternal and immutable spirit of Russia. This country suffered a number of disadvantages compared to Western Europe; it did not go through the training of Scholasticism and, therefore, failed to acquire in the Middle Ages the logical discipline which had such enormous impact on Western science and law; it missed the splendor of the Renaissance with its skeptical spirit; until very late, the urbanization of Russia, unlike the rest of Europe, failed to result in the emancipation of the intellectuals. For centuries, the dominant concept of law was the decree of an autocrat, and the dominant concept of freedom—the absence of law. Such handicaps are not easily made up for. Yet, a great effort of "Westernization" of Russian culture in the second half of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries proved to be far from unsuccessful. It was during this period that Russia made its greatest lasting contributions to European civilization, especially in literature and music. Slavery was abolished in the eighteenth century, serfdom in the 1860s. Bolshevism restored both under other names and it nearly—though not entirely—destroyed the encroachments of Western spirit onto the Russian soil. However, we have no reason to believe that the decades of rapid development which preceeded the Bolshevik despotism were a freak of history, an unnatural break or a tumor forever buried under the weight of barbarity. There is indeed much proof that a cultural rebirth in Russia is still possible, despite the catastrophic losses brought about by communism, and despite decades of isolation, the extermination of so many talents and the general mental and moral decline. It took only a few years of very modest and very relative cultural relaxation in the late fifties, after the terrifying devastation of Stalin's rule, to produce a real movement of renewal in various areas of culture—literature, film, painting, the humanities.... Who could have expected that a Solzhenitsyn had survived under the rubble of Russian literature? Even now, after years of persecutions, intimidation, deportations and vicious censorship, the situation has not reverted to the days of Stalinism; there are many people in Russia desperately trying to scratch openings in the wall of cultural tyranny. Whatever may emerge in Russian culture that is genuine is bound
to be anti-Soviet in meaning, although not necessarily in form or expression. And the Russians who are truly attached to their tradition are well aware of the fact that this tradition has been ravaged by Sovietism and can only be restored against it.

Still, it is undeniable that Sovietism has not been imposed on Russia from outside, unlike in Central Europe; it has emerged and been kept in power by internal forces alone. In all countries of Central Europe, Sovietism would collapse instantaneously in the absence of the threat of Soviet tanks, in spite of the obvious fact that there is in those countries a sizable layer of party, police, military and state bureaucracy which is interested in the indefinite survival of the regime (they would fight, as they do, for their privileges, but none of them would shed blood for “communism” if it means anything but these very privileges). The Russians have no “big brother” watching them. Inevitably, the Soviet domination of Central Europe is perceived by the huge majority of people not only as a national and social oppression, not only as an economic exploitation, but as a cultural expropriation as well—an attempt by a foreign civilization to rob them of their historically shaped identity. The enormous interest of the Poles—and by no means only of their intelligentsia—in their history manifests this perception.

The moral to be drawn from this picture is simple. The entire Central European territory is potentially explosive and is bound to remain so, no matter how successfully the rulers manage temporarily to stifle the expression of revolt and discontent. With any political crisis—and such crises will inevitably occur—the great mass of latent hostility and all the provisionally silenced cultural forces will appear on the surface of social life. There will be no permanent “normalization” Soviet-style. Western leaders cannot prevent such convulsions from happening. The most short-sighted, and indeed most perilous, policy consists in panicky attempts to patch up each crisis as it occurs, in the hope that the Western world will soon return to business-as-usual and that a lasting pacification will be achieved.

Yet, business-as-usual is unlikely to prevail. Over thirty-eight years have elapsed since the end of the second World War; many people born after the war in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will soon have grandchildren of their own, and no peace treaty has been concluded or is likely ever to be; it appears that we are still in the period of armistice. We all know the reasons for this abnormality: The peace treaty, as the Soviet Union would have it, should legalize all its annexations and conquests. The Yalta agreements are often invoked by the Soviets as a substitute for a peace treaty, as an act that includes this legalization. To be sure, they speak about Yalta in general terms, never quoting, as far as I know, the actual text of these agreements, which would be most awkward indeed: As everyone knows, there is nothing in these agreements about the division of Europe, military blocs, let alone Soviet domination of Poland and other countries or the annexation of Baltic states. Instead, in these agreements free elections are announced. For some people, therefore, there is nothing wrong with the Yalta agreements; the only trouble, they argue, is that the Soviets failed to abide by them. This is true as far as the actual text of the agreements is concerned, but there is another facet to this affair: The Western powers did not formally legalize the Soviet domination of Poland, but they did accept—in defiance of their previous commitments—the break in the legitimacy of the Polish state and thus accepted de facto that a new state had to be formed on the basis of the existing situation (i.e., the Soviet army in Poland and the communist “provisional” government). To be sure, subsequent events and the absorption of Poland into the Soviet empire did not result from Yalta but from the very presence of the Red Army on Polish territory. Still, the acceptance of the rupture in the continuity of the state amounted to giving an ambiguous semi-legitimacy to the communist, and thereby Soviet, rule. Thus, even though the Soviets cannot quote any specific part of the Yalta agreements to support their claims (and they should be challenged to do so every time they mention these accords), it is not quite wrong to speak of Yalta as a symbolic root of the intrinsically morbid situation of Europe after the war. It seems that President Mitterrand alone among Western leaders has clearly stated that the world should think about ways of getting out of Yalta. Indeed, as long as Central European countries feel, quite rightly, that they have been torn by violence out of their historical continuity and forced into a foreign empire, Europe is bound to remain sick and potentially explosive.

It is not out of place to mention that, in some
respects, the situation is less manageable, at least in Poland, than it used to be in the period of Stalinism \textit{stricto sensu}. In spite of all the atrocities, persecutions, hostilities and bloodshed, in the first post-war years at least two aspects of the situation allowed for a certain amount of possible communication between the power apparatus and the population. First, the Communist Party did exist as an ideologically active organism; however wrong they may have been and however much in conflict with the majority of Poles, Party members were in good part genuinely committed to the cause of communism and ready to defend it; and a not quite negligible part of the pre-war intelligentsia with socialist or leftist sympathies believed that the new system, in spite of its repugnant aspects, would evolve into a better form, while getting rid of the unpleasant features of pre-war Poland. Indeed, the active opposition among the intelligentsia in those first years was quite limited (and it should be remembered that, in this period, even though the crucial levers of power were in the hands of communists, there were until 1948 non-communist parties legally operating and pluralism in cultural life was not yet stifled).

Second, there was a widespread feeling that the country, devastated and mutilated by war and the German occupation, had to be rebuilt, and that it was everybody’s duty to participate in this effort, even under communist rule.

Since then, everything has changed. After the illusions and disillusion of 1956, after decades of decline, communism has ceased to be an ideological issue at all: It is a matter of sheer violence; the Party is packed with power greedy and money greedy careerists and the communist believers are conspicuously nonexistent; the Party hardly ever tries, except for ceremonial occasions, to convince the people of the virtues of socialism; whenever it makes an effort to be heard by the population, it appeals to “geopolitical” concerns (which in fact amounts to saying, “We are in the clutches of a beast, just keep quiet and do not irritate it!”). In addition, the Party’s claims to run the Polish economy were utterly shattered and discredited after all the economic disasters brought to the country by its leadership; its credibility vanished forever. As a result, coercion has remained the only instrument of stability and the entire fabric of the society is torn apart.

I do not pretend to have good practical or strategic advice to offer. There are many possible scenarios and many have actually been described. My point is simply that no sober political strategy can be based on the expectation that this fundamentally rotten situation will last indefinitely or will be healed within the existing political framework.

And there is another moral: The hope for Europe is in a non-explosive disintegration of the Soviet empire. We cannot calculate the chances of such an evolution; we may only say that we have no proof that it is inconceivable—and the West can contribute to it. To abandon this hope amounts to admitting that, in the face of the absolutely rigid and immutable character of Sovietism, the West has nothing to do except to be prepared for a military confrontation which might result from Soviet miscalculation or from Soviet temptation to escape into war from intractable internal difficulties. If, however, the West does not give up the hope of a non-explosive development which would ultimately lead to the decomposition of the colonial empire, it can do a lot. It can encourage diversity and variety both in the Soviet Union itself and in its dependencies; but it must not tell the Russian people that they are hopeless and incurable barbarians—for to say so is not only untrue, but also reinforces their feeling of identification with the oppressive regime, whereas it is in the interest of civilization and peace to weaken this identification.

The Polish events of 1980-81 and the Solidarity movement have shown, for the first time, the possible ways of such a non-explosive decomposition of Sovietism. Even the brutal response to the popular movement and the military dictatorship established in December 1981—unprecedented event in the history of communist states—have a meaning which goes beyond the mere confirmation of the despotic nature of the system. They are to be seen as a link in its disintegration.
Since the end of the second World War, a schism has run across Europe from the North Cape to the Adriatic Sea. Germany, torn in two by it, has played a fateful role in Europe’s history and prolonged it now through its division. The two parts of Europe, with different political, economic and social systems, and their own separate alliances, face one another in a hostile or temporarily relaxed way.

As long as Europe stays divided, it will neither as a whole nor in its parts, be able to play an independent and prominent role in international affairs or become a weighty center in the global balance. Nor will the two parts, by themselves, reach a total and vital unification. Europe, in its divided form, will remain an epicenter of crisis on our globe, where the two superpowers and their blocs confront one another, and it may, in an extreme case, become the flashpoint of a world conflagration for the third time. The division of Europe as a geopolitical, economic and security factor is, in any case, more important and dangerous than other tension-loaded partitions, such as in Korea, in South-East Asia or on the Indian subcontinent. The task of developing a peaceful and prosperous world order cannot be solved without a satisfying answer to the question of Europe.

Europe, geographically fissured into the Scandinavian, Iberian, Italian and Balkan peninsulas and the British, Irish and Icelandic isles, with the wall of the Alps in the center, great rivers flowing in different directions into the Baltic, North, Mediterranean and Black Seas, and appearing as a small extension of the immense Asian land-mass, has never in its history found a unity—political, economic or cultural. As a mixture of various tribes and races, of Germanic, Romance, and other languages, the Europeans have been split among religious, cultural and national lines and fighting one another

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for domination on their continent or for colonial conquests. They found a common cause, for a short time, in the defense of the Occident against outside threats from the Orient by Mongolian tribes, Islamic Arabs and Turks and the Russian Empire. Ideas of Europe:

What then is this idea of “Europe” and “Europeanness” that has existed for over a thousand years? A great European, the Austrian writer Hugo von Hofmannsthal, wrote in the American magazine Dial in 1924 that, “in this old and complicated Europe, spiritual, historic and political things are closely and inextricably connected,” but could describe their interrelation only in meteorological terms, as “an all-European weather that, like the physical weather, has its maxima and minima, its storms and calms, foggy obscurations and stagnations, and whose thunderstorms and falls of temperature are the European wars and revolutions.” The vision of “European supranationality” was seen as manifest solely in the spiritual and cultural spheres, as an amalgamation of the Greco-Roman heritage, Christian religion, Renaissance humanism and the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.

The Europeans were able to dominate world policy up to the beginning of the twentieth century: They built an efficient economy on their continent, colonized Latin America and Africa, extended their rule to India and the Far East, sent settlers to North America, developed modern sciences, technology and industry, but never found for themselves a lasting political order embracing their continent and all its peoples. After Napoleon’s dreams of a European Empire were shattered, the victorious Holy Alliance attempted to create a European equilibrium in the final acts of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, based on the independence of states and the protection of the status quo.

The “concert of European nations” ended in the gunfire of World War I, as did Europe’s predominance in world policy. During and after the War, new concepts and structures appeared which subse-
quently competed with one another and have been shaping the fate of Europe to this day. A new order for Europe, proposed by President Wilson in his address in May 1916, was based on the principle of self-determination for nations and the plan for a League of Nations, in which the "principle of public right" would have precedence over the "individual interests of particular nations." From the breakdown of the dominant dynasties of the Hapsburgs, Romanovs and the Hohenzollerns, a host of new states emerged, such as Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Thomas Masaryk, the President of the new Czechoslovak Republic, proposed in April 1918, a "democratic organization of Europe" in concert with Wilson's ideas. The League of Nations in Geneva failed to protect the system of European relations established at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919—it was handicapped by the absence of the United States and became bogged down in legalistic procedures and national power-interests. Lenin came out vehemently against a "United States of Europe" and countered with his plan for a world revolutionary "Union of Soviet Republics"—a federation of "future Soviet-Germany, -Poland, -Hungary, -Finland with Soviet Russia." In Germany, which had lost its Eastern and Western territories after its defeat and where Wilson's ideas were equally abhorred, the concept of a "mitteleuropa" was developed, with the aim of a unification with Austria and domination over the new East-European states. Hitler then put this policy into practice step-by-step, with the subjugation of Austria and the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938, the division of Eastern Europe in concert with Stalin in their pact in August 1939, and finally at the start of the second World War with the attack of Poland on September 1, 1939. Hitler's fight against Europe in the name of a "new Europe," and the military occupation of almost all the continent, did not lead to the construction of a Greater Reich encompassing all of Europe, but rather to the destruction of Europe's traditional political, social and cultural fabrics. This fact, we must not forget, is at the bottom of today's European problems.

At the end of World War II, after the defeat of Axis powers, the Allied forces met at the Elbe, in Vienna and at the Adriatic Sea. The demarcation of their conquests became the dividing line of today's Europe. The facts created by feats of arms shaped Europe's post-war order more than the high-sounding intentions of the Atlantic Charta, signed in 1941 by Roosevelt and Churchill and, later, by Stalin. The absence of a binding contract between the three main partners of the Allied Nations, concerning rights and duties, spheres of interests and material claims, was one reason for the conflicts that would emerge later. Another was that their alliance consisted of two different political and social systems with opposing concepts and outlooks: Western democracies and Soviet totalitarianism. The quarrels between these two systems during the War and at the conferences of Teheran in 1943, and Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, about Poland, Germany, the Balkan, Trieste, Italy, and Greece already contained a list of the crises that developed after the War. The Yalta Conference in February 1945 changed the political map of Europe in a way similar to that of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 or the Paris Conference of 1919. For Stalin, the main purpose for a continuation of the alliance was the permanent suppression of Germany, whose partition he had already envisaged in Teheran. Yalta did not involve a demarcation of spheres of interests in Eastern Europe; on the contrary, it was the lack of binding agreements and the uselessness of the Western concessions to Stalin that led to an unplanned, uncontrolled distribution of forces in the post-war era. The division of Europe occurred after 1945 in a series of tests and confrontations that developed into the Cold War between the former allies. This division became final in 1948, when the new-born democracies in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania were brought under communist rule. Moscow prevented its satellites from participating in the Marshal Plan, the allied control of Germany came apart, and Stalin attempted, in the Berlin crisis, to push the United States out of Europe.

During the Cold War, two different political orders, economic systems and alliances emerged in Europe—on both sides of the Iron Curtain—which in principle have remained unchanged until today. Western Europe saw the creation of NATO, the birth of the European Economic Community, and the overcoming of the traditional hostility between France and Germany—the most important development in post-war Europe. In Eastern Europe, a forced unification into a Soviet-led "socialist community" was rigorously pushed ahead. The CMFA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) was
founded in 1949 as a counterpart to the Marshal Plan, and, to counter NATO, the Warsaw Treaty was concluded in 1955. In 1949, Soviet-controlled East Germany was made into a second German state (the GDR) and integrated into the Eastern bloc. Only Tito's Yugoslavia resisted Stalin's orders and became an independent socialist state.

The rigid division and hostile confrontation of the Cold War came to an end, in a practical sense, with Stalin's death in 1953. A new era of peaceful coexistence began with the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, which ended Austria's Four-Power occupation and gave it a neutral status. Both blocs then began to loosen. The subjugated peoples in the East started to rise against the harsh rule and economic deprivations imposed by communist regimes and Soviet overlords—first the workers in East Berlin in 1953, then the Poles and Hungarians in 1956. The Hungarian revolution was crushed by Soviet tanks; the West did not support their movements for greater independence and freedom and accepted their belonging to the Soviet bloc. On the Western side, the plan for a European Defense Community failed. France, under de Gaulle's leadership, distanced itself from NATO and introduced, as the second European power after Britain, its own nuclear forces. The two superpowers, as members and protectors of the two opposing European camps, were more and more involved in areas outside Europe—the USSR in the conflict with China, the United States in South East Asia, and both in the Near East.

**FROM DÉTENTE TO “SOLIDARITY”**

Washington and Moscow accepted, in the early seventies, a strategic parity, and in starting a policy of détente, agreed to reduce their confrontation in Europe. Across Europe's dividing line, movements and exchanges gained speed. The Federal Republic of Germany recognized the German Democratic Republic as a second German state, and settled her differences with the East European states and the Soviet Union in the "Eastern Treaties." The Western side expected to promote, with political cooperation, economic exchange and arms control with the East, a "convergency" of the two different systems. This is precisely what the Soviets wanted to prevent; they claimed, in the Brezhnev Doctrine, the right to intervene against internal changes in socialist countries. This doctrine was used as a justification for sending in Soviet tanks to quell Czech attempts to develop "communism with a human face" in August 1968. As a by-product of détente, a process for European security and cooperation was set in motion in 1972, in which (with the exception of Albania) all European states, Canada, the United States and the USSR took part. The Soviet leaders were interested in obtaining a guarantee from the West that the status quo and existing borders in Europe would be maintained. For such a recognition of both Soviet hegemony and the existence of the socialist states in Eastern Europe, the West requested concessions in the fields of human rights, information, and contacts between persons. A compromise was reached, which included provisions for extended trade and confidence-building measures in the military field. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki ended on August 1, 1975, with the signing of the Final Act by 35 heads of state. Without a doubt, the CSCE produced new hope for an end of Europe's division—trade increased and helped the West overcome the recession that followed the oil shock; the Eastern countries accelerated their technical modernization—and a more relaxed relationship between the two blocs developed. The expectation of a new European order after Helsinki proved to be as shortlived, however, as had been the case after Yalta, and for much the same reason—both sides expected different things from the Final Act. The implementation of its provisions was frustrating, especially in the field of human rights in the East, and follow-up conferences in Belgrade and again in Madrid became tedious affairs. The cooling of détente after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and especially after the events in Poland in 1980-81, marked a set-back in the CSCE process.

After a short breathing-time of détente and CSCE, relations between East and West and conditions within both alliances appeared to be worse than before, and the outlook seemed rather grim. The whole situation in Europe was altered, during the high time of détente, by the introduction of Soviet SS-20 rockets, which threaten all European capitals, thereby producing new insecurity and increasing Moscow's opportunities for political pressure on the West. NATO's response was the double-track decision of December 1979, envisaging either a mutual reduction of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) or, to begin at the end of 1983, the stationing
of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe to balance the SS-20s. Moscow is very intent on preventing this deployment, but without reducing its own INF. In the INF talks in Geneva, the decisive question is not only a military one (to balance or reduce both sides' INF), but also a political one regarding degree of the Soviet influence upon the decisions of NATO, its right to adequate defense, its choice of weapons, and, last but not least, the future cohesion of the Western alliance. At the same time, the contradictions within both alliances are increasing: Differences between the European NATO members and the United States are widening on the INF question, the assessment of Soviet policy, the conduct of East-West relations and trade with the East. They overlap with growing discrepancies, on both sides of the Atlantic, in economic and financial matters.

The situation within Western Europe is not satisfying either. The idea of a United Europe has lost attraction and followers, and has almost vanished in the younger generation. One of the reasons for this is the lack of progress in the integration of the E.C.; despite years of pronouncements and planning, it remains stuck in bureaucratic labyrinths and threatened by nationalistic self-interest. Cooperation in foreign affairs has not been, up to now, very convincing. Most Western economies are in stagnation or recession, millions of workers are out of jobs and whole branches of top industries—i.e., steel and shipbuilding to name just two—are no longer competitive or are going bankrupt. Alarm is spreading about an “economic decline of the entire of Western Europe.” Overdeveloped state bureaucracies and overextended welfare systems do not allow for necessary innovations. Finally, European science, technology and industry, which played an important part in the “economic miracles” of the past, are evidently falling behind modern developments in such fields as microelectronics, robots, information technology or biogenetics.

The setbacks in production and development in Eastern Europe are even more striking, and its economic and technological gap with Western Europe is widening. While it appeared to the outside that relations between the East European countries and the Soviet Union were becoming more cohesive, the methods employed by Moscow to unify the “socialist community” were not able to level out the differences of national traditions and development, nor produce the qualitatively new form of coherence that is claimed in theory. As Andropov recently had to confess, the expectations “that everything will become more unified in the socialist world” were not fulfilled and, in the future, the existence of “great differences in economy, culture and the methods of socialist building” must be taken into account. However, a blueprint for such a new form of cooperation, allowing each member of the “socialist community” a greater freedom to follow its “own way,” does not, however, exist. Such members, like Rumania for example, are asking in vain for a more equal role in decision-making and better conditions in economic relations. The coordination of the five-year plans of the CMEA countries has become more complicated, and a unified socialist market has not emerged. The economic relations within the CMEA are highly imbalanced because the East European countries must depend on Soviet fuel and raw materials, and have to pay for these with exports of technology and consumer goods. They also pay a heavy share in the build-up of Soviet military might. Internal tensions have come to a boil in Poland, with the appearance of the free trade union “Solidarity” in 1980, which was crushed in a military coup in December 1981. Despite this new oppression, however, the Polish crisis has not ended. Behind the facade of oppressive political systems and unassailable Soviet hegemony, the elements of instability and open anti-Russian sentiments are becoming more visible in Eastern Europe. At the moment, Europe’s schism seems to be hardening, and both sides, infested with insuperable difficulties, are drifting further apart.

What Future?

What are Europe’s prospects for the future, and will it be able to overcome its schism? A unified Europe could outrank both superpowers in population, productivity and as an economic market. Already, the ten members of the E.C. have, with 270 million inhabitants (and about 320 million including Spain and Portugal), a greater population than the USSR or the United States, they produce about a quarter of the world economic output and they are the biggest market on the globe. The six East European countries have a population of 110 million people (together with the European part of the USSR, it amounts to some 300 million), and claim to produce approximately one third of the world industrial output (of which the Soviet Union
claims one-fifth). In addition, the five neutral countries combined have 50 million inhabitants and also possess a high level of industrialization. Nevertheless, a European unity, no matter what the form, will remain a dream as long as the Europeans cannot disengage from their present dependence on the United States and the USSR; and neither Washington nor Moscow have the slightest intention of giving up their interests on the European continent. The Soviet Union's long-term strategy, in place since Stalin's time, is to push the United States out of Europe and to break up the Atlantic Alliance; the United States wants to loosen the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe. The American concept for a unification is still Wilson's idea of "democratic Europe," which is, of course, incompatible with a Soviet Europe as it was conceived by Lenin and remains, in essence, Moscow's plan. The gain of all of Europe by one superpower, and its loss by the other, alter the global balance—that is reason enough for both
the United States and the USSR to prevent such a development. The option of a global “super-Yalta,” giving the Soviet Union control over Europe, confirming a U.S. hegemony in Central and South America (including Cuba), and perhaps accepting Chinese influence in Asia, can be excluded as beyond all political rationality. In Western Europe, the idea of a “neutralization,” or, as others refer to it, “self-Finlandization,” is gaining ground, with the aim of “decoupling” the military alliance with the U.S. in NATO. This tendency is a far cry from de Gaulle’s proud concept of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural,” an independent, active center in world affairs; it reflects nothing more than a desire to opt out of the superpower confrontation and withdraw into a peaceful shelter. Besides, “anti-Americanism” alone is not a sustainable basis for the building of a new European structure; pushes for a neutralistic “decoupling” from the U.S. could one day be matched by an American isolationism in favor of a withdrawal from Europe.

In any event, it will be impossible to establish an independent Europe unless the following conditions are met:

—First, the creation of a supranational political organization and a broad common market—an aim that, until now and under more favorable conditions, has eluded the E.C.

—Second, independence from outside raw material and energy sources, or the securing of necessary supply-lines from abroad—this implies greater involvement outside Europe and a better coordinated foreign and security policy.

—Third, without an independent and efficient defense, a neutral Europe would become the prey of Soviet power. Apart from its costs to, and impact on, the industrialized societies, the establishment of a European defense would necessitate the sharing of the British and French nuclear potentials. Another impediment would be the integration of the FRG into this collective security system: German participation in nuclear defense, or access to nuclear weapons, is unthinkable, while on the other hand an exclusively conventional build-up would give the Federal Republic’s army an unwelcome strength in relation to other forces.

—And finally, needless to say, the problem of Germany’s reunification would have to be taken into account in any new European unity.

Whether, as is expected by the adherents of a “neutralization,” such a development on the Western side were to give the Soviet Union an incentive to loosen its grip on Eastern Europe, or even allow the satellites to join a neutral Europe, is very doubtful. The Soviet leaders will always try to keep the “socialist community” under their control because, in their evaluation, it is the richest bounty of their victory in World War II—it has changed the global balance of power and provided them with a glacis against the West. Soviet rule in Eastern Europe will remain infested with the germs of future conflicts that may be generated on the inside by the nationalism and thirst for self-determination of the subjugated peoples. Of course, Moscow can again let an Iron Curtain fall, indurate its rule in the East, and harden the split of Europe. The other option, just as unpromising, is that Moscow may let its satellites go free, in which case Eastern Europe would become fragmented into small nationalistic states.

Altogether, for Europe three dangers remain. The first is that, as the main field of confrontation between the two superpowers, its fate will depend on decisions made in Washington and Moscow, and the state of relations between the two. Second, a Europe unable to overcome its division and find a more coherent integration or, at least, a better cooperation between its parts, will remain stagnant, leading to a lapse in the development of modern science and technology. Europe would then lose in the competition with more dynamic societies like the United States or Japan. The third danger is that, quite apart from important economic and security problems, traditional forces, such as the Germans’ desire for reunification or the East European nations’ quest for freedom, may grow in strength, upsetting existing structures and relationships on this continent.

The solution to the East Europeans’ striving for independence and to the problem of German reunification can only be found in the broader context of a politically united Europe. The problems of Europe on the whole cannot be treated in an isolated way, but rather in a global context and, above all, in the framework of a more intensive cooperation with the other modern industrial societies in North America and the Far East on a trilateral basis. Hope may be, as Hofmannsthall expected sixty years ago, with the “European weather” affluent in a “planetary atmosphere.”

** YOU HAVE SPOKEN RECENTLY OF “REPUDIATING THE LEGACY OF YALTA;” WHAT PROSPECTS DO YOU SEE FOR CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO IN EUROPE? **

Next year will mark the fortieth anniversary of Yalta. It is time for us on both sides of the Atlantic to start thinking about the future of Europe in light of these forty years. In my judgment, the division of Europe is not only the unnatural consequence of the destruction of Europe in the course of two World Wars; in the long run, it is also an inherently unstable and potentially dangerous situation. Accordingly, I think one of the longer range objectives that could help to restore a greater sense of trans-Atlantic purpose ought to be that of peacefully undoing the division of Europe. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, for many Europeans, the existence of the two alliances across a dividing line in the middle of Europe has to be seen as an extension of superpower efforts to perpetuate the status quo. That status quo exists on the prostrate body of Europe. In my view, the sense of shared democratic purpose would be galvanized if we could make it increasingly clear that, in the remainder of this century, it will be the shared objective of Western democracies to peacefully—and I underline the word peacefully—but also very deliberately, work to achieve the goal of undoing the existing division. That means a very deliberate policy designed to engage the East Europeans in closer contacts with the West and will also mean, later on, a willingness to explore the possibility of somewhat differing security arrangements in the heart of Europe, so that such evolutionary political change is not seen by the Soviets as a direct challenge to them.

** WHAT SPECIFIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DO YOU HAVE IN MIND? **

I think it is sometimes counterproductive, when one wishes to engage in a long term process, to be too specific about some of the steps that will be required later on. If you are too specific, you will immediately galvanize opposition to your approach—an opposition derived from the natural proclivity of most people to favor the status quo because it is more familiar and more comfortable. Accordingly, let me limit myself to some general propositions: The confrontation which now exists in the heart of Europe, based on highly concentrated military forces, is a byproduct of Western anxiety that the Soviets might invade the West; and it is a by-product of Soviet determination militarily to control their empire. It is that reality which, gradually and over time, has to be changed. Some arrangements regarding a progressive thinning-out of forces, some special zones precluding certain kinds of weapons, would be the normal and mutually reassuring concomitants of closer political and economic ties.

Let me add one point about what I mean by “undoing the legacy of Yalta.” In the formal sense, Yalta never involved the division of Europe; it involved guarantees that Eastern Europe would have freedom of choice and democratic systems. In an informal sense, however, it made the Soviet Union the guarantor of the execution of these promises in Eastern Europe, thereby de facto placing half of Europe under Soviet control and creating the division of Europe. Thus, by “repuating Yalta,” I mean repudiating the historical legacy of Yalta, rather than any formal agreement reached at Yalta itself. At the same time, it is very important—and I wish to stress this point because very often there is confusion over it—not to associate the repudiation of Yalta with a repudiation of the Helsinki agreements.

To the contrary, the Helsinki
agreements need to be abided by:
They are not a concession by the
West to the East but, if anything,
rather the opposite. It is sometimes
argued that, with Helsinki, we ac-
cepted the status quo in the East.
This is not at all the case. The
status quo exists; all we did was
accept the notion that existing
boundaries would not be changed.
That is to the good: Until we ac-
cepted that notion, the Soviet
Union could present itself to the
Czechs or the Poles as the protec-
tor of their territories. By
removing that issue, we, in effect,
weakened the role of the Soviet
Union. At the same time, by insist-
ing on Basket III, we have
legalized and institutionalized the
notion that the West has a right to
comment on the internal practices
of the East European governments,
and that the pursuit of human
rights is a Pan-European obliga-
tion. Therefore, I consider the
Helsinki agreements to be of net
benefit to the West and I in no way
associate the repudiation of the his-
torical legacy of Yalta with a
rejection of them. On the contrary,
I think it is important to reaffirm
our commitment to Helsinki while
rejecting Yalta.

Pendence?”
It is nothing new. In fact, in the
very first months of the Carter
Administration, we had a high
level policy discussion of our posi-
tion toward Eastern Europe and, at
the time, three options were being
discussed. The first was to have an
undifferentiated positive attitude
towards all European countries.
Another was to favor those Eastern
European countries with a more
independent foreign policy, nota-
bly Rumania and Yugoslavia. The
third option was to focus on those
countries which pursue a more
open, pluralistic domestic policy,
notably Hungary and Poland. It
was my view that the latter two
options should be melded into
one—namely, that the United
States should be more responsive
to those countries which have a
more independent foreign policy abroad
and to those with a more national
or independent policy at home.
What Vice President Bush said
recently is, I think, consistent with
that and makes good sense at this
stage. It should be a matter of
interest to the East Germans or to
the Bulgarians to note that some
other country, which we do not
need to identify specifically, is able
to enjoy better relations with the
West because of some marginal,
but over time increasingly signif-
ificant, accommodations in either its
domestic or its foreign policy. This
then serves as a constructive ex-
ample that a better relationship with
the West produces tangible bene-
fits, without necessarily upsetting
the political apple-cart.

Do you see any “parallel”
loosening of both al-
liances West and East?
Some loosening may be taking
place, but the real danger is that it
may not be synchronous but rather
sequential. And if it is sequential,
more likely than not the West, not
the East, will become looser first.
If that happens, a military-political
imbalance will have been created
which would place the indepen-
dence of Western Europe in
jeopardy. This is why it is so im-
portant for us to pursue not so
much a policy designed merely to
reconsolidate the West by sharper
confrontation—which has the
effect of consolidating the East
even further—but, rather, a policy
which taps our pluralism as a posi-
tive weapon to entice the East
while encouraging it to be more
pluralistic. Undoing the legacy
of Yalta is, I think, a very worthwhile
objective in that context, because it
gives everyone a sense of direction.

Do you presently detect in
Western Europe a mood
favoring the kind of peace-
ful change you envisage?
I think there is a potential for
tapping such a mood, but if I had
to describe the predominant mood
in Western Europe, I would have
to use the words uncertainty, con-
fusion, even pessimism perhaps.
Europe is not doing as well as, in
my judgement, it could and cer-
tainly should. America and Japan
are plunging into the “technetronic
era” with increasing success (some
of the views I expressed in my book *Between Two Ages* are even more relevant now, I think, than when they were written ten years ago. Europe, however, is not keeping pace; thus there is a potential for a deeper economic malaise there, which will increase Western Europe’s attraction to the closed Soviet and Eastern European market, with the possibility that the Western Europeans will turn towards this market while disassociating themselves from the United States. The net result of such a prolonged process would be not so much a disbandment of the NATO alliance as a gradual process of political and economic subordination of Western Europe to the Soviet Union. That is the danger which needs to be averted. One way of averting it is to identify America and Western Europe with a shared objective that is historically valid. I do not believe that concentrating on the purely military dimension of the East-West problem, or trying to get the Western Europeans to hew to our line on the Middle East or in Central America, is going to do it. We have to identify ourselves with a cause which has meaning to the Europeans and which has even some deeply felt emotional significance for the West Europeans. I think undoing the division of Europe, which is essential to its spiritual and moral recovery, is a goal worthy of the Western democracies. How do you fit the Pope’s action in this picture? I do not want to fit what the Pope is trying to achieve into this picture—I know it would result, three weeks from now, in a new attack in *Pravda* to the effect that the Pope and I are orchestrating some kind of joint strategy. (As you know, I have been accused by the Soviets of having had something to do with the selection of the Pope.) Therefore, what I am advocating has to be seen as totally separate from what it appears to me the Pope is doing.

What he is doing is, I think, historically fundamental. He views the West as beset by growing hedonism and materialism, and in need of genuine spiritual revival. He sees the East as dominated by a bankrupt ideology and potentially very ripe for a genuine spiritual revival far beyond the frontiers of Eastern Europe and including Orthodox Russia. In other words, my impression is that the Pope’s vision is an extraordinarily dynamic and optimistic one. Too many Western observers, in my judgement, have focused exclusively on his interest in Poland. I believe that his interests are far broader than that and historically very ambitious. A remarkable book has been published on the last days of Cardinal Wyszynski, when he was dying in Warsaw, which includes some conversations he had by telephone with the Pope. It was rather interesting to see the extent to which Cardinal Wyszynski too, while dying, was expressing the view that the East is becoming ripe for a spiritual renaissance. Right or wrong, and these views may be too optimistic, I think the Pope sees today’s West and East as terrains for new missionary zeal—a zeal not in relationship to a very remote task but a zeal in relation to genuine potential.


Before his election as Governing Mayor of West Berlin in June 1981, Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker had been a Christian-Democratic member of the Bundestag since 1969, and its Vice-President since 1979. Following are excerpts from a conversation with Dr. von Weizsäcker at Berlin’s City Hall on September 19, 1983, only days after his much heralded visit with Erich Honecker—the first meeting ever to be held by a Mayor of West Berlin with the leader of the German Democratic Republic.

A CITY DIVIDED: THE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE...
The division of the city, the country and the continent, of course, came as a result of a war waged by Hitler: We cannot turn anywhere else to complain about a situation which, in a historical perspective, certainly cannot endure.

Apart from the political split, the city was divided physically more than twenty years ago. This was meant to prevent the people from the other side of the city and from East Germany from escaping forever to the West. That need, felt by the leadership on the other side of the wall, was attributable to the steady drain of people towards the West. The Eastern side has paid for this with a very heavy setback in its international reputation: To need a wall in order to close one’s population in is not a very healthy sign of the population’s approval of its leadership. Yet, the Eastern side has argued more than once that, in the meantime, they have paid their price and time is now working in their favor. In order to support the viability of West Berlin, they stress, West Germany and other parts of the Western world have to continue investing more and more heavily and might very well grow tired of doing so. It is an unnatural situation, they say, to be kept alive only by artificial subsidies; this, in the long run, will lead to a development where “West Berlin will fall as a ripe apple into our hands.” It is our task to prove that they are wrong. This is not easy, but certainly possible.

...AND TODAY’S PROBLEMS
We have to distinguish internal problems from those which concern East-West relations in the city or in the country.

Internally, we are faced with unemployment and insufficient economic development—a problem which is made more difficult by the geopolitical/geographical situation of the city. Yet, after having lost very many jobs—far more jobs proportionally than in the Federal Republic as a whole—I think we are on our way to getting a modernization movement in industry going. This will, slowly but, I hope, steadily get us new competitive jobs—jobs which can stand the competition in world markets better than some of the old jobs we have here. We have lost the headquarters of some big companies; we have not lost the scientific and cultural and research know-how, personnel, and investment; thus leading industrial groups in modern technology in Berlin find very fine surroundings and partners in the universities and research institutes. This is the main direction of our work, and some early and steady successes can already be noted.

In our relations with East Berlin and East Germany, the main problem lies in the difficulties people have in getting together. Every West Berliner going to the other part of the city for a day’s visit, an hour’s visit even, has to pay an entrance fee—an experience quite unheard of in any other part of the world known to me. If a family consisting of two parents and two children and a grandmother want to see their relatives in the other part of the city, they have to pay, for just one afternoon, 100 Marks, which is often simply more than they can afford. This is contrary to what had been agreed upon when the Four-Power Agreement was signed more than ten years ago. This is the main point of contention between East and West Berlin at the present time. Second, we want to see possibilities for short or longer trips or vacations from the East to the West. In countries like Czechoslovakia or Hungary, people of every age are entitled, every third or fourth year, to some form of travel to another country of their choice. This is not the case for the East Germans, and we want an improvement on that...
front. What we really want is the implementation of Basket III of the Helsinki agreement, and of the agreements just recently reached in Madrid. This is our main purpose. Apart from that, there are quite a number of links and meeting possibilities in the cultural, economic, technological, and also political fields. On that score, I have just been visiting Honecker a few days ago and had a rather lengthy conversation with him which is quite a “first”.

**MEETING WITH HONECKER: SIGN OF CHANGE?**

Not a “change,” but the underlining of a development for which you can already find other signals. I had always intended to meet with Honecker one day. It is, on the one hand, not risky—it cannot bring disadvantages with regard to the status of our part of Berlin. I am not in a position to change that status anyhow; it rests with the four powers; German leaders, whether they come from the West or the East, cannot change it. As to the political propaganda that might result from such a meeting, I have made it very clear at the beginning of my conversation with Honecker that, should either one try to use the meeting at the expense of the other side, it would not only be the first but also the last meeting of this sort.

Let us go ahead, therefore, as the four powers did with the Four Power Agreement. For if you look at the Four Power Agreement, you will see that there was a kind of “entrance gate” to the practical and pragmatic problems that would have to be solved in connection with it: On the one hand, the three Western powers state that the existing ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic are to be maintained and further developed. On the other hand, this is to take place while Berlin shall not be governed by the Federal Republic and is not a constituent part of it. Now, if you take those two statements together and look at them more closely, you will find that the second inherently contradicts the first: The ties that exist and that are to prevail, in substance, amount to nothing but a description of Berlin as a part of the Federal Republic and of our common federal government. I do not participate in the Bundesrat (the “upper” chamber of our federal legislature); I do not have full voting power there as do the other ten Länder. Nevertheless, in one way or another, we do participate in all this. This is why I think it was very reasonable not to get bogged down with those questions of principle—over which the four powers have been quarreling since the end of the war, and over which East and West Germany are still quarreling—and thereby prevent ourselves from moving to other, more practical questions. Such is precisely the aim of such a meeting: to discuss practical problems—and, of course, we have some. They may not be of worldwide importance, but they are of importance to us. For instance:

—We want to have clean air; to this end, we now invest in our energy plant something like DM 1 billion. In so doing, of course, we end up protecting mainly the surroundings of Berlin, not ourselves. We want, therefore, to see some kind of corresponding move from the other side.

—We have a local traffic system, connecting the two parts of the city, which has so far been run by East Berlin (the “S-Bahn”). Now the East Berlin authorities do not want to go on with it any longer, and want us to take it over. Whether that is going to happen remains to be seen, but we want to talk about it.

—In four years, we are going to have the 750th anniversary of Berlin. It is, in a sense, a quite important date—not that a anniversary is a peace treaty or a “reunification,” but it is a national event. Should we go on planning this anniversary in both parts of the city separately, without telling the other side what dates and kinds of events we have in mind? I should hope not. I asked Honecker if he would be willing to name a representative, which he did, and I named one of my colleagues here. These kinds of practical questions were really the main subjects of that meeting—apart from the fact that we, of course, did speak about deployment of the INF...

**DÉTENTE—A WORD OF THE PAST?**

I still believe in old principles such as the principles put forward by Belgium’s foreign minister Harmel in the late 1960s. I think the purpose of NATO was, and will remain, two-fold. We have to see to it that we are able to defend our freedom; and we should use that security aspect, that self-defense aspect of NATO, not just as an aim in itself, but rather as a stepping stone to promote better relations—this you might or might not call a “détente” policy between East and West. I think it is very understandable for this American President—it is definitely not his fault, nor that of any specific President or Administration—to be disappointed by what seemed to have started fairly hopefully in the early ’70s. True, we have had this Berlin agreement as one important posi-
itive result of the Ostpolitik. On the other hand, while during the ’70s the Americans more or less relied on the notion that neither side should try to get a unilateral advantage over the other side; while they did abolish their compulsory military service; while they did interrupt their B-1 bomber program, and while President Carter did forego deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon [neutron bomb]—the Soviets went on and on building up their weapon systems. This, combined with what the Soviets did outside NATO (in Africa, or in Asia as in Afghanistan) and with what happened (this time, not due to the Soviets) in Iran, explains why many Americans should have felt, “We are not going to be kicked around anymore in the world under the label of détente. We do have to see to it that a proper balance of power is being safeguarded and that cooperation with the Soviets entails certain principles to which both sides have to adhere.”

On the other hand, at the present time, East-West relations, in my personal view, suffer from one rather severe drawback: Due to the Soviets and the Americans, we now have relations or negotiations concerning exclusively security, arms control, arms build-down or arms build-up, but nothing else. And behind this is the belief—I would say both in the Pentagon and the peace movement in Europe—that peace is the consequence of either armament or disarmament. In my opinion, both views are wrong. I think neither armament nor disarmament per se are paving the way to peace. A peaceful, active cooperation is what paves the way to disarmament.

To put it in terms of the three Baskets of Helsinki, we are faced with the same old problem: Basket I is very important, Basket II is very important, but if you want to have improvement in both you need to start with Basket II. Unless you work to develop and promote cooperation in the many fields where there are, objectively speaking, common or even parallel interests on both sides, you will not get progress on human rights. If you deny the Soviets cooperation on the many subjects in which they are so vitally interested—especially since they are perhaps even further behind the West than they used to be twenty years ago—and then expect them to give in, to compromise on the one and only field where they have had a feeling of success (armament), you will have to wait for a long time.

In short, I can see why the practice of détente has been at times so difficult to understand and may have become, in the end, unpopular—far beyond the Reagan circles—with Americans in general. I think, on the other hand, that it is our task—and, if I may say so, because of our experience here, also Berlin’s little contribution—to see that cooperation should not be neglected, that Basket II should not be neglected. This is what I am working on as much as I can, and to this, of course, my meeting with Honecker was also meant to be a contribution.

Influencing Soviet Behavior: What Mix of “Carrot and Stick”?
First of all we have to be aware that no general, all-purpose recipe exists. We will not force the Soviet Union on its knees by boycotting it. Nor will we lead the Soviet Union to direct emancipation and democratization by simply cooperating in every possible field. The Soviets will be willing and able to stick to their political priorities and not to sacrifice them to inducement or to some form of blackmail or menace from the West. On the other hand—and that may have been, for instance, the case in Poland recently—it can be sometimes quite worthwhile to contemplate doing away with certain boycott measures and to announce that some boycotts will be lifted if this or that happens. I think, on the whole, Henry Kissinger has been quite right, theoretically speaking: To link one’s initiatives and measures to a given development and to proclaim that one will be watching for such a development very closely is legitimate and can be productive—in many cases, though not in all. For ourselves, we also face this very kind of problem, with the same kind of options, on a smaller scale in East-West German relations—economically, for instance, with what we call the “swing agreement” [a stand-by line of credit made available to East Germany since 1951] without any payment of interest. It started with DM 200 Million, was DM 850 Million in 1982, and will drop to DM 600 Million in 1985, when new negotiations are scheduled to take place.

In the very long run, I do believe that a steady form of cooperation is what can improve the general situation and the East-West relationship. But once we introduce a new step and commit ourselves to it, we should not expect any instant result or instant response to it. Hence the need, at the bottom line, for great steadiness and caution.
NATION

The purest of nations on earth, when its judged by a flash of lightening,
Thoughtless and swooping in everyday toll!

With no pity for widows and orphans, no pity for old people,
Stealing a crust of bread from a child's hand.

Ready to offer their lives to Death, Heaven's wrath on their foes,
Smiting their enemy with the screams of orphans and widows.

Entrusting power to men with the eyes of traders in gold,
Elevating men with the conscience of brothel-keepers.

The best of their sons remain anonymous,
They appear once only, to die on the barricades.

Bitter tears of that people cut a song in the middle,
And when the song dies away, many voices tell jokes.

A shadow stands in a corner, pointing to his heart.
Outside a dog barks to the invisible planet.

Great nation, invisible nation, ironic nation,
They know how to distinguish truth and yet to keep silent.

They camp on marketplaces, concerning in wisecracks,
They deal in old door handles stolen from ruins.

A nation in crumpled caps, carrying on their backs their belongings,
They go west and south searching for a place to live.

A nation with neither cities nor statues, neither sculptures nor paintings,
Only with a word passed from mouth to mouth and a poet's prophecy.

A man of that nation, standing by his son's cradle
Repeats words of hope, always, till now, in vain.

1948

Translated by Reiner A. Winter and the author.
N A R O D

Najczystszy z narodów, ziemia ojadząca światło błyskawicę,
Bezmyslny a przebity w miarze zwyklego dniu.
Bez łitości dla wdów i sierot, bez łitości dla starców,
Kradnący sprzedaż dziecka skorze od chleba.
Zyje składaj ofierze aby skąpane gniew niebios na wrogów
Płaczem sierot i kobiet wroga porażę.
Władzę oddaje ludziom o oczach handlarzy złotem,
Pożywa wznowić się biedziom o sumiennych zarządcach bordelu.
Najlepszy jego synowie pozostają nieznani,
Zjawiają się tylko raz jeden aby umrzeć na barwakach.
Gorzsie lży tego ludu przerywają w połowie piosenki,
A kiedy milknie piosenka mówi się głosno dowcipy.
W katach z trzmiel przy stole i pokazuje na sierocę,
Za oknem wyspies do nowy dziej się planuje.
Naród wielki, naród niezwalczony, naród ogarnięty
Umie rozpoznać prawdę zachowując o tym milczenie.
Koczunia na targowiskach, porozumienie w się zatem,
Handluje starym klątkami na przyjęciach w rumach.
Naród w porannych czapach, z całym dobytkiem na plecach,
Idzie szukając śdzieb na zachodzie na południe.
Nie ma ani miejsca ani pomników, ani rzeczy dla malarstwa,
Tylko z uści do ust miesione słowo i wyroby poetów.
Mężczyzna tego narodu, przystając nad synem kolyski,
Kowarza słowa nadzieję, zawsze dobycie czas dałemnie.

1943
Federal Chancellor of Austria from 1970 to 1983, Bruno Kreisky had previously served as Foreign Minister (1959-66), and was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the time of the signing of Austria’s celebrated State Treaty of 1955, which led to the evacuation of Soviet and other occupation forces from his country. Kreisky was arrested and imprisoned in 1935 when the Social Democratic Party he had joined a year earlier was outlawed; arrested again in 1938 when Austria was under Nazi occupation, he escaped to Sweden where he spent the war as an exile.

Following are excerpts from a conversation with the Chancellor at his Vienna home on September 23, 1983. The Chancellor’s opening salvo was directed at Vice President Bush’s remarks in the Austrian capital, just two days before, to the effect that “The United States will engage in closer political, economic, and cultural relations with those countries such as Hungary and Rumania which assert greater openness or independence. We will strengthen our dialogue and cooperation with such countries.” I cannot agree with his views, noted Kreisky, mindful of Austria’s status of neutrality, of which he was a principal architect and the most illustrious guardian. You can make such a policy, but you should never talk about it; any move by Mr. Reagan in the future is doomed to be read in Moscow with great suspicion. This is the best way to reduce existing possibilities of disengagement in Central Europe. Frankly, it was incredible to me that a man in such a position could utter something like this in an open forum—it is simply counter-productive to the very policy one is envisaging....

Kreisky then continued: This being said, I see three principles, always to be kept in mind when it comes to our relations with Eastern Europe.

Dealing with Eastern Europe: Three Premises

First, there have been from the very beginning, and still are, crucial differences among the Communist countries of Europe. Yes, the Soviet bloc is a military alliance, but it includes very different countries with different national identities, and we have, therefore, to treat these countries differently. Take the Hungarians, for instance, who are not Slavs; the Poles, who are not pan-Slavic; the Bulgarians, who have always been pan-Slavic; the Czechs, who have a democratic history all of their own—and so on and so forth. In spite of the fact that they belong to this military bloc, there are very subtle, yet very profound, differences which you have to keep in mind when making policy towards “the East.”

Second, there is a striking absence of democratic tradition in Eastern Europe. None of Eastern Europe’s countries, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, ever had a real democracy—not Hungary; not Bulgaria; not Poland, which, under Marshal Pilsudski, had a highly developed military dictatorship not much different from today’s; not Yugoslavia, which had a military dictatorship with notably corrupt politicians; not Rumania, with its dictatorship of corrupt lawyers and officers under the King.... Czechoslovakia was the only country with a highly developed democracy. Elsewhere, sad as it is to say, dictatorship is nothing new. There is no other real point of reference in the people’s minds, no remembrance of any kind of true democracy, even if today’s regimes are ideologically different from yesterday’s. Germany, on the other hand, was an old democracy, and so was Austria—in both cases, there was after the war something to harken back to, and weathered democratic leaders could be found. Willy Brandt was brought up in a democracy, I was brought up in a democracy. This makes a tremendous difference and should always be kept in mind.

Third, let us always remember that only in a time of détente is there a chance for dissent—in literature, in the arts, in the allegedly “small” things of life and, as we have seen after Helsinki, also to some extent in political matters. We did feel, at the time of détente, that a process of liberalization was developing. Public dissidence of the kind that arose
under Khrushchev's "thaw" could never have existed in the time of Stalin. Think of this explosion in literature—a very deep one, reaching the entire intellectual class. Think of Solzhenitsyn and all the others at that time. Think of the repercussions in other Eastern European countries—with the exceptions today of Czechoslovakia and Rumania where strong Stalinist strains remain. (In this respect, one of the most baroque remarks of Mr. Bush was the suggestion that human rights might somehow be better in Rumania—when Rumania is probably more Stalinist than any other European Communist country, and probably even more Stalinist than the Soviet Union itself!) DÉTENTE SHELVED? Only in the United States. Because of the propaganda of the current Administration; and because of a fact which has nothing to do with détente, namely, the Soviet Union's destruction of the climate of détente with Afghanistan. Détente was a process with tremendous consequences in Europe. As one who headed the government of Austria for thirteen years, I can tell you that none of our economic and political successes during that time would have been possible if we had not had détente. If the Cold War had been going on, monies and resources would have left the country, we would have had none of the prosperity and abundance so much in evidence today in the streets of Vienna. This is also true in Helsinki, in Copenhagen, in Stockholm, in Berlin itself. I remember my visit to President Kennedy in the early sixties: Our whole hour of talks was full of telephone calls about the situation in Berlin. See how calm, how quiet it has been around Berlin during the last few years! This is the difference that détente has made in Europe. That some Texans should think détente inconsequential is no reason to forget what a tremendous achievement it was on this continent. I am not for appeasement; I am the first to recognize that the Soviets were indeed guilty of destroying détente, partly because of Afghanistan and partly because of the deployment of the SS-20s in Europe. Now we have the Soviet side viewing Mr. Reagan's America as bent on being strong enough to dictate political conditions to them.... These are the hard facts we have to live with.

The division of Europe can be gradually reduced only in a time of détente. As long as the Cold War prevailed, we experienced total division exemplified by the Iron Curtain, which no one could cross. In recent years, thousands of Hungarians were able to come to Vienna, Austrians went to Hungary, various degrees of changes and improvements occurred with most Eastern European countries—in short, Europe's division was attenuated. THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY... The signing of the State Treaty was a unique event, in that it resulted in the Soviets leaving Austria. As one who was intimately involved in the negotiations, I can only find one explanation for this: Khruschev recognized that the Stalinist aspects of Soviet foreign policy had to be liquidated, just as he had started to liquidate Stalinism inside the Soviet Union. Clearly, he and his fellow Politburo members wanted to change the climate of the Cold War, which the Soviets had lost as a result of the policy of containment: They lost Berlin, they lost Yugoslavia, they lost the civil war in Greece, they "lost" the Marshall Plan, which they had meant to hinder when they erected the Cominform, they lost Korea, they "lost" the peace treaty with Japan—and in the end, with the policy of détente, they lost the Cold War.... I'm a living witness that we have never had thirty years like those that followed the State Treaty—thirty years without any interference from the Soviet side. Of course, there were occasional reproaches and criticisms, the Soviets expressed their unhappiness about Austria joining the European Council, about Austria becoming too close to the Common Market, etc. Yet, we did everything we had to do and, again, I am a living witness of the results: thirty years without interference. ...ANY LESSONS FOR OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES? No. The other European countries do not really have anything similar to "negotiate" with the Soviet Union, with the sole exception of Germany and the issue of reunification. This the Soviets will never accept. They can create a lot of propaganda around this issue and are likely to do so now, they can put forward German neutrality as an alleged precondition, but it is meaningless. I remember asking them about it: Neutrality, they argued, is a matter of a piece of paper; you can sign such a paper with a small country and be reasonably sure that it will always observe it. But what can we do, Mikoyan would ask me rhetorically, if a large, densely populated country such as Germany decides overnight to give up its neutrality? Pursuit of such a reunification
is therefore an unrealistic approach. The Soviets have talked about it in the hope of disorienting German public opinion, and they will do so again. Likely offers to dismantle the SS-20s are in the same vein: We know that no Russian marshal would accept the destruction of such expensive weapons, to say nothing of the verification problems involved. You can withdraw them or find other technical means of controlling them, but destruction seems incredible to me....

THE CONCEPT OF MITTELEUROPA—MORE ALIVE TODAY?

The idea of Mitteleuropa had a chance at the time of détente—not in the political sense, of course, because we cannot change the blocs; but as far as people, their mind-sets, their attitudes, their cultural exchanges are concerned, we had a tremendous chance, and we still have a chance. Take but one example: Cultural exchanges between Hungary and Austria have been quite substantial over the years—this has been a chance for the Hungarians to "narrow the gap." When I would make a speech in Budapest or in Belgrade, it was my habit never to speak of Eastern Europe—I would say that "we belong to Central Europe." This is the kind of thing you can say in Budapest, and they appreciate immensely this notion of a shared Central European identity. For them, this is a chance for "disengagement" from the Communist ideology. All this will be destroyed in a new Cold War, and we are on the eve of a new Cold War—only, under much more difficult conditions than prevailed during the time of the policy of containment. Europe today is the biggest armed camp we ever knew, with millions of soldiers and arms with an unprecedented capacity to kill poised on both sides....

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE

As a Social-Democrat, with a so-called Marxist or "Austro-Marxist" education, I have one big question in my mind: How could one envisage a movement towards democracy in Eastern Europe? There is a substantial difference between partial liberalization and democratization. It seems to me that, as long as the Soviet Union is powerful and militarily strong, all forms of liberalization will end at the point where democratization is near—we have seen it in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, we have seen it in Poland. No matter what we try, it will always end in the same way. Our only chance is if the process of liberalization starts in the Soviet Union. And this, in turn, is possible only if the Soviet Union is not threatened militarily, for under military threat the marshals will have the last word.

In what way the Soviet Union can or will change, I do not know. But we should keep in mind that democracy is not only something political—it also means, for instance, granting more substantial rights to women (their situation in the Soviet Union is terrible); more rights to the people in the kolkhoz; more rights to the workers in the factory, and so on.... Granted, these rights will have to be limited in scope, but only thus can a democratic process start. (Democracy is indeed a process, a permanent one—witness our experiences in the West.) And it can only happen over time—unless you believe that Russia can be made democratic by war. But what does war mean today? It would amount to creating democracy among ruins.

We had some opportunities in the past. Mr. Andropov knows precisely what is wrong with the Soviet Union, and what could be done, cautiously. He may now be too old and too ill. But the bottom line remains that pressure against the Soviet Union will make the marshals restless: If you want us to defend the Soviet Union, they will argue, you have to follow our lead. This is the problem.

LIMITS OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM

Do you really believe that the Soviets have any interest in making Switzerland a Communist country? With all the problems they already have—in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, everywhere—they cannot expand in Europe. They can in Africa and Asia—but never in Europe, unless through military action. This would mean war, and war means the Soviet Union's end, and ours too....

There may be again in the future a discussion similar to that which occurred between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, when Khrushchev, in essence, told Mao: The time for world Communism is over; what do you want to socialize—ruins? You are in favor of making war, and you want us to wage war to make the world safe for Communism? Do you know what the outcome of war will be? Ruins! This was one of the reasons for the split between Khrushchev and Mao.

A new discussion of this kind could very well take place tomorrow, and if it is the other side that wins this time, we will have war—but it will have been provoked in the first place by a policy which gives them a reason for war. This is what I fear—that a
day will come when the Soviet marshals will tell the political leadership in the Soviet Union, "We have heard what the Americans are declaring, they want to be so strong that nobody will dare stand in their way of making peace; how long are we going to take it?"... I fear we are now reaching this point. Knowing Soviet leadership and decision-making, I can almost visualize the Politburo asking the marshals for their assessment of the situation, and the latter describing the threat of unacceptable destruction hanging once again—after World War I and World War II—over Russia. Then, the least dangerous option will seem to them to be to build new armaments. And we will be back in the old vicious circle—only, this time, with more and more powerful rockets in the heart of Europe. This will result in a heightened restlessness in Europe, for how can a people live permanently amid such weapons? This is why I think it is counter-productive to attach ironclad deadlines to such matters, and why it is time to give negotiation a little more of a chance, and to postpone—be it only for a few weeks—the deployment of new missiles in Europe. Hence my recent letter to this effect to President Reagan.
"Was I that same person who, four years earlier, had rushed towards Russia filled with devotion and candor? Once again a dream was vanishing in the face of reality. Might a new dream ever blossom again?"

Milovan Djilas
*Conversations with Stalin* (1962)

Such are Milovan Djilas’ words to describe his "disillusionment," as his plane was leaving Moscow for Belgrade in that dawn of February 1948, following his last series of talks with Stalin. Four months later, in a striking departure from the prevailing pattern of Europe’s division, the final break between the Soviet Union and the People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was consummated: a landmark in the unique destiny of Yugoslavia, the only Eastern bloc country (with the exception of Albania) to owe its liberation at the end of World War II, not to the Red Army, but primarily to the three-year struggle of its own Partisans; a landmark also in the equally unique historical experience of Djilas, who, from one of these early Partisans and subsequently one of the top four leaders of Tito’s Yugoslavia, was to become—many “disillusionments” later—the first dissident of the post-war era. Few personal itineraries have been more closely intertwined with the ordeal that resulted in the post-war configuration of Europe. Even fewer now offer so intimate a reflection of the ideological and political chasm that still runs, dream after dream, through the heart of today’s Europe.

In 1937, when Tito assumes the leadership of the new Yugoslav Communist Party in the wake of a bloody purge ordered by Stalin and the Comintern, Milovan Djilas is a 26 year-old militant, who has previously spent three years in prison where he was tortured for his communist activities, and who will be elevated the following year to the Politburo.

The above is the result of several hours of conversation with Milovan Djilas in Belgrade, on September 20 and 21, 1983 with *Triaglogue’s* Editor and Paul Révay, European Director of the Trilateral Commission. This abridged account was prepared by *Triaglogue’s* Editor.

On July 4, 1941, one day after Stalin’s call to arms against Nazi Germany, the Yugoslav Party decides to launch the armed struggle. In his recent memoir, *Wartime* (New York, 1977), Djilas tells of his role at Tito’s side in the ensuing Partisans’ war against the occupant and in their fratricidal “war within the war” against the rival resistance forces of Mihailovic.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, Yugoslavia is at first the only Eastern European country to follow Moscow’s lead in categorically opposing the Marshall Plan and in favoring the creation of the Cominform. A cabinet member and frequent emissary to Moscow ever since the creation of Tito’s provisional government in November 1943, Djilas serves successively as head of the Party’s “Agit-Prop,” President of the National Assembly and Vice President of Yugoslavia until 1954.

In 1954, he is expelled from the Politburo and dismissed from all State functions. His articles of a year before advocating democratic freedoms and rights, and denouncing the “bureaucratization” of the regime, are only a prelude to his more and more fundamental critique of communism in such classics as *The New Class, Conversations with Stalin*, and *The Unperfect Society*, published in the West in the late fifties and sixties. Djilas is imprisoned from 1956 to 1961 and, again, from 1962 to 1966.

A very young 72 year-old Djilas receives us in September 1983 in the small, book-filled Belgrade apartment where he now lives, under intermittent harassment, in what could be called a state of “country arrest.” The old feistiness of the Partisan often returns as he paces, meditating aloud on the fate of his divided continent — weaving and unweaving the theory and praxis of empires, ideologies, freedom—and errors.

Although it occurred in the wake of Yalta, “in a formal sense, Yalta is not, of course, the root” of that division of post-war Europe which Djilas sees as abnormal: *As long as Germany remains divided, he notes at the outset, a normal situation and a normal relationship between East and West is impossible. It is absolutely abnormal for so great and so developed a nation*
as Germany to remain divided; it is absolutely abnormal for our time, for the conscience and philosophy of modern man, to have such a nation, which has been independent for centuries, in some sort of semi-colonial situation—as is the case with the countries of Eastern Europe. To be sure, the situation in these countries isn’t what it was immediately after the war, when the Soviet Union ruled over them by telephone and the Soviet Ambassadors played the role of regional governors. Yet, we cannot say of these countries what they are “independent”—they do remain dependent. I believe that the situation in Europe and in the world cannot be normal without freedom for these countries and without the reunification of Germany.

Not that Germany should be reunified without conditions. Germany did provoke World War II and many nations remain highly sensitive to it—including Yugoslavia, for we have suffered too much at the hands of German imperialism. This is also true of Russia. However, given prevailing conditions and the relation of forces in the world today, Germany, even united, cannot in the future play the role of a major power. Today, the obstacle to the freedom of Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany can no longer realistically be seen as the “German danger.” That division was the result of the Soviet Union’s expansionism and desire to place all of Eastern Europe under its control, combined with some Western countries’ interest in dividing Germany after the war. France and Britain were, deep down, inclined to keep Germany divided; we now live with the results of this policy which, I think, in a historical perspective, was wrong. A correct policy would have sought German unity and German disarmament.

As long as the situation in Eastern Europe remains what it is, it is doomed to provoke repeated tensions between East and West and, concretely speaking, between the United States and the Soviet Union.

TWO IDEOLOGIES, TWO SYSTEMS

The problem of the role of ideology in the Soviet system is still, theoretically speaking, unresolved. I think ideology plays today some role—the Soviet system cannot exist without it. However, that role has tended to become secondary, ideology is more and more the excuse for expansionism.

Much more important than ideology is the difference between the two systems, East and West. In Eastern Europe—including for the moment Rumania and Bulgaria—the system is no longer as closed, as monolithic, as it was after the war, and slow changes are possible. We have the beginning of normal relations between European countries (e.g., Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia…); we have the beginning of some mixed forms of economic and social organization; most European countries are now socially stratified. But the problem remains, of course, that of the Soviet system, which is still crude and monolithic and, above all, inherently expansionist. This, I believe is the problem of the future.

Hence, what Djilas perceives as the essential—national independence, state independence, for the countries of Eastern Europe…. There now exist different levels of dependence on the Soviet Union: The situation varies from Czechoslovakia to Hungary to Poland to Bulgaria to Rumania. (Rumania is, on the one hand, the most independent state, excluding Yugoslavia; on the other hand, it probably has the hardest regime.) That kind of differentiation could not have been imaginable in the past—and it means that, as we try to imagine a “free” Eastern Europe, the situation could be very different from country to country. Some could be more communististic, some less; some harsher, some less harsh—for a while. In the end, all these regimes would probably change, but not automatically nor simultaneously everywhere.

To what extent does the system rely on the presence of Soviet troops? The gradual process of independence in Eastern Europe goes on even under Soviet control, stresses Djilas. Spiritually, with the exception of Bulgaria, we may say that all these countries are now independent from the Soviet Union. This is evident when we speak of the culture and philosophy of these countries, and it even reaches some Party circles. This means that the Soviet Union, in practice, exerts its control through narrow and, in the long run, narrower and narrower channels—i.e., more and more through military circles, the secret police, and some leading communist groups.

Djilas believes that “absolute freedom” for these countries is not possible as long as the Soviet Union remains the way it is—that is, basically bureaucratic and expansionist. Admittedly, there is some movement within the Soviet Union—not very visible, not very clear; “the Soviet Union is no longer as strong, internally or externally, as it was ten or twenty years ago; it may now be militarily stronger, in relative and absolute terms, than ever in its history, but its internal and external problems are also probably greater than ever.” Yet, its grip on Eastern Europe remains overwhelming. In the end, Djilas thinks real change in Eastern Europe is likely to be predicated on change in the Soviet Union. Does he see possibilities for such change under the new Soviet leadership? Djilas thinks Andropov is “more intelligent than Brezhnev” and a “fine tactician.” He sees no proof of some of the rumors
circulating in the West that the new Soviet leader would be "a liberal," nor does he expect serious steps toward change in the system under his leadership, but rather some attempts at administrative improvements: Even if he had the intention of changing something, the apparatus is so strong, so bureaucratized and narrow-minded, that the room for maneuver for reforms would be very small. A very long period of time will be needed for real internal change in the Soviet Union, and very much depends on the foreign situation: If Soviet expansionism is stopped, then the crisis in the Soviet Union may be slowly aggravated and some perspectives for change may open up. But a policy of concession and appeasement toward this expansionism is the greatest danger, and leads directly to war. To this day, Soviet society is such that there are still no strong internal impulses for change. Truly, the Soviet Union is a military empire and, as we know from history, military empires usually do not change: They rot. They are altered only over long periods, and usually through a process of decay, not through reforms. I think this applies to the Soviet Union, and this is why the West is, in my view, doomed to be strong—and to wait.

POLAND'S "FIRST"

Djilas sees recent developments in Poland as "an extraordinary première in Eastern Europe (including Yugoslavia)":

This is the first serious, fundamental change to occur in the society of an Eastern European country. We are speaking of a real transformation in social and political relations in Poland: I am convinced it cannot be stopped. The Poles will win! I do not know when or how, for this depends on many elements—Soviet policy, the strength of the West, prevailing East-West relations—but the Poles will win! Imagine, for instance, that Bulgaria or Rumania somehow freed themselves from the Soviet Union: We still couldn't be sure that their respective regimes would change automatically. These societies— their consciousness—are not on the level of the Poles. Even Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 were different: Czechoslovakia was more or less the result of discontent among Party leadership and intelligentsia; Hungary was a mixture of counter-revolution and discontent among some Party leaders like Imre Nagy, [Defense Minister] Maleter and others. In Poland, however, we face change in the society as such and as a whole.

What we now see in Poland is, beneath the government, an illegal society. By "beneath the government," I mean an obviously weak and relatively not cruel government which is actually maneuvering between the Soviet Union and the people of Poland. By "illegal society," I mean that many forms of social life in Poland have now developed independently from the government—witness the intellectual, literary and cultural life, witness new movies and other creations. Clearly, the government can no longer control everything. Nor is it in complete control of the working class. Or of the church—which has succeeded in truly separating itself from the government and becoming a parallel force. From the point of view of totalitarianism, it means that, for the first time, large social strata are independent from the government—they live their own lives, and they wait! By contrast with the other communist countries, where ideology reaches down to the family life and every factory and other details of civilian life, they are intellectually and ideologically independent from the government.

The Polish events have been underestimated in the Western press. Particularly after martial law, many believed that it was the end of the story—we now know it is not true. See the most recent demonstrations in Poland, with five thousand, eight thousand, ten thousand participants: This is a great success, when you think it happens in a police state. I remember my own experience in pre-war Yugoslavia when we organized demonstrations here: If we managed to have one thousand or two thousand demonstrators, what a big success it was!

What about the role of the Polish army? Djilas observes that the Polish government has special units connected to the Ministry of Interior of which it is sure and which it can use against demonstrators and the people at large.

More generally speaking, Djilas adds, the attitude of the Polish army was unexpected to all, including the opponents of the government, who thought of the army as a patriotic bastion around which to unite in case of Soviet invasion. This proved to be an illusion. Clearly, the army's leading circles and higher officers are indoctrinated and docile to... well, the "Party"?—but the Party doesn't exist now! The army is now, in effect, playing the role of Party bureaucracy. What we have is really a sort of Party's junta. In every communist country, the army is somehow the armed extension of the Party; never is it an "independent" body as in the West. In Poland today, the army is, in fact, playing the role of savior of the system. In this sense, it is an extreme-case illustration of what I think is happening to all communist systems: They are moving increasingly toward military rule. From a social point of view, this is clearly a regression; but from an ideological point of view, it may well be a form of "negative progress"—the Party and its avant-garde as the essence of the na-
tion are disintegrating and this can only deepen the crisis.

Djilas believed that the Soviet Union would not permit change in Poland and would intervene. In retrospect, he now thinks the Soviet leaders chose “the best way to use the Polish army.” Active Soviet intervention, he emphasizes, would have been catastrophic for the Soviets, who would have faced a very hostile population with high probability of armed resistance, unlike the case of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, for instance. All in all, his assessment is that “in Poland, the situation can be reversed only with the kind of awfully cruel terror for which neither the Polish government nor the Soviet Union itself are strong enough. In our time, with today’s means of information and possibilities for world-wide propaganda, to introduce such mass terror is impossible.”

Communism: Ideology, Expansionism, Revisionism

Isn’t the Soviet Union expansionist because expansionism is an inherent feature of its ideology? For Djilas, sheer expansionism has clearly replaced the old objective of general, world-wide revolution: Expansionism in the Soviet Union started with Stalin, and some elements of it were already discernible in Lenin’s time: The Soviet Union was weak then; ideologically, its expansionism was what is called “internationalism.” Today, however, this internationalism is greatly transformed: Soviet expansionism still speaks in the name of international communism, but the fact is that international communism no longer exists—it is split into many different national movements. Yes, internationalism is immanent to Soviet communism; but this no longer means that it is immanent to, say, Yugoslav communism, or even to Chinese communism. In contrast to Mao’s time, the Chinese are moving away from expansionist communism; they are moderating, they no longer have Mao movements anywhere in the world, they worry only about problems in neighboring countries, like Cambodia, Korea, Mongolia—because the Soviet Union clearly surrounds them with its influence.

In the Soviet Union itself, although immanent to the ideology, international communism, to the extent that it exists at all, is closely connected, if not identified, with Soviet expansionism. It is essential to understand that what has become the Soviet Union’s policy of expansionism today is typical of a great military power: It is a highly differentiated policy, no longer of the simplistic “black-and-white” variety of earlier times, when every Party was forced to be servile to Soviet leadership. The Soviets today are flexible, they collaborate with a host of non-communist countries with which they happen to share interests at any given time (Syria or Libya, for example); at the other end of the spectrum, they help Vietnamese imperialism in Cambodia, because Vietnam is against China. In Latin America also, their policy is highly differentiated and, again, everything—including ideology—is subordinated to pure and simple expansionism. The revolutions now under way, in Latin America for instance, are not independent. The Yugoslav revolution was ideologically tied to the Soviet Union, but in practice, in organization and policy-making, we were independent. In Latin America today, on the other hand, those revolutions are connected to Soviet imperialism—which gives the United States reasons to react, for it realizes it is not just confronted with a revolutionary danger: Revolution in El Salvador isn’t dangerous to the United States, but revolution connected with Cuba and the Soviet Union clearly threatens U.S. interests in Latin America…

Closer to home, what of Eurocommunism? I have always been in favor of Eurocommunism—I saw it as a positive phenomenon in the direction of revisionism and reformism in the communist movement. Concretely speaking, however, today Eurocommunism exists only in the Italian Party. It did exist, and still does, in the Spanish Party, but that is now a weak Party which has disintegrated into factions; there are also Eurocommunist trends in the Swedish, British and Belgian Parties, but these Parties are weak and relatively unimportant; as to the French Party, it never was and still isn’t Eurocommunist—it has remained doctrinaire, narrow-minded and is still, in many ways, tied to Soviet communism. Thus, Eurocommunism today is a kind of Italian invention! The Italian Party is a strong one with great influence—in fact, I think it is the strongest party in Italy, for the Christian Democrats are really a bloc of different tendencies. Ideologically speaking, the Italians have dropped some essential tenets of Leninism: They have dropped the dictatorship of the proletariat; they are in favor of parliamentarianism; and their internationalism is no longer unconditionally tied to Moscow. In short, the Italian Party—and this is a very new phenomenon in Europe—is developing toward some form of democratic socialism.

Speaking of the evolution of some of these European communist parties away from the Stalinist model, Djilas emphasizes that Stalinism is the wrong term, for the origins of Stalin are in Lenin. Stalinism is but one phase in the development of Leninism, just like Leninism was a phase in the development of Marxism.
From Lenin onwards, as is the case with any great leader, different roads were open: One was Trotsky's, another Bukharin's, the third, and clearly the most realistic one, was Stalin's. The same goes for Marx: From Marx on, we had the reformists—and we had Leninism (and Stalinism) as a continuation of Marx's revolutionary teaching. One can't say that Lenin isn't connected to Marx, that he was a Blanquist or some sort of Russian revolutionary type. No, Lenin is closely tied to Marx—not to all of Marx, of course, or to some of the more humanistic teachings which abound in his theories—but to Marx's revolutionary side.

After Detente: Europe East and West Today

How does Djilas assess the lessons of détente and the posture of the West today? It is not that détente was such a bad idea. However, deep down, the West understood détente as generalized relaxation, not appeasement, in ideology as in every other field. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, perceived détente as the weakness of the West—as the West demobilizing itself. If the West wished to cooperate economically and culturally with the Soviet Union under some control and within certain limits, this could be positive. But, in truth, the West demobilized and disarmed in every way possible—and the Soviet Union took advantage of it: It built up its military, altered the balance of power in Europe with new intermediate range missiles, intervened in Afghanistan, and altogether strengthened and sharpened its expansionism during that very period of détente.

This is why, in my view, a good policy should consist in being strong at all times, while negotiating, cooperating, trading, etc. And to put in place an adequate policy mix of strength and overtures, it is vitally important to understand the nature of Soviet expansionism—the reality of the Soviet system. This is why theoreticians are so very important today. Mere pragmatism isn't enough, and can, in fact, be very dangerous. Profit is the greatest strength of capitalism, its impulse and its engine; but in relations with the Soviet Union, it might well be its supreme weakness. Beyond immediate earnings and other fruits of trade, a larger view and some theoretical approach to the Soviet Union are essential. It is crucial not to indulge in illusions, and to see that this is a system which will not change in the near future and will use every possibility or opening for expansionism. This system is not like Hitler's—explosion all at once to provoke war and invade all around. It is a system founded on a rational philosophy. For Marxism is a Western philosophy, born of the Western mind. To be sure, its aim is not rationalist; it still purports the existence of an absolute truth and seeks utopia. But, in its methods, it is a rational, analytic system; the ways and means of Soviet expansionism are very carefully, rationally elaborated and promoted.

Djilas sees spiritual and cultural contacts continuing inevitably to develop among the nations and states of Central Europe, despite the Iron Curtain, thereby contributing to the "spiritual independence" of Eastern Europe. Beyond existing state-to-state contacts, he emphasizes the more and more deeply felt historical and cultural identity of Europe, East and West. "The people," he notes, "feel closer to each other, perhaps more so now than even during the pre-war period." No matter what the state of relations may be at any given time, this "spiritual and cultural collaboration" must broaden and never stop: "The problem of relations between East and West is one for the long haul, and this kind of collaboration could well prepare the groundwork for a future common life and the solution of many other problems." This is why Djilas considers the Pope's actions as "of paramount importance—because they touch on the large spiritual connection between East and West." Although an "atheist" himself, Djilas does see "European civilization as a Christian civilization," and thinks that the Pope, "as a religious/political leader, is a very talented man indeed, and the first to succeed in influencing Eastern Europe and in connecting, spiritually, the East and the West through religion. . . . This is really the first strong, spiritual step toward unification of Europe—i.e., toward freedom in Eastern Europe. In this sense, the Pope is, I think, a great contemporary leader, who is working for the centuries...."

In the same vein, "now that there exist some possibilities for enlarging various forms of culture in the Soviet Union, which were not permitted in the past" (in literature, in music, in cinema...), Djilas stresses the important political role that culture can play—"not directly, but in a long historical perspective, to weaken the ideological schemas and prejudices which exist everywhere."

Such prejudices, Djilas suggests, exist not only in the East, but also in the West: One such prejudice is that communism will disappear with the Soviet Union. Absolutely not! Communism will survive the Soviet Union—not necessarily this variety of Leninism, but whatever form of utopian teaching humanity will come up with. Utopia seems to be very much a part of human nature; it is also deeply rooted in Christianity—and
communism does have some roots in Christianity: See this idea of fraternity, equality and brotherhood, also found in the utopian aspects of the French Revolution.... Communism as an idea may be unrealistic, but it is also inspiring, as is every utopian teaching. The Soviet Union and its system may well disintegrate one day, but a new form of utopian thinking is doomed to arise—in China, in Europe, or elsewhere. This is one of the reasons why I think the danger today is not communism as such, but the Soviet Union and its expansionism; and why to identify the idea of communism with the Soviet Union actually helps to enlarge and strengthen the very basis of the Soviet Union.

This is not to say that non-communist political leaders or thinkers should not fight ideologically against communism; the ideological struggle must, of course, go on. It is important to explain the communist system and the Soviet system. But I repeat: What is essential is Soviet expansionism, not communism in and of itself. In this regard, I think Solzhenitsyn is wrong when he assimilates all communism, from China to Yugoslavia, to one unique devilish idea. Djilas constantly reemphasizes the "strategic importance for the struggle of our time between these two worlds, these two blocs, of differentiating communism from the Soviet Union." He likens the latter's brand of expansionism to that of the Turkish empire, "which, even when it started to decay, could not cease to expand.... And when that expansion was stopped, then the empire started to disintegrate slowly, as national and social rebellions erupted." Djilas finds other similarities between the two empires: "In both cases, for instance, the power and the ideology are united at the top—in Turkey, both religion and power were in the hands of the Sultan, who was simultaneously Caliph; in the Soviet Union, likewise, the Politburo is both the ideological chief and the seat of power...." His diagnosis is that "In the long run, the Soviet Union must disintegrate, and will disintegrate faster if expansionism is stopped."

For Djilas, one of the aspects of the decay of the Soviet Union is the increased role of the military in the Empire's leadership: I believe that today, in the Soviet Union, the army is influencing Party circles in an expansionist direction, and that all apparent fluctuations in leadership have to be linked to the role and priorities of the army.... Brezhnev was not an active statesman; he was a conservative who preserved the system after Khrushchev's experiments. Yet, independently of him, a very serious phenomenon occurred during his rule: The role of the army grew dramatically and, during that period, policies of expansionism were activated. This clearly betrays disturbing internal processes within the Soviet Union—the beginning of some sort of social crisis, compounded by socio-political-economic inefficiency. Evidently, Soviet expansionism is also the product of internal developments—that makes it all the more dangerous, as ruling groups find in expansionism an escape from domestic difficulties, and keep playing on both the population's patriotism and the bureaucracy's privileges to keep things together.

**The New Class versus the Proletariat**

In further analyzing the conjunction of internal decay, resistance to change and expansionism, Djilas returns to his celebrated concept of "new class": The Soviets are well aware that their system cannot compare with the West—just as we are aware in Yugoslavia that our system cannot be as productive as the Western system. Hence, the Soviets' idea to "invade" indirectly the industrial West—to intimidate and frighten it through superior military deployments into, in effect, working for them. (Turkey did essentially the same thing when it invaded Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria....) But no matter how conscious they are of their system's inefficiency, they will not take the initiative to change it, primarily because of their many inherent privileges and interests in its preservation. In truth, their bureaucracy is a monopolistic class of its own, which does not allow other social groups to express themselves....

Communism never really was a proletarian movement. It broadened its influence, with greater or lesser success, in the proletariat and used the proletariat as a means in the political struggle—but in essence, it is a movement born of the mind of some thinkers. And when communism is in power, the proletariat is really an oppressed class without any role or influence. During periods of industrialization in Yugoslavia or in the Soviet Union, the Party had some influence on the proletariat. The latter came mostly from a peasant milieu, poor conditions, and found "better" conditions in the factories. It was therefore more inclined, then, to help the Party, or at least not to be in conflict with it. But with time, this changes as industrialization is completed, and as the proletariat stabilizes into a class and becomes better educated. This means that the kind of conflict between communist power and the proletariat that we see in Poland is inevitable in the future. Even in my country, we see that the workers have no rights and are tightly controlled through the trade unions and the Party; we also see that an increasing number of workers are alienated from the Party and critical of it—they know that the government is not a proletarian government, and
it has been striking to see recently how some of them, including Party workers, have expressed (on television, for instance) attitudes subtly differentiated from official positions and doctrine. Clearly, during the early stages of industrialization, what was to become the new class represented the organizers of industry…. Today, the problem of the "new class" is that it is, by nature, a parasitic class. This class, its position and interests are the key to understanding the Soviet system.

Djilas then touches upon a "pot-pourri" of current issues: Reagan's policy? Although he would not agree with "every step or form of it," he thinks this policy is "good on the whole" and may encourage some Soviet leaders to see the world more realistically than they now do—for they too live with many illusions: They think that the world is unmitigatedly hostile to them, and they think they are stronger than they really are.…. Carter's human rights policy? Not a "bad thing, but not enough": It is "naive" to have human rights as "your only means and policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union." Vice President Bush's recently proclaimed policy of differentiation among Eastern European countries? This is a "correct policy," and even though Bush's trip was not necessarily spectacular, its "importance goes much beyond concrete results, particularly considering the timing of his trip, when relations with the Soviet Union are difficult, and when any friendly gesture is very good and helps, in turn, Eastern European countries to find ways of differentiating themselves from the Soviet Union—if only by demonstrating closer collaboration with the United States." Other factors of decay in the Soviet empire? Djilas stresses the problems the Soviet Union will face from "domestic satellites: The Moslem nationalities, Catholicism in the Baltic countries, the Orthodox Church—because this is a period of religious renaissance throughout the East. To be sure, the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union is weak, corrupted, and closely tied to the regime; yet, the signs of religious revival are everywhere (see the suddenly young attendance in the churches, and the newly widespread interest among the intelligentsia—in Yugoslavia for instance—not so much in religion, as such, but in the history of the Church and the visible incarnations of religion as a cultural past). These are profound and important symptoms." Strengths and weaknesses of the West? In a more philosophical vein, Djilas wistfully laments that, "This is the time of mediocrity in the world." He castigates that "built-in skepticism in the West, whereby everything is equal, this side is worth the other side, every value is the same, and therefore all is relative: This may be the great weakness of the West—truly, a changed form of fellow-travelerism!" In his view, one debilitating effect of this ideological weakness is to "give the Soviet Union the illusion that the West is weak: the peace movements, for instance, do encourage the Soviets to believe that the West is, indeed, disunited." He recognizes, however, that the democracy and freedom that go with "this weakness" are also, internally, the greater strengths of "those societies, the likes of which have never existed in the past."

Djilas, in the end, returns to the origins of his continent's division. To what extent did the author of Conversations with Stalin intuit what was to happen? What did the West do wrong? I was in office then, and we were still very close to Moscow. Although we never directly discussed this, we could feel what was possible then for the West, and what the West didn't do. I believe that the mistake of the West was that it demobilized its armies and forces at once! If the American and British armies had stayed in Europe, the destiny of Eastern Europe would have been different—not that of all of Eastern Europe, to be sure, but at least of some countries: Czechoslovakia, for instance, would be today in a different situation. Hungary, too, to some extent—neutralization, perhaps? And even in Poland, the potential existed for, if not a pro-Western Poland, at least a neutral Poland, not as much under Soviet influence. Rumania and Bulgaria are another story. And as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, things might also have turned out differently, but not without a fight—for our Partisans would have fought if the West had intervened. Yet, in my opinion, the outcome in Yugoslavia could have ended up being more moderate, less crude, milder and more democratic. Finally, the unification of Germany was possible. As we have seen, however, the West, by and large, was not for it, and the Russians felt this—from the beginning, they understood that major Western powers were inclined to divide Germany. America, on the other hand, was still engaged in the war with Japan and chose to negotiate with, and make concessions to, the Soviet Union. Demobilization ensued, without which, in Djilas' view, Europe and "particularly its heart" would be, "if not completely, at least markedly, different today."
For some time, tensions in East-West relations have continued to mount, mainly due to Soviet intervention in both Afghanistan and Poland, the negotiations in Geneva on INF—with no positive result as yet, and with the time limit for the deployment of new missile systems in West European countries approaching—and most recently, the outrageous shooting down by Soviet pilots of a Korean civil airliner that had strayed off course. Mr. Andropov still seems to be hesitant to change the foreign policy orientation begun by his predecessor, and the Reagan Administration continues to stand squarely against the growing Soviet threat. There is also an increasing awareness, both in this country and abroad, of Japan’s role and responsibility in world politics today—evidenced at the Summit Meeting of the Industrialized Democracies in Williamsburg last spring.

In this general context of complexity and confrontation, it may be appropriate to examine where Eastern Europe now stands in the arena of international politics, and how best to deal with it.

According to the opinion poll made in June of this year by the Prime Minister’s Office, “the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” have emerged together as one area in which the Japanese are most interested, after Asia and North America and preceding Western Europe and the Middle East. The USSR, with territorial problems between us still unsolved and various other difficulties in our bilateral relationship, has, of course, long been a focus of attention—more so in recent days as a result of its increasing military presence in Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, the events in, and in connection with, Poland, as well as the visit (under preparation at the time of the poll) of Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe to certain East European countries, have undoubtedly brought this region to the attention of the Japanese.

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**Eastern Europe and Its Geographical Definition**

What is “Eastern Europe?” First, it is a geographical concept which designates a buffer zone between Russia and Germany; more precisely, an intermediary region situated between the present Soviet Empire and “Western Europe,” i.e., the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria and Italy, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Balkan Peninsula. It consists of eight states: the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Albania and Bulgaria. The main characteristics of the region are diversity—ethnic and linguistic, as well as cultural—and instability: Throughout history, it has been a major cross-road between East and West, North and South and has constantly been a cauldron boiling over into great conflicts, bringing about frequent changes of national boundaries, sometimes even the disappearance or birth of a state. Last but not least, it has given rise, twice in this century, to the biggest wars in human history. (British wit describes the Balkan region as a place that produces more history than it can consume locally.)

This definition of Eastern Europe, however, will not satisfy everyone. One may ask immediately why Greece and Turkey, both Balkan states and close neighbors of Soviet Russia and its satellites, are not included, why Finland is left out in spite of an extensive common border and a special type of relation with the Soviet Union, or why, on the other hand, the German Democratic Republic, after all a German state, is considered a component of the area?

We must clarify our definition then by saying that the term “Eastern Europe” not only denotes a geographical area, but also implies a political entity. Indeed, all of its eight member states are communist socialist countries; with the notable exceptions of Yugoslavia and Albania, all the rest belong to the Warsaw Pact as well as COMECON, thus forming, with the Soviet Union, a politico-economic-military grouping called the “Eastern Bloc.” However
strong their national pride, however bitter and unfriendly local popular feeling vis-à-vis the Russians, the raison d'Etat dictates that these six countries must follow and obey their big brother, the USSR.

Japan, of course, is not in a position to comment on the “Yalta Conference,” which was, we understand, a top-level meeting of the three major allied powers of the second World War—the U.S., the U.K., and the USSR—to discuss how to end the war and how to proceed with post-war reconstruction, mainly in Europe. We do not believe, however, that the division of Europe into spheres of influence was agreed upon then and there, or that Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe was recognized on that occasion. It should be noted, however, that the evolution of world politics in the years that followed—when Soviet intervention in East European internal affairs and its blatant expansionism proceeded, virtually unchecked because of lack of energetic response from the West—helped consolidate Soviet influence in this unfortunate region.

For more than a decade following the end of World War II, little attention was paid to Eastern Europe in this country. It was a distant and unfamiliar region to us, and Japan's political weight in the world was still very small. Nevertheless, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948 caught our attention, and the courageous, independent policy pursued by it, under President Tito, paved the way for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries as early as 1952, preceding that with the USSR by four years. With this one exception of Yugoslavia, the East European states were generally regarded as satellites incorporated into a monolithic alliance, with the Soviet Union as their leader and patron. It was only natural, under such circumstances, that Japan's policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe should still be part and parcel of our policy towards the USSR; there was, therefore, no clear distinction between them.

In the sixties, the Sino-Soviet split, escalating into the dispute and then the confrontation, between the two largest socialist camp powers,
brought about a fundamental change in the structure of the bloc; Albania definitely and Rumania with caution approached the People's Republic of China, despite Soviet anger and pressure. Yugoslavia became more and more deeply engaged the non-alignment movement and, from the beginning of the seventies, an active policy of good relations with the PRC was developed.

The "Prague Spring" of 1968, however, was a tragic experience for many Eastern Europeans and their bid for liberalization, and marked a return to the old monolithic period. The hegemony of the Soviet Union in the region was reaffirmed under the name of "normalization," or "solidarity of the Socialist countries," in other words, the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

A new phase became apparent, in the 1970s, with the ascension of the West German SPD and its "Ost-politik." Based on the non-use of force and the respect for the status quo ante, or present frontiers, a new and more stable relationship between East and West Europe was developed and important negotiations involving East and West European countries were initiated—Helsinki (CSCE), Vienna (MBFR), etc. The age of détente was thus begun, and would continue until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

**Japan's Economic Relations with East Europe**

Throughout these periods, Japan's economy continued to grow steadily. Its achievements in the field of economy, as well as in science and technology, attracted the attention of many international economists and scholars, and a number of books and articles were published favorably forecasting a bright future for this country. In 1973, when the then Prime Minister of Japan, Kakuei Tanaka, made an official visit to Moscow, the Soviet leadership, for the first time in many years, recognized the existence of the territorial problems between the two countries. It agreed to negotiate a Peace Treaty, thus marking a peak in the history of post-war Japanese-Soviet relations. The Kremlin had just then decided to embark upon the gigantic project of Siberian development, and they may have thought that Japan's cooperation could be especially helpful.

By that time, Japan had become more aware of the differences between the USSR and other Eastern European countries, and had begun to feel the need to differentiate its approach to Eastern Europe from that it took to the Soviet Union. Against the background of the decline and centrifugal trend in the monolithic alliance, and the progress of détente in Europe, we conceived and began to form a new East European policy covering trade, export credits and various other economic dealings distinct from our Soviet policy. It may be presumed that the East European countries as well were looking towards Japan with expectation, for, besides the economic benefits, there was less political risk in cooperating with a remote and peaceful Japan.

The "oil crisis" in the middle of the seventies caused damage to this new pattern of trade and economic relations, hardly even started, between the East European countries and the West, including Japan. Many East European countries certainly made the mistake of undertaking an excessively ambitious industrialization program too quickly, and borrowing too much foreign money. The Western market, also hard hit by the crisis, could no longer easily absorb East European products, thus making the situation even worse for those countries most dependent on trade with the West, like Poland, Rumania or Hungary.

In addition to the economic difficulties facing Eastern Europe, such as the accumulated debts and unfavorable trade balance with the West, there is now a change in the political environment, particularly since the military authorities in Poland declared a state of war at the end of 1981. East-West economic relations have entered a new, more difficult, more complex phase.

**Differentiated Approach to the East European Countries**

As described above, our policy orientation towards East Europe has evolved from one pattern designed for the entire Eastern bloc to differentiation between Eastern Europe and the USSR. Now it appears that the time has come to attempt to apply a different policy to each separate East European country, according to its respective aspirations and present status.

Yugoslavia and Albania aside, one can classify the other six in different categories by applying different criteria. If we take economic performance as a measure, Hungary and Bulgaria would today stand highest, with Rumania and Poland at the lower end of the scale. For close intergovernmental relations with the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR and now perhaps Poland, would be at the top of the list,
and Rumania at the bottom. As far as national sentiment is concerned, one can only conjecture, but it seems reasonable to suspect that the Poles would rank high in anti-Soviet feeling at this time.

United States Vice President Bush, in a speech in Vienna on September 21, 1983, described Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia as closed societies with belligerent foreign policies, which continue to violate the most fundamental human rights, and branded East Germany and again Bulgaria proxies for the Soviets in the training, funding and arming of terrorists. At the same time, he expressed a certain sympathy towards Hungary and Rumania, and said that the United States wished to engage in closer political, economic and cultural relations with them.

We fully agree with Mr. Bush's stress on the need to follow a policy of differentiation in the region, but we must say that our relations with Eastern Europe are not well established or close enough for us to feel we can wave the "carrot and stick." Moreover, this approach does not fit our traditional diplomatic style.

We do, however, attach great importance to the solidarity of the West, to which we belong, which is why Japan has never failed to cooperate with other members of the Western alliance, whether in assistance and rescue operations, or in application of measures of sanctions and restrictions. We nevertheless believe that whatever decision is made by the West, it must be reached on a consensus basis; whatever measures are taken, they must be applied jointly and cooperatively. We also believe that, in the long run, well-prepared, professional discussion, persuasion and encouragement are more effective than threats and punishment. In this regard, Foreign Minister Abe's visit to Eastern Europe can be quoted as an example of our diplomatic philosophy and style.

Mr. Abe's Visit to East Europe

In June of this year, the Foreign Minister of Japan made an official visit to Yugoslavia on the occasion of the UNCTAD meeting held there, then, in August, he visited Rumania and Bulgaria. Why these three countries in particular?

Yugoslavia, quite apart from the rest of the area, is an important member of the non-aligned movement and should be honored and treated in a special way; and no Japanese Foreign Minister had ever visited Rumania and Bulgaria, while his counterparts in these countries have come to Japan on numerous occasions in the past.

Yugoslavia's valiant stance in world politics today certainly deserves special attention in the international community and Japan, for its part, is prepared to make an appropriate contribution to help its economic and financial difficulties. We are most grateful to the Yugoslav government for the hospitality and courtesy extended to Mr. Abe, despite a tremendous burden and workload incurred upon it by the UNCTAD. We believe that, by this visit, our traditional friendly ties and mutual confidence have been significantly strengthened.

It is well known that Rumania has been carrying out an independent foreign policy with courage and determination, while remaining within the Eastern bloc. Mr. Abe's talks with President Ceausescu and Foreign Minister Andrei revealed a genuine aspiration of the Rumanian government for peace; their position on disarmament and East-West relations seemed to be at the extreme limit of the East European framework and the maximum we could expect from it.

Bulgaria, on the other hand, is an unchanging ally of the Soviet Union; Sofia and Moscow have always sung in unison. It is a curious fact, however, that Bulgaria often describes itself as the "Japan in Eastern Europe," and its friendly attitude toward Japan has never been shadowed by the precarious Japanese-Soviet relationship. This Bulgarian attitude was reflected in the discussion between Mr. Abe and the Bulgarian leaders when they cautiously averted talk of our divergent foreign policies, concentrating instead on the development of bilateral relations.

On the occasion of these visits made by our Foreign Minister, we detected everywhere clear indications that these East European countries sincerely desire to have and develop a political dialogue with Japan. We, for our part, are ready to respond to their desire. It is true that there exists between us a number of differences in political ideals as well as social and economic systems. It is also true that the present international circumstances make communication and mutual understanding even more difficult. But despite these obstacles, or rather because of them, we must say clearly what we have to say and try to maintain our channels of communication. In these difficult times, this would appear to constitute the best guarantee for peace, stability and mutual benefits among nations.
An analysis of the effect of the division of Europe on East-West relations, obviously at the core of those relations, cannot be undertaken without attempting to estimate what kind of country and what kind of leadership we are going to have to deal with in the Soviet Union. Although the USSR has undergone remarkably few basic changes in the last decades, it has altered, it continues to evolve in an elephantine kind of way, and the people who are going to be in control a decade hence are far removed in many respects from their predecessors.

One thing, however, will not change, and that is the Soviets' perception of Europe and the priority they will continue to give to maintaining control of their East European glacis. But for a number of reasons this is not going to be as simple as it was in 1956 or 1968 or even 1983.

The present Soviet leaders, with very few exceptions, constitute the last generation to have been born before the Revolution and the Civil War, the last to have known the monstrous excesses of Stalin and World War II. They differ considerably from the first cycle of leaders—the true revolutionaries—and the second—the peasants come to power. They are those men who were promoted rapidly and with little preparation into positions of responsibility as a result of Stalin's decimation of the Party, the military and the civil administration. They themselves barely escaped the wrath of Stalin before his death in 1953. They carried with them, therefore, a lingering debt of gratitude to Stalin, together with a determination to prevent the return of the arbitrary rule of terror directed against the Party itself.

The long reign of Brezhnev, while it left the country in a state of economic and social stagnation, did create a feeling of security and stability among the hierarchy as well as for the hundred thousand or so lesser Party functionaries who have benefited from the system and who view with horror any

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The Soviet Union in the Coming Decade: Implications for the West

change or innovation that might endanger their power and privileges. Hence the timidity with which economic reform has always been approached, and is being approached to this day. Hence also the alarm in Moscow when the Czech Communist Party, in 1968, began to introduce economic innovations. It was in part to prevent the spread of reformist ideas to other countries of Eastern Europe, and to the USSR itself, that the Soviets crushed the Dubcek regime. For the same reasons, it became apparent in Poland during the last three years that the Soviets could not permit the kind of economic reforms which are patently necessary if the country is to cease being a crisis area.

There is little likelihood that the Andropov regime can take the measures needed to revitalize the economy, or indeed that it can depart substantially from previous policies in arms control and foreign policy, partly because of the nature of Soviet society, and partly because of the problems of his own political base.

Power in the USSR rests on three structures: The party apparatus, the military establishment which includes the important military industrial enterprises and research centers, and the police.

Andropov was detached from the Party Secretariat for 13 years, during which time he established his control over the KGB but lost the crucial ability to influence appointments in the Party—something which he still has been unable to recover sufficiently to count on the apparatus to loyally support him and his policies. He must therefore rely primarily on the military and the police.

In addition, his health is clearly poor. This was apparent as long ago as 1978, when he was absent from Moscow for many months recuperating from an illness. This would not matter so much now since, from all accounts, his considerable intellectual ability has not diminished, if it were not for the fact that to remain on top of the heap in the Kremlin requires constant work and attention. It took Brezhnev six or seven years before his control was assured; by the time he fell ill he had managed to
associate all his colleagues with him in a system by which all profited. Andropov has had less than a year to impose his rule, and at a time of serious international and economic crises.

Since we cannot know the true state of Andropov's health, it is impossible to guess how long his leadership will last; yet, no matter what its duration, it is likely to be a transitional regime from which no significant new departures can be expected. If the international climate had been more propitious, something more radical might have emerged. But any real concessions or compromises on arms control or political questions—particularly Afghanistan, Poland, the Middle East, support for leftist regimes in the Third World and bilateral relations with the United States—would require the agreement of the military, which in the present circumstances seems unlikely. And Andropov does not have the power, nor perhaps even the physical strength, to run the highly centralized state which in the USSR is a killing job. Thus the period of Andropov's leadership will probably be a "holding operation."

A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS

When he leaves the stage, power must almost certainly pass to the next generation, which has been patiently waiting many years for some movement at the top. The Soviet Constitution makes provisions for almost everything necessary to maintain the present system except the succession in the Politburo which is the true seat of power and, of course, lies in the Party and not in the State organization. There are no provisions in the Party statutes for the transmission of the post of Secretary-General; therefore, the hierarchy inevitably tries to put off as long as possible the day of decision, unless the situation becomes untenable and the Secretary-General isolates himself, as in the case of Khrushchev.

Nevertheless, we can probably assume that sometime in the next decade, we will have to deal with the fourth generation of Soviet leaders—men in their early fifties or sixties, in many respects a different breed. On the whole, they were brought up in an urban environment and they are better educated, more aware of the complexities of the modern world, more sophisticated, able and flexible, and for the most part Russian, nationalistic and dedicated.

By dedicated, I mean devoted to the preservation of the communist system and, as a logical concomitant, to the power, privileges and material advantages they enjoy as a result. Regardless of their background, they will all have come up through the Communist Party apparatus and will not, therefore, differ basically from their predecessors in their primary aim: the maintenance and consolidation of the absolute control of the Party over all aspects of Soviet life, and what they themselves and all who benefit from the system have personally achieved and which sets them apart from the mass of the people of the "new class" (which in itself is becoming an almost hereditary clan).

They will have, therefore, the same reluctance as their predecessors to tackle the enormous economic problems of their country by reforms which could upset the equilibrium on which the system now rests. They will differ from their predecessors in their awareness of the problems and what ought to be done about them, as even Andropov has demonstrated. But when it comes to moving beyond tinkering with the system, they will hesitate. Thus, in the next decade the USSR is likely to continue to be an unbalanced giant, perhaps all the more so as the technological revolutions in the West and Japan by-pass Soviet industry and if the military continues to absorb an exorbitant proportion of the budget. There can be no doubt that even the present leadership is alarmed by the prospects ahead, but it always comes up against the problem of ideology. Its power rests on its ability to persuade itself and the Soviet people that the seizure and maintenance of absolute power is legitimate. If you begin to dismantle the key elements in this ideology, you begin the unravelling of the system.

The only logical and ideologically safe way to improve the economy without political risk is to reduce the proportion of the state budget assigned to military purposes. In the present state of international relations, it is difficult for any Soviet leader to propose measures which would reduce tension, for they would inevitably require concessions that would be considered unilateral (Afghanistan, Angola, Indochina, Ethiopia) or would demand cutbacks in the Soviet strategic forces. Even if the focus is limited to bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms talks, it is hard to imagine the Soviet leaders being able to impose a solution to the Soviet military if the latter objected to it. This would require a leadership with a very strong base in the Party as well as in the
military and the KGB. It could well happen, but would take time—and time is running out.

The same dilemma confronts the next generation of leaders. Some very able people are coming up, but the selection of the leader and the consolidation of his power cannot be achieved overnight, unless there is some quite exceptional figure waiting in the obscurity of the Kremlin corridors of power—someone with the charisma and imagination of a Khrushchev, who can burst out of the mold and truly face up to the problems and responsibilities of the Soviet Union as a superpower. At the moment, no such figure is visible.

In foreign affairs, this means that we cannot look forward to any basic change in Soviet policies over the next few years. We will have to deal with a country struggling with almost insuperable economic problems and growing strains in the social polity; and a country unable to find an internal political formula which would allow it to take important international initiatives in foreign affairs intended to lessen tension and move out of the present impasse.

For there are certainly many reasons why the Soviet leaders would like to do precisely that. The first and most obvious is that the present political confrontation, and the failure of Soviet policies so far to prevent U.S. rearmament, carry risks of which the Kremlin is just as aware as the White House. The Soviets may be prepared to gamble from time to time, but only in carefully controlled situations and if it is likely to produce real dividends. This is hardly the case at present.

Second, the Soviets hanker after the superpower relationship. They have achieved it in military terms but they want to be treated as political equals by the Americans as well as by the rest of the world. They thought they had achieved this in 1972-73-74; then the carefully-wrought structure began to unravel. They cannot bring themselves to accept any of the blame for the process by which détente gradually faded away; it must be recalled that it was already a pale shadow of the political complex envisaged by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger in 1979—that is, well before the invasion of Afghanistan and the proletarian revolt in Poland dealt it the coup de grâce.

The Soviets would certainly prefer the kind of superpower relationship which they enjoyed with the United States in the seventies, but there are no signs at present that they are prepared to make the concessions necessary to initiate the détente process. The shooting down of the Korean airliner reflects the unchanging attitude of the Soviets toward the outside world; but the clumsy and unyielding way in which it treated the matter is a clear sign that an improvement in relations with the West takes a secondary position to their concept of security.

In any event, the major issue is arms-control and disarmament. On this score, there must be many Soviets who realize the need to improve the economy and the standard of living but hesitate to institute liberal reforms and, logically, look to the military slice of the GNP as the only politically and ideologically safe way to shift much needed resources to the civilian sector. Theoretically, the possibility of reducing, or at least leveling off, the military expenses, and the hope of regaining at least some access to Western technology should appeal to the more pragmatic Soviet leaders. But in the present circumstances, the suspicion of the West, the reluctance of the military to make meaningful concessions, and the probable inability of Andropov to force them to do so even if he favored such a policy (which is by no means certain), make it unlikely that they will choose to follow this direction.

Implications for Europe

Tightly linked to this policy is the question of Eastern Europe. The imposition of communist governments on the countries of the area and the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union were dictated as much by extreme considerations of security as by the political aim of expanding the Soviet system. But Soviet security considerations are, in effect, so exaggerated that they practically exclude any reasonable concept of security for its neighbors. To quote a popular Soviet saying, “With whom does the USSR neighbor? With whom it desires.” The ultimate example of this was the justification given by Brezhnev for the occupation of Afghanistan — the protection of the gains of the communist community, and the Soviet right to assure its security in neighboring states. This went one step further than the doctrine used to explain the reasons for the overthrow of a “legitimate” communist government in Czechoslovakia.

At that time, a very senior Soviet official tried to argue that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was neces-
sary for military reasons. It was impossible, he contended, to leave a potentially weak link in Soviet defensive lines. When I suggested that this thinking was more applicable to 1939 than 1968, his reply was that the Soviet generals were convinced that it was impossible to take the risk and that the “gap” had to be filled.

Such rationale must prevail even more strongly today and therefore express the necessity for Soviet troops in forward positions. If they decide to deploy SS-20s or some other advanced nuclear weapons in some of the Eastern European countries, the presence of Soviet troops will be even more necessary than before.

The Soviets have made it all too clear, on far too many occasions, that their military and political control of Eastern Europe is of primary importance to them, and it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which that attitude could change. Nevertheless, the situation has evolved over the years, and a simple military solution to problems in the bloc has become less and less applicable. One need only recall that it took them 24 hours in 1953 to intervene and crush the revolt in East Berlin; one week in Warsaw in 1956; one month in Budapest in 1956; six months in Prague in 1968; and in Poland, after three years of turmoil and what must be the distasteful and un-Marxist alternative of a Polish military junta (albeit a communist one), they have not yet intervened directly and militarily.

They can of course do so if need be, but this would create a possibly bloody and certainly messy situation in Poland, placing an even greater economic and financial burden on the shoulders of the USSR than already exists; and creating immense strains on relations with the West, and tensions in the rest of the bloc. Developments in Poland have made it obvious that the West, and the Western public in general, are less inclined than in the past to accept without demur the thesis that the Soviet Union has the right to behave as it wishes in Eastern Europe. While no Soviet military intervention can alter the strategic balance—except possibly to the disadvantage of the Soviets, by making their allies even less reliable than they are at present—the political situation would be greatly disturbed. The Soviets tend to take the Western reaction to the intervention in Czechoslovakia as the guerd post to future acts. They think that the West, after an initial expression of displeasure, will quickly forget and return to the main order of business—business with the USSR. I think they may be mistaken, although the caution with which they approached the Polish crisis may mean that they are aware of the probable consequences for East-West relations.

Europe remains for the Soviets primarily a “holding operation.” The maintenance of the status quo is in itself incompatible with Marxist dogma. The “correlation of forces” demands movement, even though they are always ready to make tactical adjustments and have indeed done so, as in the case of Egypt and Somalia, which demonstrates skillful diplomacy, strong nerves, and a remarkably long view of international affairs.

The pursuit of change is a pragmatic one and rules out the support of revolutionary movements unless they are low-cost and relatively safe for the USSR. But the probing continues around the edges of Europe itself where it is too dangerous to be provocative. The Soviets’ second aim, after the maintenance of their position in Eastern Europe, is, naturally, the weakening of North American ties with Western Europe. For this purpose, the frightening arsenal the Soviets can brandish in the East serves an essential political purpose. The problem for Moscow remains to properly assess the line beyond which it must not go, to carefully calculate how much might is required to secure Soviet security and achieve its political goals in Europe, as against provoking a military and political response from the West which would defeat these aims.

This analysis sounds pessimistic, but in studying the Russians I always recall the words of Rimbaud: “Nous ne pouvons savoir! nous sommes accablés D’un manteau d’ignorance et d’étroites chimères!”

There seem to be so many rigid rules by which to judge the Russians, and the Soviets. Yet, they often surprise us—either by demonstrating unexpected humanity and imagination, as in the case of Khrushchev, or an immense ignorance and indifference to the norms of civilized behavior. We have to be ready for trouble, but we should also be prepared to solve our problems with them now. For, as Alexander Herzen said a century and a half ago: “The greatest of sins that any human being can perpetrate is to seek to transfer moral responsibility from his own shoulders to an unpredictable future order.”
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