A Dimension of
North-South, East-West, and Trilateral Relations

THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Henry Kissinger

"...Making [human rights] a vocal objective of our foreign policy involves great dangers: You run the risk of either showing your impotence or producing revolutions in friendly countries—or both..."

Andrei Sakharov

"The Carter policy responds to the demands of our time, and it is very important that it receive even broader support... At the same time, lessening the danger of nuclear war carries an absolute priority... and the limitation of strategic arms must be considered separately..."

Claude Cheysson

"...The main target of cooperation (between the European Community and its partners in the Lomé Convention) must be to serve man and ensure respect for his dignity... This sums up our common aim in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as in Europe, which is by no means above criticism..."

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EUROPE, THE THIRD WORLD AND HUMAN RIGHTS

At a time when human rights are attracting particular attention in connection with the renewal of the Lomé Convention,* it should perhaps be remembered that they have not always been given such prominence and that, though respect for human rights is regarded as axiomatic by all members of the European Community, they were curiously enough never referred to in the texts establishing that Community. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dates back to December 1948, the authors of the treaties on which the European Community is founded make no mention of human rights, even in the preambles. They talk instead of civilization, peace and social progress. Yet the European countries had just experienced one of the most atrocious genocides in history.

The declaration issued by the Community heads of state or government in Copenhagen in April 1978 was the first text to refer specifically to democracy and human rights, ending with an undertaking worded as follows: ‘We solemnly declare that respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each member state are essential elements of membership of the European Communities.’

This declaration was motivated by growing concern in Europe over terrorism, to mention only one source of insecurity, and public indignation at abuses of human rights in South America. Another contributing factor was the recent encouraging trend in European countries such as Greece and Spain which at last had rid themselves of governments which flagrantly violated human rights. Many debates had been held on this subject in both national parliaments and the European Parliament, and the early prospect of the latter Parliament being elected by direct universal suffrage made governments more conscious of the importance the general public attached to such matters.

This problem also arises in the Third World, of course. It is hard to find any hard and fast explanation. Human rights cannot be said to be the preserve of either the poor or the rich: The situation is satisfactory in poor countries such as Botswana, Mauritania and most of the Caribbean countries, while the reverse is the case in Argentina. Nor can human rights be said to be the preserve of the right or left. The situation in Cambodia is no more reassuring than in Chile.

As Europeans we must speak out against all abuses, but first we must get rid of the ambiguity which surrounds the

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*The five-year agreement concluded between the nine member states of the European Community and 55 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries known as the ‘ACP’: Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Papua-New Guinea, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Upper Volta, Western Samoa, Zaire, Zambia.

Editor’s Note

In this Triologue on ‘The Politics of Human Rights,’ the Triilateral Commission gives the floor to a broad cross-section of statesmen and writers. Some of the contributions presented here come from the ‘trilateral’ regions—Kissinger, Fawer and Fairweather from North America; Benoit, Cheysson and Suharto from Europe; and Hatano from Japan. Others come from the ‘South’ (Kenya’s Mijungu, India’s Thapar) or from the communist countries—with an interview we conducted with Yugoslav dissident writer Milojko Mihajlov and an essay written at Triologue’s invitation by Andrei Sakharov, in which the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize winner describes the significance and difficulties of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and moves on to discuss issues such as disarmament and East-West relations.

It will be obvious to the reader that, in gathering such a collection, our purpose was not to present anything resembling a unified point of view or platform. The views presented naturally remain the sole responsibility of their authors. The sheer diversity of, and frequent contradictions between, the opinions put forth here testify to the extraordinary complexity of combining human rights ideals with other priorities and constraints in the conduct of foreign policy.

It may be, however, that beyond their diversity, these articles reveal a deeper unity: The interest, the passion sometimes, demonstrated by authors of such varied backgrounds reflect perhaps a new emergence of human rights from a mere aspiration, to an unavoidable factor in international affairs.
Since he left office, Dr. Kissinger has raised on a few occasions the problem of human rights and foreign policy. In an address at New York University last fall, he noted in particular that "the world needs to know what the United States stands for. But we cannot rest on this; we must know how to implement our convictions and achieve an enhancement of human rights together with other national objectives. . . . Morality without security," the Secretary added then, "is ineffectual; security without morality is empty. To establish a relationship and proportion between these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and our nation." In a brief interview with Dr. Kissinger in November 1978, we focussed again on some aspects of this challenge. Dr. Kissinger’s major points:

What are the merits and chances of success of a vocal human rights policy on the part of the U.S. Administration?

It has some merit for the United States to stand for its principles; the United States should definitely do so—and, indeed, we tried to do this also in the administrations with which I was associated. However, I think that making this a vocal objective of our foreign policy involves great dangers: You run the risk of either showing your impotence or producing revolutions in friendly countries, or both . . .

Iran? . . .

Clearly, yes. Current developments in Iran are one of the results of such a vocal policy.

Doesn’t this policy help promote within the country a much needed national consensus?

I do not think this has happened. I cannot accept the proposition that those who break the national consensus can restore it later with their own proclamations. There already existed a fairly substantial consensus, and I do not think that these proclamations have restored it in any way. As a leader, you have to make a distinction between writing a brilliant article and proposing something that gets implemented. . . . I want to make it clear, however, that I am not against a human rights policy per se; I am simply against some of its manifestations.

The U.S. is often criticized for being comparatively more lenient towards rightist types of regimes. Should there be such a “selectivity”?

This selectivity does exist, and I think it should be so. There is an enormous difference between authoritarian regimes which do not observe all democratic practices, and totalitarian regimes with universal ideological claims. There would be no difference, in my view, between what our attitude should be toward fascism and what it should be towards communism. But between authoritarian military regimes which are trying to produce a gradual evolution, and totalitarianism, the difference is fundamental. In recent times, no totalitarian regime has ever evolved into a democracy, while several authoritarian regimes—e.g. Spain, Greece, and Portugal—have done so. Our human rights policy must maintain this crucial distinction.

What about “linking” human rights with other policies—East-West trade, for instance?

I believe that East-West trade ought to be linked to basic American foreign policy objectives. But I would not have recommended that human rights be made so vocal an objective of our foreign policy. In fact, I think we achieved more by making it a non-vocal objective than those who have been talking so much about it. More generally speaking, I believe in linkage—I think that fundamental goals of American policy, no matter how they are defined, should be linked to other elements of interest to the Soviets. Either a policy has relevance to other areas of national strategy, or it has no meaning whatsoever. Linkage, therefore, is synonymous with an overall strategic view. It is inherent in the real world, and if we ignore it, it is only at our peril.

What of the silence of the Final Communiqué of the Belgrade Conference on human rights?

Frankly, now that Helsinki’s Basket III is an integral part of European security, and when human rights are a basic objective of American foreign policy, I have great difficulty understanding why human rights are not mentioned in the Belgrade Communiqué. I would rather not have signed this document.

Do you see any possibility of a joint approach on human rights between the U.S. and other trilateral countries—Western Europe, for instance?

In a forum such as the Triilateral Commission, I think it is extremely useful to discuss the significance of human rights policy; its relationship to other aspects of our policies; and how societies which, after all, are built on human rights can act on this. At a more official level, however, I believe that the Europeans have a totally different approach to foreign policy, and to human rights in particular.
The use of the word "movement" in the title of this article should not bring to mind any sort of organization or association, much less the concept of a party. We are simply speaking of people who are united by a somewhat common point of view and method of action. Being one of these people (a so-called "dissident") I do not in any way aim to play the role of an ideologue or leader. Every one of my public statements, including this one, reflects my own personal opinion in regard to questions which concern me deeply.

The socio-political ideology which gives first priority to human rights is, in my opinion, the most reasonable in many respects, if considered within the framework of the relatively narrow set of problems which it places before itself. I am convinced that ideologies based on dogmas or metaphysical precepts, or those which rely too heavily on the contemporary makeup of their societies, cannot be responsive to the complexity, sudden changes and unpredictability of human development. The imperitive and dogmatic concepts of all types of world reformers, as well as the irrational mirages of nationalism and national-socialism, have so far been realized by violating the internal freedom of people and inflicting direct physical harm—embodied in the 20th century in the horrors of genocide, revolutions, international and civil wars, anarchistic and state-inspired terror, and the hells of Kolyma* and Auschwitz.

Communist ideology, with its promise of creating a world society based on social harmony, labor, material progress and future freedom, has, in fact, been transformed by governments which call themselves socialist into an ideology of a party-bureaucratic totalitarianism, leading in my view to the deepest historical dead end.

Moreover, at the present time there no longer exists a pragmatic capitalist philosophy of reasonable individualism, at least not in its pure form. The various upheavals of the 20th century—such as the Great Depression, destructive wars, and the specter of an ecological and demographic catastrophe have demonstrated its inadequacy.

I believe that technical-economic progress is a supremely positive factor in our social life which to a large measure lessens the problem of distributing material wealth. At the same time, however, I acutely feel the dangers which are tied to this kind of progress, and recognize the inadequacy of a technocratic ideology in solving life's many-faceted complex of problems.

In contrast to the imperative nature of the majority of political philosophies, the ideology of human rights is in essence pluralistic, allowing various possible forms of social organization and their coexistence. It also offers the individual a maximum freedom of choice. And I am convinced that precisely this kind of freedom, and not the pressure exerted by dogmas, authority, traditions, state power or public opinion, can insure a sound and just solution to those endlessly difficult and contradictory problems which unexpectedly appear in personal, social, cultural, and many other aspects of life. Only this kind of liberty can give people a direct sense of personal happiness, which after all comprises the primal meaning of human existence. I am likewise convinced that a worldwide defense of human rights is a necessary foundation for international trust and security; it is a factor which can deter destructive military conflicts, even global thermonuclear conflicts which threaten the very existence of humanity.

In the postwar era, the ideology of human rights found its most consistent expression in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the various human rights movements, and in Amnesty International's global campaign for the amnesty of all prisoners of conscience.

The ideology of defending human rights played a very special role in the social movements in the USSR and in the countries of Eastern Europe. This phenomenon is tied to the historical experiences of these peoples, who within the life span of one generation lived through a stormy, brief period of intoxication with communist maximalism (this applies primarily to the USSR), with its accompanying intolerance, dogmatism, general destruction, suffering, and the crimes committed by both the Whites and the Reds in the name of that which they considered to be their great goal. Then followed the bloody horror of Stalin's fascism, which destroyed tens of millions of lives and which slowly transformed itself into the present, stable phase of a party-state totalitarianism. With this sort of experience behind us, it is natural for us to embrace an ideology which first of all places emphasis on the defense of concrete individuals and concrete rights, by methods which are in principle non-violent and nondestructive. It is an ideology which is based on the observance of laws and international documents which have been signed by our governments. The closeness in ideas and even in methods used by dissidents to wage the human rights struggle in the USSR and countries of Eastern

* Kolyma is a region in north-eastern Siberia known for its complex of concentration camps. (Trans.)
Europe makes it possible to speak of a unified human rights movement, in spite of the absence of organizational ties between the movements in these countries and the virtual inability to communicate—correspondence, the use of the telephone, and mutual visits are completely blocked by the authorities.

I would like to point out that one of the ways in which the authorities of these countries have reacted to such an absolutely lawful and constructive position taken by the dissidents was to violate their own laws—particularly during trial proceedings—to use with ever-increasing frequency underground methods of provocation, and in some instances even to commit acts of terror against certain individuals both within their own countries and abroad. And these unlawful actions used by the authorities have in turn strengthened the lawful orientation of the dissidents.

In Czechoslovakia the defense of human rights was a vital element in the “Prague Spring,” and more recently, it formed the basis of the widely known Charter 77, which in its direction and spirit is very close to numerous documents of the human rights movement in the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe.

In Poland, the Workers’ Defense Committee came into being, as well as other associations. Ten years ago, a number of groups appeared in the USSR as a reaction to unjust trials and other violations of human rights. Among these were the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee, and more recently, the Helsinki Watch Groups. The most important plateau in the formation of the human rights movement in the USSR was the creation of the remarkable samizdat information bulletin, A Chronicle of Current Events, which in spite of countless repressions and indescribable difficulties, has been coming out regularly for ten years now, with its traditional epigraph—the text of Article 19 of the Declaration of Human Rights.* I believe that this journal reflects best of all the very spirit of the movement—its objectivity and apolitical and pluralistic nature, its striving for accuracy and truthfulness, and its foremost interest in concrete violations of human rights and concrete fates of those who have become the victims of injustice.

The human rights movement in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe gives first priority to civil and political rights as a matter of principle, in contrast to the official state propaganda of these countries which purposefully accentuates economic and social rights (thus even contradicting the founders of Marxist theory). I am convinced that under contemporary conditions it is precisely civil and political rights—the right to freedom of conscience and the dissemination of information, the right to choose one’s country of residence and to live wherever one chooses within that country, freedom of religion, the right to strike, the right to form associations, and the absence of forced labor—which are the guarantees of individual liberty and give life to the social and economic rights of man, as well as to international trust and security. Civil and political rights are more systematically and more openly violated in totalitarian countries.

The key right, that of freely choosing one’s country of residence, is violated with particular crudeness in the USSR and the German Democratic Republic with its “Berlin Wall.” The freedom to choose one’s country of residence is important not only in family reunification (and I do not mean to diminish the importance of this), but it also gives the right in principle to leave a country which does not provide its citizens their national, economic, religious, political, civil and social rights, and to return to it should there be a change in the personal life of an individual or in the general situation. This right must inevitably lead to general social progress.

In the USSR only an invitation from close relatives gives a citizen the right to apply for emigration. This limitation directly contradicts international law as described in the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Thus, in “one clean sweep” they write off a large number of people who wish to emigrate or to leave the Soviet Union even temporarily for economic, religious, national, political, cultural, medical or other personal reasons. But even those would-be emigres who have invitations—in particular, Germans, Jews, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Armenians and Ukrainians—often encounter colossal difficulties. It is not by accident that there is such a word as “refusenik.” It seems quite clear to me that the repeated instances of arrest and unjust convictions of those who strive to emigrate is an attempt to crush the emigration movement, to frighten and halt in midstream any potential emigre. The article on “treason” contained in the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and other republics includes among the usual definitions of this crime, “escape abroad or refusal to return to the USSR.” In accordance to this statute, hundreds of people have been sen-

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* "Everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."
tenced to the most cruel punishments, and many have been placed in psychiatric prison hospitals.

For some time now, the fates of the convicted Jewish refuseniks—Shcharansky, Slepak, Ida Nudel, Goldstein and Begun—have become widely known, as well as the cases of those who participated in the Leningrad hijacking affair.* There are particularly many denials to emigrate and all sorts of persecutions aimed at the Germans who wish to emigrate. (From the 1930s to the 1950s hundreds of thousands of Germans died during Stalin’s deportations and repressions.) The fate of Peter Bergman, for example, whose peasant family has been trying to emigrate to Germany for three generations during the past 50 years, is most tragic.

In contrast to the generally accepted norm regarding the freedom of movement within a country (Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding article in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), in the USSR there is a passport system with an obligatory residency permit, the so-called “propiska,” which is issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Freedom of movement for those who live on the kolkhozes (collective farms) is even more limited. The Kolkhoz Decree does not guarantee the right to leave the kolkhoz, which virtually reduces tens of millions of people into serfs. The fact that some of them nonetheless do, by one means or another, attain permission to leave the collective does not change the intolerability of the general situation.

A special series of human rights violations in the Soviet Union is connected to nationality problems. The Crimean Tatars, who along with many other nationalities became the victims of Stalin’s genocide, are even now subject to the discriminatory prohibition from returning to their homeland in the Crimea. In 1944 when old men, women and children (the younger men were at the front) were exiled from the Crimea, almost half of all the Crimean Tatars died. The humiliation and cruelty to which those families who wish to return to the Crimea are subjected is beyond description. Refusals to grant residency permits, imprisonment for violating residency rules (special permission must be received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs), denial of the necessary documents for buying houses, the destruction of homes already bought (thus leaving entire families with children and old people on the street), forced evictions, inability to get work—all of these are a part of a consistent discriminatory policy which Crimean Tatars must face.

In the summer of 1978 the Crimean Tatar Musa Mamut committed an act of self-immolation, in an effort to draw attention to the tragic situation of his people. When he was being taken to the hospital, dying, he said, “Somebody had to do it.”

The acuteness of the nationality problems in the USSR is underlined by the severity of political repressions in the various national republics—in the Ukraine, the Baltic areas, in Armenia and elsewhere. Prison sentences in these republics tend to be particularly severe, and the reasons for imprisonment are even more flimsy than usual.

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The Soviet Constitution formally proclaims freedom of conscience and the separation of church and state. But in reality, those churches which are officially recognized find themselves in the humiliating position of being totally dependent on the government in the administrative and material sense. They are deprived of the right to serenade and to dispense charity, and their priests and elders are appointed by the Soviet organs.

Under these conditions, it is necessary to praise the clandestine nonconformity of the many rank and file clergy and believers of these churches. Those who oppose their church’s dependency on the authorities are subject to particularly cruel persecution—the separation of children from their parents, commitment of believers to psychiatric hospitals, arrests, convictions, confiscations, and even terrorist acts—all of which are never investigated.

Recently we were all shaken by the arrest of Vladimir Shelkov, the 83 year-old leader of the Seventh Day Adventists, who had already spent more than 25 years in prison. Repressions which the followers of this church suffer for their religious activities are particularly ruthless. Very often these people are forced to live a marginal existence. The situation of the independent wing of the Baptist Church, the Uniates, the Pentecostalists, the so-called True Orthodox Church and others is no easier.

In the Baltic republics and in the western parts of the Ukraine, religious persecution often assumes an antinational character. In Lithuania, for instance, the Catholic Church functions under great limitations, and its anonymous journal, The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, is hampered, its publishers and distributors persecuted. So far, I have been speaking about the religious situation in the USSR, which is particularly intolerant. It is well-known that in some countries of Eastern Europe, the heroic efforts of believers and certain Church leaders—such as Cardinals Mindszenty in Hungary and Wyszynski in Poland—have contributed to the establishment of a much more normal situation. The authority which the Church enjoys in these countries is one factor that contributes to the lessening of totalitarian pressure on the individual.

Emigration for religious reasons constitutes a special problem. For several months now, two Pentecostal families, the Vashchenkos and Chrynkhalovs, have voluntarily confined themselves to the American Embassy in Moscow. For over 16 years they have tried to emigrate from the USSR, after having experienced all possible forms of persecution, including prison. Now, their own local newspapers accuse them of being "spies" for foreign powers, and who knows, perhaps the same fate awaits them as that of Shcharansky, should they decide to leave the territory of the Embassy, which is

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*In December 1970 eleven individuals, mostly refuseniks, were tried for treason, theft of state property, anti-Soviet agitation, and other charges, for the planning of a hijacking to Sweden. The key defendants, E. Kuznetsov and M. Dinzishi, were initially sentenced to death, but later received commuted sentences of 15 years. The other defendants received sentences ranging from 4 to 15 years. (Ed.)
guarded day and night by the KGB. Many others of their faith have been trying unsuccessfully to emigrate (in some cases entire Pentecostal parishes), as well as numerous Baptists and other believers.

Along with the right to freely choose one's country of residence, the image a society projects is determined most powerfully by the right to freedom of conscience and dissemination of information. These basic rights are contrac
dicted by certain articles in the criminal code of the Soviet republics,* making it possible to persecute for namely those nonviolent and lawful acts which occur in all democratic states. Hundreds of prisoners of conscience are incarcerated on the strength of these articles. One of them is the prominent biologist and my close friend, Sergei Kovalev, who was also one of the editors of A Chronicle of Current Events.

The political trials in the USSR and Eastern Europe under charges of this nature are conducted with the crustiest viola
tions of the accused's rights to examine the entire record of the preliminary investigation of his case, to protection against fabricated slander and closed trials. No one, with the exception of the closest relatives of the accused, is allowed into the courtrooms of nominally "open" trials, and at many of the recent trials, even the wives and mothers of the accused could not be present. Indeed, there is much to be concealed at these trial proceedings, as well as to what happens in the camps and prisons—but about this, I shall speak later.

Not long ago the attention of the entire world was focused on the lawless trials of members of the Helsinki Watch Groups—namely, the trials of Orlov, Ginzburg, Schcharansky, Petkus, Lukyanenko, Kostava, and before them, Rudenko, Tykh, Marynovich, Matusевич, Ga-jauskas, and others—who were tried on the basis of these same articles.

In the last months the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group has issued a series of important documents. I joined in some of these, including the Group’s statement of October 30, 1978, which demands the nullification of Articles 70 and 190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and that part of the article on treason (Article 64) which classifies as treasonable any attempt to leave the country.

The conditions in which one and a half million prisoners, including hundreds of political prisoners, are confined in Soviet camps and jails undoubtedly constitutes an inadmissi
bile violation of human rights.** Prisoners suffer forced labor under severe conditions; and for the nonfulfillment of unattainable norms they are punished, most often by being placed in punishment cells where they are tortured by hunger and cold. There is no decent medical care, and they are exposed to constant provocations and harassment on the part of the administration. That is their life. During the press conference which was held on October 30, 1978—which, since 1974, has been traditionally regarded as "the day of the political prisoner"—I transmitted to foreign correspondents a letter from the special regime concentration camp in Sosnovka, in which these conditions were described with impressive exactitude and authenticity.

Among the rights which are extremely important for any normally functioning society, and which are not realized in the USSR and in the countries of Eastern Europe, are the rights to strike and to form associations independent from the authorities. Based on the example of these rights, it becomes increasingly clear that without the existence of political and civil rights, social and economic problems cannot be effectively solved. Soviet propaganda claims that our country is a fully developed socialist state with a maximum concern for the individual. But reality is far from these boisterous assertions: There is a tremendous social inequality between the working masses—especially such professionals as white-collar workers, doctors, and teachers—and the so
called bosses, who have countless privileges. This inequality is particularly painful in light of the extremely low standard of living, in spite of the fact that our country is relatively developed, in the economic sense. Allow me to cite a few figures: The average pay of a Soviet citizen is about 150 rubles per month, but some salaries are 80 and even 70 rubles, even in Moscow where salaries are higher than in the provinces. The maximum pension is 120 rubles per month, but there are many different kinds of personal pensions, and the minimum comes to about 40 rubles. A single mother receives 5 rubles per month; but if the income of a given family comes to less than 50 rubles per person, the monthly allowance per child is 12 rubles, but this support is dispensed only up to age 8. In the majority of cities even the most essential items are lacking, in particular meat, medicines and numerous basic manufactured products. People travel to Moscow from all corners of the country, spending their money, time and effort, just to obtain the basic necessities of life.

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Humanity now faces a series of complex problems which threaten normal life and the happiness of future generations. These problems threaten the very existence of civilization. One of the more insidious dangers, and one difficult to prevent, is the spread of totalitarianism, which threatens humanity’s progressive and free development. This is the very danger that the struggle for human rights directly coun
ters. The ever-widening understanding of this fact has been reflected in recent years in such historical events as the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by 35 heads of state, where the inseparable link between international security and the observance of basic human rights was established. The same shift in public opinion was reflected in President Carter’s articulation in January 1977 of a policy based in princi
ple on the defense of human rights throughout the world as the moral basis of United States policy. In this conception, the global character is particularly important, that is, the

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IDI AMIN VERSUS JIMMY CARTER:
A MORAL CLEAVAGE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH?

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The debate about human rights has to be placed alongside two other major debates in the world—the controversial quest for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the equally controversial doctrine of detente. The scale of priorities embodied in NIEO are mainly concerned with North-South relations. The focus of emphasis within the doctrine of detente is on East-West relations. The human right crusade aspires to be global—though the initiative comes from the liberal ideology of the Western world. It is partly in this sense that the debate about human rights has to be seen in the larger context of normative and ideological changes in the world. In reality there are three sets of rights which often conflict—the juridical rights of states, the collective rights of groups and races, and the human rights of individuals.

On Southern Africa, for a long time the Western countries were more concerned about the juridical rights of the Republic of South Africa (and of Portuguese “sovereignty” until 1974) than they were about either the collective rights of non-white groups or the human rights of specific Southern African individuals. But there has been more of a Western effort in the 1970s to reconcile the demands of the three kinds of rights.

African states are more concerned about the collective rights of groups and the juridical rights of states than they are about individual human rights. African reluctance to “interfere in the internal affairs of Uganda” is an emphasis on the privileges of sovereign statehood. African demands for greater interference in Rhodesia and South Africa are a response to the collective needs of oppressed races.

In the First World of the developed West, recent trends have seen even further victories for liberalism—ranging from greater openness of government in the United States since Watergate to greater moral scrutiny of public conduct in the wake of the Lockheed scandals. The Second World of the developed socialist states has also witnessed some liberalization and erosion of Soviet control.

In the Third World the emphasis is not on liberalization but on liberation. NIEO is part of that struggle. Development aid under this paradigm is not charity that President Carter can use as a carrot to reward good conduct but is part of a package of economic rights and obligations affecting the world as a whole. A shift is required in our conception of “aid.” When it is related to collective economic justice on a world scale, it becomes illegitimate to use it as an instrument for promoting Western political values.

But even if America’s human rights crusade has had elements of imperialism and arrogant self-righteousness within it, it is a great improvement over such older slogans of moralistic imperialism as “Pax Britannica” and “the White Man’s Burden.” Whereas the older Western gunboat diplomacy said to the weaker countries: “Behave yourselves—or we shall intervene!” Jimmy Carter is saying to countries already dependent on the United States: “Behave yourselves—or we shall withdraw!” Carter’s threat to withhold a carrot is an improvement on Teddy Roosevelt’s threats to use a stick.

But the whole debate on human rights has to be placed in an even wider context. What is the relationship between ideology, religion and values? What roles have the different continents played in the evolution of world culture? And where do Jimmy Carter, on the one side, and Idi Amin, on the other, fit into this global scheme of things?

Moral Conscience in History

The two major sources of moral ideas so far in human history have been religion and ideology. These two concepts themselves overlap. Religion includes an element of sanctified ideology, providing guidance for public behavior as well as private conduct. On the other hand, ideology—even when it aspires to be completely secular—tends to share with religion a sense of mission and a mythology of ultimate values.

Europe and Africa share one important element in common—neither continent has produced a major world religion. Europe welcomed Christianity from West Asia, or the Middle East. Africa welcomed Islam from West Asia also,
but in addition received Christianity primarily from its adopted home in Europe.

Mahatma Gandhi used to say quite often that virtually all the great world religions were born in Asia. He saw that as an indication of the greater moral sensibility that Asia had displayed in history, and the capacity that the Orient had for moral leadership if only it would resist the temptation to ape the materialism of Occidental modernity.

But whether Asia does indeed have an inherent capacity for moral leadership or not, it is indeed a historical fact that those religions which are today regarded as world religions are neither African nor European in origin.

Africa and America in turn share another element in common—neither of them has produced a great independent modern ideology. Much of the liberalism of America was an elaboration of a legacy of ideas borrowed mainly from Europe's cultural heritage.

And yet both Europe and America in time became independently creative, building on what they had borrowed from other sources. Christianity in Europe took a line of development different from what it had in its ancestral home. And when Christianity became more diverse with the Reformation, it contributed to neoclerical ideologies. Max Weber's thesis concerning the Protestant origins of capitalism has to be related to the parallel thesis concerning the capitalist origins of liberalism. And both liberalism and capitalism in turn helped to generate their own antithesis of socialistic ideas, which culminated in Marxism as one of Europe's most important ideological contributions to the human race.

Similarly, America did not just sit back on its European heritage, but moved on to give its political culture a decisive distinctiveness of its own. Frederick Turner's thesis about the frontier origins of American culture has to be seen as something which modified and conditioned the cultural legacies that came with the Mayflower and with the succeeding waves of European immigration into the Americas.

But while Africa does indeed share with Europe the attribute of failing to invent a great world religion, and while Africa shares with America the attribute of failing to invent a great world ideology, Africa in the modern period has suffered an additional handicap—it has not as yet enriched or transformed what it has borrowed from elsewhere in the way Europe enriched or transformed Christianity and the Americas helped to give additional meaning to their European heritage. For the time being, Africa remains in a state of both intellectual dependency and moral fluidity. It still looks overwhelmingly to the Western world for intellectual leadership. And its moral values and orientations have become fluid partly because Africa is itself a cultural melting pot. Influences from different parts of the world are seeking to emerge as a new entity. But for the time being there is a good deal of moral uncertainty, a lack of cultural direction, often a profound sense of rootlessness and anomie. Part of the agony of violence and repression in African society is due precisely to the bewildement of this moral transition between the familiar and familial restraints of the traditional past on one side and the distant and elusive standards of the future, on the other.

In the middle of this bewildering transition are leaders like Idi Amin Dada of Uganda. Such leaders are here today and gone tomorrow. If not tomorrow, then they are overthrown the day after. In any case, they are symptomatic of the malaise of social transition and the aftermath of imperial disruption committed upon Africa by others. On the negative side, there is little doubt that the Idi Amins of Africa are an indictment both of Africa itself and of the disruptions which colonial rule helped to cause in the continent.

There is, however, a positive side to the saga of someone like Idi Amin. No one who fired the imagination of so many millions of oppressed people in different parts of the world could have been entirely evil. For at least the first few years of his rule, Amin was a towering symbol of naïve but heroic resistance to the mighty nations of the world—a symbol of the semiliterate standing up to the pretentions of sophistication, a symbol of the underprivileged standing up to the all-powerful. And yet, this same Amin was one of the most brutal rulers of the 1970s. On the one hand, he was clearly a villain of Uganda; on the other, he seemed to have risen to become a hero of the Third World.

What did this tell us about the New International Moral Order? Was there indeed a moral cleavage, as well as an economic gap, between the developed and industrialized countries of Europe, North America and Japan on the one side, and the developing countries of the rest of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the related islands?

It would, of course, be quite untrue to suggest that the Third World approved of Amin's brutalities against his own people. What needs more explaining is the ambivalence of the Third World about Idi Amin, rather than any unqualified applause of him. Much of the West is quite clear in its verdict—the man is evil and should disappear from the scene as soon as possible. For much of the Third World, Idi Amin, at least for part of his period in office, was not a case of unqualified evil. He had that profoundly dialectical quality of heroic evil. And whether one applauds the heroism or laments or denounces the evil depends upon one's total priorities. In other words, Amin's significance in the 1970s has been more positive in international affairs than in domestic affairs. The degree to which the Third World has been ready at times to forgive his domestic excesses provided he remained a symbol of resistance to the mighty was indicative of a major moral cleavage between the Northern hemisphere of the affluent and the Southern hemisphere of the exploiting and underprivileged.

Almost six years after Amin took over power in Uganda, Jimmy Carter rose to power in the United States. Carter decided to become a new moral voice of the North. His proclaimed crusade for human rights in different parts of the world was intended to be global. On the one side, it turned out to be a continuation of the ideological battle between the Soviet Bloc and the West. But instead of simply proclaiming himself anti-communist—as the America of John Foster Dulles tended to do—Carter led the more positive, normative
crusade of favoring civil liberties, the satisfaction of basic human needs, and the promotion of liberal values and compassion. The North-South implications of Carter's strategy clearly have a bearing on Southern rulers like Idi Amin Dada. Let us first take a closer comparative look at these two leaders before we derive wider conclusions about their significance for the New International Moral Order.

**Preacher Carter and Warrior Amin**

One of the first differences one notices in a comparison between Carter and Amin is the huge difference between their respective bases of power. Jimmy Carter is President of industrially the most powerful and perhaps militarily still the mightiest country in the world; Idi Amin is the ruler of a relatively small African country which has now become one of the world's poorest countries. Jimmy Carter came to power in a free competitive election; Idi Amin usurped power in a military coup. Jimmy Carter is, for the time being, the political center of one of the most stable political systems in the world; Idi Amin is, for the time being, the political center of one of the more chaotic and chronically unpredictable political arrangements of the 1970s. There is therefore a substantial difference in their power bases, as well as in the legitimacy of these bases.

The personal style of these two leaders is also at variance. It is possible to emphasize in Jimmy Carter's style the metaphor of the preacher. With regard to Amin one can focus on the image of the warrior. In moral terms, Carter has been a preacher of human rights. To him and to most people, even among Amin's own admirers, the Ugandan ruler has been one of the great violators of such human rights.

And yet, even in these apparent differences there may be areas of similarity. Jimmy Carter heads a country which is at the center of world politics, but he himself comes from the periphery of that country, a little town in Georgia. Idi Amin heads a country which is peripheral in world politics, but in addition, he, like Carter, comes from a peripheral part of his own society. Jimmy Carter assumed power in a mood of moral righteousness after the Watergate affair in the United States. Idi Amin also assumed power in a mood of moral righteousness after abuses of power and political excesses under President Milton Obote. Jimmy Carter declared his readiness to purify the nation and restore its moral purpose. Idi Amin made similar proclamations in his own society, and moved in the direction of imposing a new national code of conduct, ranging from control of drinking hours to insistence on moral decorum in dress. Jimmy Carter came to power, seemingly influenced by religious fervor; he is after all among the twice born. Idi Amin also came to power seemingly motivated by religious aspirations, ranging from the ambition to create a truly ecumenical state in Uganda to the apparent conviction that he was in communion with God and was His instrument for social and political reform. Jimmy Carter has aimed to lead a moral crusade in D.C. itself and beyond. Idi Amin sought to lead a moral crusade within Uganda and then to link it to a political crusade against imperialism worldwide.

In comparing Carter and Amin, one should also examine the significance they held for black people within the United States. Black America is, after all, practically the second largest black nation in the world. It is second only to Nigeria in population, unless more reliable figures for Ethiopia than those we now have show a larger black population than that of America—assuming, that is, that Ethiopia as we know it today survives. Uganda, on the other hand, is one of the middle-range African countries in terms of population, and definitely one of the smaller ones in area. Both the ascent of Jimmy Carter to power and the activities of Idi Amin in power raised the hopes and sometimes stimulated the imaginations of Black Americans. In the case of Jimmy Carter, the optimism was partly based on the role that Black Americans had played to bring him into power at all. Carter's margin of victory over Gerald Ford was narrow, and he would not have been elected if the majority of Black American voters had not chosen him.

The optimism of Black America when Carter came into power was also based on his being a Southerner who had dared to be liberal within the South, and so, it was presumed, understood black people and their aspirations much more than Northern politicians tended to. Carter's commitment to a moral approach also seemed to augur well for the underprivileged in the United States, among whom blacks were the largest single section. The Carter appointments after he assumed power disappointed many blacks, but the eloquence of Andrew Young as United States Ambassador to the United Nations partly compensated for major gaps elsewhere in Carter's Administration. The job which Andrew Young held was not especially powerful in policymaking within the United States, but it tended to command considerable publicity. An Andrew Young highly visible but not very powerful went some way towards giving Black Americans a sense of participation in global events.

The Black American response to the phenomenon of Idi Amin arose partly out of black enthusiasm for Amin as a black nationalist. Amin's expulsion of the Asians in 1972, in the face of massive opposition from Britain, whose citizens the majority of expelled Asians were, was to many Black Americans a stroke of nationalistic genius. Amin seemed determined to put Uganda's destiny into black hands. His dedication was not necessarily to the creation of a kinder or more humane Ugandan society, but simply the creation of a situation where black people of Uganda wrenched their economic destiny from the hands of non-black people. Amin's economic war against foreign control of the Ugandan economy aroused memories of black leaders in the Western hemisphere like Marcus Garvey, who had similarly been dedicated to black self-reliance.

But what about all that brutality which Amin committed against his own black people within Uganda? Some Black
HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN TODAY

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I. Responsibility for Refugees

Thirty years have passed since the International Declaration on Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. At that time, Japan was an occupied country barred from membership in the world body; hence it was unable to cast a vote. On December 10, 1978, however, the Japanese people celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the Declaration with unusual enthusiasm, demonstrating their growing concern for the human rights problem. Encouraged by such strong public opinion, the Japanese government finally moved out of its complacency to sign the U.N. Covenants on economic and political rights.

Despite public awareness of and concern for human rights in this country, however, the rest of the world is far from pleased with Japan's conduct towards specific areas and incidents. South African policies of apartheid, for example, have been condemned internationally, and for years many nations have exercised economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, but Japan did not even try to reduce its South African trade. For that, Japan earned a great deal of bitterness in many countries. Then just as a way to hurdle the South African problem seemed to be emerging, Vietnamese refugees began, literally, to loom large on the horizon.

The Japanese government naturally helps support the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, but unlike contributions from each nation to the U.N., donations to UNHCR are voluntary. There are no quotas. Theoretically, the size of a voluntary donation by any nation is a purely internal matter not subject to judgment by others, but compared with what other nations gave, the 930 million yen from Japan between 1975 and May 1978 pales into insignificance. Considering that Japan's financial contribution to the U.N. is the third largest, at 8.66 percent of the total, its extremely modest donation to UNHCR appears downright stingy. The government is obviously aware of the deficiency, for it recently pledged 1.17 billion yen for Vietnamese refugees, a move that will redress the financial imbalance considerably. Now one question remains: Will Japan accept these refugees?

International law does not require Japan to accept refugees, since it is not a signatory of the "refugee treaty." Or at least the Japanese government has used this legal rationale to persist in denying permanent residence to any refugee. However, great numbers of Vietnamese are now fleeing their country and the United States, France and many other countries are taking these people in. The coldehearted attitude of Japan's government has been labelled inhumane, and is the target of a growing protest by both domestic and foreign critics. Only recently did the government loosen its policy slightly, declaring that "those with guarantors in Japan could be permitted residence." But this is a meager, face-saving gimmick; of the 1,910 "boat people" who have landed in Japan (as of December 10), only three have received permission to stay.

Most Vietnamese refugees seem to prefer Europe or the United States. The majority of those who have landed in Thailand or Malaysia after long periods of difficulty at sea do not want to stay there; they are waiting for eventual acceptance by the United States, France, Australia or some similar country. The same applies to refugees who have landed in Japan; most have eventually emigrated to the United States, which makes sense when one considers U.S. relations with Vietnam over the past fifteen years. Their basic preference for a Western country comes out more clearly in the large number who have chosen Norway or Switzerland, two nations that had nothing to do with the Vietnam War. It took us a full century to free ourselves from our worship of the West—we of all people should be able to understand the reasons for the refugees' preference. Even though most refugees may not want to stay here, it nevertheless reflects poorly on Japan that only three out of 2,000 have been granted permission for residence. Whether it is the very stiff conditions imposed by the Japanese government or the insular mentality of the people that makes Japan difficult to live in, the fact that so few people choose to stay in Japan is nothing to be proud of. All Japanese, whether private citizens or public officials, have a responsibility to ask themselves why this is so.

(Continued on p. 28)
The West and Human Rights

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The German philosopher Ernst Bloch created in his work the concept of the unconsummated and thus ever-significant past (unvollendete und damit fortbestehende Vergangenheit). He regarded the past as a political challenge arising wherever the historically active principles of liberty have as yet been realized insufficiently or not at all.

This applies especially to human rights, which, despite their first codification almost 200 years ago in the American Bill of Rights and the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme, are still slighted or ignored entirely in many parts of the world. A special responsibility for the implementation and protection of human rights rests with the Western democracies, which stand in the tradition of the declarations of the rights of man promulgated during the American and French revolutions and which have developed upon the foundations these documents provide. We are today more aware than ever of the urgency of this historical challenge.

The discussion of human rights has received new impetus following the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki. The civil rights activists in the Eastern Bloc were thereby enabled to cite the Helsinki Final Act, which the East European governments had also signed, and to demand its implementation. Helsinki itself was made possible only through the lengthy preceding process of detente.

A direct connection thus exists between detente and the efforts of the Eastern Bloc civil rights activists; only detente made possible this demand for human rights in Eastern Europe. One of the positive results of the Helsinki Con-

ference is thus precisely that the men and women of Eastern Europe now as a matter of course can and do voice their criticism to a degree almost unimaginable only five years ago.

It is this effect of detente which has caused the leaders of the Eastern Bloc countries to react by returning somewhat to a new self-insulation, without daring fully to abandon the already initiated policy of an opening to the West, however. I am convinced, the degree to which this turn to more self-insulation will influence the foreign policy line of the Eastern Bloc countries in the middle and long run will depend not least of all upon our own behavior.

The fact that more and more citizens of the Eastern Bloc countries are now participating in the human rights discussion is, moreover, not a consequence of Helsinki alone, but is also the expression of social changes proceeding in these nations. This would be better understood in the Eastern Bloc if only the effort were made to apply the thought of Karl Marx to the development of the USSR. In the long run, the nations of Eastern Europe will prove unable simply to detach themselves from the tradition of human rights deeply rooted in the history of Europe.

In my opinion, "Eurocommunism" already heralds proof of this observation. Even the Communist Party of France, which compared to the other so-called Eurocommunist parties has in the past distanced itself the least from the Soviet model, has not shied away from a conflict with the Moscow leadership on the question of human rights. Thus for instance, Pierre Juquin, a member of the PCF Central Committee, equated political prisoners in Chile and Uruguay with those in the Soviet Union during a public meeting on October 21, 1976. Upon the protest of the official Soviet news agency TASS, l'Humanité, the official organ of the PCF, published a resolution calling for six million copies of Juquin's speech to be printed and distributed among the populace. Other similar examples of a new attitude inside
the PCF toward the question of human rights could be cited. This is even more true for the communist parties of Spain and Italy—whatever the future of “Eurocommunism” might turn out to be.

The universal character of human rights requires that the question of human rights be viewed globally. One of the most pressing questions is that of the right to food, clothing, shelter, and education on the part of millions of men and women in the Third World. The question we must ask ourselves in connection with this debate is the following: Have we done enough to promote these elemental human rights in the Third World? I am afraid that the answer would have to be: Not yet.

Support for the human rights provisions of Helsinki also requires *inter alia* that we not silently condone racial discrimination in South Africa and that we loudly and clearly condemn the brutal repression of Chilean democrats by the Pinochet regime and the flagrant violations of human rights by the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Some people would today enjoy more credibility on this question if they had condemned the human rights violations of Trujillo and Balamu in the Dominican Republic or of the fascist regimes in Spain, Greece, and Portugal as resolutely as the infringement of human rights in Eastern Europe.

Questions of human rights concern our own nations as well. Thus one needs to address the rights of foreign workers in Western industrialized nations. We should also refuse to content ourselves with dismissing the question of the right to work and the freedom from fear and poverty by unemployment as irrelevant to the problem of human rights. We Germans must ask ourselves what reply we would make to the other side’s accusation that the state of respect for human rights in the Federal Republic of Germany is not always exactly the best, either. Certainly, no one should indict us for the so-called “Radicals Decree” without at the same time condemning the far greater restrictions on employment in the states of Eastern Europe. It must be admitted, however, that the Federal Republic is not necessarily placed in a good light by incidents such as the train conductor who was refused permission to conduct trains because of his membership in our Communist Party—which, by the way, gained only 0.3 percent of the votes in our last federal elections.

On the question of human rights, we should pay greater attention to the churches. These, because of their global presence and authority, view the question of human rights universally. The new Pope, John Paul II, who as Archbishop of Cracow and as a member of the Polish Bishops Conference concerned himself intensively with problems of human rights, may lead the Roman Catholic Church to take an even stronger stand on this question. Certainly, the Pope’s past initiatives for human rights should not go unheeded. The same holds true for the efforts of the Protestant churches.

The governments of the Western democracies should orient themselves to the real possibilities of human rights and should not be blinded to what is feasible today by a picture of what is ideally desirable. A policy of turning the human rights question into an indictment of the East European states would bring about the exact opposite of what it claims to achieve.

The process of détente would be blocked, and the men and women of Eastern Europe would be ill-served. Their situation would change, if at all, only for the worse. The West has accused enough in the past. The situation has been relaxed to a certain extent only through the policy of détente. Accusations are no substitute for political action in the interest of human beings and human rights.

The debate on human rights must also be conducted in such a manner as to promote further the humanitarian cooperation détente has already introduced—e.g. in areas such as travel and visitation rights and exchange of information—in spite of the setbacks we are presently experiencing. One must always call to mind the degree of cultural exchange achieved in the fields of science and literature as well. The human rights debate must not be conducted as an ideological crusade, for this would only cause the collapse of détente to the detriment of the human rights of men and women in Eastern Europe. Those who attempt to turn the discussion of human rights into an attempt to subvert the other political system are destined to fail.

The fact that we can now conduct the discussion of human rights on the basis of standards jointly adopted by Western and Eastern governments is an achievement of détente. The human rights discussion must be conducted in the awareness that certain rights of men and women have been recognized as common standards independent of political systems, even if the interpretation of these standards will continue to be disputed.

The discussion concerning the interpretation of the CSCE Final Act’s human rights provisions must, like that concerning human rights in general, be conducted in such a manner as to promote and not to endanger the policy of détente which made Helsinki possible in the first place. Human rights and détente are inseparable. In matters of human rights we cannot afford verbal shrillness, but must rather concern ourselves with what can practically be achieved for human beings and human rights. I consider this the only permissible criterion if we are to avoid falling back into the sterile war of words of the 1950s.
Defending Human Rights:
Two Impediments For The West

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Estimates of the longevity and salience of human rights objectives in U.S. foreign policy must rest on an understanding of both their potential impact on national interests, as they are conventionally defined, and on their domestic constituencies. Stanley Hoffman notes that human rights fit neatly into neither of the great organizing categories of contemporary international relations: on the one hand, "the politics of conflict between the chief rivals . . . the traditional state-of-war aspects of international relations" and, on the other, "world order concerns [whose] ultimate objective is accommodation" rather than enhancing our own options and constraining those of potential opponents. Although he seems to believe that the human rights issue comes closer to the cooperative rather than the competitive aspects of foreign policy, it is nevertheless incongruent with the former because it "breeds confrontation. Raising the issue touches on the very foundations of a regime, on its sources and exercise of power, on its links to its citizens or subjects."

It is just that thrust which so infuriates cold warriors of the Daniel Patrick Moynihan school. For them, human rights is a political instrument, a means of "ideological resistance" to communism.

As an available weapon in the presumably apocalyptic struggle against "totalitarian communism," human rights certainly has a future in a country where the executive branch still gets its greatest support from the Congress when the tensions with Moscow are highest. Of course, it also has a long and not altogether distinguished past. The O.A.S. Resolution excluding "the Present Government of Cuba from Participation in the Inter-American System,"—in support of which the United States was joined by several of the most repugnant dictatorships in Latin America—referred in its preamble to "respect for the freedom of man and preservation of his rights and the full exercise of representative democracy" as objective and principles of the "system." By implication, Cuba was a unique apostate from these high ends.

Like other great powers, the United States has invoked widely shared moral ideals to justify the pursuit of crasser interests. Perhaps more than others it has confused the two. The lofty tone of Teddy Roosevelt's corollary is one among a legion of examples. Moynihan's conception of human rights as an ideological shillelagh seems to have roots in this grand tradition of mixing moral enthusiasm and conventional great-power interests. The alternative conception of human rights, jeeringly indicted by Moynihan as "a humanitarian aid program, a special kind of international social work," has a decidedly more problematic connection with conventional conceptions of what constitutes an advantage in the game of nations.

These two views of what human rights are all about must coexist uneasily. For if you agree with the Moynihan faction that our fear of communism has never been and cannot be inordinate, that the East-West competition overshadows every other international issue, that our relations with Third World states must vary with their support for our side in the struggle, and that right-wing regimes are in principle less obnoxious than left-wing authoritarians, then you will inevitably end up opposing serious sanctions against anti-communist regimes. For one does not beat "allies" about the head. Conversely, if, reverting to Moynihan's disparatory idiom, what we really intend is "to be of help to individuals," then regardless of a government's stance in the ideological Cold War, we will enjoy comparatively good relations with it as long as it does not torture, murder, or arbitrarily imprison masses of its people.

Rabid anti-communism expresses fractures in our body politic—conflicts of race, ethnicity, religion, culture and class which by their nature will not heal. We speak of them conventionally in terms of Left and Right. The symbolism of human rights is profoundly important to both sides. Their endless conflict assures a permanent set of antagonistic domestic constituencies which will keep the issue alive. Occasionally, because of the need to appeal to the political middle and because there will always be Cambodias to pair off against South Africas, they apparently will even lend joint support to human rights initiatives.

Paradoxically, a humanitarian approach to human rights may be a more effective way of defending capitalism than the discriminatory, polemical manipulation of the issue seemingly urged by Moynihan. Equating capitalism with political freedom strengthens the former's moral legitimacy. When self-styled Marxist governments stifle elementary freedoms, they confirm the proposed equation. It is conversely threatened by the delinquencies of right-wing governments marching under the capitalist banner, even extolling the libertarian virtues of "free enterprise." In exemplifying the possible coexistence, if not the enthusiastic collaboration, of a capitalist economic system and a brutish political order, such governments inflict more ideological injury on the capitalist cause than the venomous polemics of its avowed Marxist enemies. So an even-handed, humanitarian approach may be attractive to conservatives as a means for strengthening both domestic capitalism (in its struggle against the sort of democratic socialism covertly espoused by populists and left liberals) and the United States in its competitive relations with the Soviet Union.

But its attractions to enlightened conservatives could prove evanescent, resting as they do on the hope that democracy and the capitalist growth model will not prove incompatible in most of the Third World. Once a widespread and enduring incompatibility were generally recognized, human rights would be seen to threaten both the ideological and material interests of international capitalism. For any campaign on their behalf would then focus attention on the
incompatibility and, to the extent it was successful in opening up political systems, would release forces propelling governments towards socialist development models.

**Human Rights and Capitalistic Growth Model: Are They Compatible?**

The degree and incidence of injury to capitalist interests in the United States resulting from a change in growth models is unclear. At a minimum, the change would hurt corporations supplying luxury consumer goods to Third World elites, since socialist regimes would reduce the income disparities which enable the upper classes to maintain living standards comparable to those enjoyed by the vast middle classes in affluent countries. Moreover, by decommercializing the communications media—that is, by barring their use to predetermine consumer preference—socialist regimes would reduce the profit margins of companies that rely heavily on the creation of consumer preference for brand names to reduce effective competition among essentially similar goods. This would adversely affect a number of U.S.-based multinational corporations. Furthermore, by favoring agricultural production for local consumption over export-oriented agriculture, they would reduce foreign-exchange earnings and thereby possibly jeopardize the country's capacity to service loans from the U.S. private sector and to permit the repatriation of income earned by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. This change in orientation would not, however, necessarily injure U.S. agricultural exports, because demand for food products, released by the redistribution of income to the hungry, might far outstrip the growth of local production.

For my immediate purposes, it is unnecessary to explore all the possible implications of a change in development models. The assumption that any socialist model is undesirable for the national interest shapes United States foreign policy. That assumption has deep and, at least in the short run, seemingly unshakable roots. And so, the odds against continued prominence for human rights in the foreign policy of the United States will narrow if there is a slump in confidence about the compatibility of human rights and Third World capitalism.

If we were to imagine the future as a mere extension of the present, confidence would collapse overnight. In many, perhaps most of the capitalist Third World states, economic growth (where it has occurred) has coincided with palpable aggravation in inequality, and, in some cases, probably even absolute declines in living standards for the lowest quintiles of the population.*

The impact of capitalist development on the exercise of political and civil rights is somewhat more varied, although far from promising. Anything resembling representative government is rare. On the other hand, regimes differ significantly in their tolerance of organizational activity and particularly in their respect for the most basic right, the right of physical security. In other words, the intensity of human rights delinquencies seems more a function of noneconomic factors—for example, racial antagonism, the supreme leader's paranoia, the incompetence or indifference of security forces, et cetera—than of tensions directly traceable to elite affluence and mass misery. But these variations occur within limits which, with rare exceptions, fall far short of human rights norms codified in international agreements and declarations. In most countries the polarization generated by inequality seems to insure persistent violation, particularly of the associational and participatory rights of the working and marginalized classes.

Confidence nevertheless survives because of the anticipated transience of radical inequality and the brutalizing tensions it produces. This happy anticipation stems in turn from the assumption that the developing nations will replicate the historical experience of advanced industrial nations, an experience marked by the coincidence of rapid industrialization and social injustice during the so-called "take-off" period, extending from the last decades of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th, and then, after a period of stable inequality, by a gradual narrowing of income differentials. Even before income differentials narrowed, the vastly increased national wealth trickled down sufficiently to raise living standards. A rising floor under extreme poverty and slowly moderated inequality created a climate of mass accommodation in which a progressively more democratic politics could flourish.

Gripped by this scenario, many Western economists find no grounds for pessimism in the worsening distribution of income. On the contrary, as typified by so respectable a spokesman as Harry Johnson, they affirmatively endorse the laissez-faire attitude of Southern governments:

> There is likely to be a conflict between rapid growth and an equitable distribution of income; and a poor country anxious to develop would probably be well advised not to worry too much about the distribution of income.

Critics** of the conventional extrapolation from the Euro-American experience cite differences in economies, politics, technology, ideology, and demographics which, in their judgment, are likely to sustain Disraeli's two nations of the affluent and the impoverished in most developing capitalist states. The lot of the lower classes in Europe and North America began to improve, it is argued, in part because they were absorbed en masse into the work force. As labor became scarce, competition for its services inevitably drove wages up. Labor scarcity was in turn a function of a comparatively gradual increase in the population and a labor-intensive technology. By becoming better paid, better fed and more valuable to the entrepreneurial class, workers no doubt found it easier to form trade unions which increased labor's bargaining power both in the market place and in the political arena.

Internal rivalries, nationalist ambitions, enlightened self-interest, and ideology (assuming it is not a wholly dependent variable) moderated capitalist resistance to these developments. The great capitalist entrepreneurs came from outside the traditional landed aristocracy and, after quickly ascending to comparable, often superior economic heights, challenged the old ruling class for political primacy. Their rivalry impeded formation of a common front against the lower classes, even encouraged them to call in new classes of voters to swell the ranks of their respective supporters. Of course, in degrees varying from one country to another, they integrated and cooperated, particularly when faced with a serious threat from the "dangerous classes." But they did not succeed in forming a monolithic opposition to the emancipation and politicization of the working class and the coincidental mitigation of its poverty.

Rivalry was only one reason. Self-interest also played a role. The means of repression were primitive, little more efficient in most respects than those available in earlier centuries. Lacking that degree of repressive power which produces almost effortless intima-

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*some authorities doubt the statistics on which this last proposition rests.

**The most imaginative and persuasive critique is Sylvia Hewlett's essay "Human Rights and Economic Realities in Developing Countries" in The Future of the Inter-American System, Peter ed., (Prager 1979). For many of the ideas in this piece, I am very much indebted to her.
idation, repression unalloyed with elements of accommodation would have been costly, even dangerous. There was a more positive kind of self-interest as well—a real concordance of interest between capital and labor stemming from the principal threat to profits and stability: insufficient demand for the plethora of goods spilling out of the new industrial cornucopia. More percipient capitalists grasped the elementary point that workers with money were consumers.

Nationalist ambitions—a symbiotic mingling of capitalist and aristocratic lusts reinforced by a half-literate mass’s appetite for vicarious achievement—reinforced the will to accommodate. Repression might do if the working masses were required only as cannon fodder in the struggle for economic growth. But if the mass were to be fodder for real cannons in the struggle for military victory over other nationally organized elites, they had first to feel a higher alliance to their kith and kin, regardless of class, than to the other workers of the world. They had, in short, to be integrated into the political nation. A liberal political ideology already widely diffused at the very outset of the industrial revolution encouraged and facilitated mass participation in national politics.

If these were the essential features of Western society’s evolution from the grim beginnings of the Industrial Revolution to the modern welfare state, only blind faith, it is argued, can support optimism about comparable developments in the capitalist nations of the Third World. A demographic explosion coupled with a capital-intensive technology, conceived in labor-scarce states, to maintain a ballooning reserve army of under- and unemployed. In many countries, and particularly in Latin America, capitalist entrepreneurs and managers either spring from, are co-opted into, or are dominated by the traditional classes. Where the upper classes are not fused into a single homogeneous elite, they nevertheless generally prefer collaboration to rivalry. And in their unremitting efforts to block the organization of a mass generally less literate, more incoherent and disoriented than its European predecessors, they deploy means of repression beyond the dreams of 19th century capitalists.

While repression is cheaper and its victims more expendable, there are no countervailing economic incentives for accommodation. National poverty is less a function of insufficient local demand than an absolute deficiency in the means for producing goods and services. Moreover, the most dynamic economic factor in developing countries is that Western-based multinationalizations can with greater ease, and at least with more immediate profit, produce luxury goods for the thin affluent elite than they could provide essentials for a mass armed with a little more disposable income. Nor do national rivalries seem to play the same kind of class-accommodating role they once filled. Whether because of a heightened sense of common class interest, or the declining legitimacy of and growing costs of war, or for other reasons, national capitalist elites evince reduced antagonism and a correspondingly greater capacity for cooperation, particularly in suppressing challenges to their hegemony.

Though all of this makes up a strong case for pessimism, at this point it is possible to remain wistfully agnostic. The case possibly exaggerates certain differences between the European and the Third World setting and does not take entirely convincing accounts of such new factors as the egalitarian ideology which seems to have displaced the 19th century’s reigning emphasis on individual autonomy. Another new factor is the capacity of the state apparatus, particularly in the more advanced developing countries, to accumulate and invest capital; growth is no longer at the mercy of the marginal propensity of the rich to save. Yet another novel factor, rich in unpredictable implications, is the emergence of the military as an independent social group with passions, interests and ambitions which are not invariably congruent with those of the monetized classes.

On the other hand, the fact that a handful of Third World capitalist states—Taiwan, Singapore, perhaps South Korea—have managed to incorporate most of the population into the modern industrial sector and to place a floor under extreme poverty should not weigh heavily against the pessimists. The fact that all are within the Chinese cultural zone, that two are comparatively small, that two were beneficiaries of extraordinarily large amounts of foreign aid, that all possess relatively sophisticated, well-organized and homogeneous populations, that the two larger ones were at a critical time extremely susceptible to the reforming advice of their American advisors, these facts make them seem if not sui generis, at least very far removed from the situation in most of Latin America.

Nevertheless, given our natural and tremendous collective urge to believe in the compatibility of human rights and Third World capitalism, we are bound to flatten compromising distinctions and hence to magnify the promise of these success stories. Economic failure and political atrocities in self-proclaimed Marxist states among the developing countries reinforce our national faith in the virtues of the capitalist model wherever it may be employed.

**Leftist and Rightist Authoritarian Regimes: An Unjustifiable Selectivity**

The United States, and the West generally, must overcome another and much more immediate impediment to the even-handed defense of human rights—namely, the assiduously propagated distortion of the useful distinction between merely authoritarian regimes, on the one hand, and totalitarian ones on the other. In this respect, *The Economist* is illustrative. Having concluded, in September 1974, that the “alternative to the Pinochet regime (in Chile) . . . was the imposition of a totalitarianism of the left,” it proceeded to reject the suggestion that Pinochet in turn represented the totalitarian right:

The word totalitarian was coined to apply to those governments—most notably the communist ones—which set out to bring almost every aspect of life under the control of the ruling party. The junta in Chile is not quite like that. Its government is an authoritarian one, and a very tough specimen of the breed, but it has not sought to impose its ideas on the totality of public life. Politics have been abolished, but men can still pursue their economic activities with a certain degree of independence; there remains a good deal of freedom in the world of culture and religion; people still have the right to travel in and out of the country. These things matter, because they mean that some centers of power and influence and independent opinion can still exist outside the reach of the government’s arm. Such a country is not a totalitarian one, because the rudiments of pluralism survive.

The distinction is important for Chile. The canters of freedom that can still be found even within an authoritarian state give men the possibility to recover the freedoms they have lost. These fragments of free-

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Bread and Freedom

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS*

Romesh Thapar

Editor, Seminar (New Delhi)

A major reason why human rights have suddenly become one of the key issues in international dialogues is the extraordinary global crisis through which the functioning of humane government is passing—and, of course, the absence of any cogent or convincing alternatives to such governance. In fact, our general bankruptcy in this area, both conceptual and implementational, has heightened the crisis by permitting all manner of political charlatans, with charisma and without, to practice the most extraordinary brutalities in the name of human liberation and advance. We do not have to go far—our own subcontinental region abounds with these aberrations.

Historically, it was believed by a large body of social analysts that we had moved through struggle from the age of feudalism (when rights were nonexistent and favors were bestowed by a tiny land-owning aristocracy) to the wider parameters of bourgeois democracy (when some rights have been won but have to be extended to establish the base of genuine social security for the people as against the narrow interests of the new property-owning class). The establishment of the workers' states was seen to mark a qualitative change in the texture of the liberation of humanity, but the brutal and psychopathic interpretations of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat destroyed a large number of very fundamental rights which have to underpin a working, decentralized, participatory society.

It was a widespread recognition that the enlightened society sought by these workers' states was far from achievement—a recognition affecting large sections of crucial opinion throughout the world that crystalized the battle for human rights. If we do not see the totality of the failure, and then modify it taking into account that in many societies there have been important advances in specific areas of human rights, we will tend to think only of this or that aspect of the question without establishing interrelationships. The complexity of human advance is such that it would be sad if we were to become the partisans only of the theories and programs peddled by Carter, Brezhnev, by Hua, by Indira Gandhi or Bhutto, by Iran's Shah or Uganda's Idi Amin, by Nazi or Zionist or tribal racism and overlordship, or by the new exponents of national rights—the Enoch Powells of the world.

If we tabulate the advances in human rights in our world during the last several decades, they are phenomenal. To begin with, feudalism is almost totally smashed, and where it holds, it is but a thing of rags and tatters. It is in Latin America, where the landed gentry, linked to expatriate marauders from Europe and powerful transnational corporations, and in some parts of Arabia and Africa, where tribal loyalties and dominances are manipulated by former colonial powers, that the embers of a neo-feudalism glow. In Europe, North America, Japan, in parts of South Asia, and Australia, the broad thrust of human rights underpinning a number of freedoms has created the basis for more just societies. The attempted egalitarianism of the socialist world stretching from East Europe, through the vast areas of the Soviet Union, to China, Korea and Vietnam, has neglected the freedoms of assembly and expression on the false plea that the economic freedoms of guaranteed food, work, health and education take precedence in the development of peoples. In the Third World, rising from the quagmires of colonialism, the battle for human rights continues against the remnants of colonial collaborators, feudal and the servitors of international capital. There is success here, and failure there, but significantly there is no disengagement from the battles now joined.

The fact that the world has shrunk, communication-wise, intensifies the battle for human rights. We are able now to locate the violations, analyze them, organize protests and create an international consciousness about the need to protect defenders of human rights. The calculated horrors of fascism enlarged our comprehension of what human beings were capable of doing to each other, if unchecked. The aberrations of the communist system, protecting its rationale of a dictatorship of the proletariat, are also recognized as indicative of our sickness. Consciousness spreads as we see the real meaning of the military-industrial establishments of supposedly free societies in the international context of human rights. Still, the "national chauvinists"—and they can be of several varieties—push their esoteric, yet often persuasive, arguments. They can become a challenge if we

*We reprint here the text of an address given in 1978 by Romesh Thapar at a seminar meeting of the Indian Society for International Law. (Ed.)

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What Objective For A Human Rights Policy?

The aim of a human rights policy should not be simply to help dissidents abroad—in Eastern Europe, for instance. It should above all involve trying to save democracy in the West. It is a case in point that, after World War II, many countries have not only become totalitarian but have also lost any possibility, it seems, of becoming democratic. For instance, certain African countries where democracy has never existed now have little chance of moving toward the democratic way of life. If this trend continues, the very existence and future of our civilization as we know it in the West is in great danger. The activities of the so-called “dissidents” are important to the extent that they really underscore the essential problem—that of saving our civilization. In this broad perspective, Jimmy Carter’s early human rights policy was significant because it marked the first time that a United States President, a leader in the West, presented a true ideological alternative to the other side.

Every week that I spent in jail, I had the opportunity of gaining my freedom simply by signing a paper certifying that I was giving up my convictions. Similarly, I am certain that Ginzburg and Shcharansky could have obtained their freedom quite quickly if they had signed a statement recanting their views. The primary aim of our effort is not and should not be to “help” dissidents personally to regain their own freedom, but indeed to help promote the entire democratization process. In short, what it all boils down to is not to save oneself, but to save democracy.

The Carter Administration’s Approach

President Carter’s vocal human rights policy did have some important results for a number of individuals. His timely letter to Sakharov helped him, as he was close to being arrested and persecuted again. Also, Carter’s activist human rights policy may well have prevented the arrest and jailing of several signatories of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia; it definitely provided an impetus to their actions. In Yugoslavia itself, the mere fact that the Helsinki follow-up conference was held in Belgrade caused the release of a number of the most important political prisoners, and the strong United States stand on human rights before the conference acted as a decisive stimulus for the creation of the first Yugoslav sramišt. In Yugoslavia, sramišt was the equivalent of a human rights organization.

A prominent Yugoslav dissident writer who refused to emigrate in the mid-1960s and subsequently spent a total of seven years in jail for his criticism of Tito’s regime, Mihajlo Mihajlov has repeatedly witnessed from the inside the effectiveness and impact of various Western human rights strategies. Last arrested in 1974 and sentenced to seven years for spreading “hostile propaganda,” he was released on the eve of the Belgrade Conference, in 1977, and allowed to travel to the United States, where he was lecturing in the fall of 1977.

People in free countries are often skeptical as to the concrete penetration and impact of such a strongly voiced concern for human rights upon and among the anonymous masses of people in totalitarian countries. But they hear it, and how! The people hear it, the prisoners—political and common—hear it, everyone hears it very well; as far as I am concerned, I heard quite clearly the initial Carter pronouncements when I was in prison. The press, first of all, does filter through; also, one always learns to read between the lines: When Carter is violently attacked in the press of a communist country, people learn to understand what it means and why it is there. In the end, these policies do inevitably seep through to practically everyone.

On the whole, the early actions and proclamations of the Carter Administration were a source of tremendous hope for all those who were imprisoned for their beliefs, as I was at the time. Indeed, such loud words are much more helpful than is usually realized in the West—but on one condition—namely, that they be uttered on a consistent basis. If such action is suddenly dropped, then the loud and beautiful words can become counterproductive. It would have been much better, for instance, if America had demonstratively walked out of the Belgrade conference instead of allowing the issuing of a Final Communiqué which lacked any mention of human rights.

An Alternative Planetary Vision

The central problem, in my view, is that the West lacks a world vision which supersedes pragmatism, and lacks a truly international democratic movement. A broad, all-encompassing vision is the basis of the strength of communism, and we in the West must develop a similarly strong global vision if we are to be successful in opposing communism and its fundamen-
1978. His most recent work, Underground Notes (Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1976) is a collection of essays covering a broad range of philosophical, literary and political themes all linked to his perception of a needed "renaissance of the human spirit" in the offing. As is clear in the following excerpts of a recent conversation with him, his overall view is based first and foremost on a strong faith in the fate of democracy as the only living force capable of opposing effectively the threat of totalitarianism. (Ed.)

tal disregard for human rights. Furthermore, such a vision is the only way human rights can eventually be articulated as a full-fledged policy with the complex set of international objectives of Western governments.

This vision is not incompatible with democracy, and it already exists, to some extent, in the United States. Most people here do share an all-encompassing commitment to democracy, and I meet more and more young people who realize that only a total struggle for human rights everywhere will make it possible for the United States to exist and continue as a democracy. Although a strong planetary vision does not yet fully exist here, I feel that young people are groping towards such a vision and that more people do realize they cannot preserve their own democracy if they do not fight for the principles of democracy all over the world.

At a deeper level, I believe that something truly religious, or spiritual, is indispensable for us to fight effectively the "pseudo-religion" of communism; it is quite clear that neither atheism nor pragmatism is what is called for. The existence of democracy makes me optimistic precisely because I associate democracy with this spiritual and religious element. To speak as Locke when he was trying to define democracy, a man who belongs to God can neither abandon himself to complete subjugation by another man, nor can he place another "human being under his total control; what he can do is "entrust the right to administer his will temporarily to another human being who is freely elected by him." By contrast with the fundamental values of democracy, Marxism eliminates this "godly perspective" and as a result, it allows itself to exert total domination over men. In this spiritual basis for democracy I find the most effective antidote to totalitarian oppression.

A Commitment To Action

It is essential for the United States to realize that it cannot be content with just being an example; true, the fact that America is a profoundly democratic country and continues to follow its own principles is already in itself an encouragement to democracy abroad. However, if this belief in democracy is not translated into an actual foreign policy, one which does not hesitate to link every issue, then your human rights efforts will remain useless. A human rights policy has to be constantly aligned with the government's action and backed up by economic and other tangible measures.

In the same fashion, the West's fight for human rights should be translated into support for all democratic forces wherever they may be. To be selective or more lenient toward rightist types of dictatorships for strategic reasons is short-sighted—even if rightist types of authoritarian regimes do lack in general the ideological drive and the absolute degree of control and oppression which characterize leftist totalitarianism. The fact of the matter is that in the long run, the right-wing dictatorships inevitably prepare the pathway for the very existence and survival of leftist totalitarian regimes.

Finally, it is essential that the United States avoid the temptation of nationalism. Its strength and the greatness of its role in the world stem from the universal nature of its principles and beliefs. It would be a disaster for the world if America were to steer away from this all-embracing human consciousness to take a narrow nationalist one.

Besides Government, What Can Other Groups Do?

Small groups in the West, such as Amnesty International and the International League for Human Rights, are very effective, perhaps more so than they realize. The International League is perhaps the more effective of the two because it has a fairly broad area of concern, while Amnesty International emphasizes political prisoners almost exclusively. On the whole, however, I believe that the press, along with world public opinion, plays the greatest role in regard to human rights. In this respect, I do not quite agree with Solzhenitsyn that the Western press is totalitarian and dogmatic; rather, I do think that the press here is sometimes too conventional and pragmatic in its approach to human rights. The most important thing for the press to do is to convey correct, exact information. Sometimes, for pragmatic reasons, it fails to do this. To mention only one example, I remember vividly that when I addressed the press at a luncheon given by the Washington Post, the journalists knew perfectly well of the human rights abuses which exist in Yugoslavia; however, they were and still are reluctant to report these abuses because Yugoslavia sometimes stands up to the Soviets, and because the West has chosen to think of the Tito regime as an example of communist independence from the USSR.

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(MIHAJLOV continued from p. 19)
In December 1978, on the eve of his return to Yugoslavia, Mihailo MihaJlov reflected upon his trip to the West and offered the following conclusion to our interview:

I believe that a person’s homeland is freedom and not a given geographic area. I choose to return to Yugoslavia not because I believe that a person cannot live without his geographic homeland, but because for a number of reasons the first decisive battle with totalitarianism is likely to be waged in Yugoslavia. Up to now, no communist one-party government has ever made the transition to a democratic pluralistic society. For many years, Yugoslavia has been the most open and liberal of communist countries; this is why a decisive change can take place there. If such a change occurs, it will bear worldwide significance—although when the moment of crisis comes, other totalitarian communist countries will undoubtedly try to stop such a precedent.

I have never said anything in the West which I did not previously state in the open in Yugoslavia; if upon my return to my country I were to be arrested, or if my passport were to be taken away to prevent me from traveling abroad again, it will only mean that Yugoslavia will be taking a dangerous turn toward totalitarianism. In the eventuality of such a fact, the democratic world can gain some benefit because the given situation will be unmasked. If, however, everything goes normally and if I am able again to return to the West next year on a tour of lectures, it will represent a great step toward freedom—no less than when I was released from prison last year. In short, I cannot be but victorious in either case.

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dom tend to expand as the regime gains more confidence in itself; there is less intrusion into people’s lives in Spain today than there was 20 years ago—or than there is in Chile now.

Does the putative distinction between right and left enjoy much intellectual merit? To begin with, one may reasonably doubt that the generality of right-wing autocrats has an inclination to restore freedom “as the regime gains more confidence in itself.” Confidence about what, one may ask. Presumably about its success in so intimidating and intimidating the human beings and institutions of the left—as well as those liberals and moderate conservatives who will defend human rights and unexaggerated democracy—that the desired repressive social order can be maintained with reduced public order expenditures and less offense to humanitarian constituencies in the Western democracies.

Even if such regimes could acquire the necessary confidence, despite their pursuit of harshly totalitarian ends which tend today to generate opposition, the result would hardly be anything we might call freedom. Anyone who bothers to listen to what Pinche or his ideological siblings in other states say and write cannot avoid discovering a contempt for democracy indistinguishable from the views of the most hardened Stalinist.

The Spanish precedent is hardly felicitous. In the first place, the regime built its confidence like a vampire. One hundred thousand would be a conservative estimate of the persons massacred by Franco following his absolute triumph. This on top of the hundreds of thousands in exile, and the vast number of potential enemies—republicans, anarchists, socialists, communists, liberals, and regional nationalists—killed in the course of the Civil War. What Spain illustrates, then, is the degree of inhumanity required to infuse a regime with confidence when it is driven by ideological zeal and is determined to impose policies antagonistic to the interests of a large segment of the population.

Nor does Spain nicely exemplify a progressive slackening of the authoritarian impulse. The impulse survived over three decades; time simply decimated the ranks of those it possessed. Gradually they lost the power to impose the brutal regimes which they continued to prefer. The tenacity of fascism was impressive. Thirty-five years after Franco crushed the last vestige of resistance in a country of Western Europe directly exposed to the currents of liberalism and the pressure of neighboring democracies, political parties, even of the center-right, were still outlawed. At least a half-dozen right-wing authoritarian regimes in the Western Hemisphere have demonstrated an even more impressive capacity to maintain themselves.

Compare Czechoslovakia in 1968, just before the Russian invasion braked the gathering momentum of self-liberation. More insulated by geography and international politics from the liberalizing influence of the West, that country seemed as close as Spain at Franco’s death to the threshold of a free society.

There is simply no persuasive historical basis for the conclusion that right-wing autocracies are less tenacious, more subject to erosion by the yearning for freedom, than those of the left. Nor is there a persuasive theoretical case.

A private sector within the economy does not necessarily represent a center “of power and influence and independent opinion . . . outside the reach of the government’s arm.” In fact, the government may be little more than the militarized arm of the private sector. Or, the two may be so intensely intertwined by mutual interest that no important differences of opinion can emerge. Or, businessmen may exist purely at the sufferance of a military caste, Mamslukes who prefer to leave economic activity to carefully screened and cowed civilians made malleable as well by the guarantee of liberal profits. Nor is it inevitable that the church or cultural associations serve as independent centers of power. For they too can be participants in the regime or its docile servants.

Just as the presence of ostensibly private institutions does not guarantee the existence of pluralism, so their absence does not necessarily assure monopolistic control. However strong their aspirations to centrally directed uniformity, radical parties cannot annul the social, economic, political, and in some cases cultural contradictions that promote division within their ranks and encourage appeals for support to constituencies outside the elite structure. Who after witnessing the last decade’s profound struggles within China can still speak of the “blue ans.”

Neither in precedent, such as it is, nor in theory do I find a basis for the presumptive attribution of superior moral features to regimes of the right. What makes some regimes more tenacious and vicious than others is a function of national history, the immediate domestic environment, the international context and, perhaps, the personality of leading figures. Ideology can make a regime more brutal where its application is peculiarly inappropriate to the particular society. If for instance, a modern, highly secularized nation fell under the thrall of a band of Puritan fascists

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ANTIGONE VERSUS CREON

Jean-Marie Benoist*

Today, a demand for a new ethic is being born. Through the voice of President Jimmy Carter, the U.S. has undertaken to give preeminence to the reaffirmation of a universal absolute, the rights of man, over the absolute imperative of Realpolitik. It could be tempting to see in this merely a withdrawal into the abstraction of good conscience or self-righteousness—a new form of the eternal "missionary" zeal of the U.S.—if suddenly, by its very excess, the challenge set forth by President Carter had not come to disturb the traditional order of diplomatic conduct and polished behavior between nations. The great hope raised both in the West and the East—particularly in the East where the suffering dissidents are to be found—by the signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference regarding human rights, can no longer be sacrificed on the altar of the cold logic of Realpolitik. Even if President Carter, the author of the challenge, wished at some point to forget his own overpowering gesture, he would be incapable of cancelling its effect. There is now a breach in the wall of totalitarianism and fascism. Wherever people suffer—in Chile, Uganda, the countries of Eastern Europe, in every place where the commissar's explanation of history has been turned into a state religion and where a theocracy, black or red, dreams of eradicating the unusual, the heterogeneous, the dissenting—in all these leaden states emerges today a new generation of men who no longer use bombs or violence, as in still recent times when the absurd dialectic of a dying Leninism authorized resorting to blind force. The new weapon of these singular men from the East and from the West is the sheer strength of their belief in the letter of the Helsinki agreements. Their fight consists in relentlessly calling upon their governments to honor their signature. What an ironic outcome of a well-known ruse of post-Hegelian rationalism: The letter of the law, once denounced as legal hypocrisy by the cardboard men of Marxism-Leninism, now plays that very role of the unwritten laws in the name of which human rights continue to challenge the Raison d'État.

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New Mission for Western Intelligentsia

Today the intellectuals can no longer be content to remain at home, signing petitions for the implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreements; in 1977, the real battle was being fought in Belgrade, where the fate of the dissidents and persecuted was at stake; tomorrow it will be fought in Madrid.* The clamor of those united by pain ascends to us like Mahler's Song of Lamentations, the Klagende Lied. Here in the West we must multiply our expressions of irreverence towards totalitarian systems and doctrines which rationalize violence. We must make all the Shigalovs and the Lebedevs of the future realize that they will find us resolute in the face of their will to power and their work of dehumanization. But this indispensable disrespect is insufficient and would be futile if we did not also listen to the lament which now rises, as clear and loud as Dostoyevsky's admonishment to the West in The Possessed. It was Solzhenitsyn who first awakened us from our doctrinal sleep—a hurricane more powerful than all of the Mays of 1968. And now Zinoviev in Gaping Heights, Plyushch in The Carnival of History, and with them the whole army of those who are without name and with no voice to call our attention. The blood of dissidents cries out, despite all the pitiable attempts by the right as well as the left to use it for

*The next meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is scheduled to take place in Madrid in 1980. (Ed.)
their own purposes. It is the same cry as the cry of the persecuted Chilenos, Iranians, Argentinians and Ugandans. “Man is born free; yet everywhere he is behind bars.” Faced with this rise of tyranny and fascism—red or brown—two attitudes await us, two strategies for us to adopt: (1) to carry out the signed treaties to the letter, and (2) to continue to name the persecuted wherever they are. To carry out the signed treaties implies showing the powers which initiated these documents that their signature commits them and bounds them forever. The Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries will not be able to avoid their obligations. No economic barter, no bushel of wheat, no brand of tractors can ever allow the signatories of the Helsinki agreements to “bow out.” The writers, scholars, intellectuals—all the tireless servants of the word—must, without any slackening, call upon the signatory powers to implement these agreements. We are at the point where noninterference becomes cowardice. We must involve ourselves in the events taking place in the East. Every day we must ask for news of Rudenko, Tykhy, Shcharansky, Ginzburg, and Orlov. A formidable clamor is on the rise, now answered by a formidable show of solidarity. Spontaneously, intellectuals and free men of all walks of life feel this solidarity, for they have understood at last the value of their freedom. Their main trump is to not belong to any organization or paralyzing structure, but to intervene as individuals, and to name and invoke the persecuted endlessly, as in the tragic nêkvia of antiquity.

The effect of this act of naming is incalculable. Through a mysterious network which travels back on the tracks of samizdat, glimmers of hope light up in the East the minute the name of the persecuted is sounded in the West. The wall cracks a little each time we invoke the names of Michnik* or Orlov. Some forty scholars from Western Europe, participating in a conference on the acceleration of nuclear particles in Provinzto about 100 kilometers from Moscow, signed a message of sympathy for the physicist Yuri Orlov, imprisoned since February 10, 1977. The document reads as follows: “Yuri, we are saddened by your absence but we remember and speak of you.” The first step, the initial stage of our resistance to barbarism is to write, to telephone—like those members of the British Parliament who, each day, make a point of calling one of the imprisoned in the East. We must name, we must inform ourselves and the world.

This is the purpose of the “Antigone Initiative,” which unites Western European intellectuals who share a common goal—the setting up of a shadow-Belgrade, another forum, parallel to Belgrade but in Vienna or Geneva. This forum would be responsible for the concrete examination of violations of the Helsinki agreements, violations deliberately ignored by Realpolitik and the imperatives of secret diplomacy. Why this “Antigone” committee? Because it is Antigone, daughter of Oedipus, who despite the forbidding of her uncle Creon, king of Thebes, goes out one night to throw a handful of earth on the banished body of her dead brother. Antigone speaks in the name of indefeasible rights, of unwritten laws older than time. Today, these same demands are embodied in the Helsinki agreements and compel their observance. “I myself did not believe that your edict had the authority to grant a mortal the power to infringe upon divine decrees, decrees which were never written and are unalterable. It is not as of today, nor even as of yesterday, that they exist—they are eternal and no one knows from which past they come to us.” Today, the Helsinki agreements are the equivalent of these fundamental laws; they are the very faith which the persecuted buried in the house of the dead obstinately cling to—their only ray of hope. Human rights—against the Raison d’État.

Therein lies the new European resistance. By a curious accident of history, this resistance was born of the diplomatic fallout of President Carter’s personal initiative. President Carter raised his voice to compel the signatory states of the Helsinki Conference to move forward towards a new ethic defined by the respect of human rights, and in so doing he has broken with the routine of Realpolitik. His gesture may well be promptly dissipated by the Administration which surrounds him, reduced to a simple equation among the many parameters to be considered by his advisors. But nothing will mute this voice of the sorcerer’s apprentice which he became for a moment—a voice of challenge, an indomitable call to resistance and to dissidence which will echo in history with the same ring of transcendence as General de Gaulle’s appeal in June 1940. The call for human rights must be heard by all free minds concerned with today’s resistance.

The Myth of Eurocommunism

This resistance is not only a cultural flight, but also a global fight for civilization—a fight for the ethics of human rights, the concrete struggle of individuals for other individuals and not just an abstract battle in behalf of universal goodwill. These urgent actions can prevent Europe from becoming a dead entity—but only if, in addition, we exert an acute vigilance, capable of mobilizing the intellectuals and all free men to demystify the most dangerous illusion ever to have been born of Europe’s present mood of capitulation: the myth of Eurocommunism.

The threat of Eurocommunism may seem to have receded somewhat in the past months, especially since the largely unexpected defeat of the so-called Union of the Left in France’s general elections in March 1978. However, these elections remain a constant reminder of what we have so narrowly escaped and could well face again in the future. Indeed, in countries which are fundamental for the equilibrium of Europe, Eurocommunism should continue to preoccupy us—as a continuing danger, and also as a case in point of the kind of illusions which could void the human rights struggle of its very content. As such, the phenomenon of

*Adam Michnik was the member of the Polish KOR released in August 1977, as Poland did not want to stand accused at the fall 1977 reconvening of the Belgrade Conference. Our efforts are not in vain.

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(CHEYSSON continued from p. 2)
term “human rights,” which has a different connotation depending on whether we are talking about ourselves in Europe or are referring to the Third World. In Europe, human rights encompass political, economic, social and cultural rights, the right to security and work and personal rights. In the Third World, our intention is in no way to pass judgment on the ways in which society is organized or governed, nor on the forms in which popular will is expressed, but we are concerned with the fundamental rights of the individual and his personal dignity, or, to quote the first paragraph of the Preamble of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “... recognition of the inherent dignity ... of all members of the human family.”

Consequently, we cannot remain indifferent to flagrant violations of that dignity, arbitrary detention, torture or racism. Public opinion, workers and young people in our countries would not tolerate such apathy and would withdraw their support for a real joint development policy with the Third World—support which we particularly need at a time like now when the economic crisis seems to make our people preoccupied with their own concerns. True development must involve the whole population, which cannot be the case if individuals are humiliated or ignored. The lesson learned from the 1930s must also be borne in mind, namely, that to tolerate racism in one country is to place the whole world at risk.

Existing conventions between Europe and the African countries omit any direct reference to human rights. Europeans must take full account of their Third World partners' legitimate concern to resist any interference in their internal affairs, a consideration which is particularly important in relations between former colonial powers and former colonies. This also explains the Community's efforts to place systems of aid on a contractual and nonpolitical basis.

A conflict between these principles undoubtedly exists. It is particularly important to discuss this matter in relation to Lomé, which is more than just a trade agreement and seems to establish a partnership in all areas of cooperation, allowing cooperation policy to take its place among policies in other sectors. Our ACP partners are well aware that the spirit of Lomé is far broader than the texts themselves. They were the first to urge their Community partners to take up the question of human rights in Africa, leading to public declarations against violations of human rights, apartheid and torture in Southern Africa. What would their answer have been if we had asked them what article of the Convention they were referring to?

Together we must therefore reiterate the goals of our cooperation, stressing firmly that the aim must be to serve mankind by promoting dignity and respect of the individual. The Commission of the European Communities proposes that the new Lomé Convention should include a specific and explicit reference to the resolve of all signatory states to respect the fundamental rights of the individual. The Community would state in a formal unilateral declaration appended to the Convention that it reserved the right to censure publicly any violations of human rights and to check carefully that the aid it provided could not be used for purposes other than those intended.

The Commission does not believe that breaking off relations with our partners and stopping aid are effective means of helping downtrodden populations that are denied the most basic human rights. First, the Community is bound by a contract. What body could be said to have the unquestionable authority to break such a contract? Most important of all, cessation of aid and the breaking off of relations would not greatly discomfort the most oppressive governments but would add to the wretchedness and woes of those who suffer under their yoke. The poor have basic human rights no matter how disgracefully a country's rulers may behave: Have we the right to overlook this fact just to set our consciences at rest and seek an opportunity to make pretty speeches? I doubt it. We should instead insure that aid corresponds to the basic needs of the population and really gets through, and ascertain that it cannot be misappropriated for other purposes. Let us steer clear of taking lofty stands that in practice are irresponsible and have damaging consequences for peoples already hard-hit by other tribulations.

It is by no means certain that these careful distinctions will be accepted by the countries negotiating the renewal of the Convention. Our partners are very suspicious, but they realize how fundamental these matters are to European public opinion.

It is therefore our belief that they will listen to us. The negotiations in progress are bound to be protracted. A statement by the President of the ACP Council, Mr. Patterson, the Jamaican Foreign Minister, gives cause for optimism. After calling for formal condemnation of racist acts committed daily which are fundamentally undermining human dignity, Mr. Patterson declared at the opening of the meeting of the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers that the main target of cooperation must be to serve man and ensure respect for his dignity as a human being. These words sum up our common aim in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as in Europe, which is by no means above criticism, especially as far as the treatment of migrant workers is concerned. ■

(FARER continued from p. 20)
determined to reconstruct society along theological lines, there would be no alternative to an unending murderous repression.

Thus, while ideology needs to be taken into account as one of several factors which help us to anticipate the humanitarian dimensions of a particular movement's political triumph, it does not justify a powerful presumption in favor of fascists, caudillos, and other assorted horsemen of the right. In the moral realm, as in the practical, there is no satisfactory alternative to considering each case on its complicated and often precarious merits. It remains to be seen whether Western elites, with their rooted ideological commitments, can manage this feat of judicious detachment. ■
A Canadian Perspective

Gordon Fairweather
Chief Commissioner
Canadian Human Rights Commission

Presidents and Popes have expressed their convictions about human rights and dignity and have added impetus to those governments and peoples who have tried to give effect to rights proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Covenants thereto; Pope John Paul II recently said human rights is the great effort of our time. I believe people carry certain obligations, duties, rights and privileges as a mark of their citizenship; so too do nations as part of their responsibilities as members of the United Nations.

How has the international community acted to fulfill these obligations? Some reference to our not-too-distant history may be salutary: Forty years ago, in Evian, representatives of 32 nations held a conference to see what could be done to help the Jews then undergoing persecution by the German Reich. We should recall the futile outcome of this do-nothing conference, and the tragic consequences of its inaction when accusations are made that concerns for human rights interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, is empty rhetoric if nations resort to such excuses to abdicate their responsibility. I believe Evian should not be forgotten. In October 1938, the French foreign office sent an explanatory memorandum to the German Foreign Ministry about the intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, still-born at Evian. This document stressed the purely humanitarian function of the Committee, and reassured the Germans that “none of the states would dispute the absolute right of the German government to take, with regard to certain of its citizens, such measures as are within its own sovereign powers.”

Hitler then informed the South African Minister of Defense, “We shall solve the Jewish problem in the immediate future . . . the Jews will disappear.”

On November 22, 1938, four months after Evian, a front-page article appeared in Das Schwarze Korps, the official newspaper of the Gestapo: “Because it is necessary, because we no longer hear the world’s screeching (emphasis mine) and because, after all, no power on earth can hinder us, we will now bring the Jewish question to its totalitarian solution.” Steps toward the final solution were outlined, concluding with the sentence: “The result would be the actual and definite end of Jewry in Germany and its complete extermination.” I am grateful to a note in the Manchester Guardian for recalling this time in 1938 when 32 nations decided to pass by on the other side.

“The world’s screeching” has now been turned into an instrument for addressing and solving human rights violations through the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. This Committee makes regular reports to the General Assembly and had its genesis in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ten years—a terrible decade—after Evian.

What situations was the world facing in December 1948? “Human Rights Declaration Adopted by U.N. Assembly” is a headline on the front page of The New York Times of December 11th, 1948. The story that follows states that the Universal Declaration was nearly three years in the making. The vote for adoption was 48 to 0 with the Soviet Bloc, Saudi Arabia and the Union of South Africa abstaining. Other front-page stories of the same edition of thirty years ago told of the visit of Madame Chiang Kai-Shek to Washington where she was to make representations to President Truman. At Westminster, Winston Churchill, in what a foreign correspondent termed “a single sweep of oratory,” proposed three changes in British foreign policy: ending of the Labour Government’s “sulky boycott” of Israel and conditional recognition of the new state; quick cessation of dismantling of nonwarlike industries in Germany; and admission of Spain to the United Nations.

That edition also covered a meeting in Washington which foretold the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the mayor of New York joined a delegation of mayors seeking help from the federal government for solving housing, school and traffic problems in large United States cities. This last bit of intelligence is added so that as we address the impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights during the past thirty years, the realities of urban life will not be overlooked.

When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, it was seen as the initial step in putting together a bill of human rights that would have legal as well as moral force. It was not until 1976, however, that this became a reality. Three instruments are important:
— The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
— The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
— The Optional Protocol to the latter Covenant.
Canada acceded to the Covenants and the Optional Protocol after having obtained the approval of the ten provincial governments.

Rights in Canada, whether civil, political, egalitarian, economic, social or cultural, derive from several sources. Many political and civil rights are to be found in the British North America Act of 1867 and the various amendments to it. In 1960, Parliament adopted a Bill of Rights which has application to laws made by the Parliament of Canada. The government of Canada has been trying for a decade to get the approval of the provinces for entrenching a bill of rights in a new Canadian constitution. Although it has not yet been successful, Canada has adopted other measures to give effect to rights recognized in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

For one thing, Canada reports to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These reports are due within one year of a country’s adopting the Covenant, which in the case of Canada was May 19, 1976, and therefore, unfortunately, Canada’s first report is now overdue. Our tardiness in complying with the guidelines of the Human Rights Committee stems from the fact that the federal government must oversee the preparation of its own report while urging along reports from ten provinces which have different timetables and different priorities for the use of staff and resources. Despite frustrations and realities of federalism, the report is finished, is being translated, and will be submitted before the year’s end.

The Parliament of Canada passed the Canadian Human Rights Act in July of 1977, which opens: “The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws in Canada to give effect, within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada, to the following principles:
(a) Every individual should have an equal opportunity with other individuals to make for himself or herself the life that he or she is able and wishes to have, consistent with his or her duties and obligations as a member of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, marital status, or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or by discriminatory employment practices based on physical handicap; and
(b) The privacy of individuals and their right to access to records containing personal information concerning them for any purpose including the purpose of ensuring accuracy and completeness should be protected to the greatest extent consistent with the public interest.”

The Act establishes a Canadian Human Rights Commission of three full-time and up to six part-time Commissioners. Each of the ten Canadian provinces has its own antidiscrimination laws which are broadly similar to the federal law, and each province has a human rights commission.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission is an independent quasi-judicial agency, and federal government departments are bound by its rulings. Complaints are made by those who believe they are being discriminated against by a person or institution acting on behalf of a federal government department or agency, or a business or industry under federal jurisdiction. They may be filed by an individual or group of individuals, or the Commission may initiate complaints. Once a complaint is accepted, it will be investigated and a report made as a result of which the Commission may appoint a conciliator who will attempt to reach a settlement. Failing conciliation, the Commission appoints human rights tribunals, and their decisions have the force and effect of an order of the Federal Court of Canada. If the complaint is found substantiated, the tribunal may order that the discriminatory practice cease and that compensation be paid for wages lost or expenses incurred, or for damage to the victim’s feelings or self-respect. A special program, sometimes called affirmative action, may be ordered to equalize opportunity for a group that has suffered from discrimination in the past.

As well as dealing directly with complaints of discrimination, the Canadian Human Rights Commission carries on programs of research and information; it has a mandate to consider recommendations and carry out studies on human rights and freedoms; it reviews other Canadian statutory instruments for consistency with the Canadian Human Rights Act; and Parliament has also instructed it to endeavor to effect attitudinal change.

This sort of administrative detail may appear banal when compared with the shattering significance of events such as the Evian Conference. But it is precisely such administrative details, and the patient day-to-day working to improve the social order that it implies, which ultimately assures that there will be no more Evians. Humanity’s emerging collective sense of responsibility for the integrity and dignity of every individual life entails more than declarations, more than rhetoric. It entails political decisions, jurisdictional in-fighting, allocation of resources, budgets, administrators, every detail right down to electric typewriters and paper clips before abstract ideas are translated into effective changes in the lives of individuals.

There may still be those who think of human rights advocacy in terms of “the world’s screeching.” But that attitude does not and will not prevail. Our “sense of common destiny, as members of one human family, on a shrinking planet, a mote of dust in infinite space, which can survive only if we all learn to live together” (as I.F. Stone has expressed it), will not allow it.
(SAKHAROV continued from p. 7)

attempt to apply the same legal and moral criteria to human rights violations to every country in the world—to Latin America, Africa, Asia, the socialist countries, and to one's own country. I know of some important and fruitful results of this policy in South and Central America, and in other areas. I am not at all inclined to underestimate the importance of waging a human rights struggle everywhere, striving to limit this struggle only to the USSR and Eastern Europe. To eliminate the suffering taking place today is more important than anything else, and it is not at all important whether that suffering is near or far, in the geographic or national sense. But at the same time, I also wish to emphasize that the crux of the threat of totalitarianism lies in the USSR, and this too must be taken into consideration.

I believe that President Carter's principled position responds to the demands of our time and to the democratic traditions of the American people. It can further the unification of all democratic forces in the world, and it bears an historical significance which cannot be cancelled by certain inaccuracies in the concrete execution of this policy. I consider it very important that the principled position put forth by the United States Administration regarding the defense of human rights receive even broader support, as well as those initiatives aimed at strengthening the position of the U.S. This is necessary for the U.S. to successfully carry out its leadership role in the Western world, to counterbalance the offensive policy of totalitarianism.

I have in mind here even such strictly domestic issues as the energy program and the fight against inflation. It seems to me that the discussion of key problems in the currently tense situation should be conducted above party politics and above other internal differences. Also in need of our support are such key issues of international life as the peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel, which is in the interest of all the peoples of the Middle East and the world as a whole. A problem which is more modest in appearance, but important for the economic and political independence of the West, is the effort toward the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I was recently distressed to learn about the negative results of the referendum held in Austria on this question.*

The American people are freedom-loving, generous, active and energetic (at least, that is the image that I have of them), and they will undoubtedly be able to overcome those problems which now face them and the entire world. One especially significant reflection of the evolution in the social climate of the world has been the series of political amnesties in many countries—and many of these countries are far from democratic. There was an amnesty in Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Chile, and in Poland. An amnesty is also scheduled to take place in Iran and in the Philippines, as well as in several countries of Latin America. The human rights struggle in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe was one of the factors which contributed to these events—the freeing of thousands of people.*

At the present time, that small handful of dissidents, whom I know personally, is going through a difficult period. Many wonderful, courageous people have been arrested. The campaign of slander and provocation is intensifying, which in part is directly orchestrated by the KGB, but to some degree is used by, or reflects the division, discontent and disillusionment among, some of the human rights activists and the circles close to them. Life is complex—and under these circumstances personal resentments and ambition have driven some people to actions and statements of a questionable nature. The number of active participants in the human rights movement in Moscow and in the provinces has probably diminished somewhat.

And yet, I believe that there is no basis for stating that the human rights movement has been defeated. It is one of those areas where arithmetic has very little relation to the thing at hand. During the past few years the human rights struggle in the USSR and Eastern Europe has substantially changed the moral and political climate of the entire world. The world has not only received a wealth of information, but it has also believed in it. And this is a fact which none of the repressions or provocations of the KGB can change. It is the historical reward earned by the human rights movement. Now as before, the sole ammunition of this movement is publicity—free, accurate, and objective information. This weapon continues to be effective. It is also quite evident that as long as the conditions and the goals of the human rights struggle remain, new people, motivated by certain circumstances in their lives and their own spiritual drive, will take the place of those who have left. And this too cannot be prevented by the repressions of those who are in power. On the contrary, a cessation of repressions would result in a major improvement in the authorities' position.

What do I expect from people in the West who sympathize with the human rights struggle? It is true beyond a doubt that their help is very important. And in this connection I should like to focus my attention on a few questions which are now being debated. The great deal of attention directed toward human rights problems in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, especially following the period of trials in the spring and summer of 1978, is an extremely important factor on which I place much hope. But expanded possibilities also demand extreme accuracy and judiciousness in action, keeping all the possible consequences fully in mind.

In the Western press the thought has sometimes been expressed that the strategic arms limitation talks, in whose success the Soviet Union is interested, as is the entire world, have opened up possibilities of applying pressure on the USSR on the question of human rights. In my opinion, such a viewpoint is not correct. I believe that the problem of lessening the danger of annihilating humanity in a nuclear

* On November 5, 1978, Austrian voters rejected a plan to open the country's first nuclear power plant at Zwentendorf. (Ed.)

* In most cases, these amnesties have been partial ones. (Ed.)
war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations. I believe that the principle of practically separating the question of disarmament from other problems, as formulated by the United States Administration, is completely correct. Consequently, the strategic arms limitation talks must be considered separately, and considered separately, we must ask ourselves whether it will lessen the danger and destructive power of a nuclear war, strengthen international stability, or prevent a one-sided advantage for the USSR or a consolidation of its already existing advantages. Such a separate, practical approach does not negate, of course, the doubtless fact that a durable international security and international trust are impossible without the observance of the basic rights of man, specifically, political and civil rights. It should also be pointed out that the West should not consider the cutting of military expenditures as the main goal of arms limitation. The basic goals can only be international stability and the elimination of the possibility of a nuclear war.

Another problem widely discussed in the Western press concerns the use of boycotts—scientific, cultural, economic, and so forth—as a means of applying pressure on the USSR for the purpose of freeing at least some political prisoners. After the trials of Orlov, Scharansky and Ginzburg, many Western scientists refused to take part in the scientific seminars and conferences held in the USSR. Some scientific associations refused altogether to cooperate with Soviet scientific institutions. I welcome such boycotts as a means of expressing the protest of world public opinion against the violations of human rights in the USSR. The same applies to economic boycotts, for example, the refusal to sell computer technology or oil drilling equipment. The Soviet Union and other totalitarian countries must know that the politics of defending human rights is not simply a beautiful phrase used by Western politicians, but an expression of the people’s will in Western countries, and that the continuation of human rights violations is irreconcilable with the continuation and expansion of detente. The same thought can be suggested by Western businessmen, politicians, athletes, lawyers and many others who have dealings with the leaders of totalitarian countries.

However, the problem of boycotts is complex and contradictory. No doubt the question of prestige in the world political arena, the struggle to attain and keep power, especially in the context of behind-the-scenes struggles, and the very traditions of a strong power do not allow the leaders of totalitarian states to react directly to pressure exerted against them. It is also certain that at the same time, boycotts weaken realistically useful contacts, and diminish the number of levers which can be used to apply pressure in the future. Therefore, in such complex matters it is impossible to give one single answer which could be applied in all cases. I can only express a few general considerations. It seems to me that with a few rare exceptions, it is best to avoid boycotts with ultimatums. That is, it should not be indicated in an obvious manner that the boycott will cease only if the totalitarian regime undertakes certain concrete steps. In such a case, a boycott will demonstrate the one side’s interest in a particular cause, and at the same time create a situation where the opposite side is pushed into a “dead end” from whence it cannot extricate itself without losing face.

I am also convinced of the necessity of combining various and impressive public campaigns with an energetic and thoughtful quiet diplomacy. The exchange of political prisoners can be an important arena of action for quiet diplomacy. I have already written that I do not understand and do not accept the contentions against such exchanges which have been expressed in the West. It seems to me that in some cases, this is practically the only realistic way to tear people out of the hell of the camps and prisons. Even if this method can help only very few people, still, it is a breakthrough, and it assuredly does not harm those who remain behind. Prisoner exchanges also do not undermine the authority of human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, whose goal is to achieve a worldwide political amnesty.

The proper attitude towards the forthcoming Moscow Olympics is a separate problem. My position coincides with the opinion expressed in the letter of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, which I also signed. It was sent to the International Olympic Committee and to its President, Lord Killanin. The authors of this letter note the human rights violations which exist in the USSR and warn that the Soviet authorities intend to limit the contacts between people at the upcoming Olympic games, in complete disdain of Olympic principles. The authors urge that this not be permitted and demand an end to persecution for nonviolent actions in support of human rights, i.e., for religious activity and the attempt to act on the right to freely choose one’s country of residence and place of domicile within that country. They call for the liberation of all prisoners of conscience. The authors of the letter state that they give great significance to the forthcoming Olympic games and ask that their letter be brought to the attention of the national Olympic committees and sports organizations in various countries, in order that every participant in the forthcoming Olympics can express his regard for the questions raised. Unfortunately, up to now we have not been informed of the Olympic Committee’s reaction to this document.

The ideology of human rights is probably the only one which can be combined with such diverse ideologies as communism, social democracy, religion, technocracy, and those ideologies which may be described as national and indigenous. It can also serve as a foothold for those who do not wish to be aligned with theoretical intricacies and dogmas, and who have tired of the abundance of ideologies, none of which have brought mankind simple human happiness. The defense of human rights is a clear path towards the unification of people in our turbulent world, and a path towards the relief of suffering.

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Translated by Ludmilla Thorne
Extending aid to refugees will provide only a partial solution. If a large number of people flee their own country, clearly something is definitely wrong with the government of that country. One of the boat people who landed in Japan, a journalist, said, "Under the French, times were really tough. Then when Japan occupied our country, one million died of starvation. Even then we never thought of deserting our fatherland, but the same people who got through all that can no longer bear life in Vietnam today."

A representative of the Vietnamese government has said that "all these people are leaving because the country is poor." But Vietnam is not the only poor country in the world. The people of many, much poorer nations do not risk life and limb just to get out. One suspects that the violation of human rights by the government, and not poverty, is the main reason so many are fleeing Vietnam. If this is correct, before criticizing other countries for inadequate financial contributions or for not cooperating in the acceptance of refugees, we should denounce the government that is causing misery not only for its own people and closest neighbors but for the rest of the world. If necessary, sanctions should be imposed and the country should at least be required to pay for the care of its refugees. Political refugees are totally different from those made homeless from earthquake, fire or some other natural disaster, and any solution requires some level of extra-financial involvement by other countries.

II. Human Rights and Social Stability

A country's immigration policy and treatment of foreigners, including refugees, are in some ways secondary to a firm guarantee of human rights for its own people. A country that cannot protect the rights of its own citizens cannot be expected to protect the rights of others who come to its shores.

The protection of human rights includes protection, first, of the individual from infringement by state or government, and second, of the individual from violations by other individuals. In both respects, Japan ranks as one of the staunchest defenders of human rights in the world. Violation of rights by the state, in the form of oppression or discrimination for political, racial or religious reasons, for example, is next to unknown in Japan today.

There are an estimated two or three million political prisoners throughout the world, but none in Japan. Japan can boast total guarantees of freedom of speech to the extent that political parties basically antithetical to the government can, and do, have Diet representation which, in a sense, seems to indicate that freedom of thought and assembly may be actually working more thoroughly than in the United States. It takes a stout heart and certain risk in many countries to criticize the government, but in Japan such critics, even outspoken opponents, are often played up by the mass media as progressive and enlightened. Scholars and intellectuals often need more courage to support the government than to oppose it, opening themselves to attack as conservative, right-wing, or weakly submissive and too compromising.

Another reason for Japan's solid record in upholding human rights is its comparative racial homogeneity and lack of serious racial problems throughout its known history. This does not mean that Japan has no minorities; among its people are Ainu, the aboriginal Japanese, who live largely in Hokkaido, and many Koreans who were naturalized after the war. But they do not constitute a large enough group to become a political force and they have blended relatively well into the mainstream. Legal measures to suppress or discriminate against them are not necessary, nor do they require reservations in which they would be protected.

But legal equality does not mean social equality. Ainu and Koreans are usually at a disadvantage in marriage and employment. Their efforts to establish greater social equality have resulted in minority organizations, a few of which, such as the Ainu Liberation Alliance, have on occasion resorted to terrorist tactics. If, however, quotas were set whereby enterprises were required to hire a certain percentage of Koreans, Ainu, or other minorities, efficiency in business might suffer. Such practices would also give rise to accusations of reverse discrimination, as in the United States where quotas were imposed to insure university entrance for a certain percentage of blacks, women and students from developing nations. There is little legal recourse, furthermore, in matters of choosing a spouse, as in so many other areas where neither domestic law nor international treaties can regulate cases of social discrimination that arise out of people's individual likes and dislikes.

A third factor that helps Japan maintain its high standards of protection of human rights is that religious beliefs are not the source of personal or social friction or a basis for discrimination. Before the promulgation of the present Constitution, Shinto was the state religion and the emperor of Japan was given the status of a sacred being. Today church and state are totally separated and no religion is ever suppressed by the government.

What is meant by violation of human rights among individuals is so broad that we cannot do more than consider it briefly here. The right to life and property are perhaps the most basic of individual human rights, and it is possible to assess the extent to which they are protected by examining the rate of occurrence and the rate of arrest for violent crimes, including murder.

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do not grasp the many dimensions of the battle for human rights.

Human rights crystallize in confrontations and struggles, nationally, internationally, and what I would describe as globally.

- Nationally, the cleansing of society of religious discrimination, feudal and racial oppression, and class exploitation expressed through highly organized elite groups dressed up in all manner of conservative and radical trappings, is the ground-level work in which human rights are rooted, nourished and matured. Unless this aspect is stressed repeatedly, we tend somewhat erroneously to imagine that the battle is only against jailing a free spirit, against torture as a weapon of suppression, and so on. A fuller view of the totality of human rights helps us to balance our judgments of others who might be less fortunately placed in terms of this or that right. However, we must always remember that the buttressing of human rights dissent, free expression and independent action are critical because upon them rests the articulation and organization of the struggle for the continuing liberation of human beings.

- Internationally, taking note of the continuing struggle for human rights in a complex and uneven setting, we have to work to counteract the nationalist sentiment which seeks to denounce external exposure and censure as unwarranted interference, as an affront to national sovereignties. The nurturing of international sentiment around the protection of specific human rights is of enormous importance in creating hope and sustenance among those sought to be crushed and silenced by their tyrannical societies. So many otherwise well-intentioned persons fall victim to this kind of distorted nationalist sentiment brought into play by every Humpty Dumpty ruler. The whole point about the cultivation of an independent mind is that it should be able to sift falsehood from truth. The raucous nationalist is the enemy of independent thought and the processes which go into its making. We have to defend international intervention in the area of research, exposure and censure. Only on this basis can we hope in the end for meaningful action in support of human rights. And there is no future without action.

- Globally, even as we build the rapport between national groups and enrich international awareness of the critical battles around human rights, actions mount around the great themes of our time—the smashing of colonialism, the ascendancy of the forces of peace against those that batter on war, the creative assertion of alternatives for the future, and the building of the latent camaraderie between peoples through systems of disinterested succor and relief which span the universe. We tend to take this effort for granted. This attitude fails to record the momenta growing within our societies to establish the humanitarian links which destroy the twisted calculations of the narrow, the exclusive, the parochial, the practitioners of various authoritarianisms.

Human rights need sensitive study at these three levels, or we tend to become fuzzy about what it all means. Nationally, the Indian with his caste and communal abnormalities; the American with his color blocks; the hidden or not so hidden racism of so many white peoples; the exclusiveness of so many Islamic and Zionist movements; and tribal and other chauvinisms inevitably encourage political methods which are hostile to the healthy growth of human rights. We have to be aware of these damaging flaws in our own national character, and be able to remedy them, before we can really become effective in the international struggle to attack these very same cancerous areas. Those who resist genuine, impartial international exposure of the national abnormalities which throw up distorted and brutal political practice are those who use a patriotic-nationalist screen as a cover for their authoritarian ends. The global struggle on issues of common concern to humanity is enriched by national and international actions.

Look at the situation in a more positive light. When viewing national abnormalities, it does not take long to realize that these are rooted in systems of life and living still immune to just and humane values. These systems cannot change unless values change to the extent that the systems are destabilized and made ready for restructuring. At this critical moment in the history of nations, unfortunately, essentially authoritarian movements confront each other. The human tragedy is captured in the opposing currents of fascism and communism, both speaking the language of dictatorship. In this confrontation, unless special situations are created, the people are paralyzed within the status quo. In a sense, we find precisely this kind of situation in either the First, Second or Third World. Significantly, the struggle to break this stultifying status quo of authoritarianism finds expression in the massive attempt in several advanced countries to compel communist organizations to submit to democratic frameworks which guarantee human rights, including the paramount rights of organized dissent and protest. France, Italy, Japan and Spain are in the lead.

These very important political developments will certainly have a profound impact internationally on the assertion of human rights. We have moved away dramatically from hostile power blocs. A multi-polar world has eased tensions. And, now, if the trend within some communist parties towards participative democracy advances, the detente which escapes us may well crystallize. Such detente, internationally, reduces the pressures asserted nationally to suspend human rights on this or that plea. It also cuts, globally, the wasteful expenditures on what has come to be an armed peace, and so recovers the resources for the development of human living. This is the essence of human rights, whichever way you look at it. We are likely to see many more breakthroughs in rigid posture and ideological intractability if we are able to isolate the gangsters, the self-seekers, the lobby manipulators, and the international intelligence agencies from the business of national and international politics. Some kind of global action perhaps is required to expose the superstructure of fraud and deceit, of criminality, which

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and armed robbery, which are the most direct violations of those rights. No matter how "protective" the law claims to be, if life and property are often or regularly threatened, human rights are not secure.

David H. Bayley's book, *Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States* (1976) has some very interesting figures to offer in this regard. In metropolitan New York, with a population of about twelve million, there were 1,739 murders in 1973, while in Tokyo, whose population is about the same, there were 196. Nationwide, there were 9.3 murders for every 100,000 people in the United States, but the figures for Japan were about one-fifth that level, or 1.9 murders per 100,000. Figures for armed robbery show an even greater gap: Such cases occurred 105 times more frequently in the United States. During 1973 the U.S. recorded 382,680 robberies, and Japan, 1,876. New York alone had 74,381 while Tokyo had 361. The United States' incidence of crime is increasing annually, whereas Japan's rate is dropping to the extent that the number of recorded crimes in Japan is half of the figure for 1948.

The accompanying table lists the rate of arrest for the five years from 1974 to 1978. Arrests for homicide have been at or above 96 percent for the entire period and averaged 80 percent for armed robbery.

### Arrest Rate for Homicide and Armed Robbery in Japan (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Robbery</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>96.38</td>
<td>96.38</td>
<td>96.38</td>
<td>96.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police White Paper, 1978

Of course, criminal arrest has no direct connection with guarantees of human rights; if a person has been murdered his rights can never be restored to him. But the overwhelming odds that they will be caught deter a great many potential criminals, which is half the battle in the protection of human rights.

It has been suggested that its huge police force is one reason that Japan has so few crimes of violence and so many arrests, but actually the ratio of police to the general population is very low compared to many of the industrialized nations. Japan maintains less than half the number of police per person in France, and about two-thirds the number in the United States. The Japanese policemen and policewomen are, however, highly capable and perform well, partly because of the efforts of law-enforcement authorities, but also because the public has a good understanding of human rights and are supportive and cooperative.

The activities of radical groups, such as the Japanese Red Army, are considered by the Japanese public violations of human rights, along with violent crimes in general. As the following National Police Agency data show, the number of policemen injured in demonstrations or incidents involving radicals is about half the number of people arrested. Police fatalities while on duty stand at eleven since 1960, most of them occurring during the riots and demonstrations surrounding the 1970 automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

### Police Officers Killed and Injured in Riot Incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number Killed</th>
<th>Cause of Death</th>
<th>Police Injured</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>572</td>
<td></td>
<td>796</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2,918</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1 Rocks thrown by demonstrators</td>
<td>5,601</td>
<td>6,287</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1 Rocks thrown by demonstrators</td>
<td>5,665</td>
<td>14,293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>858</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5 Beaten by demonstrators (3) Burns from Molotov cocktails thrown by demonstrators (2)</td>
<td>3,152</td>
<td>7,389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2 Shot by Japanese Red Army</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td>862</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1 Burns from Molotov cocktails thrown by demonstrators</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1 Helicopter crash</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>699</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,175</td>
<td>42,743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, in the same period only one student was killed in the clashes between demonstrators and riot police—a woman listed as an accidental death. In 1977 police in Nagasaki shot to death one of...
several armed men who had taken over a bus with twenty-three passengers on board. On the whole, the police are extremely careful, often to their own disadvantage. Statistically, ten times as many police as criminals die during the perpetration of a crime. The very strict control maintained on weapons of all types is of course important, but it is not the only factor in the low death rate among criminal offenders. Police restraint is conspicuously strong in Japan. When the Japanese Red Army took over a cottage on Mt. Assama in 1972, taking the owner's wife as hostage, rifle shots fired by radicals claimed the lives of two policemen, but the incident ended without the police firing even one round. Compare this to recent events in India, for example, when demonstrators protesting the arrest of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi were fired upon by the army, bringing deaths and injuries to almost 200.

Japanese respect for human rights is essentially very strong when it comes to killing, stealing and violence, and because of this popular feeling, the government is sensitive, sometimes overly cautious, about not infringing on these rights.

Problems for Japan

In many ways this is a safe society where the rights of the individual and group are protected, but it has its problems as well. In the past, the government has been attacked for its weakness in handling hijacking incidents in which hostages were taken. The government has tended to be overly solicitous towards the rights of the hostages, complying with the highjacker's demands by releasing convicted murderers from prison in exchange for hostages. It has also paid enormous sums in ransom. The West German government, in contrast, took a tough stance when a Lufthansa pilot was killed by hijackers and the plane eventually re-took by commandos. That incident and the resolute determination of West Germany when terrorists abducted and killed industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer left a strong impression on Japanese authorities. Japanese police were allowed, for the first time, to fire on hijackers in the Nagasaki "busjacker" incident. We can expect some improvement in tactics from now on because the government has finally realized the need for international cooperation in controlling terrorism. Japan has declared to all nations that it will no longer bend the law and surrender to criminal demands.

Japan also suffers from easily overheated popular feelings about human rights. The words mōjin (blind person) and mekura (blind), for example, are now considered derogatory and discriminatory. Announcers and guests on radio and TV programs recently stimulated a flood of angry phone calls to the stations by using expressions like mekura meppō (blindly), mekura hebi ni ojizu (blind daring) and honto ni koi wa mōmoku da ne (Love is indeed blind). Calling a blind person "mekura" to his face is something to be avoided, but it is going too far to ban traditional maxims and phrases just because they contain such words. That prohibition constitutes in itself an infringement of the freedom of speech.

About a year or so ago, a Korean clergyman living in Japan began legal proceedings against a network when the announcer pronounced his name in Japanese rather than the Korean fashion, on the grounds that his personal rights had been infringed. If a name must always be pronounced according to the rules of the language of one's country of origin, then different spellings like Wilhelm and William and Henri and Henry can no longer be permitted. It is difficult to support the right to demand that your name be pronounced everywhere as it would be in your own country.

The tendency to flare up over such issues is partly a reflection of a self-centered preoccupation with rights over obligations, and an emphasis on the individual at the risk of neglecting the group. On the other hand, their very nature is a good indication of the peace that reigns in Japanese society, giving the margin for such disputes to arise.

But behind the peace and calm lurks a number of evils. Until recently Japan was virtually untouched by any kind of narcotics, but now the illicit drug traffic is mounting, bringing ruin to the lives of the young people touched by it. In almost every instance narcotics are related to abnormal, harmful sexual activity. Another evil is the growing number of firearms either smuggled into the country or illegally manufactured here. Crimes involving firearms are definitely on the upswing. Also, reflecting the present economic slump is the skyrocketing increase in crimes related to financial troubles. Probably worst of all is the increase in crimes perpetrated by policemen, of which there were six or seven in 1978 alone. Aggressive measures are necessary, before it is too late, to maintain peace and order in society—the necessary preconditions for the guarantee of human rights.

The fourth problem is one of the most intricate and the hardest to solve: to achieve a balanced adjustment of the rights of individuals. Until now, the issue of human rights has tended to be approached by defining the concept, determining its limits, devising machinery for its maintenance and finding practical ways to use that machinery. In the past, the conflict between the guarantee and the infringement of human rights has been clear-cut; the main problem was to strengthen respect for and awareness of human rights in popular attitudes. The battle lines were neatly drawn, enemy and ally were well understood. The war between good and evil could be fought relatively easily.

Today, though, the boundaries are extremely tenuous, as in struggles for the right to sunlight, or the demand for clean air to breathe unpolluted by tobacco.

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Eurocommunism, and particularly the responses it has had among some elements of the United States Administration yield a few essential lessons.

In the French context, Eurocommunism is clearly only a paper tiger—as has been amply demonstrated by the French Communist Party’s retrograde behavior since the election of March 1978, and as was subtly documented even earlier in Annie Kriegl’s remarkable book on the subject.* However it is at the international level that the damages caused by this empty myth have taken disquieting proportions—in particular when Eurocommunism’s alleged charms began, it seems, to seduce those very Americans who should see in it their worst enemy and who, instead, with a simplistic Manicheanism reminiscent of Yalta, managed to see in it the possible component of a geopolitical strategy for the medium-term future.**

Parts of the Carter Administration and the political circles in Washington seem to have been indoctrinated by the successive waves of socialists and crypto-communists who flew to America in 1977 and 1978 to deliver their gospel: If the Union of the Left had won in Paris, they were saying at the time, the moderates in the socialist and communist camps would have been able to make democracy prevail, and in this radiant paradise of a perfectly civilised social democracy America would almost have been able to recognize its own democratic ideals. Some of President Carter’s advisors appear to have willingly swallowed all this: With their middle and long-term strategy to thaw the block of Soviet satellites in order to better isolate the Soviet Union, what better way to achieve such a result than to create, in Western Europe, a powerful pole of attraction for the countries of Eastern Europe. In short, it amounts to creating a second Mecca of Marxism which, carrying further West the favorable effects of Tito’s secession, would operate as a Western Byzantium by comparison with the Rome of Marxist orthodoxy which Moscow is. This would involve little cost since, in the end, it would affect only two nations, France and Italy. (Spain, where Carillo is in a minority anyway, enjoys a strong democratic center which could turn the country into a “sanctuary,” thus securing an indispensable yet sufficient bastion for American military bases.) With Rome and Paris in the hands of a supposed Eurocommunism, on which the U.S. would be content merely to check from time to time that it wears a “human face.” America thus would have allegedly gained a useful instrument capable of, if not thawing, at least defrosting efficiently Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern satellites.

However subtle and attractive, such a “game” implies a misunderstanding of a number of elements, of which it may be important today to respectfully remind the American President and some circles of his Administration. First, Eurocommunism is but an illusion: Italy’s communism is clearly ill at ease with its contradictions and its multiple allegiances; the French communists, for their part, remain very well-organized. In their case, as has been made even more obvious since the March 1978 general elections, the party apparatus remains in total control. In France, the communists’ accession to power, far from inaugurating the “other” kind of communism about which some American experts so naively dream, would only strengthen the omnipresence of an implacably Leninist organization which has already managed over the years to infiltrate substantially the state and private enterprises. These are no allies to wave at the Poles, Czechs, Bulgars, and Hungarians, but indeed the cold apparatchik of a Western brand of Leninism which, despite the momentary tribute paid to a tactical de-Stalinization, stands nevertheless in its behavior, beliefs, and predilections for order—an army of soldiers committed perinde ac cadaver to Moscow. A strategy which bets on Eurocommunism would crumble all the more quickly as, indeed, there is no such thing as Eurocommunism. To abandon Western Europe to such a sad lot—as the Kissinger diplomacy already abandoned Africa by yielding on the weakest link, Angola—would amount to a dupe’s deal for the United States, which would suddenly be confronted with a weakened and hostile Western Europe.

In addition, there is another reason why we French do not want to be the pawn of such a strategy: Freedom remains our most precious possession, our hope and our salvation—and even in the illusory hope of giving life again to Poland and Hungary by supposedly attracting them out of Moscow’s orbit, it does not seem very advantageous to welcome in France the irresistible growth of an incurable cancer: police bureaucracy.

For us, the matter is as clear and simple as it was in Pascal’s wager: We prefer not to stake an entire lifetime for an eternity of totalitarianism; faced with the threat of Eurocommunism, let us be allowed to play the card of our salvation. This, in short, is why in my view a profound contradiction exists between the two current elements of America’s strategy—human rights and Eurocommunism. I hope I will be forgiven if I choose the first of these strategies and reject the second.

** Let us not forget that, with President Carter’s election, the rather Germanic entourage of his two predecessors—which was often characterized by a somewhat Metternichian or Bismarckian vision of the world—has been replaced by a group of decision-makers with very different socio-cultural backgrounds and world outlooks. In the first place, it is headed by a big-hearted Baptist Southerner in the person of Jimmy Carter, whose struggle for human rights we applaud without reservations. In addition, the elevation of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a subtle and nuanced mind, is also, after all, the elevation of a philosophy and worldview which originated in the nations of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Hence, we find a predilection—playful at times—for mosaic strategies, a foreign policy equivalent to Wislawa Szymborska’s genius in the field of literature which, in a certain way, casts diagonally across the appearances of things and in a baroque manner avoids a primary focus on “form” per se to make a greater use of its effects.

The suffering of the martyrs of totalitarian regimes in Europe should not make us forget that still further East on the Indochinese peninsula, men and women are also being
persecuted by tyrannies which are also the progeny of Marxism and Leninism. These men and women are perhaps even closer to us, because of the cultural ties and the trust that we established with them more than a century ago and because of the fidelity with which they chose to maintain some hope in Europe, despite the torments of war. Are we still worthy of this fidelity and hope of the Catholics and Buddhists of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, who continue to expect from us something better than just an easy acceptance of the alleged inevitability of Marx’s laws of history? Are we worthy of these men, women and children who suffer in Indochina when our own newspapers, once so concerned with castigating American bombs and napalm, remain desperately silent now that Marxist tyranny is crushing and deporting and massacring them by the millions in the name of progress and revolution? Can it really be that there are good corpses and bad corpses—those who fit in the Marxist dogma of history’s inevitability and those who don’t?

The founding of the Khmer-Lao-Vietnamese Committee for Human Rights* warrants our recognition and support. These exiles from Indochina could indeed be content, as are so many emigrants from Eastern Europe and Latin America, to lead a quiet life and try to forget or to cultivate Old Regime nostalgia. But, as Rousseau wrote, “Freedom and rest are incompatible: One has to choose.” The lesson given us by these members of the Indo-Chinese community in exile who show such solidarity with their martyred brothers is a double teaching in hope: As a refusal to let the mantle of silence and repression fall over Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, it is a lesson in resistance; and an ethical lesson which is even stronger is the warning that human rights do not merely consist in those few values elaborated by the Western portion of Europe during the short era of rationalism at the end of the 18th century. In this lies the invariable proof that, despite the inevitable indigenous colorings of our nationalism and of our ethics, the norms of respect for the human being transcend borders by their very universality. Clearly, the Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist codes are capable of assimilating and vitalizing them to an even greater extent than our present decadent, prosperous and replete materialism.

Whatever the martyrdom of these populations in the Orient, whatever the silence of our newspapers and media regarding their ordeal, their lesson and their example continue to weigh on our consciences. They teach us not to question this irresistible demand—respect for the human being. They teach us that freedom is indivisible, that it cannot be dissolved by mechanistic rationalizations of history, and that it constitutes indeed an imperative, both absolute and concrete. Faced with the complaints of the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese victims of a demented and cruel form of the materialist rationalism of Marxism, we know that we can no longer be content with the vague solidarity of our leftist intellectuals expert in petitions, or with the abstract pomposity of their good conscience. We know that we have to be actively concerned with the fate of this and that particular individual within the framework of a universal preoccupation with the dignity of man and respect for such simple things as the freedom to come and go—a freedom denied these individuals today in the name of Marxism’s abstract dementia.

Without respite, we must from now on inform ourselves, learn of the fate of this or that friend who lives in Saigon, Phnom Penh or Vientiane. We must listen to the doctors who treat and testify, to the civil servants who give their help without prejudice day after day to loosen the vise. Our task will not be to mime the suffering involved, but to try to bring greater recognition of it in the West, in Europe as well as in America, so that the façade of respectability of these tyrannies is constantly disturbed and the status quo never becomes entrenched. The task at hand is humble, discreet, and concrete, and one of sincerity and conviction.

This task must be accompanied by an implacable critique of the fraud of Marxism-Leninism, a religion of intolerance and destruction. Let us give no rest to dialectical materialism and its institutionalized lie. Some casuists and dialecticians in the communist parties of the West would like us to believe that the “Stalin phenomenon” is but an epi-phenomenon, a simple swerve in the history of a regime which was working for the people’s happiness, or that Stalinism became what it was because of Russia’s barbarism and the particular savagery of the Georgian tyrant. The fact is, however, that the germs of this barbarism and of the ensuing massacre lie in Leninism and in Marxism itself, with their claim to be scientific political doctrines. By totemizing materialism, by erecting its method as a dogma of truth, one draws a fateful line between those who serve the advancement of the revolution, and those who obstruct it. In both cases, man is no longer an end in himself, but simply a means. He is used, as an ally or as an instrument; should he become an obstacle, he is eliminated. The dementia of this primitive Machiavellianism, a mixture of sentimentialty and bureaucracy reminiscent of 19th century socialism as depicted by Dostoyevsky, and this hyped rationalism are the only explanations for the horrors of the system which now oppresses Eastern Europe—and also, alas, parts of Africa (beginning with Angola) and most of Asia, particularly in the Indo-Chinese peninsula.

An ideological cancer spread by Soviet Russia and by a nightmarish China has come to contaminate Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, nations whose gentleness had flourished even under the colonial regime, in spite of its excesses. Today, this very gentleness makes for their vulnerability; the penetration and monstrous impact of the Marxist system, in its absurd frenzy of collectivism and nationalization, are made easier as the natural openness and refinement of these cultures make them less capable of mobilizing their own antibodies.

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threatens the transition our world is making towards a more just and humane future. There are glimmerings of this consciousness in the work of several international organizations. In other words, the seed is being sown.

When I look at my country with this understanding of human rights and their assertion, I am convinced that there can be no meaningful advancement unless we begin to see the future of our national or continental society in frameworks which are different from those we are accustomed to. Human rights, founded upon essentially elitist development organizations and structures catering to a population which is going to double within the next 25 to 30 years, will find it almost impossible to survive. The elitist system, threatened by the masses demanding an equal place in the sun, and unable to restructure itself to meet the new demands of an egalitarian age, will attempt various authoritarian permutations and combinations. In these maneuvers, human rights are the first to be extinguished, particularly the crucial right of dissent and demonstration. If human rights are to be preserved and extended, deepened and consolidated, we have to begin to construct the institutions and organizations of what might be termed a participatory democracy. This will call for the mobilization of the political skills of various persuasions—a most rewarding task.

Participative democracy means a radical overhaul of our deeply entrenched development notions pertaining to ecologically balanced life and living: the planning of homes and work places with easily renewable local materials; a diffuse, decentralized yet integrated habitat as opposed to one with rigid urban-rural, residential-commercial divisions; the necessary breakdown of all rich-poor categories in each locality, and an end to exclusivities; easy mass transport systems where necessary; education that equips people for existent jobs, with a parallel effort to blot out the difference in reward for intellectual and manual labor, and a promise of education plus technical and scientific reeducation when demanded and at whatever age; health programs that attack with boldness and concentration the known causes of disease and debility; industrial and agricultural productivity based on systems of management which stress the creative role of individual men and women as opposed to the systems which reduce them to cogs; and the careful utilization of increasing leisure time for the cultural uplift and enlightenment of human beings.

This churning up of our notions is central to the resolution of our economic and social problems. But the forging of the political weapons to achieve a more meaningfully structured society, capable of managing complex challenges without damaging human rights, is the critical question. In India, the authoritarian currents have been considerably diluted by the passion of Mahatma Gandhi and some of his inheritors like Jawaharlal Nehru and Jaya Prakash Narayan. The process has to continue, drawing sustenance from wherever possible. It has to overwhelm the thinking of the Hindu nationalist, the Islamic revivalist, and those elitist forces who have come to believe that the world was created for them and the status quo has to be preserved by a concentration of power and authority. Indeed, the churning up must crack the rigidities of liberal, socialist and communist thinkers who resort to authoritarian remedies to serve their own obsessions. A great cleansing of thought is needed if we are to solve the development problems of our planet in the context of human rights.

We have yet to start upon this task in earnest. The patterns of waste in the affluent world and want in developing lands have to dissolve before we are able to assert the universality of human rights. The worst practices in life and living are initiated by the ruling or dominant elites of each society, whether capitalist, socialist or communist, and there is no vigorous presentation of alternatives to what we have come to accept almost as inevitable. Our world is passing through qualitative demographic changes, and these, linked with the powerful egalitarian assertions, demand equally qualitative changes in life styles, work and creativity. Only then can the social structures become somewhat stabilized to resist the onslaught of the authoritarians with their concepts of the modern slave state.

The struggle for human rights at the level of a nation, between nations, and across the globe, is, in my opinion, one of the major influences in texturing the societies of the future. If this struggle were abandoned, we would return to the dark ages. The authoritarians, whatever their line, in the final analysis always act in the interest of narrow groups of vested interests. Every blow struck for rights which we consider fundamental to our well-being and creativity is a blow for retexturing our societies in the interests of the broader masses, so that they are insulated from the authoritarians. This is the reality of today when our world is at a potentially catalytic point.

In short, in the struggle for human rights we see the ramifications, appreciate the totality of the condition of humanity, and defend ourselves from those who would separate this right from that, bread from freedom. Our people gave dramatic expression to this when they voted at the last general elections. But let us always remember that if they vote for freedom, they want bread too. We cannot separate the rights of human beings. They are indivisible, in a way or sense; they can only be fought for together. Nationalism, power concentration, elitist disciplines and the lack of participative action are the enemies. In other words, the fight for human rights demands very clear perspectives.

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smoke. Here, the rights of one individual clash with the rights of another, and because both sides have a fair claim, it is not easy to determine rationally which should be given priority. Of course, these problems are not unique to Japan, and they can occur in any country whose people are free from threats to life and property by the government. In that sense, Japan’s domestic policies are way ahead of many nations in human rights. To resolve the conflict between the rights of individuals remains one of our most urgent tasks.
Americans simply did not believe the reports, which were after all derived from the white-controlled media. On the other hand, those who believed the stories about Amin's brutality could always say: "What is the big deal? We have been experiencing brutality right here in America for 300 years, and continue to do so in ghettos and police cells. What does it matter if a black ruler has to be brutal at times in order to be effective in his struggle against white power?"

Many Black Americans had become numbed to some extent by the heritage of brutality in America's own society. The overwhelming majority of them were descendants of slaves, and are themselves today among the poorest and most impotent sectors of the population of a country which is at the same time among the richest and most powerful in the world.

The role of Amin has eroded the legitimacy of Western hegemony by challenging it and defying it in a variety of ways. The myth of Western invincibility was receiving severe knocks from Amin's sustained strategy of irreverence. The biggest act of defiance still remained the expulsion of British Asians and the nationalization of some British firms and property. But there were other instances of calculated impertinence whose total effect amounted to the gradual erosion of the Western mystique. He defied diplomatic protocol time and again. He was capable of sending a cable to Richard Nixon wishing him a speedy recovery from Watergate and another cable to Prime Minister Golda Meir telling her to pull up her knickers against the background of the October war in the Middle East in 1973.

Amin converted the whole world into a stage, trying to force some old imperial myths through the exit door, and to bring in new defiant myths of black assertiveness. His highly publicized picture, being carried on a big chair by four white men, ridiculing Rudyard Kipling and his vision of the White Man's Burden, was part of Amin's theater of the absurd.

Another strategy to ridicule the world system was his keeping the world guessing. His games with the world news media in the summer of 1977, in relation to the Commonwealth Conference of Heads of Government and Heads of State in London, was one such instance. Would Amin come to defy the diplomatic ban against his participation at the Commonwealth Conference which the British Government had decided to impose? His radio in Uganda issued statements which implied that he was about to land in London, and then go by boat to Britain; or was about to land in Ireland, and find his way to the Commonwealth Conference. A deliberate comedy was unfolded upon the world stage, poking fun at the world and its ways.

Amin also employed the periodic strategy of holding a hostage or hostages, or permitting Western missionaries and teachers within Uganda to be seen as a pool of future hostages against Western power. In more than a symbolic sense, much of the Third World right now is held hostage by the Northern hemisphere. The superpowers in particular are in a position to destroy the rest of mankind in their own rivalries for hegemony. Economically, the Third World is held hostage by the capacity of the Northern hemisphere to decide the destinies of the economies of the South. A decision by the North to drink half as much Ugandan coffee as it does right now could either mean an improvement with the fall of Idi Amin or it could spell out a calamity with massive reprisals among Ugandans without a discernible amelioration of their plight. In short, drinking habits among Western Europeans and North Americans, or how much chocolate the affluent North is interested in this year as opposed to last year, could either put economies in the South under severe strain or create a temporary boom here and there. Apart from the oil-rich Third World countries, almost all Third World countries are, in a fundamental sense, held constantly hostage by the tastes and consumption patterns of the Northern hemisphere.

Therefore, when Idi Amin holds a Westerner like my friend and former colleague, Denis Hills, hostage, there is a profound reversal of roles. Or when Amin threatens to bring all Americans within Uganda to Entebbe Airport, there is again a sense of the mighty being held hostage by the whims of a Third World tyrant, just as the Third World as a whole is held to ransom by the vagaries of Western consumption patterns.

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It is partly because of these considerations that Amin emerges as a symptom of the profound moral cleavage which both reinforces and reflects the wide economic and political gap between the mighty states of modern industry and the fumbling economies of developing societies. And for this reason, Idi Amin is to some extent no less a preacher than Jimmy Carter, though much more of a warrior than the American President. In his own incoherent and naive flamboyance, Amin is preaching the song of greater equality in global terms. In his own simplicity and brutal responsiveness, Amin violates the canons of humanity in his own society. The domestic tyrant in Uganda is a voice of equity in world affairs. Amin is, quite simply, a case of heroic evil.

This brings us back to the weaknesses and gaps of Western approaches to human rights, on the one hand, and to the paradoxical moral stature of Idi Amin's rebellion against dependency on the other. As we have indicated earlier, human rights cannot truly be divorced from the wider search for both political and economic equity. When Jimmy Carter falls short of taking full account of the economic disparities between developed states and underprivileged societies, he weakens the moral basis of his crusade. In contrast, when Idi Amin becomes one of Idi Amin's rebelions against Amin's rebellion against dependency on the other. As we have indicated earlier, human rights cannot truly be divorced from the wider search for both political and economic equity. When Jimmy Carter falls short of taking full account of the economic disparities between developed states and underprivileged societies, he weakens the moral basis of his crusade. In contrast, when Idi Amin becomes one of the persistent voices of anti-imperialism in the Third World, and plays the role of demolition expert, he destroys a substantial portion of the dependent structures that Uganda had inherited from colonialism. The brutal tyrant becomes a warrior of liberation.

To some extent, Third World tyrants are the illegitimate
children of a marriage between domestic underdevelopment in their own societies and external exploitation by others. These bastards of an unholy maternity are an indictment of both parents—the social fragility and weakness of will within the local society, on the one hand, and the social insensitivity and basic economic greed of the external suitors, on the other.

To blame the brutal side of Idris Amin on the bastard alone, and not on the true structural parents also, is to be ahistoric. To blame Amin only on the forces of imperialism outside—as African Marxists sometimes tend to do—is to betray an inner psychological dependency, and to seek constantly the comfort of blaming all one’s sins on some external Satan. To blame the durability of Idris Amin only on the people of Uganda and their incapacity to resume control of their own destiny is to forget that the people of Uganda are not entirely free agents, not least because Idris Amin obtains his weapons of destruction and repression from external sources, and receives a considerable degree of legitimacy from the international state system as it has evolved since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.

The tantrums of Idris Amin are due to the man himself, to the nature of Ugandan society in a historical perspective, and to the consequences of imperialism and the continuing external manipulation of Third World societies at large.

The New International Moral Order requires therefore at least three levels of conscience: the conscience of the individual, be that person ruler or subject; the conscience of each society, be that society powerful or weak; and the conscience of the world community as a whole.

The New International Moral Order is in the throes of being born. The labor pains of the 1970s do indeed include the wanton brutalities of Idris Amin; they also include the moral experimentation of the Carter Administration in the United States. What should be remembered is that the story is much bigger than the individuals involved within it—and much broader in its ramifications that what we can perceive for the time being in our own lifetime.

(BENOIST continued from p. 33)

The vulgarity of Lenin’s ideology, as exemplified by his book Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, is at work here. In Russia, it helped to destroy tradition, collective memory, local cultures, and all diversity in the name of the uniformity of a lawless system which tolerates neither difference no dissidence. In Indochina it continues in the deportation and destruction of people and their possessions, the frightful forced exodus of city dwellers to the countryside of Cambodia, the loss of people’s identities and very names, the disproportionate destruction of cultural or ecological equilibria, the grotesque workings of collectivization and nationalization of all industrial, commercial and independent activities in Vietnam. What Tamerlane, what Genghis Khan, despite his frenzy of aggrandizement, would have been able to push dementia to such a degree of cruelty and violence?

Such a degree of horror could only be attained by continuously relying upon the doctrinal justification of historical and dialectical materialism, transformed as it is into a state religion. Our smiling, blinded Eurocommunists no longer have the right to blame barbarism on the alleged cultural backwardness of the populations subjected to the Marxist yoke. Such racist or ethnocentrist arguments do not hold when confronted with the terrible evidence of the Marxist-Leninist nightmare. The present ordeal of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia points once again to the necessity of eradicating Marxism from this planet, to fight with all the weapons of law and politics against a system which has only brought blood and tears. From Cuba to Russia, from China to Indochina and Angola, there are no examples of a Marxist regime which is not a giant nightmare as well as a complete political, economic, social and cultural failure.

Instead of feeling guilty for our liberal democracies, instead of seeing them as merely political institutions “in the hands of the dominating class,” and instead of seeing the exercise of the freedom constitutionally granted us as just “a formal freedom,” let us perceive the need to spread the hope of human rights in a concrete manner to other peoples on this planet who suffer from the deprivations of the most elementary rights and freedoms. When specifically expressed in their very concreteness and against the background of the universal nature of respect for the human being and his dignity, the rights of man remain our most effective response to the established lies of cynical and authoritarian doctrines: They are anchored in the eternity of an indefeasible demand, a demand that makes a brother of the next man, an end instead of a means of a frozen, sub-Marxian rationalism. May the present suffering of our Asian brothers make us hear the need to mobilize ourselves to fight against the imposture.