The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together among these regions.

CHAIRMEN

North America: Europe: Japan:
David Rockefeller Georges Berthoin Takeshi Watanabe

Triologue is a quarterly publication of The Trilateral Commission, 345 East 46th Street, New York, New York, 10017.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES
1 YEAR (4 issues) ................. $12
2 YEARS (8 issues) ............... $22

Mail all orders and payments to:
The Trilateral Commission (North America)
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

Copyright © 1982 The Trilateral Commission
TRIALOGUE GIFT SUBSCRIPTIONS

We will send a notice of your gift as soon as we receive your order.
Subscription rates:  1 year at $12 □ or  2 years at $22 □
Send a gift of Triologue to:

Name ________________________________________________ Name ________________________________________________
Address ________________________________________________ Address ________________________________________________
City ___________________________________________________ City ___________________________________________________
State ____________ Zip _______ State ____________ Zip _______

Bill to:

Name _______________________________________________________________
Address _______________________________________________________________
City _______________________________ State ____________ Zip _______
Payment enclosed □  Bill me later □  Offer good to U.S. addresses only.
BUSINESS REPLY CARD
FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 6595 New York, New York
POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

TRILATERAL COMMISSION
(North America)
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017
A Special Welcoming Offer to TRIALOGUE

Subscribe Now —get Trialogue

☐ for ONE YEAR
(4 issues) at $12
☐ for TWO YEARS
(8 issues) at $22.

Just mail this self-addressed coupon, and, at no extra cost, you will also receive as they appear the Task Force reports published by the Trilateral Commission.

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY, STATE ZIP

SIGNATURE ☐ Bill me later ☐ Payment enclosed

Offer good to U.S. addressees only
BUSINESS REPLY CARD
FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 6595 New York, New York
POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

TRILATERAL COMMISSION
(North America)
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017
TRIALOGUE. Summer/Fall 1982

2 Mitchell Sharp: Editorial
4 Gerard Smith: An Interview
7 Raymond Aron: In Search of Security
14 Makoto Momoi: From Disarmament to Arms Control
18 Zbigniew Brzezinski: East-West Relations: Strategic Crossroads
22 Alois Mertes: Peace and Security

Insert

Indira Gandhi: A Special Statement

28 Joseph S. Nye: A New Start for Strategic Arms Control
34 David Owen: On "Common Security"

40 Takahiro Yokomichi: Security and Disarmament

46 Carlo Trezza: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space

Publisher
Charles B. Heck

Editor
François Sauzey

Circulation
Peter Witte

Graphic Design & Photography
Paola Piglia
It is a sign of the times that this issue of Tri- alogue should be devoted to security and disarmament and that this subject should be on the agenda for the 1983 meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Rome.

In recent months questions of security and disarmament have moved to front center not only as a political issue affecting relations among the trilateral countries but as an element of growing importance in the discussion of economic relations. Every trilateral discussion of energy policy and East-West trade and financial relations is permeated by security considerations, witness the dispute among governments about the building of the natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe.

It can be assumed that all the trilateral countries want to be as secure as possible and have no interest in following policies that would have the effect of weakening them in relation to potential enemies. The continued existence of the Atlantic Alliance is evidence of the determination of Western Europe and North America to act together in the face of threats of aggression. The integrity of Japan is fortified by a defense alliance with the United States.

The strength of these alliances derives from the fact that the members have entered into and continue them willingly and, as partners, share in the formulation of joint defense policies and make their own decisions, without coercion, as to the nature of their respective contributions.

Canada’s Foreign Minister from 1968 to 1974, Mitchell Sharp also served as Minister of Trade and Commerce (1963-65), Minister of Finance (1965-68) and Leader of the House of Commons (1974-76). He is now Commissioner of the Northern Pipeline Agency in Ottawa.

It follows that differences among trilateral countries on trade and financial relations with the Soviet Union or its associates in the Warsaw Pact arise, not from differences about the importance of security, but from differing perceptions as to how security is affected by the trade policies being advocated or followed. The natural gas pipeline is a case in point. It may be that the perceptual differences can be reconciled by factual analyses and debate. The Trilateral Commission can play a useful role to this end. If, when all the relevant facts are marshalled and debated, there remain significant differences, I suggest that the burden of proof rests with those who would advocate restriction of trade in peaceful, non-strategic goods and services to show that security would as a result be enhanced. To put it another way, one should give trilateral countries engaging in trade with the East Bloc countries the benefit of the doubt from a security point of view and assume that they will respond if shown by their friends and allies that the security risks have been underestimated.

This does not mean that the debate should be muted. In many respects the more vigorous and open and well-informed, the better. It does mean that it should not call in question, directly or by implication, the dedication to security of any of the trilateral countries.

The debate about disarmament and arms control within the trilateral countries should proceed from the same assumption. The advocates of unilateral nuclear disarmament may be wrong; I believe most strongly that they are. It does not advance the debate to accuse all of them of being dupes, playing into the hands of potential enemies. There is reason for genuine public concern about the risk of a nuclear holocaust.

Paradoxically, in view of the current paralysis,
there is a wide measure of agreement as to what needs to be done. All the well-informed participants in the debate on arms control and disarmament suggest a similar agenda. I venture to say that the program for disarmament put forward by the Independent Committee under the chairmanship of Olof Palme, one of whose members, Georgi Arbatov, is a distinguished Soviet citizen, would not be seriously challenged in principle even by spokesmen for the superpowers.

The central problem is how to come to grips with and overcome the suspicion and mistrust that now pervade relations between the superpowers and to cope with the very real difficulties of attempting to control the technological momentum behind the strategic nuclear arms race which threatens to destabilize the security balance.

This argues for increasing emphasis upon confidence-building measures, for example, crisis management involving participation by representatives of both superpowers, perhaps in a neutral city, the prosecution with greater vigor of the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe, and the technical problem of verification.

Verification is a key element in the construction of the edifice of arms control and disarmament. Openness is central to that process. But technology has taken us well beyond the notions about openness that were prevalent a generation ago. It isn’t only a matter of access. Verification entails a technology of its own that differs from weapons system to weapons system. Therefore the work of verification should prepare the way for arms control agreements that still lie ahead; otherwise, problems of verification will inevitably prevent the conclusion of even well-advanced arms control negotiations.

Confidence can also be built up by circling around the crucial strategic arms negotiations and concentrating upon reaching an agreement, for example, on a convention for the banning of chemical weapons. A convention of that kind would demonstrate that mankind does not really want to annihilate itself. Negotiation of a new treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space, while this is still a prospect rather than a reality, would also fall into the category of confidence-building measures.

As to the technological momentum behind the strategic arms race, it will be agreed, I hope, that somehow this must be brought under control. A few years ago Prime Minister Trudeau proposed a process of suffocation which he has refined into a policy of stabilization with two complementary components: a strategy to inhibit the development of new weapons systems and negotiations aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals, designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

In a sense there is nothing new in this stabilization approach. As I have said, it isn’t ideas that are lacking; in the field of arms control and disarmament what is lacking is good will and mutual confidence. If we, and I speak as a citizen of the world, are to succeed we should be clear, however, on the priorities and what is essential if agreements are to achieve their purpose.

Finally a word on linkage. Arms control, to be viable, must increase security for both sides and be mutually beneficial. It makes no sense, therefore, to vary the pace of negotiations as a sort of punishment or reward for bad or good behavior by the other side. It is going to be difficult enough to make progress without unnecessary complications.
Gerard Smith, a former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, served as chief American delegate to SALT I, from 1969 to 1972. He recently recounted this experience in *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I* (New York: Doubleday, 1980.) He also served as Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation Matters from 1977 to 1981, and is currently Chairman of Consultants International and Chairman of the Board of the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C.

Ambassador Smith, who was the Trilateral Commission's first North American Chairman from 1973 to 1977, is the North American author of the task force report on “Security and Disarmament” to be presented to the full Trilateral Commission at its 1983 plenary conference. The European author for this report is Paolo Vittorelli, a member of the Italian Parliament and President of the Defense Studies and Research Institute in Rome; and the Japanese author is Kiichi Saeki, Chairman of the Nomura Research Institute.

Quite independently from the work of this task force, Gerard Smith was also the author, together with McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan and Robert McNamara, of a much noted article in the Spring 1982 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance”, which submitted the by now well-known proposal for a policy of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons in Europe. In an interview with Triological’s Editor in July 1982, excerpts of which follow, Ambassador Smith commented on a variety of current arms control issues as well as the many reactions, particularly from Europe, to the “no-first-use” thesis. Needless to say, his views here are strictly his own; they do not reflect joint work among the authors of the Commission’s task force or anticipate the conclusions of its 1983 report.

**On START:**

In my view, it is clear that the Reagan Administration’s opening proposals for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) – i.e., the so-called “Eureka” proposals – are not negotiable. The final arrangement, if it ever arrives, is not going to look anything like the “Eureka” proposals. One must give the Administration the benefit of the doubt; yet, I must say that I have grave reservations about the seriousness of the whole exercise. It looks to me as if the Administration first started on a rearmament program and ran into great opposition, both in Europe and the United States; the final blow to the original program was probably the nuclear “freeze” phenomenon, which, I think, made the Administration realize that it would have to change its position. Having reached this conclusion, the Administration must have asked itself: What type of arms control proposals can we come up with that will look presentable and yet will not commit us to very much? Clearly, the Soviets are not going to accept something that limits their strongest asset (the land-based ICBMs) and does not limit our strongest assets. Although our negotiator in Geneva says he is cautiously optimistic, I think in his heart he must realize that, unless there are fallback positions we don’t know about, he will be there until the end of the Administration.

**On SALT II:**

SALT II, in effect, is a sort of freeze, a negotiating moratorium, and I think it is a good thing. I do not quite understand the Administration’s commitment not to undercut the terms of SALT II. I gather there was much discussion within the Administration over how this would be phrased. They do not say they will honor the Treaty, nor do they say that they will live up to all of its provisions: They say they will “not undercut” it. Do they reason, in effect, that this does not mean all of the Treaty’s provisions have to be respected, as some recent statements in the press seem to suggest? Furthermore, I am struck by the open-endedness of that commitment: The Administration says it will not undercut SALT II as long as the Soviets do
not. Thus, the Soviets could say, all right, we will honor it for 20 years. Do we mean to say that, in that case, we will have to do the same? I do not believe this is what the Administration meant; yet, that is precisely what the language would indicate.  

**On Intermediate-Range Negotiations:**

There again, as with START, I think we were in effect driven into the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) negotiations by European popular pressures. The proposal we made — the “Zero” option — must look non-negotiable to an intelligent man like Paul Nitze, our INF negotiator. I cannot see how the Soviets would agree to limit their intermediate-range ballistic missiles when the British and French systems are unlimited: They could build these up ten times their present size with no treaty limitation, whereas the Soviets would be kept to a numerical ceiling. That does not seem reasonable.

**On Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe: Any Alternative to Deployment?**

I think this question is entirely up to the Europeans, and that we should not lean one way or the other. My personal feeling is that Europe has lived for years with the Soviet SS 4s and SS 5s without worrying too much about them. The Soviets have now deployed a system — the SS 20 — which is more mobile and more accurate, but this does not mean that the net result would be any different: In the event of a war, the SS 4s and 5s could destroy European cities completely. The SS 20s can do the same. I do not think, therefore, that the Europeans should lose any more sleep now than they used to when they were faced with an earlier generation of these weapons.

**On Deterrence:**

As I understand it, the U.S. position is that, in order to have true deterrence, we have to have not only a second-strike capability, but also that the Soviets are apparently reaching for — that is, the ability to take out the other side’s ICBMs. But if we really mean it when we say that we will not go for a preemptive, disarming first strike, the question is, what is the good of having the capability to take out empty silos? I have never seen an answer to that. This is why I feel that we have plenty of deterrence without building the MX missile.  

**On Extended Deterrence:**

The “Gang of Four”, as we have come to be called, behind the no-first-use proposal is not an official group, and I do not see why what we suggested as our personal opinions should have any effect on a judge-
directives to military staffs. The change-over to the necessary defense structure will take several years, and this period will be accompanied by risks in foreign policy. But if, because of these risks, the change is not made, we can be certain that towards the end of the sixties Europe will not be able to defend itself against non-nuclear aggression at all. So those who think that it is not possible or not worthwhile to limit military conflicts to conventional weapons must not be allowed to exercise any influence on the strategy of NATO… (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1962)

Similarly, in his Summer 1982 Foreign Affairs article, General Rogers, far from saying that a conventional deterrent is impossible for us to achieve, argues that a four percent increase in defense budgets over six years could give us such a conventional deterrent. He does not say that he would give up the first-use threat. But his stated aim is for us to have sufficient conventional forces to frustrate a Soviet attack; the burden would then be on the Soviets to decide whether they want to go to first-use or not. This seems to me to be very close to what we are saying about no-first-use.

In this context, I also think it is important to remember that the Soviets have to keep 46 divisions on the Chinese front; that half of their troops on the Western front are troops from their satellite countries, which one can assume not to be excessively reliable; and that their lines of communication go through Poland… In the face of that setup, to argue that we could not possibly manage strikes must be mistaken. Yet, so much of the criticism directed at the proposal is based on this assumption that we could not build up our conventional forces to the required level — showing a rather curious reluctance to even study the question, whereas our nuclear strategy (in Alexander Haig’s very words) should constantly be under study.

**On Nuclear vs. Conventional Weapons:**

Having witnessed nuclear tests in the Pacific, I can assure anyone that there is a difference, one of nature, between nuclear and conventional arms; to believe that nuclear war would be no worse than conventional war seems to me completely off base. In *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981) Lawrence Freedman recounts some rather instructive war-games: In one called “Operation Sage Brush”, a war game in Louisiana, which is the size of Greece and Portugal put together, 70 bombs were used, each not exceeding 40 kilotons in yield. They were all dropped on military targets. “The umpires ruled that all life in Louisiana had ceased to exist” — all life! In another exercise called “Carte Blanche” in West Germany, “tactical weapons were used only by the NATO allies”, with no retaliation. “The results show that the German people would be devastated in this sort of nuclear war through the effects of blast and fallout.” The war lasted two days; “355 devices were exploded, mostly over West German territory. Even without the effects of residual radiation, this would have left up to 1.7 million West Germans dead, and 3.5 million wounded — more than five times the number of German civilian casualties in World War II.” In two days! Anybody who tries to blur the difference between conventional and nuclear weapons, even tactical ones, simply doesn’t understand the facts.
In the early Sixties, the Kennedy Administration launched the 1,000-missile Minuteman program and introduced in the deliberations of the Atlantic Alliance a number of strategic ideas, developed by experts from academia and such institutes as the Rand Corporation. The major premise of the Kennedy team could be said to have been self-evident: You cannot expect to deter every type of aggression by threatening massive retaliation. You should therefore have at your disposal the military capability to deter a potential enemy from minor aggressions which do not call for a nuclear response. This capability should both contain initial assaults and serve as a red light: If the aggressor persists, the atomic threshold will be broken and no one will be able to guarantee that the battle will not escalate to extremes. The doctrine of flexible response was thus adopted by the Alliance, and it remains in force to this day.

In theory, this doctrine seems to me to be the best available; I cannot think of a preferable substitute for it. However, flexible response has never entirely won the heart of the Europeans, since it envisages the possibility of a battle fought with conventional weapons at the center of the Old Continent—a thought which may seem acceptable from a U.S. standpoint, but much less so for the Europeans, and particularly the Germans. And if the Soviets were to take the enormous risk of a frontal attack against the German-American forces, why would they stop halfway? Twenty years ago, it was taken for granted on the Western side that the United States enjoyed nuclear superiority over the Soviets. The threat of escalation was thus an additional factor of deterrence. In such a situation, European security was based on divisions equipped with conventional weapons capable of stopping the initial assault and prolonging the battle until the belligerent powers were forced to choose between a cessation of hostilities and the resort to nuclear weapons.

Why has this balanced doctrine, one of compromise, aroused such heated controversies in the public at large while also raising doubts among strategists? The fact of the matter is that flexible response was not fully implemented. The members of the Atlantic Alliance did not acquire the kind of conventional forces capable of fulfilling the mission which the doctrine gave them. Soviet superiority in conventional forces seems far too great for NATO’s troops to be able to resist long enough. In addition, the territory of France is no longer available for the logistical purposes of the allied armies. Finally, since the aggressor would benefit from the advantages of attack and perhaps surprise, one may wonder whether the Alliance would have enough time to execute its plan for gradual escalation, or whether it would not be forced almost immediately either to accept defeat or to resort to nuclear weapons.

Such a situation—which I have briefly outlined at the risk of making the Western position look even worse than it really is—explains one of the aspects of the moral crisis of the Alliance. To use the classic expression, what is the “American umbrella” worth? Henry Kissinger, back to private life, declared in Brussels in 1979 that the Europeans were constantly demanding of the President of the United States assurances which he simply could not give them, and which in any event would be worthless. What would be the President’s decision if Europe were about to be overwhelmed? To attack the territory of the Soviet Union with nuclear missiles would invite incalculable destruction on American territory.

This dilemma arose when the Soviet Union acquired a counter-deterrent vis-à-vis the United States. The side which is superior at the highest level threatens the other with escalation. But what are these subtleties worth? They are relevant only as long as there remains a considerable gap between the respective capabilities of both enemies. For many years already, this gap was probably of little significance; today, we can safely say that it is no longer significant at all.
Faced with a situation which has not radically altered but rather worsened, neither the Americans nor the Europeans have a miraculous formula. The former recommend that the latter increase their conventional forces to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. The latter agree in theory with the advice or injunctions of the Americans; more often than not, their leaders declare themselves powerless to act upon the decisions collectively taken within NATO.

The controversy — I would characterize it as permanent for the past quarter of a century — takes on a new dimension with the introduction of intermediate-range missiles in the Soviet arsenal. In the early sixties, the Soviets had deployed intermediate- and medium-range missiles, the SS 4 and SS 5, while the U.S. was launching the Minuteman program. Over the last few years, they have deployed new intermediate range missiles, the SS 20s, which — according to their declarations — replace the SS 5s. Even if the SS 5s are indeed effectively withdrawn as the SS 20s are deployed, this substitution results in a substantial increase of the power of the Warsaw Pact, and perhaps even in a profound, qualitative alteration of the politico-military situation in Europe.

The SS 20s, unlike the SS 5s, are mobile; they are “mirved,” with each missile carrying three independently targetable warheads; the accuracy of these warheads (within 200 to 300 meters, for a range of 3,000 kilometers) creates new possibilities. The SS 4 and 5, less accurate, could only be aimed at very large targets such as cities; the precision of the SS 20s enables them to hit and destroy crucial links in NATO’s defense apparatus without spreading devastation all around or massacring men by the millions and destroying buildings as a result of fire or blast. The deployment of the SS 20 started in 1977. Chancellor Schmidt was probably among the first to realize the peril and to suggest a response. Long discussions within the Atlantic Alliance led, in December 1979, to the decision to deploy 108 Pershing II and 464 cruise missiles, starting at the end of 1983. These missiles would be deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and the U.K.

Government leaders and politicians, not invariably well-versed in strategic matters, fall back on traditional formulations and rationales; François Mitterrand speaks of the need for equilibrium or balance — a notion which makes little sense. The 572 missiles that NATO plans to deploy starting in 1983 do not “balance” the 900 warheads of the 300 SS 20s currently deployed. In the meantime, the response envisaged by NATO for 1983 has triggered a massive Soviet propaganda campaign and strengthened neutralist and pacifist movements in West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and elsewhere.

What are Moscow’s arguments? The Soviets denounce the deployment of missiles that could, within seven or eight minutes, reach and hit the Western regions of the Soviet Union — in violation of the spirit of the SALT agreements limiting the strategic forces of the two super-powers. From European bases, the Americans could strike part of the Soviet territory. To the question “Why the SS 20?”, they answer that they are only replacing the SS 5. Besides, they argue, missiles on board American submarines placed under NATO command directly threaten them; thus the SS 20s balance the Polaris or the Poseidon. In this war of words, only one point probably reflects a genuine reaction: the reduction to seven or eight minutes of the interval between the time the missiles are launched and the time they reach their targets.

In any event, the Soviets promptly seized the opportunity to endorse and exploit the Stockholm declaration — to play on peaceful or pacifist sentiments in the democracies while forbidding all similar demonstrations at home. The pacifist movement, in the Federal Republic and elsewhere in Western Europe, did not result only from Soviet propaganda, nor is it manipulated exclusively by Moscow (although it is infiltrated by Soviet agents); that movement expresses vague, yet strong, popular feelings: fear and horror of war in general, and of nuclear war in particular.

To some extent, these sentiments are illustrative of the state of mind of millions of Europeans who, despite the crisis, continue to enjoy the charms of a consumer society and feel no passion capable of awakening their martial zeal. To be sure, most neutralists and pacifists feel no attraction whatsoever for the Soviet Union and fear it. Rather, they indulge in the illusion that peace will be better preserved by détente than by rearmament.

The polemic against the future Pershings, combined with almost total indifference to the SS 20s, escapes rationality. Yet, this very irrationality needs to be explained. What are the impulses, more or less conscious, behind such behavior? Above all, in my view, the Europeans, particularly the Germans, no longer have the kind of trust they had a generation ago in America’s protection. Doubts about the credibility of
the nuclear threat have become pervasive. As a result, the temptation to appease the bear gets the better of the will to resist. The malaise is made worse by uncertainty as to the political or strategic importance of the Euromissiles, and by many statements of the American President and his advisers.

The deployment of these new missiles on European soil inevitably conjures up the thought that this soil will be the theater and the victim of a limited nuclear war. In response to a journalist’s question, Ronald Reagan declared that a limited nuclear war was unlikely but not inconceivable. The President was right: the doctrine of flexible response implies the limitation of nuclear war since it provides for gradual escalation. Had the President said that any nuclear war would be unlimited, he would, in effect, have returned to the doctrine of massive retaliation – or at the very least, he would have formulated in the most categorical manner the thesis of the starkest alternative: either conventional war or nuclear apocalypse.

American theorists have always leaned to this opinion, insisting on the central importance of the nuclear threshold. From the moment that threshold is crossed, there is no longer any guaranteed fire-break – hence the doctrine recommending a reinforcement of conventional forces.

Four distinguished Americans – McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, George F. Kennan and Gerard Smith – have recently pleaded for a doctrine of “no-first-use”. The United States would renounce the use of nuclear weapons as long as another power – in this case, the Soviet Union – does not use them. Since the Soviet Union is also ready to make such a commitment, both superpowers would solemnly pledge never to use their nuclear forces unless one of them violates its pledge. Would such a dual commitment modify the probability or improbability of nuclear war? One may legitimately question the effectiveness of such declarations.

Moreover, a declaration of no-first-use would require a revision of the official doctrine of NATO, that of flexible response. This doctrine provides for the resort to nuclear weapons if conventional defense is in peril. The no-first-use declaration hardly reinforces confidence between the two superpowers; on the other hand, it would tend to increase tensions between Europe and America. The Europeans do not contemplate a vast conventional war more enthusiastically than a limited nuclear war. In both cases the Old Continent would be devastated – and U.S. territory spared. This asymmetry is the result of geography, not of any ill-will on the part of American leaders. All in all, these controversies only contribute to greater confusion.

The initiative recommended by the four signatories of the no-first-use proposal is meaningless unless it means purely and simply that the Americans would not resort to nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe. If the Americans were to take such a decision in advance, what would be left of the “nuclear umbrella”? Whatever the balance of conventional forces between the two blocs is at the center of Europe, the Soviet Union is in a much better position to send in reinforcements than the United States. In the absence of a military effort which would require a real transformation of European societies, the prosperous democracies of the West cannot win a big war, fought with conventional weapons only, against the Soviet empire. It is important for the Europeans to strengthen their armies and conventional arsenals to make it impossible for parts or all of the stakes of war to be seized in a quick operation of a few days, in order to deter the Soviets by persuading them that the conventional battle would assume such dimensions as to make an escalation to nuclear weapons probable, if not inevitable. The declaration of the Four could only weaken the overall deterring effect which the whole ensemble of Western conventional and nuclear forces brings to bear on the Soviet Union.

What is the function of the Euromissiles in this ensemble? According to strategic experts, they tighten the “coupling” between the theater of operations and the central balance. American missiles, deployed on European soil, and capable of hitting parts of the Soviet Union’s territory, symbolize U.S.- European unity. Whatever its intentions are, the Soviet Union cannot launch a frontal attack against NATO’s forces without neutralizing first the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. It cannot afford not to “take on” the Euromissiles, and therefore the United States. The chances of a conquest of Europe without U.S. nuclear intervention decrease, the credibility of deterrence increases. This strategic rationale escapes public opinion, and European statesmen have done little to help their people to understand it. Anxious to appease the passions surrounding the issue of the Pershings, the four advocates of no-first-use have deepened the crisis of confidence. If the choice is between the risk of a limited nuclear war with the Pershing’s and that of a conventional war lost in advance with no-first-use, the pacifists and neutralists will reject both options: détente, based on a wager on Soviet
moderation, is much more appealing.

In the end, the pacifists and neutralists, consciously or not, come close to fearing American protection more than a Soviet protectorate. Soviet troops, they reason, will no more invade Western Europe than they have Finland since 1945. After all, they benefit from European industry; it is not in their interest to impose their own stifling system on it. Vaguely, many Europeans—though not the majority—dream of preserving their freedom without having to face the hazards and servitudes of defense.

These hazards and servitudes are unfortunately very real, and no doctrine will ever eliminate them entirely. The potential battlefield on the Old Continent lacks depth. NATO’s troops cannot yield any ground in order to gain time. The advantage in striking first is enormous, and the Western democracies will not be the first to strike. The Soviets have acquired the capabilities required for diverse methods of attack: either an assault with conventional weapons only, combined with the threat of monstrous reprisals if NATO breaks the nuclear threshold; or an initial attack using missiles against vital points of the Atlantic defense apparatus, immediately followed by an onrush of armored divisions. The latter scenario does appear in Soviet military literature. Yet, however precise the SS 20s are, a hail of a few hundred nuclear warheads will cause collateral destruction the extent of which is impossible to measure in advance. If the Soviets follow such a plan, they will take over Western Europe, but not without seriously risking a nuclear war which would not be confined to the Old Continent.

Faced with such perils (which are inherent to the nuclear age and the Soviet build-up) strategists, politicians and public opinion react tentatively, according to their moods; by their own contradictions, they make the task of our leaders almost impossible. Let us return to the issue of Pershing II: These missiles do not yet exist— they are under development and are not scheduled to be deployed before the end of 1983. Public opinion has forced governments to negotiate with Moscow now. Such a negotiation already constitutes a success for the Soviet Union.

Why should the Soviets agree to trade the future 108 Pershing and 464 cruise missiles against the existing 300 SS 20s and their 900 nuclear warheads? If they thought it was in their interest to renovate their intermediate-range missiles, why would they now renounce doing it? Besides, at the negotiating table, the Soviets will not be content to oppose their 300 SS 20s to the 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles. They will raise the issue of French and British missiles, and possibly even that of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. SALT II took years of negotiations. The negotiation on Euromissiles could also take years, unless the American negotiators make major concessions on the Pershings—those 108 medium range-missiles incapable of reaching Moscow and against which the world-wide Marxist-Leninist propaganda apparatus is raging.

Are the Pershing II missiles a fundamental element of European security? On such a subject, categorical statements would be untimely. It seems to me, however, that a few propositions are hardly disputable. The Pershing program responds to the SS 20s. Suggested by the German Chancellor, it has become the symbol of Europe’s defense will. If this program is abandoned under the pressure of public opinion, this abdication too will take on a symbolic value. The Europeans would be granting the Soviet Union a right of supervision of their own defense. If the Soviets concentrate the guns of their propaganda on a given weapon, the Europeans let themselves be persuaded, or be terrified; popular movements let themselves be deceived or manipulated, and they finally force their leaders to yield to the Soviets. Such an abdication would deliver yet one more blow to the Atlantic Alliance.

Strategically, the Euromissiles scheduled for deployment in 1983 are, in my view, justified as instruments of deterrence. Are they indispensable? The mechanics of deterrence remain mysterious if not unknown. No one can tell which acts the Soviets would commit in the absence of the Pershings, or which acts they would be deterred from by the deployment of medium-range American missiles on European territory. All the same, these Euromissiles do tend to prevent “decoupling” between what happens on the theater of operations and what occurs above the Europeans’ heads between the two superpowers. The question is not to “balance”, in the strict sense of the word, the SS 20s with the Pershings. The notion of equilibrium relates to a balance of power between conventional armies. When nuclear weapons are involved, at issue is the preservation of deterrence—which does not imply equality, even approximate, in numbers of launchers or warheads. For some time the United States has had more warheads while the Soviets have had more, and more powerful, launchers.

There are some who regret that the Pershing issue was
even raised at all. Popular emotion, anti-nuclear movements, whether pacifist or neutralist, have been fueled and amplified by the Pershing missiles. In their absence, I believe some other incident or pretext would have been found to ignite these reactions. The situation of the Germans, with the Soviet army massed on their border, is somehow tragic: No doctrine can ever fully reassure them.

The only doctrine they would accept would be that which the French proclaim: Refuse the battle. Faced with any aggression that would turn out to be a major one, retaliation on Soviet territory should follow—immediate, massive and perhaps total. For the benefit of Western Europe, the Americans would revert to the doctrine of massive retaliation. Yet, would this threat be credible, given the Soviet capacity to inflict upon the United States the very degree of destruction Soviet cities and military installations had just suffered? In order to make this threat credible—a monstrous threat if it is acted upon—the Americans came up with flexible response. The elusive, inconceivable war would come about only as a last resort, when conventional weapons had proved to be insufficient. In the first case, the Europeans fear the implausibility of a massive threat; in the other, they dread a large initial battle on their soil, involving the inevitable destruction of conventional war, followed by a war involving nuclear weapons spreading death all around.

If none of these scenarios is likely to reassure anyone, it is not for lack of inventiveness but because of the reality of the situation itself. When there is nuclear equality between the two superpowers, conventional inequality weighs more heavily on the security of the allies of the superpower that is weaker in conventional arms. The allies of the United States hesitate between strengthening their classical forces and another doctrine of deterrence, tempted as they are to follow a different road, which some call détente and others appeasement.

Simultaneously, in the United States, the debate over U.S. security is being revived—security against nuclear war. Scientists, moralists, and a number of strategic thinkers evoke the destruction of the human species in the event of a nuclear war "to the finish" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Some express concern at Reagan's rearmament, invoking the futility of a nuclear arms race when both sides have the capability to destroy each other's society several times over. If the United States, with the missiles of a few submarines, has the means to destroy most Soviet cities, why try to acquire additional capabilities to annihilate them several times?

The doctrine recently developed by Theodore Draper in The New York Review of Books (July 15, 1982) contributes little that is new (no more than the no-first-use doctrine). It revives what the experts used to call the "minimum deterrent": It is enough to possess a nuclear force capable of inflicting on the aggressor unacceptable damage, whatever the first strike may have been. A reserve of invulnerable submarines meets this requirement. On this basis, there is no need to race at the rival's pace. If he wishes to spend himself into bankruptcy by accumulating superfluous launchers, let him do just that.

The doctrine of the minimum deterrent squares with that other doctrine, mutual assured destruction (MAD). Each side has the means to destroy the other if attacked. But to what type of attack will one respond with massive destruction? The reason why, twenty years ago, strategic experts used to dismiss minimum deterrence is that such a concept of deterrence is akin to a bluff. When the French were arguing in favor of deterrence of the strong by the weak, they were saying that the capacity to drop a few bombs on Moscow or Leningrad would deter the Soviet Union despite its thousands of nuclear warheads. The Americans used to deride this doctrine. Today, a number of Americans are reverting to MAD—without realizing that the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, rationally, excludes the eventuality of a nuclear attack by one side against the other. As a result, they end up reducing to almost nothing the effectiveness as a deterrent of a threat which is just as ruinous for the side which extends it as it is for the side to which it is addressed. In that sense, strategic nuclear weapons end up neutralizing themselves. All the nuclear powers can do is to return to square one: To postulate that any use of nuclear weapons leads to apocalypse, that qualitative and quantitative improvements of nuclear weapons are but a waste of precious resources, and that invulnerable submarines carrying missiles are sufficient to ensure this minimal deterrent effect.

This rationale, often used by scientists, invites at least two objections: First, if nuclear weapons, even tactical ones, trigger apocalypse, the Europeans cannot rely on any weapons other than conventional ones. The logic must be pursued to the end: If all uses of nuclear weapons unleash the apocalypse, the theory of deterrence is reduced to a poker game. One threatens to do something which has little credibility; perhaps the "deterrent" will
not carry out what he announces he will if the "deter-
nee" ignores the threat. Rationality goes by the board,
since the failure of deterrence – the implementation of
the threat, whether it was clearly stated or only hinted –
would result in unthinkable catastrophe for all.

The second objection concerns the very premise of
minimum deterrence, and of mutual assured destruc-
tion, which in the last analysis goes back to massive
retaliation. The subtest advocates of these doctrines do
not state categorically that any use of nuclear weapons
necessarily escalates to the extreme. They insist rather
on the difference in nature between conventional and
nuclear arms. They think it necessary for the salvation
of mankind to persuade statesmen that conflicts involv-
ing nuclear weapons would probably become uncon-
trollable. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, no one
can know where violence will stop. Indeed, nobody
denies this risk; but does this mean we should say full
escalation is inevitable? Most scientists and a number of
commentators surreptitiously cross over from the first
variant to the second. The first preserves deterrence, the
second reduces it to a bare minimum. If escalation is to
be feared, flexible response remains relevant; if escalation
is inevitable, flexible response becomes hardly
distinguishable from massive retaliation, since the for-
mer explicitly provides for the use of nuclear weapons
which are supposed to result inevitably in the ultimate
orgy of violence.

Whereas most commentators tend to revert to the
initial concept typical of the 1940s and 50s – i.e., the
radical difference between conventional and nuclear
weapons – others follow the opposite path: they argue
that there exist some nuclear weapons whose explosive
power does not surpass that of conventional weapons.
Missile accuracy tends to make them fit for battlefield
use. In other words, some tend to make nuclear weapon-
ons look banal, others to accentuate their originality.

That the Soviets consider total nuclear war a catastro-
phe, and that they do not think it inevitable, is hardly in
doubt. But to argue that they would agree with the
Americans that any nuclear explosion would inevitably
escalate is to draw a conclusion which is nowhere to be
found in Soviet literature. Soviet literature does not
exclude a protracted nuclear war; and such a scenario
makes sense only if the two superpowers do not shower
each other with nuclear warheads by the hundreds. If
they did, then both would have only one possible
interest: to survive and bandage their wounds. This
scenario is not the only possible one.

Europe's security can only be defined both against
and by the nuclear threat. The Europeans will be the first
victims of a nuclear war initiated on their continent; yet,
they cannot do without the nuclear threat under present
circumstances, in the face of the Soviet arms build-up.
Nuclear war would be a catastrophe for mankind as a
whole; in that sense, some will argue that it is more to
be feared than expansion of the Soviet empire. I
personally think that Western Europe cannot be pro-
tected without the threat to resort to nuclear weapons.
This is why the four authors of the no-first-use proposal
do more harm than good. In essence, they order the
West to fight, and in the end to loose, a conventional
war; implicitly or not, they uphold a thesis we might call
"no stop", or one of inevitable escalation. Such a
combination leaves no way out for the Europeans.

The existing Western doctrine seems to me to be
better than all alternative doctrines; it treads a narrow
path between non-first-use and MAD. The '60s doctrine
subsists – less satisfactory than it was twenty years ago,
yet the least nefarious. In any case, where is the security
document that could satisfy a camp which is doomed to
maintain a defensive posture – and one that faces a state
free to act as it wishes and which, aside from parity at
the strategic nuclear level, enjoys quantitative superi-
ority at all other levels? On the other hand, what
military aggression in Europe would not imply incalcu-
lable risks for the attacker?
Few words are so misleading and even deceptive in international politics as “Disarmament”, which has been misused not only by “anti-nukers” and pacifists, but also by academics and policy makers.

Most of them seem to believe sincerely that disarmament is feasible, if only nations that possess arms would try a little harder. Others base their cases on either moral, strategic, political, psychological or economic grounds. Few address themselves to the linkage between security and disarmament, because they think the two words represent mutually irrelevant, or even mutually exclusive, concepts.

There are at least three basic factors which have contributed to this conceptual chaos.

First, most disarmers make their own moral value judgment. Armament leads to wars and disarmament to peace, they argue. Here, the emphasis is on arms or military hardware: Diehard disarmers call for general, comprehensive disarmament (GCD); others, “anti-nukers” for instance, focus their case on nuclear disarmament, depending on their particular value judgments.

Secondly, most debates on disarmament reflect a general trend to blame policymakers – in the military-industrial complex or in government, as the case may be – for lack of will to carry out disarmament. More often than not, slow progress in disarmament is due not so much to lack of will as to difficulties that are inherent to the technological nature of arms and other elements of any military establishment, large or small. These difficulties are ignored and the debate becomes unrealistic: The end product is a crusade, morally self-righteous but impracticable in reality.

Thirdly, on the brighter side, there has been an increasing interest in arms control, though it is still little understood and often confused with disarmament. Di-

— Makoto Momoi is Dean of the Faculty of Defense Studies and Professor of International Relations at Japan’s National Defense College. The views expressed in this article are strictly his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense College.
past history of disarmament treaties is to be a guide, one finds only a series of discouraging signs that most such treaties will be eventually ignored, forgotten, violated or made ineffective, mainly because of technological progress.

Fourthly, what about "potential" weapons or military know-how? Wars have not been waged because of the presence of weapons; on the contrary, weapons were built to meet a need to fight. This need is the product of political, psychological and other complex motivations. Unless one can control such motivations, armed conflict — even by primitive means of violence — will remain with us for the foreseeable future.

Finally, the cause of conflict is essentially mutual distrust. What is needed, then, to maintain even a precarious stability is to remove distrust — hence the need for confidence-building measures.

It is this kind of thinking about the state of military art which has led us to turn our attention to arms control rather than disarmament.

A theoretical transition from traditional disarmament to contemporary arms control took place in the early 60s, following a decade and a half of futile efforts to reach workable agreements on disarmament. As arms and know-how proliferated globally and among militarily lesser countries, nations realized a need for self-restraint for their own security.

Fundamentally, they knew from their experiences since the 1920s that a given disarmament agreement is never free from clandestine acts of cheating or violations, since a foolproof surveillance or inspection is not always feasible. They began to put an emphasis on self-restraint or exemplary action, in the hope that others may follow suit through tacit agreement, or through mutually agreeable arrangements of limited scope designed to reduce crisis.

All this reflects an international interest in global security, which has come to depend on two major factors of stability: mutual restraint between the two nuclear superpowers (nuclear detente), and containment or limitation of local confrontations (conventional crisis management). In either case, arms do continue to exist and their elimination is not immediately practical. But security-minded nations are interested in maintaining a status quo and, it is to be hoped, in discarding arms as they become either obsolete, unnecessary or uneconomical.

It is true that Japan abounds with "anti-nukers" and G-C-Disarmers; their political impact, however, is limited to the domestic scene. They know too well that Moscow is much less tolerant than New York, which permitted some of them to stage anti-nuclear demonstrations. They are fully aware that there are no immediate prospects for GCD. Enrenched in anti-war (and, by their own definition, anti-military of anti-defense) camps, they cannot tolerate that arms should continue to exist, even if controlled.

On the other hand, arms control has yet to be accepted in academic and journalistic circles as a full-fledged theoretical and policy concept.

For one thing, the notion that arms control boils down to a near monopoly of the nuclear superpowers has long been prevalent in Japan. Another reason has been that debates over arms control, whether nuclear or conventional, sound too technical for laymen to understand. This somewhat erroneous impression has discouraged many from studying arms control seriously.

Furthermore, even those interested in arms control have failed to observe that Japan has long practiced self-restraint, a major element of arms control: Japan has no nuclear policy; its military posture is limited to the defense of the homeland; it does not export or transfer arms; and it renounces long-range strike capabilities (to the point of removing mid-air refueling systems from its fighter aircraft). In fact, long is the list of Japan's self-imposed restraints in armament and voluntary limitations on its defense policies (including an open pledge not to send military manpower overseas).

**Momentum for Arms Control**

On the other hand, in academic, if not yet in policy, circles, arms control has become a fashionable word — for several reasons:

First, in the past few years, the Japanese have become security-conscious for the first time since 1945 — due, in part, to the behavior of the three major nuclear powers in the Pacific.

In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union began deploying a remarkably large number of armed forces (today, nearly 25 per cent of each service branch) in the Far East. This has invited critical comments from Peking, where Japanese visitors (including those who were against Japan's security efforts and for GCD) were "lectured" to take a firm stand against the Soviet Union. At about the same time, Washington began to make open, candid remarks concerning the limited response capabilities of the United States.

Secondly, in the spring of 1981, the Soviet Union
made new overtures toward Northeast Asia by advocating confidence-building measures (without specifying the details, but referring to Japan) and by issuing conciliatory statements addressed to China (see, for instance, Brezhnev’s speech in Tashkent in early 1982).

The third contributing factor to the new vogue of arms control was psychological, in reaction to a general trend, gradually developed throughout the '70s, to see arms control talks as the natural preserve of the superpowers. To a certain extent, such attitudes were understandable; after all, non-nuclear weapon states are generally not privy to nuclear matters. On the other hand, however, they (including Japan) are now frustrated over increasing signs that the superpowers' arms control initiatives tend to “preempt” or keep others from doing what the two giants have already done (e.g. the Space, Seabed or, to some extent, Non-Proliferation Treaties).

A fourth reason is that the world perceives a growing need to regulate, if possible, or at least to keep an eye on, transfers of arms and modern technology from producers to third-world nations. This line of argument is vulnerable from a technical point of view; beyond self-restraint, there is little prospect that effective control measures could be put forward.

Fifthly, such a concern has been accelerated as an increasing number of non-superpowers have been involved in armed conflict in the late 70s and early 80s. Local wars have become too “modern” to limit damage to civilians (see the Iran-Iraq, Israeli-PLO, and Falkland crises). This has fostered an interest among arms controllers in the linkage between arms control and crisis management, this all-important aspect of regional and national security.

All this has contributed to promote widespread interest in the link between security and arms control without actually sacrificing disarmament, which still remains in Japan a useful, if not effective per se, diplomatic instrument. In international fora such as the U.N. General Assembly, reference to disarmament is a must. For domestic consumption too, it is a politically important concept. A failure to mention disarmament in a major public speech invites vehement attacks from the opposition; hence the repeated references to Japan as “the only victim of A-bombings” and related calls for nuclear disarmament . . .

On the other hand, mounting concern about Japan’s security, against the background of a changing strategic environment in the Pacific, will continue to feed debates upon debates on the security-arms control linkage.

These debates are bound to become influential as Japanese policymakers are concerned with conflict-avoidance, one of the aspects of crisis management. (Other aspects include conflict-limitation and conflict-termination).

From a security point of view, there can be two basic ways of avoiding crisis: 1)- to remain “unprovocative” (through arms reduction, freezing and/or a defense build-up designed to lessen the emphasis on destabilizing elements); and 2)- to deter potential adversaries (through dissuasive actions or declarations, and/or the offering of bonuses such as economic and technological cooperation).

From a Japanese standpoint, therefore, the avoidance of crisis and conflict spells a need for arms control measures designed to lessen destabilizing elements, particularly extreme vulnerabilities. (Japan’s security posture leaves almost no room for reduction or massive freezing; vulnerabilities, on the other hand, are to be feared, for they do tend to provoke others).

This, in turn, creates the need for a carefully planned, restrained defense build-up, coupled with improved C3I (Communication, Command-Control and Intelligence) Systems. Such an effort, if coordinated with “dissuasive” offering measures, bonuses in particular, might help to consolidate the status quo.

In reality, there is little room in Japan for major disarmament efforts that would be consistent with security. Rather, Japan’s security calls for continued arms control efforts.

After all, as John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee correctly point out, “arms were a symptom of political antagonism; if the mutual confidence existed to halt the arms race, the necessary trust would have existed to resolve the underlying political tension.”

Disarmament may have been, and may still be, an “illusion”; but most, if not all, arms control measures are not.
President Carter’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Brzezinski was a key founder and the first Director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976.

In a seminar organized by the Commission in May, 1982, Dr. Brzezinski spoke to the Commission’s North American members and other guests on the theme of “East-West Relations at a Crossroads”. Following are excerpts – later amplified in an interview with Triolgue’s Editor – of his remarks bearing on the U.S.- Soviet relationship and a wide range of security issues of concern to the trilateral countries.

East-West Relations at a Crossroads
All in all, I do not think we are in a situation in which one should spend one’s nights awake, haunted by the specter of Soviet global domination. The Soviet Union does not have the assets necessary for global predominance of the kind the United States enjoyed in the mid-1950s. The Pax America of the 1950s was the product not only of American military preponderance, but also of our overwhelming economic power, and equally important, of our political appeal, cultural attraction, social vitality and the like. The Soviet Union doesn’t have these assets. The Soviet Union is a global force only in the military dimension; in every other dimension of global power, it is wanting, and thus I do not see it emerging as a dominant force on the global scene.

But Soviet power may be used to create greater tensions, simply because of the irresistible temptation to exploit any current troubles to enhance Soviet influence and prestige, and to reduce American prestige. That does raise the question of whether there isn’t the risk of at least a Fashoda between the United States and the Soviet Union, and of course potentially even a Sarajevo.

In my judgment, we are at one of those stages similar in some ways to the period between 1946 and 1948, and then later between 1959 and 1962, when basic, long-term commitments are in the process of being shaped. The first period produced a prolonged cold war; the second period produced a prolonged and rather uncertain détente. I’m not sure which way things will go right now. But I think they are at a stage in which they could go in either direction: we could get an acute intensification of global tensions, and a rather unpredictable and unstable American-Soviet rivalry; or perhaps present conditions of turbulence could be exploited to start again stabilizing the relationship and building what I would hope would be a genuinely more comprehensive and reciprocal détente.

It’s not going to be easy to do this, and it will require a great deal of deliberate American leadership – American leadership in the fashioning of proposals to the Soviets in the area of the strategic relationship, where I believe that a number of proposals could be made which would give the Soviet Union at least the choice of some fundamental consequences. I am particularly attracted to proposals which would focus on gradual reduction of strategic arms by some annual quotas. I am attracted by the notion of reduction of American tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany in return for a symmetrical reduction in Soviet tank forces in East Germany, because that would create the required symmetry and political evolution; on that basis perhaps one could move towards a nuclear-free zone in the North – provided that NATO countries such as Denmark and Norway, in addition to neutrals like Sweden and Finland, were compensated for by a Soviet zone involving the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic states. A similar concept might also apply to the Balkans.

In addition, it seems to me that, because of the criticality of the Polish situation and the danger that it could explode into something very ugly, we should match our essentially negative sanctions with a more comprehensive and clearer program of positive inducements if there is accommodation, and that means an American-West European economic initiative addressed in effect to Moscow though focused on Warsaw, in order to give some inducements to the parties concerned to try to resolve the issue in a more stable fashion.

I do not believe that such initiatives will end the rivalry between us, but at least in two significant dimensions they could create a framework around it, and also help to rally our allies. These issues, I should
stress, need to be discussed very fully with our allies; this is why I have long felt that the annual economic summit should be transformed into a strategic summit in which centrally important political issues are also seriously discussed with the parties with whom they ought to be discussed, namely, with the other industrial democracies in the trilateral context.

**Deterrence in the 1980s**

The central problem is that, to deter the Soviet Union, you have to deter a power which now has the capacity to conduct warfare on several levels, conventional, lower-intermediate nuclear, and apocalyptic nuclear, with the latter falling into two categories— all-out or perhaps selective and protracted. Deterrence has to be effective on all of these levels; therefore, whether we like it or not, deterrence now requires a far more extensive and diversified capability than was the case before. That was the thought behind the issuance of Presidential Directive 59 in 1980 which initiated a new and essentially a war-fighting doctrine, not in order to fight a war but in order to deter the other side from feeling that leverage may exist that could be exercised.

**U.S. and Soviet Capabilities: “Ambiguous Equivalence”**

The President of the United States recently declared, authoritatively though I suspect impulsively, that the United States is strategically inferior to the Soviet Union. I find that somewhat wanting as an analysis of the actual relationship between the two powers. My own view is that the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union can best be capsulated by the words “ambiguous equivalence.” That is to say, we are clearly ahead of the Soviet Union in some key systems. The Soviet Union is clearly ahead of us in some key systems. There is uncertainty about some others. In particular there is ambiguity as to what it all adds up to.

I think what it all adds up to is that neither side can be very certain about the consequences of a military engagement, and even less so about the consequences of quick preemption, and that at the present moment the relationship of power is such that neither can count on effectively and convincingly intimidating the other politically through the use of power as a threat. Thus the relationship is one of rough equivalence but also of ambiguity; but trends in that relationship are admittedly adverse. In any case, it is a relationship that is more complicated than when one party was clearly superior to the other, as was the case in 1962—the other party knew it, moreover the other party knew that we knew that we were superior, and that we knew that they knew that we were superior. That, I think, imposed a certain relationship of inhibition which today is absent, and in a much more turbulent context, it does raise the question of whether the projection of power and the scope of power on both sides may not begin to overlap in some fashion which heretofore was not in evidence.

**What Criteria for Arms Control?**

I think there is something to what the Administration is saying—namely, that limitations on megatonnage and on warheads in the longer run are likely to contribute to greater stability and reductions than limitations on delivery systems only. But I do think that to get there, you have to pass through the latter first. I have not the slightest doubt, and I am prepared to argue this at length, that SALT II was a great improvement on SALT I, and that it deserves to be ratified. It is in the interest of both parties, and particularly us. First, it does result, if implemented fully, in some reductions, and while some may not be much, some is the first ever. This constitutes a very important change in the historical pattern. Second, it does involve, for the first time, some truly important limits on qualitative improvements, particularly the fractionation of warheads.

Now, one could go beyond that, to do what the Administration is talking about, namely impose limits and reductions on megatonnage and warheads; but I think a more felicitous way of getting there is first to ratify the SALT II treaty. Otherwise, I am afraid that we are going to create a situation in which we will go to the Soviets with the latest proposal and the Soviets will then reject it, and we will have a highly debilitating debate at home on whether the rejection is evidence of Soviet ill will (and therefore we should tough it out) or whether the rejection is proof of the Administration’s incapacity (and therefore we should punish ourselves or abandon the proposal).

When we went to the Soviets in 1977 with a comprehensive cuts proposal which was a surprise to them, we did do one other thing which most people ignored. In essence, we said to the Soviets: If you are not prepared to buy that, then let us have a quick agreement, largely on the basis of the 1974 Vladivostok agreement, leaving aside the unresolved issues; then we can come back at a later stage and
negotiate deeper cuts. The Soviets chose to reject both; the press focused largely on the rejection of the deep cuts, and blamed us in part for even proposing it.

I would like to spare the Administration that dilemma, and I think it would therefore be wiser if we went to the Soviets and said: Look, it is in our mutual interest to have real reductions in megatonnage and warheads. But if you cannot go along with this, then let us implement rapidly SALT II, maybe with one or two cosmetic adjustments — since the Reagan Administration has become so committed to changing it — and then let us go on from there to reductions in megatonnage and warheads. Otherwise, I think we will lose momentum. In addition, if SALT II collapses altogether, I think the Soviets are in a much better position than we are right now to maximize their inventory, and to do so quite rapidly, while this Administration, which had talked so much about the window of opportunity being opened, has in fact been “sitting” on the one system which would have somewhat narrowed the time in which this window would be opened — the MX. Therefore we are really not in a position to compete if there is a sudden resumption in the strategic arms build-up.

No-First-Use?

I disagree with the recent “no-first-use” proposals¹; I have the highest respect for the authors who have spent a great deal of time reflecting on this issue, but I am not convinced that the argument is desirable or timely. I should add that, during my service in government, we considered making such a proposal, we reflected on it, we debated it, and we reached a conclusion (which was shared by Secretaries Brown and Vance as well as the President) that it was not desirable.

My criticisms of the proposal would be as follows:

First of all, I think the proposal in itself makes TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) deployment less likely because it reduces the incentive to go ahead with it, and by the same token it reduces the Soviet inclination to have an arms control accommodation over TNF. This in itself is serious. Secondly, I think that if adopted, it eventually would give the Europeans a very difficult choice between increased conventional efforts or neutralism — and I am not sure that they would choose the former over the latter. Thirdly, I think it transforms
what we call the strategy of flexible response into a strategy of predictably inadequate response. And this, fourthly, has the effect of increasing the probability of conventional war. This, in turn, means that, if you have conventional war, even if you are committed to no-first-use you may end up using nuclear weapons, thereby making even a nuclear war slightly more probable. Furthermore, outside of the European context, I think it really does raise questions about our ability to defend Korea, where we do have a first-use deployment ready, and that is very serious. Lastly, I think it has a negative impact on our relations with the Europeans, because it gives them the feeling that we have an inclination to rethink fundamentals periodically and very suddenly. This is destructive of the sense of continuity in the relationship which is an integral part of security; I don’t think it is accidental that responsible Germans, particularly Foreign Minister Genscher, came out very quickly, with negative reactions towards the proposal.

**Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe – What Chances for a Bargain?**

I was personally never persuaded that we needed TNF\(^2\) for military reasons. I was persuaded reluctantly that we needed it to obtain European support for SALT. This was largely because Chancellor Schmidt made such a big deal out of the so-called Eurostrictive imbalance that was being generated by the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. To keep him in line we felt that some response in Europe on the intermediate level would be necessary. We felt we were responding to the European desire in shaping the TNF, but we were also very conscious of the fact that Europeans were ambivalent. As a result, one track of the NATO decision was designed to satisfy those Europeans who felt that their insecurity ought to be reduced by some offsetting deployment giving the West an intermediate capability of matching the Soviets; the other track was designed to satisfy those Europeans who felt that it was important to match any security efforts by a new arms control initiative.

I am now rather doubtful that a bargain can be struck in the TNF negotiation. This doubt is due in part to the fact that I am becoming increasingly uncertain whether the Europeans will go through with the deployment of the new missiles. Since the Europeans are increasingly less likely to go through with deployment, the Soviets have less of an incentive to reach an arms control accord.

**Towards A Nuclear “Freeze”?**

I think “freeze” proposals are deceptive. A genuine freeze on production would require a degree of verification which would make the verification problems of SALT II look like a very simple living room game. The fact of the matter is that, for a long time to come, we will not have the kind of access to the Soviet Union to permit us to verify whether weapons are being produced or stockpiled. I think it is deceptive for Democratic candidates to be advocating the freeze because the effect is largely to generate greater self-restraint on the West without any reciprocal restraint on the Soviets.

**The Presence of Nuclear Weapons: Impact on Nature of War and on Local Crises**

In my view, to say that “whenever nuclear weapons are present, war loses its earlier function as a continuation of politics by other means” is more of a religious incantation than an analytical description. It runs the risk of being self-deception. The fact of the matter is that we do not yet know that nuclear weapons have outlawed war. The danger is increasingly that there will be a low-level nuclear confrontation of some sort in this decade or the next. I think it would be wrong to assume that a new era has been entered, and especially if that assumption were to lead to decreased deterrence.

Nuclear weapons shape the overall context and climate within which local conflicts now occur. The fact that nuclear weapons are not brandished in the conventional fashion that, say, gunboat diplomacy was employed, doesn’t mean that they aren’t there, and that the threat is not there. The fact of the matter is that a lot of crises in our age have already been affected by the reality of nuclear weapons and by the changing balance of power. The United States reacted in different ways to recent problems in Cuba or in the Middle East than when it had unilateral nuclear monopoly. I dare say that some of the caution that West European governments tend to advocate is derived from the deeply felt awareness of the existence of the Soviet nuclear threat. In that sense, nuclear weapons are a continuing factor in our relationships and in ongoing crises.


\(^2\)See NATO’s “double-track” 1979 decision on deployment of new Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe and concomitant negotiations now underway in Geneva.
Détente, disarmament, peace: these concepts, not merely pleasant-sounding words, characterize an ancient longing rooted in human nature for harmony, justice, and an absence of force in relations between states. Just how cynically the word peace can be used, though, is shown by merely two events: the 1939 pact between Hitler and the Soviet Union served the “cause of peace,” it was stated in the preamble, although Stalin thereby gave Hitler the green light for his attack against Poland and the start of World War II. After 1945, the Stockholm “call for peace” arranged by Moscow was concomitant with the Soviet subjugation of East Europe and a part of Germany. The call was heeded not only by Communists and “progressivists” in the West but also by many people on whom the mere words peace and freedom had the effect of a drug that made them incapable of posing the question concerning their real meaning. Today, too, the accelerated Soviet arms buildup with nuclear intermediate-range missiles (SS 20), the threat of the use of military force against Poland, and the war against the Afghan people are similarly accompanied by Brezhnev’s verbalism about peace and disarmament. These bitter experiences indicate basic differences between the Soviet and the Western concept of disarmament and arms control.

Soviet foreign policy is determined by two clearly recognizable drives: – an insatiable concept of security, which reflects anxiety about free labor unions in Poland, about free people in Czechoslovakia, about the desire of Germans for reunification;

– an international revolutionary ideology that maintains the world must become Communist in order for there to be peace and justice.

The entire military complex – be it as fighting strength, as defense-oriented economy, or as arms control diplomacy – is in the service of these long-term political goals.

A Christian Democratic member of the Bundestag and of its Foreign Affairs committee, Dr. Mertes is Foreign Affairs Spokesman of the Parliamentary group of the CDU/CSU, (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, the West German opposition party.)

For Moscow, therefore, moral categories are applicable only to the content of political goals but not to the military means of exercising power as an instrument of policy. This also applies for nuclear weapons and, as shown by the most recent development, for biological and chemical weapons. From this perspective the arms race, since the Soviet Union could ultimately win it, is not in itself bad, but only in those phases in which the West balances off Soviet advantages or even achieves again superiority. And from this perspective the renunciation of force, arms control, and disarmament are likewise not good in themselves but only to the extent that they do not work against Soviet conceptions of the goal or even altogether favor them. Here I merely recall the Soviet doctrine of the “just war.”

In contrast to the accepted Western concept of security, which in essence means military defense, the Soviet concept of security is of a more comprehensive nature. War potential is the decisive instrument of the political leadership’s security. Some of the consequences of a basic attitude considered defensive by the Soviet leadership are in reality acts of offense. Several examples: the iron control of the cordon sanitaire; the imposition of discipline, i.e., the suppression of the political opponent in one’s own camp; the offensive intimidation of and threat to democratic countries in Western Europe for the purpose of being able, in the event of a serious incident, to exert pressure and blackmail. Such measures are targeted at an environment suspected of being cowardly, where even during times of peace people philosophize about the alternative, “better red than dead,” an attitude that engenders political defeatism. Moreover, in keeping with the primary of political policy over other considerations, the Soviet leadership firmly maintains that military issues can be separated from the underlying political issues only as a method for conducting negotiations and making propaganda, but that in reality military and political issues are not to be separated. In actual arms control policy, too, conservative stabilization on the domestic front and a dynamic policy of influence and expansion abroad prove to be principles of current overall Soviet strategy.

Responsible authorities within the Atlantic Alliance
have always seen two equal dangers to peace and freedom. No one can deny the danger of a nuclear war, the danger of a nuclear self-destruction of mankind, or repress the danger from consciousness. For this reason we respect the concerns and anxieties of the so-called peace movement in our country. We cannot and do not wish to deny the legitimacy of the fear felt by many fellow human beings. Their anxieties are in response to several factors: the overwhelming effect of modern weapons of mass destruction in the event of their use; the rapid technological progress, which to many seems no longer controllable; the military-technological systems and institutions, perceived by many people to be gigantic, anonymous, and even threatening to become autonomous.

The paradox of the deterrent strategy – the prevention of a war by the threat of a war of terrible and unimagined extent – is understandably extremely difficult to ponder. After all, deterrence as a bitter political necessity can achieve a broad consensus among the population only if simultaneously there is awareness of a second danger that is more concrete because it is more probable. This danger, which is now denied by the peace movement, consists in the self-imposed political restraint on the part of Western Europe toward the Soviet Union, as expressed in a compulsion toward preventive good conduct in response to the expansive goals of a totalitarian superpower.

The consciousness of the political nature of the Soviet menace has constantly receded during the last decade. Many who today advocate one-sided disarmament pay no attention either to the speeches and proclamations or to the deeds of the Soviet leadership. These are the facts that no longer actually permit an erroneous assessment of the Soviet threat: the ongoing expansion of the USSR; their aggression in the Third World, even to the extent of invading Afghanistan and waging war there; the ongoing Soviet arms build-up, which evidently is directed toward military superiority, at least regionally; the Soviet violations of the 1970 German-Soviet Renunciation of Force Treaty, of the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki, and of the basic definitions of international law in Afghanistan and Poland. The overwhelming majority of West Europeans also perceive this danger to be on a par with the concern about a nuclear holocaust. This applies to a particular extent to the German population.

In considering weighty international questions, it is necessary to note the following differences between America, the other nuclear powers, and us Germans:

To be a nuclear power is not merely a military process; it creates the feeling of great nonchalance and great freedom of movement vis-à-vis the powerful counterpart, the Soviet Union. This feeling we do not have, and for this reason under certain circumstances too great vacillations in Western policy are a problem for us.

The geographic situation of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, from which it is separated by two oceans, likewise creates, in both a good and a problematic sense, a different state of consciousness among Americans.

The third difference relates to us as Germans. A double moral encumbrance burdens our relations with the Soviet Union. The first encumbrance is the fact that on June 22, 1941, the German Reich broke its word and unleashed a dreadful war against the Soviet Union, a fact that made a deep impression upon the peoples and leadership of the Soviet Union. But there is also the other encumbrance: the fact that Moscow continues to believe the future security of the Soviet Union can be created by dividing Europe – by the use of force. We Germans are deeply touched by this consciousness.

The fourth difference consists in the rights and responsibilities of the four powers in reference to Germany as a whole and to Berlin. In our view, the United States, like France and England, is present in West Berlin not merely as a protective power. Its presence serves as a reminder that the German question is an open question legally, politically, and morally. The legal basis for the presence of the Western powers in Berlin does not rest on the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, but exclusively on the 1945 rights of the victors, as made clear by the Western powers in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. On the issue of Berlin we, Germans, are therefore in a strange situation of affirming the right of occupation; we are in this position, however, not because the issue of occupation is involved, but because the rights of protection are involved. And since the rights of protection are involved, the following should be remembered: It is of great historical importance for the future, too, that the German question still requires regulation; that the treaties for the normalization of relations with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic, as well as the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki are modus vivendi texts. In other words, all these documents are renunciation-of-force texts, but it should be
kept in mind that the material and formal prejudice of the peace treaty is not thereby given.

For three reasons the West knows that it is quite obviously obligated to a policy of balanced arms reduction:

First, because modern weapons for mass destruction are becoming steadily more lethal, and in the event of a hostile conflict could lead to unimaginable catastrophe;

Second, because armaments devour energies and monies far more plausibly available for combatting the starvation and misery of suffering peoples of the Third World;

Third, because renunciation of the threat and use of force for the implementation of political goals and legal concepts is the guiding principle of our foreign policy, which claims universal validity. For this reason the Federal Republic of Germany, upon joining the Atlantic Alliance during Adenauer’s chancellorship, stated a contractual renunciation of the threat and use of force for the implementation of its political goals. For this reason we were the first country to agree of its own accord to renounce nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons.

There is only one exception to the renunciation of force, which is also acknowledged in the Charter of the United Nations, and that is the right to individual and to collective self-defense of nations. This exception is based on a moral postulate – namely, that the state must protect its citizens. The biblical injunctions concerning ultimate perfection, including the demand to offer the other cheek if one has already been hit, is no license for persons to use threats and force who wish to do harm to domestic and international order. If out of personal conviction I consider it right, I may offer my own cheek, but I may not offer the cheeks of my fellow citizens.

As a person responsible for affairs of state, I must give precedence to the highest moral principle, the protection and love of my neighbor. From the standpoint of the christian ethos, anyone prepared to risk his life for his neighbor, for his fellow citizens, practices an extraordinary form of love of neighbor.

Arms buildup and disarmament are not ends in themselves

If the Western arms control strategy is to be successful, then its foundations must be subjected to scrutiny that is free of illusion.

From President Kennedy to President Carter, the primary goal of United States foreign policy was – by means of bilateral dialogue, cooperation, and treaties with the other nuclear superpower, the Soviet Union – to impede a nuclear war that would hurl people into inconceivable suffering. High points of this policy of 17 years’ duration were: the 1963 Test Ban Treaty under Kennedy, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty under Johnson, the 1972 Salt I Treaty, the 1972 American-Soviet Declaration, and the 1973 U.S.–Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear Warfare under Nixon, the 1974 Vladivostok Agreement under Ford, and the Salt II Treaty under Carter.

Konrad Adenauer urgently counselled the United States against the Vietnam War (1964–75), since it would divert American energies from Europe as the main region of tension. In the course of that war, Washington during the Johnson administration also lulled itself for a time in the hope that, with progress in arms control negotiations, Moscow would persuade the rulers in Hanoi to terminate the conflict, which was increasingly burdening America’s domestic policy, without loss of face for either side. (Moscow, however, with Hanoi sought a total victory of the Vietnamese communists).

During these 17 years Washington proceeded on three assumptions:

– that Moscow shared the goal of impeding a nuclear war;
– that Moscow would slow down its massive arms build-up in the area of conventional, maritime, Eurostrategic and intercontinental-strategic-weapons;
– that Moscow would moderate its worldwide approach, especially in the Third World – i.e., that in a process of détente, it would slow down or end the systematic expansion of its power.

Between 1969 and 1976 this American concept was joined as a seemingly useful extension, by the SPD-FDP coalition’s concept of détente. In any case, it found the support of the United States, especially since in the 1971 Berlin Agreement it had brought the Soviets to a stop on a sore point in East-West relations. And the reservations of the CDU-CSU – that détente would dampen Europe’s alertness and resistance against the persisting Soviet threat; that Moscow would hold a different interpretation of the treaties covering normalization of relations with the normalization of relations with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic, and would use its own interpretation of those treaties against the West; that normalization in intra-German relations would some
day be misused as an instrument of blackmail against Bonn’s Western policy—were hardly understood in the United States.

Starting in 1976—after Vietnam and Watergate or, more precisely stated, after the Cuban intervention in Angola—a slow and steady process of disillusionment set in in Washington. Ultimately this process was accelerated rather than impeded by Carter’s idealism concerning peace and by the constant vacillations of his foreign policy. The Soviet war in Afghanistan prompted his statement on January 1, 1980 that America must finally realize that the Soviet Union pursues long-term political goals of expanding its power worldwide. A growing inner awareness and the ensuing wave of disenchantment with his foreign policy led to the victory of Reagan and the Republicans. Triggered by the worldwide expansion and the unimpeded excessive arms build-up by Moscow in the '70s, the following basic convictions now prevail in America:

Out of elementary self-interest, the USSR, along with the United States and with all nations that pursue rational security policy, shares the goal of impeding a nuclear war. But beneath the threshold of the risk of a nuclear war with the West, Moscow pursues direct expansion in the Third World. Toward Western Europe, in contrast, it pursues a strategy of influence that is targeted at an inner split of NATO. It is also targeted at a constantly growing attitude among Europeans of preventive good conduct vis-à-vis Soviet interests and at a growing distancing of Bonn from Washington due to “particular national German interests” (easing of intra-German relations, trade with the East).

Out of self-interest Moscow, in its will toward power, will only be prepared to terminate its constantly spiraling arms build-up and be willing to have balanced, verifiable disarmament if confronted by a Washington that is equally aware of its power, i.e., if it were confronted by an America that no longer regards negotiations and treaties on arms control as a “value in itself,” but likewise uses these measures with its allies as an instrument of world policy for the consistent pursuit of its own interest and thereby credibly preserves the peace.

It must be made clear to Moscow that détente does not mean dictatorship and superiority but human rights and balance. Peace will not become more secure by ambiguous compromises in the manner of the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki, which subsequently—as in Belgrade in 1977-78 and in Madrid in 1980-81—lead to endless contention, but by clear agreements to which each verifiably adheres.

Today the United States again perceives the Soviet Union in the broadest political context.

One of the most fatal tendencies in the current discussion of security policy is to see and to treat the so-called arms race outside of this historic-political context. Such thinking about disarmament, which is ultimately unpolitical, can have a disastrously harmful effect. It was in this manner that the disarmament policy of the Labor Party and the war resistance movement in England during the 30s was conducive to Hitler’s drive for power.

We cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union—which for its part is subject to real, particularly economic, pressures—might be prepared, in response to a firm attitude of the West, to make a reevaluation of its interests.

For this reason the CDU/CSU supports all positions of the Alliance and of the Federal Government in the most important international disarmament bodies. This also applies without reservation to the disarmament offensive of the United States which, in close agreement with its allies, has presented comprehensive proposals for the reduction of conventional, tactical nuclear, and intercontinental strategic weapons. The goals of this disarmament policy range from the abandonment of a controlled arms build-up to the achievement of significant reductions in the particularly destabilizing, hence particularly dangerous, weapons in the east and in the West. Out of elementary self-interest this disarmament policy deserves our political support. These initiatives are characterized by transparency, balance, and verifiability, which are unconditional components of an effective arms control policy. We hope that the Soviet Union also supports these principles not only verbally but in deed. A first step in this direction would be the readiness of Moscow and its allies to disclose their military expenditures to the register of the United Nations and to abandon their opposition in general to practicable and effective measures of on-site inspection.

This also applies in reference to biological and chemical weapons (B and C weapons). Negotiations concerning the total and controlled ban on chemical weapons have been under way for years at the Geneva Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. But an agreement is not in view, because the Soviet Union opposes the disclosure of its chemical weapons systems. Instead of that we hear news about the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet army in Afghanistan and the
A Special Statement

INDIRA GANDHI
Prime Minister of India
armaments have been in vain. The partial Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have not lessened the destructive capacity of the Great Powers. Nor have nuclear weapon states practised the self-restraint which they wish to impose on others, particularly those who have no intention of entering the nuclear arms race. This problem must be dealt with at the point where it is most serious, i.e., the relations between the Great Powers and their mutual discussions on arms control. It is unrealistic to expect continued protection from the so-called balance of terror. In the escalating of stockpiles, how can any one possessor of nuclear weapons claim moral superiority?

Merely because nuclear weapons have not been deployed after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we cannot ignore the thousands of nuclear warheads, placed in different countries and continents, and cruising the Oceans. An inadvertent act could well spark off a war.

I am alarmed at the wholly untenable theory of the limited use of nuclear weapons and how insidiously minds are being conditioned to the idea of nuclear wars being winnable and that human civilization can survive such a war without much damage, perhaps a little better for being cleansed of ideological adversaries. Could there be greater self-deception? No serious analyst believes that nuclear wars can be limited. Any such conflict, begun in the most nicely calculated manner in quantity and quality, would inevitably escalate into a global holocaust.

This realization is causing concerned women and men to voice their anguish. Life, culture and civilization cannot be renewed through mutual destruction. The populations of the Great Powers and millions of people in the developing world have had no say in decisions which determine their fates and that of future generations. I believe the time has come when the world’s meek and disinherit are no less concerned and must be heard.

In a message to the recent U.N. Conference on Disarmament, I suggested the following concrete program of action to bring about total disarmament:

First: Negotiation of a binding nature on the non-use of nuclear weapons.

Second: As a first step towards the eventual reduction of existing stockpiles, a freeze on nuclear weapons, providing for the total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons, combined with a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Third: Immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests.

Fourth: Towards this objective, negotiations towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament, within an agreed timeframe as was discussed between the
U.S. and USSR in the agreed principles and draft treaties of the early 1960s.

And fifth: Initiative by the United Nations and its specialized agencies in educating the public on the dangers of nuclear war, on the deadly effects of the arms race on the world economy, as well as the positive aspects of disarmament and its link with development.

A few countries have since declared that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It would be a welcome beginning to a new program of disarmament if all other nuclear weapon states made similar announcements.

To the people of the poorer countries, the danger of nuclear war may seem remote and unreal as compared to the immediate pressure of want and exploitation. The problem of arms control must be dealt with by simultaneous efforts to reduce the economic and social disparities which feed international conflicts. We in the non-aligned group see an organic link between armament expenditure and economic reconstruction. A token reduction in armament expenditure and its diversion to economic assistance to developing countries would produce dramatic results. On a more universal level, diverting the use of our scarce mineral resources from non-productive purposes, would greatly help the conservation of our planet’s finite resources.

At our stage of human achievement and consciousness, some of the older commitments which were moral, constructive and creative are becoming increasingly restrictive. Narrow patriotism, regional pride and sectarian prejudice do not help struggles for survival as a single race. In the next century we could well think of planetary patriotism over preoccupation with dead or dying loyalties. Growing scientific and technological ability can ensure a minimum quality of life to all peoples everywhere on earth within a generation or two. It is never too late to step back from the brink. To avoid the drift towards annihilation and race suicide with courage and determination would be the most wonderful and laudable achievement.
"It is unrealistic to expect continued protection from the so-called balance of terror."

In the Third Century B.C., Asoka, one of the greatest of our kings won a glorious but bloody victory. Horrified at the death and destruction, he renounced war as an instrument of state policy and began to propagate non-violence and peace. His example was memorable, but alas not infectious. Down the centuries, in my own country and others, war, vandalism and violence have continued, maiming and killing millions, and wiping out entire cultures. In less sophisticated terms, separate survival was possible. In the midst of desolation there was some hope of renewal.

This slender chance of survival in war is now threatened by the growing barbarity and efficiency of human creations. We are confronted with the possibility and probability of the total extinction of the human race, its memories, its achievements and its prospects. The Great Powers have acquired capacity to destroy the common heritage of humankind many times over and in a manner which would make the environment itself too noxious even for those few scattered groups which might escape the initial death wave. We are told that it would take several millennia for organic life to begin all over again.

The international community’s attempts to limit the manufacture and use of
constant increase of Soviet superiority in chemical weapons in Europe. The Federal Republic was quite rightly a signatory to the B Weapons Convention, which was reached in 1972 by the Geneva Disarmament Commission. But adherence to this real disarmament treaty, to date the only one, is not yet verifiable. Due to opposition by the Soviet Union, a corresponding regulation through which nations submit to effective international control has thus far failed. In this area, too, the responsibility for the failure to date of efforts at disarmament is evident.

In 1955, when Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, negotiated in Moscow the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the return of German prisoners of war, and the resettlement of Germans wishing to leave the Soviet Union, he made a statement that still is of compelling relevance: "The highest good that merits preservation by all Germans is peace. People in Germany know that the progress in science and technology achieved since the last war has put into man’s hands possibilities of destruction about which we can only think with horror. After all, everyone in Germany knows that the geographical situation of our country would particularly endanger us in the event of an armed conflict. New measures for the settlement of differences and conflicts must be found. Such measures must be based on international cooperation. For all of us that is neither dream nor theory. Wherever the policy of my administration found an opportunity for acting accordingly, it did so... But if peace is to yield its full blessings, it must not be jeopardized. It must be assured." The last sentence contains the problem that is so pressing for all of us: the tension between security and disarmament. All persons involved with this problem – whether in the capacity of studying the issues, of decision-making, counseling, or commenting – have the duty of making clear the fact that there is a tense relationship between the necessity of security and the goal of disarmament. All of us are obliged to explain to the youth and to the people of our countries that we want disarmament with security, and that the difficulty and the task of practical policy consist in reconciling both goals.

Particularly in an era in which the shortage of public monies coincides with the need for increased defense efforts in support of foreign policy, it is the task of those responsible for dealing with social and political issues to fight for the domestic political legitimation of our security policy. An understanding but resolute dialogue with the pacifist movements in the Federal Republic of Germany is urgently necessary.

Just as the moralists of prohibition basically erred in morally deprecating alcohol as such, those persons who mortally disqualify weapons as such also err – regardless of whether it is the moral condemnation of the crossbow by the Second Lateran Council of 1139 or whether it is the moral condemnation of the weapons of mass destruction by the one-sided disarmament moralists of our era. The paradoxical nature of these weapons is that they are simultaneously a curse and a blessing: a curse, because in conflict they destroy not only the combatants but millions of other people and their vitally necessary possessions; a blessing, because their deterrent effect has given Europe 36 years of non-war, and probably will continue to be effective in sustaining peace. This paradox has its origin in human nature and in politics, not in the weapon, which is a lifeless object incapable of responsibility. The Soviets, as Russians and Communists, recognize this fact.

Their guilt and their tragedy, hence the risk to all of us, is their false conception of history and of man, a conception that claims militant infallibility. But such attitudes of infallibility can lead not only to the destruction of domestic peace but also of an international order which, although not paradise on earth, requires a vital minimum of self-restraint in terms of ideology and power politics.

We must make clear that our peace and freedom can only be assured by balanced historical perspicacity, political strength of will, and military power.

Translated from the German by Martha Humphreys
Two years ago, arms control was in disarray. The U.S. Senate had failed to pass the SALT II Treaty, and the newly-elected president called it “fatally flawed.” The Republican Party platform promised to “reach the position of military superiority that the American people demand.” President Reagan appointed to his Administration a number of hawks who believed that arms control had lulled us into accepting inferiority. The new Administration linked any talks on arms control to better Soviet behavior. Yet, not much had changed in Soviet behavior or American defense posture by the Summer of 1982, when the United States found itself observing SALT II and engaged in two major arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva.

What happened? Why the dramatic change in the Administration’s posture? In large part, the cause can be found in popular reactions in Europe and the United States to the Administration’s early discounting of arms control and its talk of nuclear war-fighting. Basically, the President scared the public. Ironically, too-tough talk about nuclear weapons had the effect of weakening public support for new strategic systems. In the United States at least, Ronald Reagan was the father of the nuclear freeze movement. Polls show that the freeze movement had real grass roots origins in the middle class. Activists and politicians had to scramble to catch up.

The experience of the past two years illustrates a basic truth about nuclear weapons and defense strategy in democracies. The public wants prudence, and rightly so. The basic dilemma of nuclear deterrence is to have a posture and weapons that are usable enough to be credible, but not so usable that they are likely to produce the horrors of nuclear war. That dilemma leaves a narrow central space for effective policy. Left-wing politicians tend to try to escape these narrow policy constraints by pretending that we can get rid of nuclear weapons; the temptation for right-wing politicians is to escape by treating them as normal usable weapons. Neither form of escapism is very successful.

The majority of the American public tends to hold a common sense of appreciation of this basic nuclear dilemma. For example, polls show some 70 percent of the public favoring a nuclear freeze, but when the question is posed in terms of support for an unverifiable freeze which might allow the Soviets to gain an advantage, 60 percent are opposed. The public wants prudence in the form of strong defense and arms control. Indeed, the conjunction of the two can produce a more consistent security policy than harping on the single note of defense. It is a misreading of history to attribute the defense cutbacks of the 1970s to the lulling effect of arms control. As Henry Kissinger has noted in his memoirs, the impetus to cut defense budgets grew from reactions to the Vietnam War and from demands for reordering domestic priorities well before SALT was negotiated. If anything, the debate surrounding SALT heightened attention to strategic issues and defense budgets in the late 1970s.

On the other hand, the wrong type of arms control can have a distorting effect on defense programs. We tend to want different and sometimes incompatible things from our nuclear forces. We want political stability – the ability to contain Soviet power in the normal political competition that occurs between major powers. This requires a degree of usability to enhance the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. We also want crisis stability, the assurance that neither side will have an incentive to use nuclear weapons first in a time of deep crisis. This means avoiding vulnerable forces which we must either use or lose. Finally, we also seek arms race stability; some relief from the costs and risks associated with an ever increasing spiral of acquisition of forces beyond reasonable needs. Specific defense programs and specific arms control proposals often have to trade off some of these objectives against the others.

The Problem of Strategic Vulnerability

Current thinking on arms control in the United States tends to underemphasize the objective of crisis stability.
Ironically, the two major proposals, the nuclear freeze and the President's deep cuts approach both share a focus on numbers rather than types of weapons, and neither do much to solve the problem of strategic vulnerability that is crucial to crisis stability and has been at the heart of our defense debate in recent years.

There is indeed a problem of strategic vulnerability, but the issue has been poorly posed in the national debate. Rhetoric about a "window of vulnerability" has exaggerated the significance of the vulnerability of the land-based quarter of our nuclear forces. Nonetheless, if the only part of our strategic force that is capable of quick, accurate attack on targets hardened by concrete and steel is vulnerable, and a crisis develops to the point where nuclear war looks imminent, there is an incentive for the Soviets to strike first to limit the damage our forces can do to their hardened targets. Moreover, even in normal times, the vulnerability of our ICBMs carries the risk of causing political miscalculations by emboldening Soviet leaders, and eroding the confidence of American leaders and our allies.

In actual practice, rather than technical theory, a Soviet planner would face numerous difficulties and major uncertainties about whether a preemptive attack would succeed. Thus the probabilities of such a strike are very low, particularly under normal conditions. But given the enormous consequences, the United States cannot rest its security on the hope that Soviet planners will always have the proper appreciation of the uncertainties, particularly at a time of deep crisis.

The long-term vulnerability problem — for both sides — is to insure that critical deterrent missions are not located in a single vulnerable force whether it be the assured (but possibly suicidal ability to destroy cities, or the somewhat more credible capability to strike some forces (including hardened targets). If strategic forces have diversity and overlapping capabilities to perform these missions, then both deterrence and crisis stability are enhanced.

For example, the development of the invulnerable based Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile, which will be accurate enough to strike hardened targets, will remove Soviet prospects of protecting such targets by a surprise attack on our land-based missiles. In other words, the deployment of the invulnerable Trident can reduce the significance of the land-based missiles' vulnerability. At the same time, the continued existence of land-based missiles (preferably in a less vulnerable mode if one can be found) helps to hedge against Soviet efforts at anti-submarine warfare.

The strategic vulnerability problem is to insure that our overall forces and their ability to perform all deterrence missions cannot be removed by a first strike. Part of the solution to that problem comes from force modernizations such as the Trident program. But part can also come from arms control. While it is difficult to negotiate reductions to solve our problem in the short run, we can formulate proposals that limit the threat and encourage the evolution of our and Soviet forces in more stabilizing directions. And the existing SALT I Treaty that prohibits anti-ballistic missile deployments enhances the deterrent credibility of our forces by assuring that we could penetrate to Soviet targets if necessary.

One of the problems with a nuclear freeze that is formulated as a ban on all testing and deployment of new systems is that it would freeze the current strategic vulnerability problem. We could not develop the Trident that reduces our ICBM (intercontinental land-based missiles) vulnerability to a second or third order problem, nor would we create the incentives for the Soviet Union to bargain seriously and urgently over arms control proposals that could help to alleviate the vulnerability of the three quarters of their forces that are based on land. A better way to formulate a freeze would be to put a ceiling on the total number of warheads, and allow both sides freedom to alter the mix of their delivery systems in a more stabilizing direction. Arms control talks would help to encourage that movement. Some supporters of the current freeze movement see it as a metaphor for such serious arms control efforts; others interpret it literally as a simple ban. A freeze formulated as a ceiling with freedom to mix could do more to enhance crisis stability than a freeze formulated as a simple ban.

There are also two types of supporters for the deep cuts approach that is favored by the Reagan Administration which became apparent in the bureaucratic infighting that preceded the President's speech at Eureka in May. Those in the Pentagon who favored even deeper cuts than the announced plan were often opponents of arms control who counted on the non-negotiability of such proposals.

Deep cuts are politically appealing. Rather than the intangible goal of "crisis stability" stressed by arms control, it promises tangible disarming reductions easily grasped by the public mind. Not only is there a promise of major savings of money, but the deep cuts would also promise a significant change in the momentum of the
strategic competition. Nonetheless, such proposals contain a number of problems and ambiguities.

First, deep reductions may not be desirable, depending upon which weapons are affected and how they are phased. The dangerous consequence of nuclear weapons lie in their use, rather than in their existence. While high numbers may increase some statistical probability of use in an accidental or mechanical sense, they do not necessarily increase the probability that their use would be initiated deliberately. On the contrary, low numbers may invite preemption or raise uncertainty about the perceived stability of the military balance and thus have a negative effect on the probability of weapons actually being used. While overall numbers of weapons in both arsenals are very high, the ratio of weapons on each side does affect political perceptions as the recent concern over vulnerability of land-based missiles has shown. And certain types of proportional cuts could be destabilizing. For example, cutting the number of strategic submarines in half, given the fact that half of the remainder would then be in port, would mean that fewer than ten submarines would have to be tracked and destroyed for a successful preemptive attack.

As for deep cuts in land-based missiles, the key problem is negotiability. As mentioned above, the Soviet Union has roughly 75 percent of its strategic capabilities in land-based missiles compared to about 25 percent for the United States. While the Soviets have been investing heavily in submarines, and will face a worsening problem of the vulnerability of their ICBMs later in the decade, it is hard to see them giving up the political advantages they associate with large land-based missiles. History and geography reinforce this reluctance. If the United States has been unwilling to give up the land leg of its triad, it is even harder to see the Soviet Union doing so. If that is the only proposal, it may lie on the table for a very long time.

This leads to the third problem with the deep cuts approach – its focus. If all efforts were concentrated on the deep cuts proposal, would other aspects of arms control be neglected? In principle, one could imagine also making progress on other specific and more limited items, but not if they were linked politically or in bureaucratic practice to a non-negotiable deep cuts proposal. It may be possible to devise a verifiable measure of equal destructive power, allowing each side to choose a force structure within a common limit which can be significantly reduced. But it will not be easy and it is unlikely to be quick. The danger is that the search for the perfect becomes the enemy of the good, and all arms control is stalled or discredited. As a long-term device, but not the sole focus of strategic arms control efforts, the right kind of deep cuts proposal may be useful. As the sole focus of arms control, it has substantial problems. Ironically, these very problems may explain its appeal to some who prefer no arms control.

It is too soon to judge definitively President Reagan’s START proposals. As numerous commentators have pointed out, the bare bones that are known may exacerbate rather than reduce the vulnerability problem; their negotiability is uncertain, and many items such as cruise missiles and bombers have yet to be put on the table. Nonetheless, the focus on warhead ceilings is not a bad starting point, particularly if we build upon existing SALT counting rules, greater flexibility evolves in the sublimits on launchers, and incentives are created for gradual de-mirving or other stabilizing measures. Time will tell.

**Nuclear Stabilization: Four Tracks**

But START is likely to take time, and there is always a danger that it will stall. Crisis stability would be enhanced if START were incorporated in a broader framework of “nuclear stabilization talks” which would have four different tracks.

First, crisis stability would be served by establishing a regular pattern of “TAC Talks” designed to enhance transparency and communications. Such talks could be held at several levels. One aspect might include meetings between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Soviet counterpart. These discussions would not seek formal agreement, but could explore ambiguities in posture and doctrine as well as military perspectives on possible specific measures and agreements. The TAC talks might also explore confidence-building measures, and limited agreements on selected problems. Whatever the fate of the START process, efforts would be made to continue the transparency and communications features already attained in SALT such as the non-interference with surveillance agreement and regular Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) meetings. It might also be useful to discuss topics like strategic doctrine or targeting of command centers even if no formal agreement were feasible (or desirable). Existing confidence-building measures such as discussion of naval incidents, notification of exercises in Europe, and the hot line, could be supplemented by new measures such as a ban on testing depressed trajectory launches of submarine
missiles or of fractional orbit bombardment systems. Another possibility would be Senator Nunn’s idea of a joint crisis notification center which would coordinate U.S. and Soviet reactions if a nuclear weapon were exploded somewhere.

Such measures would not profoundly affect the central strategic balance, but they would help to enhance stability in its management. Transparency and communication will not change the nature of the strategic balance, but various experiments have shown that the classic game of “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which each side can cooperate but is tempted to sell out the other, is played differently when there is communication and many rounds. TAC talks cannot transform the relationship to one of trust, but they can help to set boundaries on some of the worst case analyses.

A second initiative would be regular Force Structure Discussions among high level Soviet and American civilian and military officials. Such discussions would be designed to encourage the informal arms control process. They would not seek to reach negotiated agreements, but would explore areas of potential informal reciprocity. For example, one modality might be “three list discussions.” Civilian and military officials would describe their respective defense programs in three categories: (a) those which are unalterable and non-negotiable; (b) those which are firm in principle but which could be altered depending on which of a set of specified actions the other side takes; (c) those with long lead times and joint gains if each side exercises restraint, or preclusive arrangements can be worked out. There need be no formal commitment, but the effects of their procurement decisions could be made clear to the other side. Some of our decisions would depend on their behavior; others would not. Verification would be simplified since our behavior would respond to their observed behavior. While this is obviously a simplification, the important point is to develop a way to encourage informal arms control procedures to supplement the formal treaty negotiating process and not be hostage to it.

A third track to the Nuclear Stabilization Talks would be negotiations to reach limited agreements where they are possible. The stability of the arms competition (and possibly crisis stability) could be served by seeking preclusive agreements which fenced off certain areas or technologies from arms races. Indeed one of the lessons of past arms control efforts is that when there is adequate lead time it is easier to preclude arms races than to agree on reduction of existing systems. The ABM Treaty is a case related to technology, and the Antarctic Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, and Seabed Treaty are spatial examples. Current candidates for such discussions include space-based laser technologies, and the testing of systems intended to destroy satellites in geosynchronous orbits; (satellites that provide critical early warning and communications capabilities are located in such orbits). Neither side can achieve a decisive advantage in these areas, since the other inevitably would respond in kind. And the technology is not so advanced that preclusive arrangements would be impossible.

The fourth track, obviously, is START. Negotiated limitations and reductions in strategic forces, where these are possible, can contribute to crisis stability and potentially to reduction in the costs of the arms competition. This latter concern may become more important if both the Soviet and American economies perform at low growth rates in the 1980s. Proposals in this area may remain difficult and lengthy to negotiate, particularly if they involve deep cuts or difficult verification problems. Patience will be necessary. But if they are not the central or sole focus of the arms control process it may be possible to carry out such prolonged negotiations without their falling victim to the inevitable political vicissitudes of U.S.-Soviet relations. And if they are pursued as one track in a broader framework of Nuclear Stabilization Talks, there will be less danger of the whole process of arms control being limited to what may be the excruciating slow pace of the START talks. The case for continuing a START process should not preclude pursuit of the “TAC” and other limited dimensions of arms control.

Even if the desirability of a Nuclear Stabilization Talks (NST) framework were granted, would it be feasible given the current climate of U.S.-Soviet relations? Since arms control must be seen in the context of the overall relationship and linkage is inevitable in the political process, won’t new initiatives have to wait for a turn in the postwar alternations of American attitudes towards the Soviet Union?

Not necessarily. Linkage can be tactical or de facto. The former is a matter of choice. Its wisdom will depend on circumstances. Generally speaking, it would be unwise to assume such an asymmetry of strategic interest that tactical linkage will often be to our advantage. But in some cases it may be inherent. Linkage is a matter of degree, and the proposed NST framework is designed to take that into account by placing less of a
central role and political burden on the START effort to limit and reduce strategic forces. “TAC” talks among civilian officials and military staffs, force structure discussions, and limited agreements on depressed trajectories or anti-satellite warfare may be sufficiently useful to our defense planning, yet limited in their effect on overall relations that public opinion would accept their negotiation without, for example, a drastic change in Soviet behavior in the Third World. In other words, there will be situations where linkage need not enter the negotiating process if we so choose. Of course, there are degrees of Soviet behavior. A bloody Soviet invasion of Poland, for example, would be likely to interrupt even such limited measures for a substantial time.

One can imagine a range of Soviet behavior in the Third World that would also delay progress, but without necessarily leading to a breakdown in all items within the NST framework. The specific outcomes would depend on how the Administration chose to respond, public perceptions of the Soviet behavior in question or the reaction of allies, and the existence of other policy instruments for response to the Soviet behavior. To the extent that the arms control is the only strand in the relationship, it will be bound to bear more of the tactical burden of response. On the other hand, to the extent that public opinion and military planners want the sense of predictability and management in the nuclear competition that an NST framework would imply, it would limit the tactical manipulation of arms control procedures as signals and sanctions. This would be further reinforced if U.S. tactical linkage permitted the Soviet Union to divide the Alliance and pursue detente in the European context in a manner which isolated the United States. In short, some inherent linkage would be inevitable, but within limits the tightness of the link with different aspects of the NST framework would depend upon U.S. tactical policy choices.

Even when political relations with the Soviet Union are poor, we have a common interest in nuclear crisis stability. We should pay more attention to it in our arms control proposals. A framework of nuclear stabilization talks with four tracks and with informal communications supplementing the formal reduction talks would give a good deal more flexibility to our strategic arms control approach. Reductions or freezes are not all that is needed for a new start.

And yet again the buds will swell,
Nature explode in green,
But your back is broken,
O Time of mine, so lovely, so sad!
And with a stupid smile
You peer back, cruel and weak,
Like a beast once supple,
At the traces of your own steps.

Osip Mandelstam
(From "The Century", 1923)
Common Security is the title of the Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. It is an attempt to achieve for disarmament and arms control what the Brandt Report has tried to do for development. The most significant difference is that we could not possibly have addressed disarmament in a serious way without Soviet involvement, which was missing in the Brandt Commission. An interesting and important contrast too is that, unlike the Brandt Report, which caused barely a tremor in the United States, initial press coverage for Common Security shows that it may have a far greater impact in the U.S. Many commentators were extremely surprised that we were able to achieve a unanimous Report which bridged, in many ways, East and West, North and South. Throughout the Report there is not a hint of unilateralism, a point made clear by the Chairman, Olof Palme, in his introduction to the Report.

Much internal political debate over disarmament has become very polarized around the issue of unilateralism versus multilateralism. The Report tries to span this divide and counter the feeling of despair about the prospect of achieving any substantive progress with arms control negotiations. It is easy to forget how close the United States and the Soviet Union came in 1978 to a major breakthrough across the range of arms control negotiations. It is no joy to recall those near misses, but the negotiations which took place during President Carter’s period of office have laid the foundation.

Risking an optimistic assessment, I believe it is possible to make progress over the next two years in the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces), START (Strategic Arms Reduction) and MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) talks. While a more pessimistic forecast is the dominant view at present, there has undoubtedly been a dramatic shift in what is now being said, compared to President Reagan’s election speeches, and even to the first few months of his Administration. Informed commentators fear, however, that though the Administration’s language has changed, the underlying sentiment is still hard and inflexible. To succeed, the negotiations must be buttressed by a deep understanding of the flexibilities that will be necessary in the negotiating position of both the U.S. and USSR. There are obviously some people in the Reagan administration who are still hoping that the small print and reservations surrounding Presidential decisions will predominate, and that they will be able to claw back a position which is still fundamentally hostile to the concept of arms control. If they do not triumph and if President Reagan, having adopted an important change of course, does not turn back, then he may well follow in the footsteps of President Nixon and deliver the most substantial arms control negotiation ratified by Congress. The kind of political pressures developing in the United States for President Reagan to deliver an arms control agreement – these pressures are already strong in Europe – may prove to be the new and vital factor in the U.S. debate. In this case, Common Security could provide both an agenda and an achievable framework covering the key global disarmament issues. The Report does not enter deliberately into any of the internal debates within democratic countries – such as the “freeze” proposals in the United States, or whether Britain should embark on the Trident missile program. Our hope is that many shades of political opinion in all countries can unite on the main issues which we highlight.

We make a very stringent critique of some of the current attitudes held by governments in the North and South. The Western industrialized countries must, however, resist the temptation to take up these criticisms selectively. We must not just endorse the Report’s recommendations on how to reduce the continued expenditure on arms by countries who can barely afford to feed and house their citizens. This represents a most dangerous trend in the Third World. But the West and the Soviet Union must also accept some of the pungent
criticism directed at themselves. The nuclear powers are seen by the Third World as having refused to grapple seriously with a Comprehensive Test Ban — refused to recognize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was seen by many of those countries who signed it as being part of a deal in which the nuclear weapon states would cease their own vertical proliferation. Yet the Third World is very keen to ensure that the disarmament debate not focus entirely on nuclear questions. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that the debate be broad based, covering the nuclear and conventional weapons races. The total failure of the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament can be greeted by both East and West either with a sigh of relief and a shelving of the issue, or by seizing the opportunity to take the initiative and channel future discussion into more productive areas of negotiations.

The concept of common security links disarmament to development and viable security to growing prosperity. This concept denies neither national sovereignty, nor national interest. Rather, it reinforces the importance of the inter-relationships — so strong an element within the Brandt Report. It attempts to help people realize that seeing the security of any nation in a narrow framework is hopelessly inadequate. The Falkland Islands crisis has been a very good way of alerting not just the British people to the dangers that still lurk in a world in which there is no accepted international order.

No nation-state operating alone can establish world order, yet no nation can abdicate its responsibilities where there is no enforceable world order. It is so easy to criticize the United Nations, to dismiss it or concentrate on its imperfections; and yet, how frequently we are driven and forced to use the U.N. as the only mechanism available. The concept of common security will gain in strength over the next decade. The failure to implement the Brandt Report’s recommendations, the lack of success at Cancun, the deplorable Soviet record on aid, the aid cutback (particularly in the United States and in Britain), the growth of world indebtedness and the instability of the world’s financial system are all pointers towards insecurity and instability. It is obvious that there are no resources readily available from the industrialized countries to divert for development. As the Western industrialized countries’ own unemployment figures mount, so our introspection increases. There is only one source of theoretically dispensable expenditure, and that is the massive expenditure on arms. It is too simple to believe that rich countries will switch out of arms expenditure into development expenditure. To many, the inter-relationship is neither direct nor even apparent. Spending on arms in the North and the South is inspired by fear or ambition; there are no such powerful triggers urging spending on development. We have to appeal to reason and develop the argument that stability breeds security.

All members of the Palme Commission were well aware of the problems that face the United Nations and of the difficulties of reform. Our proposals sought, therefore, to come to grips with the realities. We recognized that there was no point in advocating changes in the Charter, for that was impossible to achieve. We sought a practical way forward, within the limitations that the Soviet Union and the United States and China might impose on any strengthening of the role of the Secretary General and of the U.N.

The area we chose quite deliberately was Third World territorial disputes. We were quite openly selective and said we did not think our procedure could be applied at present to either East/West conflicts or Europe. It is, however, in the Third World that there are innumerable territorial boundaries in serious contention which can flare up any time. The Report argues that the Secretary General must have a greater capacity for immediate initiative. Within the Charter the Secretary General, in theory, has that power, but U.N. powers are built upon precedent. Recent precedent has circumscribed the action of the Secretary General to the extent that he feels inhibited in acting in any politically charged situation without the support of the Security Council. This has resulted in built-in delays of weeks and sometimes months. What is needed is a “political concordat” whereby an understanding is developed between the veto powers to accept that the Secretary General can act within hours in the sort of crisis at issue and at least send investigative teams immediately without going to the Security Council. If that capacity had been promptly exercised over the years, a number of disputes might have been averted. A wise Secretary General, and the present incumbent shows every sign of being a wise Secretary General, could effectively use such an understanding, in the certain knowledge that action need not have Security Council approval, but that any initiative taken in the early days of tension would be supported. In relation to the Falkland Islands, such a capacity might well have been successful. An immediate U.N. mission, with perhaps only a few people being sent to the Falkland Islands, Buenos Aires and London before the
impending Argentine invasion, might well have been just the little barrier necessary to have stopped the final decision to invade. It might have been swept aside, but it is much harder for one state to put itself against the U.N. community and it is particularly hard for Third World countries to do so. This recommendation deserves serious study and full support with a commitment to implementation.

Another innovative recommendation in the Report relates to battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zones (BNWFZ). The Commission does not propose a European nuclear-free zone—it if we had proposed such a geographically based nuclear-free zone, the criticisms of the Report from the U.S. State Department could have been understood. A proposal by Egon Bahr for all non-nuclear weapon states in Europe to have no nuclear weapons on their territory only appears in the Report as a personal annex; it was not a Commission recommendation. Since this was an issue on which the Commission spent hours and a great deal of emotion and energy, it is very important that the actual proposal be judged on its merits. A battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone is a functional zone related to weapons systems. In principle it would cover all East-West border countries, but the area initially to be free of battlefield nuclear weapons would be 150 kilometers on either side of the border between the two Germanys and Czechoslovakia, covering the central front in Europe. Eventually it could extend to the flanks—Scandinavia and the Kola peninsula in the North, Turkey and the Soviet Union in the South. The concept of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon warfighting strategy has at its roots a belief in the possibility of limited nuclear war; it touches on the most sensitive area in the nuclear debate. It contains the essence of the nuclear dilemma: Are we entitled to plan on the basis of the “first use” of nuclear weapons? The possibility of cruise missile deployment has provided the emotional fuel for the European peace movement, but in many ways, it raises less important issues than the “early use” of nuclear weapons which underpins the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Democratic politicians have been lulled for over two decades to complacently accept planning for tactical nuclear warfare or battlefield nuclear warfighting, which is desperately dangerous. Many people who have and are now making these decisions in governments believe that such a strategy is nonsense. The problem for all of us, whether politicians or servicemen, is that we are only able to publicly denounce it when we leave office.

The first step in dismantling this strategy is to examine afresh the conventional balance and the practical steps necessary to raise the nuclear threshold. We must concentrate on inhibiting the “early use” of nuclear weapons—that is the first step to inhibit the “first use” of nuclear weapons. The Report discusses the “fog of war” and highlights the dangers when, in the first few hours of a conventional attack, let alone days, an attacking force overruns a nuclear munitions site within 150-kilometer of the border. The danger of such an attack triggering a nuclear exchange is immense. No command-and-control procedures can be guaranteed to ensure control. The pressures on politicians coming from field commanders would be enormous to authorize nuclear release. The emotional anxiety amongst public opinion in Europe relates to its fear that Europe could become a cockpit for nuclear weapons. They are now beginning to sense that current NATO and Warsaw Pact strategies are predicated on the possible early use of nuclear weapons.

President Reagan made a statement some months ago in which he correctly gave the conventional view of NATO’s battlefield nuclear strategy. It was headlined across many of Europe’s main newspapers as an outrageous “gaffe” by the President. He was castigated for being irresponsibly “trigger happy”; yet in fairness, he was only stating the exact NATO strategy which successive European and U.S. governments had all accepted. Suddenly people are beginning to wake up to the dangers and the implications of battlefield nuclear weapons.

The argument has slowly begun to move away from a total preoccupation with possible cruise missile deployment towards battlefield weapons, with a recognition that, if they are to be removed, then we need a balance of conventional forces—men, tanks and aircraft—on the central front. NATO started to build up battlefield nuclear weapons in response to a perceived overwhelming Soviet conventional advantage. Inexorably, particularly over the last 10 years, the Soviet Union has moved into adopting a similar concept by deploying tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets have repeatedly and publicly denied that their country would ever contemplate the first use of nuclear weapons. But it is a fact that serious people interpreting Soviet exercises in Eastern Europe do believe that these are conducted on the basis of the first use of nuclear weapons. It does not affect the strategy even if the Soviet claim is right. The fact that NATO thinks that they are planning the first use of nuclear weapons is an important reality. Differences
of perception matter. If the Warsaw Pact or NATO thinks something about the other’s strategy, that is in itself an issue. The Report advocates, as a practical response, the negotiating of a 150-kilometer zone on either side of the border in which neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact would have any nuclear warheads.

Of course, nuclear warheads can be brought into this zone, and nuclear weapons can be fired into the zone. But there is an inhibiting factor, even if verification would not be absolute. With the pinpoint accuracy of modern weapons, it is perfectly possible to target nuclear weapons out of the zone in a tactical sense to carry out the tasks at present allotted to battlefield weapons. Even if one believes – and I do not – in the admissibility of using nuclear weapons in order to deal with an accumulation of tanks at a choke point, one does not have to deploy battlefield nuclear weapons with all their uncertainties of command-and-control.

The Report was practical and hardheaded in stressing that one could not negotiate such a zone safely until an approximate overall balance of conventional forces had been negotiated. Those who are concerned about raising the nuclear threshold and battlefield nuclear weapons triggering a global exchange must face up to the reality of what that means for conventional defense. Ideally, of course, it would be preferable to get parity, or rough parity, of conventional forces through the negotiating process at a lower level. The MBFR talks, after nine years, ought to have reached a negotiated settlement long ago. In Washington, in 1978, at the NATO summit, it was agreed to have an MBFR meeting at the Foreign Ministers’ level. It was resisted by some and was accepted only because of the particular political balance of NATO Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers at the meeting. No sooner was the ink dry on the agreement than the recommendation was forgotten.

A meeting at the Foreign Ministers’ level would have concentrated the minds of politicians, East and West, and offered the chance of reaching an agreement. It used to be that politicians met for months collectively to actually negotiate international agreements, but recently this has been delegated to the bureaucracy and the politicians only come to the signing. The result is diplomatic inertia. The MBFR talks at Vienna should not be allowed to go beyond 1983. If differences remain such that the politicians will not sign an agreement, it is better to halt the charade. Then we will have to consider whether to go into a wider European Disarmament Conference, concentrate on confidence-building measures, and negotiate more on weapons systems than on the numbers of fighting forces. Meanwhile, we should see if we can have some return for all the bureaucratic effort that has been put into MBFR, quite apart from the cost.

It should be possible to complete a negotiated battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone as part of implementing the suggested four-stage withdrawal over a seven year period now put forward by the West in the MBFR negotiations. The battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone is a modest proposal. No one should pretend it represents a massive breakthrough in nuclear arms reduction, but it is a critical first step. It starts the process of dismantling the conventional wisdom which plans for a limited nuclear war in Europe. It has one other additional advantage: It could be linked with a chemical-weapon-free zone.

Everyone is in favor of a wholesale, all-embracing ban on chemical weapons. This would reinforce the total ban on biological weapons. But the immediate prospects for such an agreement are not good. The United States has a justified concern about the evidence relating to “yellow rain” from chemical weapons already used in Asia. The question is whether we can take a limited step in Europe which would be part of a step towards a total and complete ban on chemical weapons. All agreements relating to chemical weapons are going to be particularly hard to verify, for chemical stockpiles are very easy to diversify and very hard to detect. One way to help in the verification would be to ban any protective clothing from being distributed or worn in a chemical-weapon-free zone. The problem with this is that the protective clothing for chemical weapons is almost identical to the protective clothing for nuclear fall-out. Yet it is possible to verify that no exercises take place with any protective clothing in a particular zone. The critics of such a zone say that one can exercise outside the area while hiding protective clothing and chemicals within the zone. This is true. But a zone inhibits, it makes it a little less likely that we will see a chemical weapon exchange in Europe and complements a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is a limited, modest step towards the objective of a total ban on chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are not necessary under any perceived danger or strategic imbalance. It is a folly to allow the military and the scientists to talk of developing and deploying chemical weapons. One of the arguments against a ban on all protective clothing will be: How can one deprive the
armed forces of protection? After all, chemical or nuclear weapons might be used. Yet in one of the most highly industrialized and densely populated zones in Europe, is it unreasonable to ask troops to do without protective clothing against radiation and chemical weapons when the citizens in the zone have no protection and would be affected if any nuclear or chemical weapon were to explode in the area?

At the end of the Report is a Program of Action. It is to be hoped that it will not gather dust on the shelf. The Brandt Report was seen as a struggle amongst economic theorists. Rightly or wrongly, it was portrayed as trying to turn back the dominance of monetarism and was labeled, perhaps unfairly, as a Keynesian document. When our Commission was first set up in 1980 we thought we would have to argue the whole case for arms control afresh. It was a most depressing period in recent history. Common Security is an attempt to point a way towards success. Pessimism now predominates; we must instead allow a cautious optimism to prevail, negotiate so that reason forces a downward spiral in the arms race, and determine to use the money saved to invest in world development. This means seeking security at a lower level of arms and ensuring a higher standard of human existence.

1*Common Security: A Program for Disarmament*, Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, published in 1982. Its members were Olof Palme (Chairman), former Prime Minister, Member of Parliament, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (Sweden); Georgi Arbatov, Full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet (USSR); Egon Bahr, Member of Parliament, Chairman of the Bundestag Subcommittee on Disarmament and Arms Control, former Minister for Economic Cooperation, (Federal Republic of Germany); Gro Harlem Brundtland, Member of Parliament, former Prime Minister, Chairman of the Labor Party (Norway); Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Former Prime Minister, former President of the Council of State (Poland); Jean-Marie Daillet, Member of Parliament, Vice Chairman of the Parliament’s Defense Committee, Chairman of the UDF Defense Committee (suspended his participation in Jan. 1982) (France); Robert A. D. Ford, Ambassador, Special Adviser on East-West relations to the Government, former Ambassador to Colombia, Yugoslavia, Egypt and USSR (Canada); Alfonso Garcia-Robles, Ambassador, Chairman of the Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament since 1967, former Foreign Minister (Mexico); Haruki Mori, Former Ambassador to the United Kingdom and to the OECD, former Vice Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan); C. B. Muthamma, Ambassador to the Netherlands, former Ambassador to Ghana and Hungary (India); Olusegun Obasanjo, General, Member of the Council of State and Distinguished Fellow of the University of Ibadan, former Head of State (Nigeria); David Owen, Member of Parliament, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (United Kingdom); Shridath Rampal, Secretary General of the Commonwealth, former Foreign Minister (Guyana); Salim Salim, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tanzania); Soedjatmoko, Rector of the U.N. University in Tokyo, former Ambassador to the USA (Indonesia); Joop den Uyl, Member of Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister and former Prime Minister, Leader of the Labor Party (Netherlands); Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State (U.S.A.).

Every year the nations of the world increase their armaments and continue to modernize their weapons systems. But we cannot but wonder: Is all this effort really increasing the security of each country? Is it indeed contributing to the stability of international relations? Quite to the contrary, the more nations advance technologically and the more money they pour into armaments, the more uncertain the security situation seems to become and the more unstable international relations seem to grow.

Every country faces problems that urgently need solution. Japan, the United States, and other industrialized countries in Western Europe suffer from severe fiscal deficits, inflation, and unemployment. In the developing countries, the population explosion deepens the anguish of poverty and hunger. Smothered by rigid government controls, the economies of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries stagnate, and dissatisfaction has begun to grow. To the resolution of these fundamental problems, armed might can contribute nothing. Today, it behooves each country to resolve its problems of inflation and unemployment, and invest its human and other resources in ways that will combat the sources of domestic instability as well as the poverty that persists in developing countries by promoting disarmament. The urgency of this task for the sake of all the countries of the world is obvious.

**Past Disarmament Negotiations**

Disarmament negotiations in the past have been mainly bilateral efforts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or conducted through the Geneva Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations. Some success has been achieved through SALT I and SALT II, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental War, and the “hot line” between Washington and Moscow, but actual progress has been limited.

---

Takahiro Yokomichi is a Socialist member of the Japanese Diet and a ranking member of the House's Committee on security issues.

Recent debates in the United Nations General Assembly and other international organizations range over many issues, including a total nuclear test ban, a ban on use of nuclear weapons, de-nuclearized zones, the Indian Ocean peace zone, the international transfer of conventional weapons, and the reduction of military expenditures. Discussion touches on everything from weapons to operations and expenditures, taking up all the problems related to disarmament. As yet, however, no real headway has been made.

We know from past experience that negotiations on disarmament can make headway only if a consensus is achieved between the Soviet Union and the United States. As long as the present climate of distrust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continues, disarmament can hardly go forward.

On the other hand, as we have seen in the opening of the new START and TNF negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR, efforts by the Western European countries and pressures from the peace movement are beginning to prod the two superpowers toward more productive negotiations.

The Japanese, too, from the standpoint of their own national situation, must consider what they can do and how to further the cause of disarmament.

**Japan's Perspective**

1. **DISARMAMENT POLICY**

   Since the end of the Pacific War, Japan has eschewed military power as the main pillar of its national security, and has sought to achieve the same ends through a more comprehensive approach, including diplomacy and economic cooperation. In other words, for Japan even more than for other countries, disarmament and arms control should be a vital issue in its security policy. Unfortunately, however, the problems of disarmament (including arms control) have not heretofore been considered among the issues of national security policy. There is a section on disarmament in the United Nations Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but its activities have been limited to formulating Japan’s responses to discussion in the U.N. In the Diet, discussion of disarmament has never gone beyond approving its desirability in general terms.
This is ironic, because for Japan disarmament ought to be the prerequisite for security and stability in its international relations. Discussion on disarmament should include global issues – such as nuclear testing and biological warfare – as well as concrete issues – such as ways to foster an environment of peace in Asia, and what Japan and its neighboring nations can do to reduce tensions and realize disarmament.

Japan’s military strength is being increased year by year. At 320,000 tons, the Japanese navy is the fifth largest in the world, next to that of France. It has an anti-submarine capability second only to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and its naval strength is greater than any other country in Asia. Its air force is also the strongest in Asia. North Korea has more military aircraft, but most are outdated MiG 15s or MiG 17s. By comparison, Japan has 75 of the newest F 15s. Its army is on a par with that of Great Britain. Counting its combined forces, this makes it the leading military power in Asia, and in terms of military expenditures it is third among the non-nuclear countries of the world.

Despite these facts, many Japanese have been led to believe that, because Japan’s peace Constitution renounces the right to maintain war potential and because Japan has no nuclear weapons, it is in no position to enter the debate on disarmament. But disarmament is our problem as well and the time has come to make it part of our policy concerns.

2. THE LIMITS OF JAPAN MILITARY STRENGTH

During the last thirty years of conservative rule, the government has developed the following arguments in support of Japan’s military strength:

First, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces will be mobilized only in the case of a direct attack on Japanese territory and the scope of its activities will be determined by three conditions relating to the exercise of the right of self-defense: sudden and unjust invasion; absence of other appropriate means for coping with such an invasion; and, limited to the minimum, necessary counteroffensive. Second, Japan does not maintain the right to participate in collective security arrangements and cannot dispatch troops overseas. Third, Japan’s forces are intended exclusively for defense; and therefore not to be equipped with armaments capable of posing a threat to other countries (e.g. ICBMs, long-range bombers or aircraft carriers). Fourth, no conscription system shall be instituted! Fifth, Japan observes three non-nuclear principles (non-manufacture, non-possession and non-introduction) and three principles prohibiting export of arms.

If all these principles were actually observed, Japan would have a military force unique indeed among other countries. That its forces are intended “exclusively for self-defense” means that they are not maintained on the basis of the comparative strength of its neighbors, but rather in terms of what is considered sufficient to repel a localized attack of a limited scale. The idea is to be able to cope with potential attack, not to pose a threat to surrounding countries.

In general, countries calculate the size of their military forces on the basis of the concept of deterrent strength, and this, in turn, is based on the belief in a potential threat. Threat derives from two factors: intent and military capability. Intent is both difficult to gauge and changeable; it is most common therefore to judge the potential threat of another country by the level of its military capability, and to determine on that basis the level of forces necessary to meet the potential challenge. This is the so-called “balance” theory.

According to the notion of deterrence, as long as a country holds greater military power than its rivals, it also has something more reliable than simple deterrence. When rival countries follow the same thinking, the result is mutual arms build-up.

The deterrence/balance theory ultimately leads to the arms expansion race.

The concept of a military force designed by definition exclusively for defense renounces both the balance theory and the idea of “counter-threat” force. In this, Japan takes the initiative by choosing the path of asymmetry with its neighbors. It is a choice made possible because, having lost its colonies, Japan no longer holds territories that might become the cause of an armed dispute, and also because, as an island nation, it does not have common boundaries with any other country.

3. JAPAN’S ROLE

Japan’s national territory makes up 0.27 percent, its population 2.5 percent, and its GNP 10 percent, of those of the entire world. It is a trading nation based on a small land-space surrounded by the oceans. Its population is concentrated in urban areas and its economy is heavily reliant on other countries for raw materials.

It is impossible for Japan to wish for peace and prosperity only for itself; only if there is peace and prosperity in the world can it enjoy that state. As a member of international society deeply dependent on the rest of the world, it is all the more responsible to global society. The internationalism and pacifism which
are described as Japan’s ideals in its Constitution cannot be simply taken for granted; they can only be realized through real efforts on the part of the Japanese themselves.

If threat indeed derives from intent and military capability, we must devote our efforts to a diplomacy that fosters peaceful intent and a stable international environment, and to creating the conditions for relations of mutual trust that will help make disarmament and arms control a reality.

The first step in this endeavor must be to strengthen the United Nations. Japan should not only contribute a greater share of the cost but be prepared to cooperate in the strengthening of the United Nations peace-keeping functions. The Constitution forbids dispatch of Japan’s military forces, but it would be permissible to send other types of personnel such as doctors, police officers and technological experts.

A second effort that must be made is to further expand and improve economic cooperation and assistance to other countries. Japan’s economic cooperation and assistance have been focused on Asia and has admittedly been considered a means for securing markets and resources. Japan should demonstrate its determination to promote global development and peace by increasing cooperation and the kind of united assistance that responds to the actual needs of the developing countries.

As a guide in this endeavor, we should try as soon as possible to attain the United Nations target for official development assistance of 0.7 percent of the GNP, and to make it an assistance we can be proud of both in quality and quantity.

The third way we can contribute to global stability is by promoting the interchange of capital and technology. Efforts to develop industrial cooperation can help to resolve trade frictions with the United States and Western Europe, especially in the areas of capital and technology. Economic exchange with the countries of the socialist bloc will also contribute to the spirit of détente.

Finally, we must actively work to promote disarmament and arms control. On this point, I would like to discuss several problems from the viewpoint of Japan’s national security. For Japan’s foreign and security policy, I believe it is vital to have a proper perspective of these issues.

**Disarmament and Arms Control in Asia**

1. **THE NUCLEAR ISSUE**

   **a. Strategic and Theater Nuclear Weapons**

   As the world’s only victim of the atomic bomb, Japan has taken a clear position on nuclear weapons, as articulated in its “three principles.” The abolition of all nuclear weapons is the goal of the Japanese people. To that end, they hope for the complete suspension of new nuclear technological development, a complete end to nuclear testing, and the freezing and reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States as well as all other nuclear powers in the world.

   The problem of strategic nuclear weapons is one that only the United States and the Soviet Union can resolve between themselves, but Japan must in no way commit itself to this nuclear strategy. Japan’s recent acquisition of many P3-C aircraft presents a serious problem in this regard.

   The Soviet Union has already deployed SS 20s in Asia, and the United States has announced that it will deploy conventional cruise missiles within this year and by 1984 arm them with nuclear warheads.

   Negotiations on strategic weapons in Europe are going on in Geneva, but even if these talks are successful, it is unlikely that they will result in a global plan that would include the Asian region. In Asia, China comes into the picture. Whether talks are carried out on a “trilateral” basis among the U.S., China and the Soviet Union, or whether bilateral talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union are conducted on the basis of a recognition of Chinese nuclear capability, Japan must inevitably endeavor to create a forum for negotiations on theater nuclear weapons in Asia.

   **b. A de-nuclearized zone**

   One of the special features of Japan’s three non-nuclear principles is the prohibition of the “introduction” of nuclear weapons into the country. Systems already exist through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty against the manufacture or possession of such weapons.

   The nuclear nations have attempted to establish strategic relations with allied countries by deploying nuclear weapons in non-nuclear nations as a means of dispersing the danger and avoiding a structure of confrontation limited to the nuclear nations alone. This is what is called the “nuclear umbrella.” However, the development of the concept of “limited nuclear war” shows us that the “nuclear umbrella” has grown ragged.

   I believe that our efforts toward de-nuclearization can only begin when other non-nuclear nations declare non-nuclear principles like those of Japan. This would
confine nuclear weapons within the borders of the nuclear nations, and would profoundly alter the strategic maps of the world. Only once this point is reached can we begin to consider establishing de-nuclearized zones or declarations prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations. In Asia, restrictions on the introduction of nuclear weapons in to the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asian countries and prohibition against entry into Asian ports of nuclear-armed vessels could be discussed. Similar measures may be proposed for the region of Micronesia.

The question of a de-nuclearized zone, however, is made particularly complicated by the central role of submarines in the nuclear strategies of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Pacific, the Japan Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.

2. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Except for a few neutral countries, Europe is divided into the U.S.-oriented NATO and the Soviet-oriented Warsaw Pact blocs. Today, most countries consider it necessary to maintain deterrent strength sufficient to maintain the balance of power, and they see all military problems in the context of East-West polarity. Thus clearly divided between two armed blocs, Europe presents an environment relatively conducive to disarmament negotiations and, in effect, various kinds of negotiations are underway, as the CSCE, the MBFR and TNF talks demonstrate.
Asia, by contrast, is much more heterogeneous, and cannot be treated simply as one integrated area. Each country has its own, quite distinct, history and culture, and does not fall clearly into ideological blocs as in Europe. Moreover, in Asia, China presents a powerful political and military force in addition to that of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the Sino-Soviet dispute has created a very complex multipolar situation. Japan’s massive economic power exerts various kinds of influence as well.

These factors make establishing a forum for negotiations on disarmament extremely difficult. Yet, if we approach each task one by one, it should not be impossible.

a. Measures to Foster Trust

It is possible to restrict military activities in the Japan Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk by agreements between the Soviet Union and Japan. Controls might be agreed upon, limiting the scope of activities such as naval or air force reconnaissance and maneuvers, restricting or requiring prior notification of firing exercises, and governing the use of straits. These and other measures would help to foster trust between the Soviet Union and Japan. The resolution of the problem of Soviet military installations in the Northern Territories would also help to establish greater trust between the two countries.

b. The Korean Peninsula

The Korean peninsula is a region on which the tripolar relations of the U.S., the Soviet Union and China are focused. Inevitably it is a touchstone of the conflict between the U.S. and the USSR, but it is far too simplistic to equate North Korea with the Soviet Union. For both China and the Soviet Union, the Korean peninsula is a kind of buffer zone; and the position North Korea has taken since the Sino-Soviet dispute began demonstrates its recognition of that role. Increased military assistance to South Korea would only have the effect of pushing North Korea toward greater reliance on Moscow.

From Japan’s point of view it is important to prevent the military situation on the peninsula from escalating to an outbreak of hostilities. Such a purpose requires efforts on the part of Japan and the United States, and should begin with improved relations with North Korea. This would, in turn, help promote improved relations between South Korea and both China and the Soviet Union. The disengagement of forces around the 38th parallel and the establishment of a wider de-militarized zone would do much to promote future stabilization of the Korean peninsula.

c. The Sino-Soviet Border

The Soviet Union’s only supply line to Asia is the Siberian Railroad. This railway runs along the Sino-Soviet border, and the Russian build-up of military strength (especially ground and air forces) in Asia was accelerated first by conflict with China and later given added momentum by normalization of relations between the U.S. and China.

From the point of view of its strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the U.S. is content to have the Sino-Soviet dispute continue indefinitely. Europe, too, is only too glad to have one third of the Soviet Union’s massive military force deployed in the Far East. Yet, for Japan and the rest of Asia, the sooner China becomes economically and politically stable, the better – for the deepening of the Sino-Soviet dispute only invites further build-up of Soviet military strength in Asia. Since the relationship between China and the Soviet Union could never return to what it was before the Sino-Soviet dispute began, it is important to set up rules for the resolution of disputes between the two countries, including the tensions along their common border.

One possibility that would create an environment in the common interest of both China and the Soviet Union (insofar as their relations with the U.S. and Europe are concerned) might be to arrange for disengagement of forces and arms control along the border.

3. INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE

Debate has been going on in the United Nations for more than ten years concerning the presence of naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Here again, a consensus between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is a prerequisite. However, although it may be impossible to establish a completely de-militarized zone, it should be possible to apply some kind of restraints on the modes of naval presence there. Japan has a major interest in this issue.

There are many methods of establishing such a peace zone – e.g., freezing foreign forces and bases located in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, or establishing separate conferences on security in Northeast and Southeast Asia.

The premise that allows Japan to propose the measures on arms control and disarmament in Asia described above is that, even if it is a great economic power, it is not on the path of becoming a great military power, either in intent or in action. Recently, this long-
established policy appears to have gone astray, and according to a government survey 70 percent of the Japanese people express concern about the recent build-up of Japan's military strength.

Conclusion

In closing I would like to mention one or two domestic problems related to the response within Japan to U.S. demands that Japan strengthen its military forces. U.S. pressures for increased military spending by Japan began to grow stronger just as rapid economic growth reached its peak. Having successfully weathered the oil crises, the country had achieved a sense of confidence about its position in the world. Since the end of World War II, Japan was absorbed by its goal to "catch up with and surpass" the U.S. and Western Europe. As the tide of rapid growth reached its final height, Japan suddenly found that, while other industrialized nations were suffering from inflation and unemployment, it alone was enjoying prosperity. Its products were foremost in the world market - not only its automobile and electric goods, but machinery as well.

A somewhat inflated sense of confidence began to grow in Japan. It bred, especially among younger people, a feeling of contempt for other Asian countries and toward the developing countries; and it promoted a misplaced nationalism symbolized by the boast that "we can do anything Americans can do."

Meanwhile many older people, mostly those born before World War II, began to see that, while Japan had caught up with the West in its standard of living and cultural achievements, its military power had lagged behind. They responded with growing calls for amending the Constitution, which restricts our military forces, and for revision of the security treaty with the United States. They argue that, regardless of what the Constitution says, it was written by the U.S. occupation authorities and therefore ought to be revised in any case. In order to achieve real equality with the U.S., they assert, Japan must revise its Constitution and the U.S.-Japan security treaty so that it can both join in collective defense agreements and send troops overseas. Some people even declare that Japan should have its own nuclear weapons.

The fundamental motive of these claims, however, is "to be equal to the U.S." The chauvinism of the younger generation and the nationalism of the older generation are brought together by U.S. demands for a stronger Japanese military. We must not overlook the potential consequences this may bring.

Today, Japan is under fire not only from China and Korea, but also many other nations of Asia, because of the Ministry of Education's revision of the history textbooks in Japan's schools dealing with the invasion of China and Korea before the Pacific War. The U.S. encouragement for Japan to increase its military power and the positive appraisal of Japanese military strength by China and Korea from the point of view of their anti-Soviet strategies have seemed to relieve the pain some Japanese felt at the memory of Japan's prewar aggression, and given new life to Japan's "military power."

What worries me most about this turn of events is that the strength of democracy in this country has yet to be tested. Can democracy in Japan control the military as it does in the U.S. and Western Europe? Here, it has a history of only some forty years.

A recent issue of a publication of the Military Study Committee of the Self-Defense Forces' Officer Training Academy features a signed article entitled "The State and the Self-Defense Forces." This article, which has been especially marked "confidential," discusses the problem of "how we should act in the event that an administration comes to power that takes the position that the Self-Defense Forces is unconstitutional." It states that "while in principle the SDF operates under civilian control, if it is necessary, appropriate measures should be taken, and it is the proper attitude of a military man to seek the ex post facto judgment of the courts and the people." It, in short, asserts that a coup d'état may be made legal in certain cases.

In response to interpellations in the Diet on this article, the government replied that it does not represent the Self-Defense Forces' official position. During the period of ruling-opposition party parity in the Diet there was a discussion of the conditions under which a coup d'état could be made legal. I would simply like the people in other countries, especially the United States, to recognize that there are potentially dangerous elements in Japan's Self Defense Forces.

Japan is recognized by the world as a nation of enlightened democratic rule and a developed nation of great industrial and economic power. But the United States would certainly want to reconsider its alliance with this country if a military dictatorship came to power.
In view of the enormous risks mankind faces with regard to the spiraling of mass destruction and conventional weapons, the subject of arms control in outer space, an area of armaments which, until recently, did not present immediate risks, might seem a frivolous subject: It is not.

Everyone is now aware of the new situation created by successful initiatives — in the first place by the United States and the Soviet Union — in outer space. The overcoming of new frontiers and new horizons has certainly struck the imagination of people in every corner of the world; but apart from the spectacular character of this adventure, one should also focus attention on its implications.

Some of these are well known: More and more, mankind’s well-being is enhanced by the enormous progress achieved through the peaceful exploitation of outer space. The use of satellites for communication, meteorology, geological and environmental research, cartography, etc… has been beneficial to all, not only from the economic and technological points of view, but also in the sense of greater and easier communications, and increased international cooperation. The political implications of such developments are considerable.

Parallel to this evolution, a military component has, inevitably, also been developed. There has been a notable increase in the use of satellites for purposes such as reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, military navigation. These devices have become an essential part of the military infrastructures of the two superpowers. In a subsequent phase, means have also been tested to destroy or neutralize the above-mentioned satellites, or to jam their communications, and the prospect that even more sophisticated weapon systems will be deployed in the future has become very real. For these new systems, outer space shall increasingly become a natural area of deployment.

For these reasons, an arms control process for outer space needs to be initiated in order to lay down the premises necessary to check closely all possible future spiraling of new weapons as well as to solve the more immediate problems resulting from the potentially destabilizing character of some of these weapons.

**An Arms Control Process: Systems to be Excluded…**

The actual definition of outer space weapons is perhaps the most difficult preliminary issue to be addressed before any progress can be made. Initially, a “negative” approach —one that tries first to establish what outer space weapons are not — is perhaps the most productive way to reach a set of definitions.

Of course, one should first of all exclude those space vehicles which, subsequent to a breakdown or malfunctioning, have caused accidental damage. The case of the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954, for example, which accidentally crash-landed in Canada in 1978, provoking serious damages on the ground and in the atmosphere surrounding the crash area, clearly cannot be considered as relevant to this study. The capacity deliberately to cause damage to a third party is an essential criterion for including a given system within the scope of an arms control process in outer space.

Also to be excluded are those space-based systems which, to be sure, have a predominantly military character, but which are incapable of directly destroying or damaging third-country property. These systems are mostly satellites with auxiliary functions designed to perform either military tasks (early warning, ocean surveillance, navigation) or essentially political tasks (monitoring arms control agreements).

Although it may seem paradoxical, both these types of satellites perform a mostly stabilizing function. The positive role played by the “national means of verification” in the existing disarmament agreements has never been put into question. The importance of such monitoring systems for arms control will always grow, given the
increasing emphasis which is put on verification and on the "transparency" aspects of any commitment to arms reduction. The trust which each side places in the means of verification has been an essential element in obtaining results in strategic negotiations and remains a prerequisite to launching new negotiations. In short, those satellites, which have direct arms control applications, provide a positive contribution to international stability; clearly their destruction as well as interference with their functioning should be considered a hostile act.

A similar argument can also be made for satellites which are not meant for arms control monitoring purposes but which have a more specifically military character: For example, the neutralization, through a deliberately hostile act, of a communication satellite can jeopardize the Command, Control and Communication capabilities of a country - especially with regard to warships, submarines and aircraft. We know how important satellites are for C3, in particular for the United States, and how serious an offense it would be if such an essential system were put out of use. The "blinding" or destruction of a geodetic satellite - used to establish the exact position of a military target - would probably be even more destabilizing since it could put the missile-targeting process of a country in jeopardy. These "auxiliary" satellites, which are so vital respectively for arms control and for the military viability of certain essential defense systems, are to be preserved if we are to maintain the existing military balance. Their elimination should not, under present circumstances, be seen as an objective of an arms control process in outer space.

Finally, despite their offensive nature and their potentially destabilizing character, ballistic missiles must also be excluded from such a process. They do pass through outer space in order to reach their target, but they themselves and their targets are not space-based. Technically, they do not fit into the framework of the militarization of outer space; juridically, they have been and are the subject of well known treaties and negotiations.

...And to be Included

The systems to be considered in an arms control process in outer space are, first of all, the so-called ASAT systems, capable of destroying and damaging satellites in orbit; also to be dealt with are what can be called "directed-energy weapons" which might eventually be developed as military devices of the future.

The importance, already mentioned, of satellites for civil as well as auxiliary military purposes, their relative vulnerability due to the present lack of protection or defense, the ease with which they can be tracked - especially at low altitudes - make satellites in orbit a tempting target.

To actually destroy these satellites - a much more difficult task - a number of devices have been contemplated: One classical form of ASAT weapon is a satellite carrying a (conventional) warhead made to explode in the vicinity of an "enemy satellite" in order to destroy it. Another tested device is an unarmed satellite capable of destroying or damaging another satellite by way of ramming. The case of such a device proves how difficult it is to verify whether a system is to be considered a weapon (although unarmed) and further demonstrates that intentions, and not only capabilities, are to be taken into account in order to effectively ban these weapons. (There also exists the possibility of a satellite being directly hit by a missile or a homing vehicle delivered by a missile. This case, however, links up with the ABM problem, a chapter in itself in the field of arms control).

The United States, and the Soviet Union, have been developing the capability of intercepting or destroying satellites in orbit. As usual, information about these developments is scarce in the case of the Soviet Union. This situation puts the United States, in this as in other fields of armaments, at a disadvantage. International public opinion remains under the constant impression that only the U.S. is developing new means of destruction, while similar developments by the Soviets remain almost unknown.

According to available Western literature, since the late 1960s the Soviet Union has developed and tested - apparently with some success - anti-satellite systems. It has concentrated mainly on what may be called the "classical" ASAT systems already described. The Russians have also allegedly developed a fractional orbiting nuclear weapon capable of delivering a nuclear device on a target after having performed an incomplete orbit around the earth.

The American programs appear to be more heterogeneous, focused on more sophisticated devices utilizing the so-called "direct-ascent" system and presently developing it along with a high-speed aircraft equipped with a missile and a miniature homing vehicle. The U.S., however, does not seem to exclude the more classical forms of anti-satellite systems. To be taken into account, although yet to be ascertained, is the possible
future use of the space shuttle, which certainly worries the Soviets. However, its high costs, its vulnerability, the fact that it is manned, and prevailing uncertainties about its capabilities, especially at high altitudes, cast some doubts on its effectiveness as a possible anti-satellite system.

It is more difficult rationally to insert in the context of arms control in outer space, the new, more sophisticated systems, labeled “directed-energy” weapons, for which a space environment is important. These systems encompass laser beams as well as particle beams. The characteristics, functioning and possible military use of such weapons are not yet well known and it would be a premature jump into the future, in view of a possible arms control process, to prejudge their military value at this stage. The laser (Light Amplified by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) is well known for its uses in physics, chemistry, as well as medicine. It also can have a wide potential military use since the laser is capable of hitting a target with precision, speed, and at great distance. Its effects would, however, be more conspicuous in outer space, where it would not encounter the interference of atmosphere.

Although it has already been tested, a military laser does not seem destined to become operational during the current decade; the enormous problems derived from the necessity of conveying great quantities of energy in outer space, as well as the problems of targeting, make the laser a possible operative weapon only in the long term.

It shall probably take even longer before “particle beams” systems become operative. Such systems would have the advantage over lasers of being usable from earth-based stations given the greater insensitivity of their beams to atmospheric absorption. But it is precisely this reason which makes it difficult today to include them in the category of weapons in outer space.

Evidence reported in Western literature points to the fact that the United States has tested some laser weapons with success. The necessity of basing such weapons in outer space, however, creates formidable difficulties. In the field of particle beams, the United States has limited itself to laboratory tests.

Information on Soviet developments in the field of directed-energy weapons is almost non-existent; this does not, however, mean that such programs are not being undertaken. One can deduce from the available scientific literature as well as from international scientific meetings that the Soviet Union can avail itself of an advanced technological capacity in this field, and it is implicit that its possible military uses have been considered.

Conventional anti-satellite weapons and weapons of the future (laser and particle beams) can be regarded as the main forms of arms in outer space; the first – having already been developed – could more easily become the object of reduction or limitation; the characteristics and effective capabilities of the second are not yet well-known, and it would be harder and perhaps even premature to impose some kind of binding restriction on them, taking into account the possible anti-missile capabilities (ABM) that such weapons could have.

**Loopholes in Existing Accords**

So far little has been done to prevent an arms race in outer space. Some binding texts have been widely adopted by the international community, setting a number of restrictions on what could become an unlimited arms race in outer space. They contain, however, large loopholes which have been promptly exploited.

The most comprehensive legal document for arms control in outer space in force today is the Space Treaty of 1967. This Treaty extends the provisions of international law and the U.N. Charter to outer space and specifically prohibits the placing in orbit of nuclear as well as other mass destruction (chemical/biological) weapons, but not of conventional weapons nor of potential future weapons. Only the moon and other celestial bodies – but not outer space in general – are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the Treaty prohibits specifically the placing into orbit, but not the passing through outer space, of mass destruction weapons. Therefore, not only is the passing through outer space or the fractional orbit of a nuclear warhead not forbidden, but even a nuclear explosion in outer space would be allowed, were it not for the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which forbid the states which are party to it to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space.

There are also other binding international instruments which relate to some of the problems of arms control in outer space, but they are only indirectly relevant to the subject, and it is therefore unnecessary to address them in detail. It is, however, worth remembering that the provisions of the SALT and ABM treaties specifically mention the commitment of the parties not to interfere with national means of verification, that is to say, in the first place, reconnaissance satellites; this obligation, however, binds only the two superpowers and refers only
to one specific type of satellite. Yet, it does reflect implicitly a clear recognition, by the countries more directly concerned, of the stabilizing character of such satellites, and of the necessity to protect them.

In recent years, new, more interesting negotiating processes have been initiated. First of all, direct bilateral talks between the U.S. and the USSR took place in 1978/79; and the issue of arms control in outer space increasingly appeared on the agenda of competent international fora. In 1981 two resolutions were approved by the U.N. General Assembly: the first, introduced by Western countries, aimed at initiating an arms control process by focusing, primarily, on anti-satellite systems; the second, promoted by the Soviet Union, ambitiously proposed a treaty on the prohibition of weapons in outer space (specifically including the space shuttle) while it ignored the necessity first to clarify definitions and priorities. It would be premature to assert that, with these two resolutions, the ground is laid for a negotiating process leading to concrete results; political willingness by and large to participate in this process remains to be confirmed.

There should be no need to demonstrate the advisability and urgency of nipping in the bud a potential arms race in outer space. Although these weapons appear primarily as counterforce systems with no direct or foreseeable threat to civilian population, and although they are theoretically directed at “clean” or “surgical” military operations, their potentially destabilizing and, therefore, spiraling effect has been amply documented.

Furthermore, the costs involved in producing these weapons are incalculable. It is true that costs have rarely constituted a real hindrance to the development of even the more expensive and sophisticated weapon systems, and it is also true that in selected cases they actually should not constitute a hindrance when security and balance are at stake. Yet, it remains to be proven that the development and launching of a powerful missile along with a satellite or homing vehicle (both of which could only be used once) is worth the destruction of another, easily replaceable satellite. And it is doubtful that the costly, though re-usable, space shuttle might constitute an effective device for such missions. It is moreover almost certain that, if ASAT systems were to be further developed and became standard equipment, additional devices would be introduced to protect satellites from such a danger – for example, the thickening of their “skin” or some decoys. Furthermore, a greater number of satellites might easily be sent into orbit, making it practically impossible for a potential aggressor to hit them all. The costs involved would be enormous and the efficiency doubtful at best.

Yet, not only high costs but also technical obstacles and questionable effectiveness have seldom constituted a sufficient brake to the development of new sophisticated weapons. Sufficient to recall how complex and costly the process of “mirving” U.S. ballistic missiles was, and how rapidly the Soviet Union caught up with its initial disadvantage in those sophisticated systems. It is hard to imagine, at this stage, the superpowers spontaneously abandoning the programs they have under way. Nor is it probable that public opinion – principally in the West, of course – will effectively focus its attention on this issue. Not enough is known by the public about the prospects of an arms race in outer space, and the priority is given, understandably, to mass destruction as well as to conventional weapons. The fact that ASAT systems are mainly counterforce devices seems to make them conceptually more “acceptable” to public opinion. It is therefore mainly the task of governments and international organizations to inform, to stimulate discussion on this matter, and to sensitize public opinion to the dangers involved.

For a Step-by-Step Approach

As mentioned, some progress, although scarce, has been made. The most significant developments have been probably the US-USSR bilateral talks on ASAT in 1978/79. Although no conclusion was reached at that time, it seems important that the two states most directly involved recognized the necessity of negotiating this issue and that, having identified their priorities, they decided to focus their attention on ASAT systems. The negotiations – which were proposed by the United States – evolved in three rounds and, at the time, the possibility was not excluded that an agreement might have been ready for signature parallel with that of SALT II. Even the joint communiqué issued in Vienna on the occasion of the signature of that Treaty mentions both sides’ commitment to search actively for a mutually acceptable agreement in the field of anti-satellite weapons. No result was obtained at the time, primarily because the Soviets wanted a moratorium on the space shuttle program. Subsequently the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan contributed, among other things, to a phasing out of these talks. Under the Reagan Administration, the entire U.S. policy on arms control has been subject to a process of deep revision. We have witnessed in the last few months the first results to have
emerged from this process regarding the most important arms control issues. The new American proposals are encouraging. Yet, no major announcement has been made concerning anti-satellite talks; the complexity of this issue and the intricate process of definition and clarification that must first be undertaken makes progress in this field objectively more difficult.3

We are still far from imposing a ban on weapons in outer space, but this task is not impossible and it should be seriously pursued. Public opinion should, in time, become more and more “space conscious.” It remains to be seen what direction an arms control process should take in order to be effective as well as realistic. At first glance, the answer seems to be simple: A global and indiscriminate ban on all possible weapons, existing and potential, may appear like an attractive solution. Yet, it is also an over-ambitious one: It carries the danger of reaching general formulas which could hardly be implemented. The precedent of the loopholes left open in the Space Treaty should guard us against simplistic and quickly-adopted overall solutions. To be sure, the risks connected with “directed-energy” weapons should not be ignored; but the emphasis — at least in a first phase — should be put on known, existing, tested systems such as the “conventional” ASAT systems, which at this stage contain the most destabilizing elements. Although this is clearly a limiting approach, it has the advantage of certainty: Each side, in undertaking a commitment, would know precisely its scope and its limits. A “hard core” of limitations, restricted to existing systems, could be the point of departure for a larger and comprehensive approach in the future. Several considerations seem to reinforce the argument in favor of such a step-by-step approach: the urgency of controlling a process — the development of ASAT systems — which is already under way and can become operational; the uncertainties about possible developments of new weapons which impede effective codification; the reluctance of the most directly interested states to undertake large commitments in rapidly developing technological sectors where the implications of progress remain uncertain.

The participation of these states, in particular the U.S. and the USSR, in this process is essential but the priority at this stage is to create a juridical and political framework inducing them to give, at an appropriate time, the necessary impulse to all efforts aiming at the prevention of an arms race in this important field.

1Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
2The evident loopholes of the Space Treaty have induced Italy in 1979 to officially propose the completion of the existing international provisions by extending the ban to include a prohibition on the placing of all armaments in space, not just nuclear and other mass destruction weapons.
3A national space policy statement released by the White House on July 4, 1982 confirms the U.S. intention of continuing space activities for civil and security purposes (including the development of an anti-satellite capability), as well as the intention of continuing to study space arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems.