Trilateral-Soviet Relations in Transition

Détente – Whither?

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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Looking Back—And Forward
NAGAO HYODO: The Needed Triialogue
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Uncertainties: West and East
by Seweryn Bialer

East-West relations have always been full of uncertainty and unpredictability. As we enter a new decade, uncertainty and unpredictability, however, become key characteristics of the period. The central theme of the period is the fact that the centerpiece of the East-West relations—Soviet-American relations—lies in shambles. The policy of the global powers vis-à-vis each other, which was shaped with great difficulty during the 1970s, has disintegrated on both sides. The United States has no Soviet policy; the Soviet Union has no U.S. policy.

The major uncertainties of the present period and of the coming years have to do with the leadership transition in both countries, with the state of their alliances, with their military policies, and with the forecast for their economies.

The American election and the assumption of the Presidency by Ronald Reagan and his team open a new chapter in Soviet-American relations. Although we know that the general mood of public and political opinion in the United States moved clearly in an anti-Soviet direction, and that the new President has strong views regarding the alleged weaknesses of the Carter Admin-

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istration in resisting Soviet expansionism, we have only a very dim outline of what President Reagan’s policies might be and what direction they will take with regard to the Soviet Union.

That the new President and Congress will increase the effort to strengthen American defenses and American ability for an interventionist policy is certain. Yet, within the parameters of a strengthened American resolve to stiffen the competition with the Soviets, at least two basic variants of the evolving Soviet-American relations are possible.

In the first variant, which we would call optimistic, a state of “soft détente” can be achieved in U.S.-Soviet relations. According to this, a relative thaw in the overall nature of Soviet-American relations sets in while America increases its military spending, SALT negotiations resume and proceed to a point where a possible interim agreement may be reached. Such an agreement may, for example, keep in place the restrictions imposed by the protocols of the non-ratifiable SALT II, while long-range negotiations on SALT III are taking place. The TNF* and MBFR** negotiations, with the participation of Europe, continue. The momentum of the last years of the Carter Administration which brought China and America closer together and pushed towards the introduction of deliveries of militarily significant technology, or even military equipment, to China slows down and the question of U.S.-Chinese military relations is reassessed.

* Theater Nuclear Forces.
** Mutual Balanced Force Reductions.
tions are established. If the Soviets do not engage in new expansionist adventures, the embargo on grain sales is lifted, and America becomes once again a major partner in trade and credit relations with Russia. The Afghan issue, where I see almost no chance of Soviet withdrawal or of neutralization of Soviet influence, nevertheless subsidizes as a hindrance towards relations with the United States—President Reagan’s rhetoric notwithstanding. At this moment, as President Reagan takes office, such a variant in the development of U.S.-Soviet relations during the coming years seems unlikely, but it is not impossible. It is a variant, obviously, which clearly would be favored by the Soviets, who would prefer the resumption of a “regulated” relationship with the United States to prevent the unnecessary and frightening threat of conflict and confrontation. The Soviets, rightly, do not expect that a 1972-style détente can be restored, but they hope that they can establish businesslike and predictable relations with the Reagan Administration.

The second variant, which we would call pessimistic but also probably closer to reality, assumes that a freeze in U.S.-Soviet relations continues and probably deepens. Tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union increase as the United States begins to rearm. The SALT process is abandoned in practice, if not in words, and the Soviets renounce SALT II restrictions. The grain embargo is extended and trade restrictions kept in place. If the U.S. commitment to rearmament continues, the Soviet Union responds with its own increased military spending. The stiffening American resolve to resist Soviet expansionism in the Third World, and the inevitable appearance of targets of opportunity for such Soviet expansionism, lead to heightened tensions and danger of confrontations. Despite the Taiwanese sympathies of President Reagan and his advisors, the momentum of broadening military relations with the People’s Republic of China is carried over into the Reagan Administration and the beginning of a military alliance with China is forged.

There are three variables which will influence crucially which of the two variants, or their combination, evolves in U.S.-Soviet relations. Western Europe’s position between the superpowers is one of the critical and potentially moderating variables here. The second key variable concerns the situation in Poland and the eventual Soviet response to developments there. The third variable concerns the situation in the Persian Gulf area and the possible eruption of crisis contingencies in which the Soviet Union will be involved and which will be extremely difficult to control.

* * *

The new Administration inherits an alliance with Western Europe which is at the lowest ebb in its existence. Aside from other reasons, it was the Afghanistan crisis which acted as the catalyst for a major deterioration in U.S.-West European relations. The differences that the Afghanistan crisis uncovered in U.S.-West European relations relate to both the perception of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and the strategy which, in light of the invasion, should have been pursued towards the Soviet Union.

The West Europeans looked upon Afghanistan as an isolated, regional crisis where Soviet behavior was to be explained primarily by defensive motives. The United States saw in the Afghan crisis a continuation and a part of Soviet global expansionist aspirations. The Afghanistan crisis forced American policy to some steps that led to the deterioration of détente with the Soviet Union.

The West Europeans reacted purely on the diplomatic level and were unwilling to sacrifice détente with the Soviet Union, particularly in the economic area, to express their displeasure with Soviet behavior in Afghanistan. Equally important, the American response to the Soviet Union’s Afghan adventure increased international tension and, if anything, strengthened the West European resolve to preserve détente with the Soviet Union, at least in its European dimension. For the first time in memory, an aggressive Soviet action did not bring the Western allies closer together but rather led to a widening of the gulf between the United States and Western Europe. Also for the first time in memory, differences with the United States and increased American pressure on the West Europeans did not lead to divisions in Western Europe but brought about greater unity among them. For the Soviet Union the split in the Western alliance was the unexpected silver lining of the Afghan adventure.

**U.S.-Soviet Relations Decoupled from Détente in Europe?**

What we are seeing now, in effect, is a bifurcation of the process of détente, a decoupling of deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations from détente with the Soviet Union as still being pursued by Europe. This bifurcation will present a challenge to the Reagan Administration. At the same time, the desire to deepen the bifurcation and to exploit the fissures in the Western alliance constitutes a cornerstone of post-Afghanistan Soviet foreign policy.

One of the major tests of the depth of the split in the alliance, and of the problems faced by the Reagan Administration, will be seen in the near future in the way in which the TFN issue is resolved. For the American side the deployment of new theater nuclear forces in Europe is a priority, dictated by the unfavorable balance of power in the European theater, whose importance by far surpasses that of the new arms limitation talks, or even, one might say, is a condition for new arms limitation talks. For the West Europeans TFN are tied very closely to arms limitation talks, particularly to the ratification of the SALT II treaty. One may expect in this area a major
test of both the congruence of American and West European conceptions of the alliance's priorities, and the alliance's position with regard to the competition with the Soviet Union. In this respect, there is one event of enormous significance that may radically influence the West European variable, and this is the potentially explosive situation in Poland and its international reverberations.

* * * *

At the time of this writing* the situation in Poland is unstable and unpredictable. The victory of the Polish workers, who won the right to establish independent trade unions, and the disorientation and lack of control of the Polish Communist Party have fearsome implications for Poland's Communist neighbors and for the Soviet Union itself.

It does not require much imagination to understand why the leadership of other Communist countries is fearful of the developments in Poland. The economic, political, and social elements that fomented the rise of a powerful workers' movement for reform in Poland are not absent in their countries. Although they are less intense in those countries, and the probability of their resulting in a situation similar to the Polish events is not immediate, the potential for it is there.

Victory for the workers in Poland and the institutionalization of the role of the independent unions as a counterbalance to the monopoly of the Communist Party could become a highly attractive example, thus increasing the danger of the spread of the Polish "disease" to the rest of Eastern Europe. Events in Poland increase the chances of actualizing a potential danger in other countries that to date remains latent, but that is not too far from becoming manifest.

The Soviet Union itself is not immune to labor unrest and the dangerous implications arising from increasing workers' aspirations. There can be little doubt that the Soviet Union faces a difficult economic situation in the 1980s. How difficult it will be is a matter of conjecture. According to the worst-case scenarios, the Soviet Union will face an economic crunch far more severe than anything it encountered in the 1960s and 1970s.

One may propose that the focus of concern of the Soviet leadership as well as the focus of their social policy will shift during the 1980s. During the period from the late 1920s to the early 1950s Soviet social policy focussed on achieving mastery and dominance over the peasantry; from the mid-1950s through the 1970s the main concern was the neutralization of the dissident movement and the achievement of mastery and dominance over the growing professional classes in the Soviet Union—the technocrat, the economist, the expert. During the 1980s it is most likely that the Party's main concern will be to achieve mastery and dominance over the industrial working class and thus assure labor peace. Under these conditions the institutionalization of workers' power in Poland represents a fearsome eventuality for the Soviet leadership; it is a dangerous and potentially infectious example. One suspects that the specter of "Polonization" is never too far from the thoughts of Soviet leaders and elites.

The Costs of Invasion

Given these circumstances, it is understandable that the Soviet leadership must be considering the eventuality of using force to change the course of Polish events through an invasion and the use of Warsaw Pact troops. Yet, it must be clear to the Soviet leaders that the direct and indirect costs of such an invasion will be truly fearsome—incomparably higher than the price they paid for the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

First, an invasion of Poland will in all probability lead to a virtual state of war with the Polish workers and the Polish nation. One may add that such a complex and prolonged military operation in the heart of a divided Europe may become unpredictable and risky even in its military consequences.

Second, the final outcome of such an invasion is, of course, not in question. The Polish nation will be subjugated by the occupying Soviet troops. The question is: Who will then feed the Polish population, who will maintain the Polish economy, and who will pay the $22 billion debt that the Polish government owes to the West? It is clear that for a prolonged period after the end of the invasion the Soviet Union will have to give massive support to a nation of 35 million people. This will create a heavy burden on the Soviet economy, which it can ill afford in its own difficult domestic circumstances.

Third, an invasion of Poland and an ensuing possible massacre of Polish workers will signify almost certainly the final break between the Soviet Communist Party and the leading Communist Parties in Western Europe. In all probability the break between the Italian and Spanish parties and Moscow will become final, and their conflict with Moscow as intense as the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Fourth, one of the foundations, if not the chief cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy after Afghanistan, when détente with the United States crashed ignominiously, was the preservation of political, cultural, and especially economic détente with Western Europe. This is a policy of great political promise and high economic necessity for the Soviet Union. A bloody invasion of Poland will shock the Left and Right in Europe and will unify them in their condemnation of the Soviets. It would probably also bring the ailing Western alliance closer and disrupt for some time to come détente between Europe and the

* December 1980.
Soviet Union. The impact of invasion will be the strongest and most important in the military area. A Soviet invasion of Poland would most probably alter the West European's policy in favor of theater nuclear forces even without SALT II.

Fifth, an invasion of Poland at a time when the Reagan Administration is coming into office and starting to define its global policies will make certain that the least benign course—from the Soviet point of view—will be selected. It will reinforce the tendencies to stress military buildup over arms control, intensify the strategic rearmament of America and the deployment of theater nuclear forces in Europe, expand the capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force, and accelerate the acquisition of foreign bases in the Persian Gulf. It will influence also the momentum of the movement towards an American-Chinese alliance which was achieved during the last year of the Carter Administration and which, at least during the early part of the Reagan Administration, faces a less certain future. The invasion of Poland will create such revulsion in the United States that the anti-Soviet mood which helped Reagan into office will be significantly reinforced and will make possible the passing of military programs whose prospects are otherwise dubious.

From what has been said it is clear that calculations of the direct and indirect, short-range and long-range consequences and implications of an invasion of Poland make such intervention the Soviet leadership's most difficult foreign policy decision of the post-Stalin era.

* * *

Another crucial variable that will influence profoundly the development of Soviet-American relations as the Reagan Administration takes office will be the development of events in the Persian Gulf area and the possibility of Soviet involvement in them. The Iran-Iraq war threatens to destabilize the balance of power within the Arab world. The dangers attendant to such destabilization are magnified by the very real possibility of Iran's internal political disintegration, or of its movement to the left. The Iran-Iraq war has created a situation in the area in which the Soviet Union cannot lose anything and can win some of its major objectives. The real threat is obviously not that of a straightforward Soviet invasion of Iran, but that of Soviet involvement in Iran's internal strife. One can expect, at least in the initial period of the Reagan Administration, that the Soviet Union will pursue somewhat less politically belligerent, militant policies. However, one should not expect conspicuous self-abnegation. If Iran begins to disintegrate, or if there is an increase in the leftist influence already present in some regions, the temptation for the Soviet Union to pick up the pieces through intervention in Iran's internal affairs may be too hard to resist. Such a policy would set the United States and the Soviet Union on a course of confrontation because it would involve the core interests of both the United States and Western Europe.

* * *

The potential for crises and the uncertainties surrounding the accession of the Reagan Administration in the United States are increased by the onset—formally initiated by the retirement of Prime Minister Kosygin—of a profound leadership and elite succession process in the Soviet Union.

The old, ailing Brezhnev will not last long in office. There are indications that parts of his responsibilities are already being handled by other members of the Soviet leadership. It is highly probable that his replacement will be Kirilenko, who is even older than Brezhnev and who will, therefore, perform the function of leader only for an interim period of time. That is to say, after a 16-year period of extraordinary stability of leadership in the Soviet Union, we may see the top leader being replaced twice in a very short span of time.

But the coming succession in the Soviet Union will not consist simply of a replacement of the top leader. The age of the central Soviet elite is today so high—in the case of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers clearly past the retirement age in Western societies—that one can expect in the coming years a massive replacement that will involve the whole core leadership group and a large part of the central bureaucracy. In all probability, it will be the most massive succession in the history of the post-Stalin era.

There are a number of reasons why succession is such an important phenomenon in Soviet political development and at the same time so difficult for both participants and outside observers to evaluate and analyze. Most importantly, the degree of unpredictability and uncertainty in the procedures of selecting a new leader and in the process of consolidating his position is much higher than in other societies. This situation injects a more pronounced element of unpredictability and uncertainty into the entire Soviet political process than is characteristic of its operation in "normal" times.

The period of succession offers a high potential for destroying the bureaucratic inertia of the departed leaders and for changing the inertial drift of their policies. It is a period with a high potential for ferment, for greater responsiveness to pressures, real and anticipated, and for broadening the political process. In sum, the succession, aside from its own intrinsic importance, acts as a catalyst for pressures and tendencies which already exist within the society, but which previously had limited opportunity for expression and realization.

Massive replacements at the levels of the top leadership and central elite, which would certainly ac-
company the second—if not the first—stage of the upcoming succession, will most probably produce political conflicts over policies and procedures, regardless of who the new leaders will be. Such a prospect is especially likely because, on the one hand, the succession will follow a period of extraordinary and long-lasting stability, during which policy differences were submerged in the name of unity, stability, and compromise, and bold initiatives, especially on the domestic scene, were lacking. On the other hand, the succession will come at a time when the Soviet Union begins to face difficult economic choices, when the possibility of satisfying diverse interests and pressures through compromise solutions becomes more difficult than during the Brezhnev period.

A New Generation of Soviet Leaders

The most important question is whether and to what extent the succession and the subsequent replacement of large segments of the elites will coincide with the emergence of distinctive differences between the incoming group and the outgoing group, irrespective of the diverse personalities within each group. I would like to suggest that in the approaching succession such a coincidence may occur. In addition to the imminent replacement of the top leader and a large part of the highest leadership, a generational change within the Soviet elite will also occur; a large proportion of the new elite will have entered politics after Stalin’s death. The approaching succession, whatever the form and results of its initial stage, will eventually involve a replacement of the top leadership and the central establishment on a scale much greater than the last two successions and will be combined with an increased generational turnover of the Soviet political elite. This conjunction of successions in both the broad and the narrow sense has no precedent in Soviet history. It will be a political development of long-term duration and significance.

What will be some of the characteristics of the new generation of leaders who will make their mark on the Soviet political scene during the 1980s? Given the fragmentary evidence at our disposal, we must at the outset underscore the tentativeness of this profile of the post-Stalin generation. This generation entered Soviet politics immediately after Stalin’s death. Thus, neither did it experience the paralyzing and destructive process of terror which continued to corrode and influence the behavior of the earlier generations despite the renunciation of mass terror as an instrument of rule, nor does it appreciate from direct involvement—out of its own hide, so to speak—the enormous price paid for the Soviet achievement. There is one thing that seems fairly certain about this new generation. One of its crucial formative political experiences—if not the most crucial one—took place during the protracted ferment and shock of Kruschev’s anti-Stalin campaign, a campaign that admitted the monstrosities no one hitherto had dared to name, a campaign that questioned authority and established truths and thereby stimulated critical thought. Its entrance into Soviet politics coincided as well with open recognition of the gross inadequacies of Soviet development and the backwardness of Soviet technology and, at the same time, with extravagant predictions of matching Western achievements in the foreseeable future, predictions that collapsed with no little embarrassment.

The new generation is clearly a Soviet generation in its typical and persistent adherence to the cult of the State. One cannot doubt the sincerity of its members’ commitment to the basic forms of Soviet political organization, or their belief that the system is right and proper for the Soviet Union. At the same time, one is not persuaded that they believe that this system is suitable or desirable for developed Western society. If they share with their predecessors a devoted patriotism, they tend to exhibit little of their predecessors’ xenophobia, and much less of their fear and deeply-rooted suspicion of the outside world. Rather they display a curiosity that surely reflects intense concern with the patent inadequacies in the working of the Soviet system.

Some traits of the new generation may appear contradictory. On the one hand, one detects a sense of security that contrasts with the sense of insecurity—one may say inferiority—of the old generation; yet at the same time their attitude toward the Soviet system is defensive. If on the one hand they seem to feel stronger, more self-confident, they are at the same time more conscious than their predecessors of the failures, shortcomings, and backwardness of the Soviet society and politics and less willing to overlook them. Unlike their predecessors, many of them are more ready to engage outsiders in frank and serious exchanges of opinion.

It is a generation that perceives the inability of the Brezhnev Administration in recent years to lay out a direction for Soviet development. It is a generation that deplores the backwardness of Soviet society, the functional deficiencies of the system, and the inability of the present Administration to make progress in rectifying the situation. At the same time it probably stands confident in its own ability to do so. It is a generation that is less likely to accept actual or potential international achievements as substitutes for internal development. It is a generation that may be willing to pay a higher price in terms of political and social change if persuaded that such a price would assure substantial improvement in the growth and efficiency of the productive and distributive processes.

Even had our portrait of the new generation of Soviet officials been less provisional and patchy, it would still be presumptuous and unwise to try to deduce any kinds of specific behavior to be expected from them. The formative political experiences to which they were exposed and some of the predicitions which they display,
and which we have tried to identify, suggest only that they might be different as a group from their predecessors in the older generation.

I should like to make one thing clear. I do not suggest the existence of a new generation of Soviet Party officials from whom one can expect reformist tendencies similar to those of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia. Nor do I expect them to be favorably disposed to the highly ideological, frantic, and campaign-like reforms associated with Krushchev. At the same time I should be surprised if they were not reform-minded in the Soviet framework, or if they were satisfied with the thoroughly conservative attitudes toward innovation which pervade the present Brezhnev Administration.

Neither do I suggest that they will be easier to deal with in the international arena. It may well be that they will be less cautious, more prone to take risks than the present leadership, precisely because they have not experienced at first hand the cost of building Soviet might and are used to the Soviet Union's great-power status. I am in no way making a judgment here on whether the new generation of Soviet officials is better or worse from the standpoint of our value system and our interests. I only suggest that the new generation seems to be different from the old.

The new leaders of the Soviet Union with whom the West will have to deal in the 1980s, maybe even in the very near future, have limited knowledge of international relations and will have to learn on the job. Their presence in the top Soviet leadership, the whole process of succession, and the confrontational politics that the succession and the difficult economic situation of the Soviet Union will introduce into elite politics, will contribute to increased volatility in international politics and will make the uncertainty we face even more pronounced.

During the coming period of uncertainty, it is too much to hope that the world will avoid major crises, tensions and confrontations. The coming period will require a cautious and consistent leadership to guide American foreign policy. Above anything else, it will require the survival and strengthening of the Western alliance. The challenge of the 1980s will be met only if the Western allies can counteract their temporary and short-range differences, preserve their basic goals and common strategy, and retain their commitment to the maintenance of a military and economic balance of power with the Soviet Union.
Willy Brandt

From the Perspective of Survival

Mayor of Berlin from 1957 to 1966, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1966 to 1969, Willy Brandt was West Germany’s Chancellor from 1969 to 1974. The recipient of the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize, he is now Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party and of the Socialist International.

In a wide-ranging conversation with Triologue editor François Sauzez, in New York in December 1980, Chancellor Brandt dwelt on a number of crucial issues for the future of Trilateral-Soviet relations: Détente and the future of SALT, intra-European relations, cooperation between Western Europe and the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, the validity of “linkage”... Yet, it will be obvious from the large excerpts of the Chancellor’s remarks reproduced here that it was not only the architect of Germany’s famed Ostpolitik talking, but also the Chairman of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, whose “Brandt Report” appeared in 1980. In assessing the broader dangers to peace in the 1980s, the Chancellor helps place the East-West conflict in the context of what he sees as the global requirements of survival.

No Political Détente Without Arms Control

In retrospect, I am not at all sure that we exploited all the chances and possibilities which existed for genuine improvement in East-West relations in the course of the past decade. But, for me, the main lesson of the 1970s has been that political détente cannot be an isolated process. It is one thing to achieve some degree of political consultation and economic cooperation, as well as some related improvements in “human relations” which may not be all that important to the Americans and many Europeans but are understandably significant for Germany: We now have some 15 million visits per year between people in the two parts of divided Germany; access to Berlin has been eased; West Berliners can now visit their relatives in the other part of the city, which they could not do when I was Mayor in the 1950s and 1960s. For us, these are by no means negligible achievements. But my point is this: Such a process of political détente cannot survive the 1980s if it is not supplemented by serious steps in the field of arms control—and this has not happened. I remember the long talks I had on this with Brezhnev as early as 1971: We did
not know then that what ended in Helsinki* and what had started in Vienna** would turn out to be two different things, but we felt clearly that both elements—political détente, arms limitations—would have to go hand-in-hand.

The question, then, is: What can we do now that the process of ratification of SALT II—a treaty negotiated over some seven years—has stopped. First of all, I think we should avoid dramatization. I believe one can find a way out, if the two superpowers go on behaving as if SALT II had been ratified—which is in effect what they have done since the treaty was signed. Then, it is important that they address without delay the issues of SALT III and begin, under the umbrella of SALT III or as a separate negotiation, to talk about Eurostrategic weapons. I recognize that this may not be easy for the Russians, formalistic as they are. Still, I think they are vitally interested in the matter. As for the United States, I do not see anything in President-elect Reagan’s declarations that would contradict the approach I have just outlined.

The 1980s: New Dangers to Peace

One year into the 1980s, it is clear to me that none of our past achievements is irreversible: Everything is put into question again. But first of all, I always think it is important to remind oneself that... there is not much sense to our discussions unless we assume that we will indeed survive the 1980s, and perhaps even the rest of the century. Who knows if we will! Yet, we have to take survival as our “horizon.”

And from that perspective, it strikes me that 1980 has been marked not only by very serious deterioration in East-West relations, but also by the emergence of grave problems of a kind which we did not know enough about a decade ago. We now face regional crises which are not East-West crises but could well develop into major international conflicts. The current war in the Persian Gulf—to mention only one such conflict—frightens me in that it is fought with weapons from the two great powers—American weapons on the Iranian side, Soviet weapons on the Iraqi side—and neither superpower is in a position to control the process. (At this stage, perhaps the best thing they can do is stay out!)

Then there is the growing disparity between industrialized and developing countries, especially the least developed ones: There is a growing sense, I think, that beyond the sheer challenge to our moral responsibility, this may well create great additional dangers to peace itself. Twice in my lifetime I experienced that hunger grew out of war; nowadays, we cannot exclude the possibility that war may grow out of hunger—mass hunger, widespread malnutrition, misery...

As far as East-West relations are concerned, the central question now is: When will the two major powers enter again into negotiations—not because they have “fallen in love” with each other, but because they will finally act in accordance with their interests. And if it is not in their interest to wage war, then it must be in their interest to devise means of avoiding war. There again, if there is interest in survival, the two superpowers will have to resume talking to each other, even if the present crisis gets worse.

If and when they do so, it remains then to be seen whether we will return to the times when all important decisions were made by the two big powers only—or whether Europe will be able to have a role of its own, to assume greater responsibilities in areas that are closer to it than to America, to become something like a second pillar for the Atlantic Alliance....

Europe—West and East

Unfortunately, Western Europe advances only slowly, and in modest ways, towards greater unity. Yet, if I compare the situation today with what it was twelve years ago, when I was Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic, I see spectacular changes: Now, political cooperation has developed into very sophisticated methods of exchanging views, preparing joint positions, coordinating actions between the Foreign Ministries of the Ten (Greece has now joined the European Community; I think Spain and Portugal will join this process of political cooperation even before they become full members of the E.C.). We have already seen in several cases—at the United Nations, for instance—that the members of the E.C. were increasingly capable of presenting common views. I am confident that, in time, political cooperation within the community will achieve greater and greater significance.

Now, can this group of Western European countries play its role in dealing with Eastern Europe? In this respect, I believe we had an extremely important, encouraging at first and later disillusioning, experience during the year 1980. In the immediate aftermath of the Afghan crisis, governments in Eastern Europe and in Western Europe came to conclusions, and behaved in ways, which did not differ too much, in spite of their deep-rooted division and the fact that they belong to different alliances. Leaders in both Eastern and Western Europe showed a similar interest in not being drawn into a major international crisis. For me—and for many others—it was fascinating to see how moderate our East German colleagues were in discussing these issues.

* The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (later followed up in Belgrade and Madrid) took place in Helsinki, Finland in 1975.

** The Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks have been held in Vienna since 1973.
between, say, January and July, 1980. Then, during the second part of the year—in great part undoubtedly as a result of the Polish crisis—relations reverted to their old pattern and the gap widened between the two German states. So much so that they now pose strictly as representatives of their respective camps. Therefore, as we enter 1981, I am not very optimistic—I am not even moderately optimistic, as far as Western Europe's role is concerned vis-à-vis the other part of Europe. This can only change if and when the superpowers reach some improvement in their relations. In this respect, some sort of revived SALT process, for instance, seems to me to be indispensable if the Eurostrategic negotiations (started in the fall of 1980) are to be viable and productive.

Europe and the U.S. After Afghanistan—Pillars Askew?

Recent problems between Europe and the United States reflect a deep-rooted contradiction: Some of our American friends would like to see a strong Europe and a weak Europe at the same time—not an easy thing to achieve! If you want a strong Europe, you must also accept it as a Europe that is not just a carbon copy of the United States, but one which has its particular traits and outlook. It resembles the problem that we, Germans, used to have with our European neighbors: After World War II we were told (for perfectly understandable reasons) that never again could Germany have an army; a few years later, we were asked to form an army and contribute in a major way to the common defense effort—which we did. To this day, there are still some people who would like to see a Germany weak enough not to frighten, say, our friends in Luxembourg, but strong enough at the same time to frighten the Soviet Union! As in the case of the United States vs. Europe, "you cannot have the cake and eat it too".

The "German Question" and the Federal Republic’s Stakes in Détente: Temptation of Neutrality?

I get tired—and "getting tired" is a mild way of putting it—of all the talk about "what are the Germans doing?" for the following three reasons: First, the record of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Atlantic Alliance speaks for itself. The quality of our army, our military expenditures, the way we honored every single agreement reached within NATO—we have lived up to our obligations. Second, our allies in the past have signed treaties upon treaties, issued communiqués upon communiqués, telling us they would help in bringing about German unity. Was it all just words? We are nowadays asking for much less than that. We know that, as things stand, there will continue to be two German states: We know that only if the division of Europe ends sometime in the future, the Germans may (or may not!) decide to enter into a closer association—in the cultural field, for instance, where it would seem most natural. In any case, that will be long after my time and must be left to the generations to come. I become emotional when I see the hypocrisy of those who, having "promised" the Germans their national unity, object when those same Germans, in the context of a divided nation, try at least to make it possible for the members of divided families to visit each other. Thirdly, there has been much talk recently about human rights. That starts at home! During my term as Mayor of Berlin, nobody could help me when the wall was brought up—as a result of Yalta, a division line was drawn not only through a country, but through a city, violating that basic right of the citizens of one city to live together. We do not ask for German reunification; we have merely been trying to alleviate in a modest way these human conditions, make visits possible and what not, knowing very well all along that all this will disappear if the overall situation between East and West makes it impossible to continue on this road.

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The South: Just Another Arena for the East-West Conflict?

We tend to be much too defensive, and too little aware of the fact that the "Communists" are looked upon with more and more skepticism in the Third World. Only a few years ago, at the United Nations, a majority of the representatives of the Third World used to applaud the Soviets' claims that "we are not responsible for the consequences of imperialism and colonialism"; this is no longer the case. More and more Third World leaders want to sit down and address the real issues with the "North" as a whole, not only with the West of the North. History, the past, are important; yet, most urgent to them are the problems of the future. And interestingly, this coincides with the long-term preoccupations of many leaders in Eastern Europe: When the experts of my North-South Commission* went to Moscow (and to Peking), they realized how aware their counterparts were of the figures and real dangers. The politicians, the apparatus in these countries, work more slowly than in our part of the world. Yet, from my conversations with, say, Kadar of Hungary or Gierek of Poland (who is now out), it was obvious to me that they understood they had a vital interest in a solution of global issues—world trade, energy, etc. . . .

* Independent Commission on International Development Issues.
It is wrong, in my view, to expect a “Communist wave” in the Third World—this is simply not happening. If the West adopts a constructive attitude and is ready to find compromises that are not only good for West/South relations but make it difficult for the East to stay out indefinitely, then we will break the prevailing deadlock: one where the majority of LDCs take maximalist, unrealistic positions, while the West stays on the defensive and is content to yield as little as possible, to contribute as little as possible. . . . Instead of analyzing with lucidity where the reasonable (and indispensable) compromises can be made on such crucial areas of reform for the future as resources, energy, institutions . . .

. . . In this respect, the concept of basic needs should come first—although it contradicts in no way the concept of human rights. We know by now that the means exist, and what they are, to get rid of world hunger by the year 2000—it is by no means out of reach. Let us mobilize on this as our priority. With regard to human rights, I have the greatest respect for what President Carter has tried, particularly in connection with Latin America. But I think we should always be aware that it may prove difficult (and not always realistic) to believe we can export the very brand of democracy which we have developed—be it British-style Parliamentary democracy or American democracy. If we want to find a workable common denominator, I think we ought to be somewhat more modest in our attempts and leave it up to these countries to find their own proper road to pluralism and freedom of expression. Being myself a Social Democrat, involved in a multi-party system, I am not certain that it is the right thing to export to every corner of Africa.

“Linkage”—Between Specific East-West Agreements and Global Soviet Behavior

There is linkage and linkage. On the one hand, it is justified—whether one is a superpower or not—to tie the discussions of problems which are important to both sides. It would be unnatural, for instance, to speak only about arms, to deal only with one given area. On the other hand, if I am all for raising with the Russians their moves in other parts of the world, we should also expect that they will have counter-arguments. When discussing the balance of power, for instance, we often forget that, from their point of view, it may still look as if they are encircled—a very old fear, that goes back to the Czarist times. America “has” Europe, Japan, China—indeed, in the Soviets’ view, it is much stronger than the Americans themselves believe. Second, and most important, when we discuss the division of world power and global behaviors, we must remember that such talks cannot be based on some status quo, “as of January 19 . . .,” which should supposedly be accepted by both sides. This is not how history develops—and we, Europeans, could certainly not accept such a concept. In short, there must be room for change. (Why should we worry, as we do, about Poland if on the other hand we accept the notion that things remain exactly as they are! Only some old-fashioned Communists in Russia, who believe they are Marxists but never read Hegel, adhere to such notions.) In other words, I do believe that there is a need for linking issues—only, not in a formalistic way, but in an organic way.
Japan-Soviet Relations In Perspective*

by Nagao Hyodo

Japan and the Soviet Union, two big neighbors in the Far East, must of necessity seek truly stable and good-neighborly relations. For Japan, the Soviet Union has been and will undoubtedly continue to be one of her most important neighbors.

Unfortunately, today Japan-Soviet relations face the most difficult period since the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1956. Japan used to be the Soviet Unions' biggest trade partner among the Western countries, but now ranks in fifth place after West Germany, France, Finland, and Italy. For the past three years, there have been hardly any exchanges of visits between the two countries at the ministerial level. Today Japanese bookstores are flooded with books on the Soviet Union, bearing such titles as Why the Japanese Dislike the Soviet Union, How the Soviet Union Would Invade Japan, etc. In Japanese universities and colleges, the number of students wishing to study the Russian language has decreased. In repeated opinion polls, the Soviet Union ranks among the lowest on the scale of countries that the Japanese people like most, and the highest on the scale of countries from which a threat to the security of Japan is likely to emanate.

The Causes of the Recent Deterioration

What are the reasons, then, for this situation? To answer this question fully is no easy task. I will only try here to analyse briefly some major causes of the recent deterioration in bilateral relations.

All Japanese would agree that the basic and most important problem yet to be solved between Japan and the Soviet Union has been the "territorial issue," which has loomed large as an obstacle to the development of genuinely stable and friendly relations between the two countries since the restoration of diplomatic relations. Because of this territorial issue, to this day no peace treaty has been signed between the two countries—over thirty-five years after the end of the war. This is the issue of "The Four Islands" lying to the northeast of Hokkaido, inherent Japanese territory which has been under Soviet occupation ever since the end of the war.

Over the past few years, serious developments have taken place on these islands, developments which the Japanese people can never tolerate. The Soviet Union has moved in one division of armed forces and started constructing new military facilities there.

The Japanese Government has repeatedly lodged strong protests, demanding the immediate removal of the military forces and installations from the Northern Territories; but, regrettably, the Soviet Union has ignored

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*This study, written in January 1981, represents the author's personal view and in no way is intended to represent any official position of the Japanese Government.
these protests and seems to be going ahead with its military buildup there. This is a most unfriendly act to the Japanese people and runs counter to that spirit of good-neighborly friendship between the two countries so frequently mouthed by the Soviet Union. Such Soviet actions cannot but damage the bilateral relationship.

The second major cause of the deterioration is the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The Japanese people have been made more suspicious of the intentions of the Soviet “peace-loving” diplomacy by what the Soviet Union has been actually doing in Afghanistan. The Japanese Government denounced the Soviet action in the strongest language. Japan has turned out to be one of the countries which took the most forthright measures against Soviet intervention: boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, restraint in exchange of high-level personnel between the two countries, and a cautious “case by case” approach to the extension of official credits which, in fact, resulted in a total suspension of official credits to the Soviet Union with only a few exceptions.

In addition to the above-mentioned major causes, there remains another factor worth mentioning: the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China in 1978 and the subsequent development of bilateral relations between the two countries. At the time of the conclusion of the treaty between Japan and China, the Soviet Union seemed to be deeply concerned about the possibility of Japan being drawn towards the Chinese foreign-policy line directed against the Soviet Union. Japan has done enough, I believe, in the past two years to convince the Russians that, as far as Japan is concerned, she has no intention whatsoever of letting herself be drawn towards such a line. Japan has made it crystal clear that Japan will not extend cooperation to any country in the military field and that China is no exception.

* * *

Thus, the Northern territorial issue, the Afghan intervention, and the China question explain to some extent why Japan-Soviet relations have deteriorated, but they do not necessarily explain fully why the Soviet Union (not necessarily individual Russians) is so unpopular among the Japanese today. At least two factors can be pointed out as the roots of this unpopularity.

First, it is often emphasized that the Japanese still harbor a deep-rooted feeling of mistrust toward the Soviet Union. The Japanese and the Russians over the past hundred years have experienced so many events which were not conducive to mutual trust; Suffice it to say here that the greatest source of mistrust and resentment lies in the unhappy memory of Soviet behavior in the closing days of the Second World War and in the postwar years.

Second, Japanese observers often point out that the Soviet approach to the Japanese is often too heavy-handed, ignoring the feelings of the Japanese people. The Soviet attitude with regard to the recent nuclear submarine accident which occurred last summer off the coast of Okinawa seems to reflect this. The crippled Soviet nuclear submarine, with the aid of a tug-boat, forced its way through Japanese territorial waters, ignoring repeated warnings by the Japanese Government that free passage through the territorial waters could not be allowed unless the Soviet Government officially guaranteed that there was no danger of radioactive leakage and no nuclear weapons were on board.

What Is Japan to the Soviet Union?

This leads to the question: What does Japan mean to the Kremlin leaders? I would like to consider briefly how important Japan might be within the overall Soviet diplomacy.

Strategically, in Soviet eyes, Japan is a part of the forward base of the United States’ global strategy. In addition to this, in the Soviet strategists’ eyes the Japanese Archipelago apparently has a specific significance for the Soviet Pacific Fleet, because the Japanese Archipelago controls three vital outlets for the Soviet Navy to the Pacific Ocean from Vladivostok—the major Soviet naval base in the Far East.

Economically, Japan’s economic power (a GNP near that of the USSR) must be attractive to Soviet leaders, who now put increasing importance on the possible contribution of Siberian development to the Soviet economy, as was manifested in the outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan published recently.

Politically, the Soviet Union seems to be increasingly aware of the political role Japan has started to play, particularly in Asia. If the Soviet Union is to engage in active diplomacy, for instance, towards ASEAN* countries, it cannot ignore Japan’s strong presence there.

With these strategic, economic, and political considerations in mind, the Soviet Union seems to have developed a long-term and medium-term policy towards Japan. We do not know exactly what the long-term objective of Soviet policy towards Japan is. I can only recall a remark a Soviet journalist made to a Japanese friend who was asking him, “What sort of country would you like to see Japan become?” His answer was, my friend told me, “a country like Finland.”

As far as medium-term policy is concerned, one of the most important Soviet objectives seems to be the conclusion of a treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation and an agreement on long-term economic cooperation.

* Association of South East Asian Nations.
It would be interesting to analyze why the Soviet Union suggests concluding with Japan, but *never* with the Western countries, a treaty such as it has with Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, etc. Japanese analysts suggest that the aim of the proposed treaty are several: to lay aside and freeze the territorial issue by providing a substitute for a peace treaty; to encourage a "neutral" Japan and undermine the Japan-U.S. alliance relationship; to counterbalance the Peace and Friendship Treaty between Tokyo and Beijing,* and so forth.

As for the long-term economic cooperation agreement, the main objective seems clearer: to secure from the Japanese Government a general commitment to economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, particularly in Siberian development. Recent Soviet enthusiasm for the agreement may best be understood in light of the domestic economic difficulties the Soviet Union faces today.

**What Is the Soviet Union to Japan?**

On the other hand, what place does the Soviet Union have in the entire framework of Japanese diplomacy? Naturally there are varieties of opinions among the Japanese public, but most people would agree that relations with the Soviet Union are of utmost importance in maintaining Japan's peace and security. Japan has an important interest in playing an active role in this respect. Military confrontation cannot be an option for Japan.

As mentioned above, the Soviet Union suggests the conclusion of a good-neighborliness and cooperation treaty and a long-term economic cooperation agreement. It is often said that the basic tactic in the Soviet approach to Japan is to separate politics and economics. In this context the Soviet Union may be trying to shelve and freeze the territorial issue, thus separating the basic political issue from economics, and at the same time to obtain prior commitment from the Japanese Government to economic cooperation. The Government of Japan has made it abundantly clear that such tactics are unacceptable to Japan. To propose a treaty of good-neighborliness and cooperation on the one hand, and on the other, to step up the military buildup on the Northern Territories, which runs counter to a spirit of good-neighborliness and cooperation, is, in the eyes of the Japanese, totally contradictory. By so doing, the Soviet Union itself seems to be undermining the very basis for such a treaty.

By the same token, there must be a firm and stable political basis in order to conclude a long-term economic cooperation agreement. The Soviet Union seems to be trying to persuade Japanese businessmen that most West European countries have already concluded similar agreements with the Soviet Union and that Japan will be left behind in trade with the Soviet Union if Japan fails to sign one soon. I would only point out that it was only after the "Ostpolitik" bore positive fruits that West Germany decided to sign a long-term (25-year) economic cooperation agreement, and that other European countries having similar agreements with the Soviet Union have no territorial issues such as Japan has.

It is a truism to say that development of bilateral economic relations will contribute to the improvement of the political atmosphere between the two countries. Economically, Japan-Soviet trade has a complementary structure: Japan exports manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials. Therefore, Japan has tried to promote some degree of economic cooperation in Siberian development on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. Economic cooperation in the development of oil, natural gas, coking coal, and timber in Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East has been successfully begun and the total credits committed to date for Siberian development amount to around 2.6 billion U.S. dollars.

It does not, however, follow that economics can be separated from politics. Japan has cooperated in some areas of Siberian development, in the hope—in addition to economic motives—that such cooperation will eventually lead to an improvement in the political atmosphere between the two countries. Unfortunately what we see today is a steady Soviet military buildup in the Far East, particularly an increased military presence in the Northern Territories.

Some observers ask whether an "Ostpolitik" is possible for Japan. Whether Japan-Soviet relations eventually enter a new era, as German-Soviet relations did, depends largely, in my view, upon the Soviet response. The Soviet Union seems to have failed to understand how much it would be in its own interests, from the long-term as well as global points of view, to put Japan-Soviet relations on a really stable political basis by settling the long-pending territorial issue. It is earnestly hoped that the Kremlin leaders will look anew at Japan-Soviet relations from a totally different angle, i.e., from a new perspective completely free of stereotyped conceptions and approaches.

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**Japan-Soviet Relations in the Multilateral Context**

No country of the West can handle its relations with the Soviet Union independent of the general political climate of East-West relations and of global power politics. International relations are too intertwined. Japan is no exception.
First of all, U.S.-Soviet relations play a fundamental role in East-West relations. It should be stressed that most Western countries find it difficult to carry out an effective diplomacy toward the Soviet Union without a stable and consistent U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. In my personal view, there is no denying the fact that in recent years ambiguity and/or inconsistency in U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union occasionally embarrassed America's allies.

Now that the Soviet Union has become a military superpower equal to the United States, Japan is no match as far as military capability is concerned. Japan maintains her security within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and a reasonable and efficient self-defense capability. Therefore a stable and credible Japan-U.S. security relationship based on firm, friendly ties between the two countries is essential for the effective implementation of Japan's diplomacy towards the Soviet Union.

In the second place, Japan-Soviet relations cannot be completely free of global power politics, particularly the quadrilateral relationship in the Far East among the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. Ever since rapprochement started between Washington and Beijing, the Soviet Union seems to have been understandably uneasy, fearful of the possibility that Japan, the United States and China may form some kind of "tripartite alliance" against her. If one looks objectively at the internal and external situation in Japan today, it is clear that there exists no basis for any such "tripartite alliance."

However, it seems that the Soviet Union's deep-rooted suspicions cannot be wiped away so easily. Therefore this should be always kept in mind, in my opinion, when Japan promotes relations with China. In this connection, it is worth pointing out that certain Western countries appear to be interested in arms sales to China. Some observers fear that, depending upon the nature and scale of the arms sale, there may well be an increase of tension in East Asia—a situation which concerns directly Japan's security. Geopolitically, Japan finds herself in a totally different position from her West European friends.

Thus Japan's diplomacy toward the Soviet Union has to be carried out carefully within the framework of the quadrilateral relationship in the Far East. But as the Afghan case clearly demonstrated, this quadrilateral relationship allows very little leeway for action. The Afghan experience proved that a concrete step by one West European friend can undermine Japan's position toward the Soviet Union, and vice versa. Paradoxically, Japan's unprecedentedly strong response resulted partly in spotlighting the lack of unity and coordination among the West in its reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan— which may have provided an opportunity for the Soviet Union to offset Western responses. The Soviet press now tries to convince the Japanese public that Japan has lost considerable business to Western Europe, due to the "excessive" economic measures taken by the Japanese Government. Such Soviet comments are grossly exaggerated, but it is not easy to persuade frustrated Japanese businessmen that those comments are totally unfounded.

This kind of possible disharmony among the West is clearly not in Western interests as a whole. In the years to come there may be an increasing need for mutual consultations and coordination among the Western countries in shaping their individual policies toward the Soviet Union. West European friends may eventually find it necessary to regard Japan as their political partner as well and expect Japan to play her political role in the entire West-East relationship. Of course I am not in any way suggesting that the West "gang-up" against the Soviet Union, but I would simply like to draw attention to the need for the West to respond more effectively to any possible Soviet challenge. Constructive triadogue among the U.S., Western Europe and Japan is needed on this common and vital problem.
In a brief interview in Washington, in the very last days of the Carter Administration, we asked Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, to reflect on a few key aspects of relations with the Soviet Union. Following are excerpts of Dr. Brzezinski's remarks.

On Détente:

I have argued consistently for four years that détente, to be viable, has to be reciprocal and based on the principle of restraint. I argued that, unless we insist on reciprocity in practice and unless we react strongly to Soviet lack of restraint, détente would be undermined. I believe the Soviets have shown such lack of restraint—first, indirectly, in Ethiopia, then more directly in Afghanistan. It is because of that lack of restraint that détente today is in a poor shape. I believe that in the future we should be prepared to compete assertively, forcefully if necessary, but at the same time always to keep options open for a more cooperative relationship. I reject the McGovernite fear of the use of American power and the inclination to acquiesce to Soviet expansionism, but I also reject a one-sided emphasis on confrontation and a one-dimensional reliance on the arms race.

On the State of the Alliance:

I think the alliance does confront a very basic dilemma: Deep down, the real question is: Do we all share a similar historical vision of the challenges of the 1980s, and particularly the challenge of Soviet power? In my view, Soviet power, having previously been directed westward and then later
eastward, is now pushing southward. I also believe that, unless our West European allies, as well as Japan, act together with the United States in meeting that challenge, our vital interests may be jeopardized. Accordingly, the alliance is facing a very major test. Can it respond effectively to a threat which definitely affects it but does not manifest itself in the geographical confines of the alliance itself? We have not, as an alliance, confronted that kind of threat before. And that, I think, is going to be the fundamental issue to which we will have to find consistent, sustained responses.

As far as our response to Afghanistan is concerned, I think it was varied, yet adequate; but it was not as strongly unified as it should have been. I believe that some of our European allies have been inclined to stress the divisibility of détente, and in my view the challenge in Afghanistan is not a regional one, but by implication a global one, and it does require a wider response.

On the U.S. Strategic Doctrine:

I believe the changes we introduced in our strategic doctrine are irreversible, because they reflect the consequences of technological innovation in the character of weaponry and of growing Soviet strategic power. Presidential Directive 59 is designed to take into account the circumstances that prevail now, and thereby to adapt doctrines which reflected largely the conditions of the 1960s. The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) really meant mutual assured destruction of the Soviet Union—it was not reciprocal. Today, a situation of reciprocal vulnerability exists, but in a context in which the other side is clearly preparing for a much more flexible concept of war than just one massive apocalyptic exchange. To deter the Soviets, we have to be prepared to deal with their war doctrines as well as their war capabilities. P.D. 59 is designed to give us greater flexibility to manage a war, to fight it on alternative levels, and thereby to deter more effectively the Soviets from initiating a war in the first place.

On SALT:

I believe SALT II is a good treaty. It establishes symmetry between the two sides and it corrects imbalances that had been accepted by the preceding Administrations, in SALT I and even in the 1974 Vladivostok agreement. In my view, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in concluding and ratifying SALT II. I think it would be a mistake to try to renegotiate the treaty as a whole. I believe that the defense measures we are now taking, together with SALT II, will give us a better strategic posture in the mid-1980s than if we did not have SALT II and the arms race continued on its own momentum.

On Human Rights:

I hope the new Administration will continue what amounts to a re-commitment of the United States to human rights. I use the word “re-commitment” advisedly, because America has always stood, in my judgment, for freedom and human rights. One of the very important achievements of the Carter Administration was to have made that re-commitment visible to the entire world. We were sometimes accused of being inconsistent in the implementation of this policy. In my view, inconsistency is inherent in this global situation. We cannot pursue a human rights policy in exactly the same way towards all countries. We have more leverage over some than over others. In some cases, there are other trade-offs which we have to take into account. But inconsistency of application does not negate the fundamental value of the doctrine—just as law enforcement in practice cannot be applied identically to all, and it doesn’t follow that the law should therefore be ignored unless every law violator can be punished. Similarly, on the global scene, the pursuit of human rights could be and was effective in some cases and less effective in others. It was nonetheless a very important step forward.

On Change in Poland:

Current changes in Poland are, in my view, symptomatic of the deeper changes that have been taking place in industrial societies over the last sixty or seventy years. As I look at the development of the Polish Trade Union “Solidarity,” at the role of Lech Walesa, and at the ambivalent reactions of the Party bureaucracy, I am reminded of some of the early phases of the formation of the labor movement in the United States, when Walter Reuther and George Meany appeared on the scene. At the time, some people viewed them as a mortal threat to the capitalist system. Today, most sensible people in America would say that the labor movement is a positive element of vitality in the American free enterprise system. I am sure that narrow-minded apparatchiks, not only in Moscow but even in Warsaw, view “Solidarity” as a challenge. I hope that ten, twenty, thirty years from now they will realize that this was a necessary stage in the shaping of a more advanced, complex, modern industrial society, one in which the industrial working class has to have a genuinely independent mechanism for the expression of its aspirations.

In that sense, I do think that what is happening in Poland is the reflection of a deeper social and political change than some of the dramatic but more narrowly political and ideological changes which occurred at the top levels of the Party in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Poland, we are faced with a more profound historical process. And if it succeeds, it could in effect lead to the shaping of a genuinely workable socialist society. This is why it is a paradox that people who profess to be socialists seem to be most afraid of it.
JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION: WHY "DISTANT NEIGHBORS"?

by Hiroshi Kimura

Japan and the Soviet Union have been described as "distant neighbors." It is a fitting description for while geographically they are quite close, a severe gap in politics, diplomacy and attitudes prevails between the two countries, setting them worlds apart. I should like to explore here the fundamental differences which are the cause of this estrangement.

Differing Views on National Security

At the end of World War II, Japan and Russia stood respectively as defeated and victor; yet, both had suffered such widespread physical and economic destruction that efforts to redevelop and reconstruct had to begin from almost nothing. More than 35 years later, as we look back over the history of this period, it is clear that the lessons each drew from World War II were completely opposite.

Punished by a senseless war, the Japanese acquired a very critical opinion of the effectiveness of military power as a tool of foreign policy, for themselves and for any other country. The Japanese put their faith in non-military strength, particularly in economic power. The man who provided the foundation for this new philosophy of national strength was Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida; his primary principle was that since "Japan lost in war, it must win in diplomacy." This principle, which has been pithily described by Masataka Kosaka as a "businessman's view of international politics," has been faithfully followed by every successive head of the Japanese Government since Yoshida. Partially as a result of the policies that grew out of this principle, Japan achieved startling economic recovery and growth, bringing it to a position of economic power second only to that of the United States.

Nevertheless, Japan did not completely reject arms as a means of providing for its own national security—its military power is in the form of a minimal deterring or repulsing force, a Self-Defense Force of 240,000 men. And yet, characteristically, Japan's major means of assuring its national security are non-military: diplomacy, economic strength, governability and, particularly, fostering and relying on mutual trust among nations. This unique approach to national security is described in the national Constitution: "We, the Japanese people, have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world... The Japanese people forever renounce... the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes."

The lesson which the Soviet Union learned from World War II was, unfortunately, quite the opposite. The Kremlin leaders felt that the territory, power and sphere of influence of the Soviet Union—the vanguard socialist state—had been vastly expanded, and its international

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authority increased, all through the achievements of the victorious Red Army.

The Kremlin’s devotion to military power by no means began at the end of World War II. A perusal of the works of Lenin and Stalin shows a pervasive stress on military power. Bolshevik leaders drew on the tradition of terrorism which was the legacy of Czarist Russia, tying it to the Marxist belief that violence is the midwife of revolution, and strengthening it through the sophisticated developments of modern military science. This trend, which existed even before World War II, was merely amplified by the experience of the war and by a combination of factors after it ended. These post-war developments included

— the Soviet Union’s successful development of nuclear weapons, making it a superpower equal in military strength to America;
— the tendency of U.S. leaders, under pressure from mistaken public opinion, to overestimate the significance of Soviet military power;
— Soviet recognition that the Soviet Union had nothing in the non-military realm with which to demonstrate its superiority to the world, since Soviet-style socialist ideology had decreased in appeal, the “socialist” economy stagnated and Soviet culture had withered with the exile of the new generation of writers and other artists;
— the escalation of political displays of power growing out of the nuclear stalemate; and
— the formation of a political-military complex within the Soviet Union.

Under these conditions, the Kremlin clung tightly to its outmoded devotion to military power, buoying itself up by the constant expansion of its forces. This trend continues today.

Differing Views on Territory

The fundamental differences between the Soviet Union and Japan in world view and, in particular, in regard to the right means of settling international disputes, leads me to the second major parting of the ways between these two countries: a different outlook on national territory. I shall emphasize the following three points.

The first concerns the concept of so-called “inalienable” or “inherent” territory. We Japanese believe in the concept of “inalienable territory,” meaning territory that has belonged to a nation from ancient times without ever becoming the possession of another nation. Tokyo has consistently justified its demands for the return of the Northern Territories—the Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands—on the basis of this core concept. It naturally believes that the Soviet Union is bound by international law to return the islands to Japan. It holds that the four Northern Islands were discovered, settled and permanently populated by Japanese and that they have always been under Japanese jurisdiction. Furthermore, it argues, they are not territories taken from other countries, and were described as areas rightfully claimed by Japan in the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Shimoda (1855), the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875) and the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951).

For its part, the Soviet Union has its own concept of “inalienable territory.” Soviet scholars assert a Soviet right to the Northern Territories because the Russians were the first to discover and permanently settle on Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Moscow has a different concept of “inalienable territory” from that of Japan. This concept is founded on the Russian/Soviet people’s peculiar view of territory. The Soviet Union, though it embraces a far-flung territory, is not blessed with any sort of natural barriers, and its existence has been maintained only through constant vigilance against the incursions of foreign enemies. When it failed to protect itself against the foreign invaders, it was forced to forfeit territory and, when it succeeded, it usually managed to expand its territory. For a people reared under such circumstances, it is only natural that there should be no such thing as “inalienable” territory as defined by Japan or a respect for an unchanging, immovable map. For the Soviets, “territory” embodies the results of conflicts between neighboring countries. It naturally expands and contracts, according to what George Kennan calls an “elastic” concept of territory.

My second point is that the question “What determines national boundaries?” evokes quite different answers from the Japanese and the Soviets. The Japanese believe that national boundaries can be changed only through consensus on all issues, reached through peaceful discussion and negotiation based on international law. This is a position based on pure legal theory which emphasizes dialogue and respect for treaties and international principles. Throughout the post-war period, Tokyo has adhered to this peaceful approach in its efforts vis-à-vis Moscow to have the Northern Territories returned. The Japanese Government has emphasized the principle of non-expansion of territories which the allied powers agreed to in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. It also has stressed that, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, Japan was required to surrender only those territories which were described in the Cairo Declaration (1943) as having been “taken by violence and greed.” Moreover, although not a participant and not legally bound in any way, Japan has stressed the importance of the Yalta agreements between the U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

While the Soviet Union still refuses to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan continues to assert that it is willing to conclude a bilateral peace treaty with the Soviet Union and resolve the territorial issue. Tokyo has also made many attempts to raise the Northern Territo-
ries issue at the United Nations and before the World Court.

Meanwhile, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the territorial issue with Japan has already been resolved—it does not exist! The Soviets refuse to discuss the matter, stating that it is not among the unresolved problems remaining from the time of World War II. If the Japanese want to raise the territorial issue, there is, in the eyes of the Soviets, no need to even sit down at the negotiating table. It is on these grounds that the Soviet Union rebuts the Japanese view. However, the persuasiveness of its arguments is severely damaged when it invokes the Yalta agreement and the San Francisco Peace Treaty, bringing it face to face with Japan's own counter-arguments mentioned above. Recently, the Soviet Union has begun to put stress less on the individual agreements and treaties signed in the wake of World War II than on the war as a whole. In other words, they assert, the stability of the international order would not benefit from any changes of the status quo as it stood at the end of World War II. The Russians argue that national boundaries as they were then are irreversible and inviolable. A close look at the Kremlin's argument, however, shows that it boils down to the fact that the Soviets are believers in the famous maxim of German geopolitician Haushofer: "Boundaries are fighting places rather than legal norms of decision."

The third important contrast between Tokyo and Moscow concerns the way the two nations value—and the significance they attach to—the Northern Territories. Why is it that the two countries cling so tenaciously to these small islands in the northern seas, even at the expense of benefits they might otherwise enjoy?

The meaning the Japanese attach to the Northern Territories is best described as psychological and symbolic. The desire to close the book on the story of World War II through the return of these “inherent territories” is strong. As the late Prime Minister Eisaku Sato put it: “The post-war period will not end until the Northern Territories have been returned.” Through unceasing and painstaking efforts, the Japanese have succeeded in banishing almost all trace of the disgrace they suffered for having foolishly given countenance to militarism—a mistake which led to defeat in war for the first time in the nation's history. Sato’s appeal serves as a reminder to the Japanese that one task still remains.

Furthermore we hope, through the return of the Northern Territories, to demonstrate the validity of our policy of “diplomacy of trust.” The Soviet Union has shown no interest in this diplomacy of trust, Japan's major foreign policy line since the end of World War II. This Communist giant is the country the Japanese most fear and consider their greatest potential enemy. Security for Japan cannot be assured if it does not get along with this giant in the North. Yet the situation cannot be settled by unilateral cooperativeness on the part of Japan. Japan hopes that the Soviet Union, a nation much stronger than itself, will be the first to act, demonstrating that it is a good neighbor with which Japan can have trusting and constructive relations. Thus, as evidence of its good intentions or as a symbol of the opening of neighborly relations between Tokyo and Moscow, the Soviet Union should return the Northern Territories.

On the other hand, the major reason why the Kremlin will not assent to the return of the Northern Islands can be assumed to lie in the value the region holds in terms of Soviet military strategy. The Northern Islands are situated at the very point which controls passage from the Pacific Ocean into the Sea of Okhotsk. On two occasions (1952 and 1964), Nikita Krushchev unintentionally revealed the Soviets' real interest in the area. To a Japanese delegation of newspapermen and later to some members of the Japanese Diet, he declared: "It should be kept in mind that, for us, these islands are of small economic importance but of great strategic and defensive importance." There are signs that the Brezhnev Government has plans to construct a huge military-industrial complex in the near future along the Sea of Okhotsk, spanning Siberia, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, and that the project is progressing steadily. SLBMs* already based in the Sea of Okhotsk region have a shooting range that covers almost every part of the United States. The American radar fence is fully equipped to track all Soviet nuclear-powered submarines with SLBMs; therefore, in order to prevent such tracking, it is vital to the Soviets that they turn the Sea of Okhotsk into an inland sea for themselves alone. Above anything else, it was with the aim of making the Sea of Okhotsk a sanctuary that the Soviet Union has deployed ground troops on three islands in the Northern Territories—Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan—as was confirmed in 1979. Thus, unless some very unpredictable situation were to develop, it is very difficult to imagine that the Kremlin leaders will, of their own accord, discard territories of such great military and strategic importance.

Before concluding, let me summarize several relevant opinions of other writers and respond to each.

* Many argue that the issue of the Northern Territories is the greatest barrier to harmonious Soviet-Japan relations and that it prevents the two nations from becoming good neighbors. Both the Japanese Government and people seem to consider the “Northern Territory” issue to be the biggest thorn in relations with the Soviets. While the Kremlin leaders take the position that no territorial issue exists between Moscow and Tokyo, they too are forced to admit that the territorial issue greatly hampers neighborly relations with Japan, since the Japanese side maintains that the “illegal and artificially created territorial issue” obstructs Soviet-Japanese relations. I would disagree with this, for the

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* Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles.
territorial issue is not responsible for the stalemate in Soviet-Japanese relations. To test this assertion, let us surmise that the Kremlin were to decide immediately to return the Northern Islands to Japan. In that event, Soviet-Japanese relations would certainly be greatly improved. Yet it would be overly optimistic to presume that all the friction between the two countries would be automatically wiped away, that Tokyo-Moscow relations would suddenly become rosy, and that conflicts or other problems would not occur again. In my view, what really obstructs Soviet-Japanese relations is the great disparity in the ways of life of our two peoples since the end of World War II—especially in their attitude towards security and the means of solving international disputes. The Northern Territories issue is merely a spin-off from those fundamental differences. Only realizing this can we understand why the Japanese Government’s demands of the Soviet Union became two in December 1979: In addition to the existing demand for the return of the Northern Islands, Japan insisted that improved relations could not begin until the Soviets withdrew their troops from Afghanistan. These two demands have the same origin: Japan’s broad concern with its security. Without an appreciation of this, it is difficult to understand why Japan is so nervous—almost to the point of paranoia—over Soviet actions toward a country far away in the Middle East.

- Many specialists in international relations point out that unbalanced military strength between nations complicates relations, making negotiations especially difficult. Robert Straus-Hupe and Stephan T. Rossny, for example, stated: “Negotiations will be the more successful the less disparity there is in military strength.” And Dean Acheson wrote, “As military inequality is reduced, negotiation becomes possible.” Citing these statements, Michael Blaker, too, stressed that a roughly equal power relationship between negotiating countries is the first prerequisite to success in international negotiations.

The importance of military parity seems a reasonable explanation for the deadlock in relations between Tokyo and Moscow. In gross economic production, the Soviet Union and Japan are almost equal, standing second only to the U.S. But the tremendous imbalance in military strength is obvious to anyone. The total number of Soviet troops is 3.6 million as against Japan’s 0.24 million. In military expenditures the Soviet Union ranks first in the world, while Japan is eighth. The Soviets spend 14 percent of their gross national product for military expenses; the Japanese, 0.9 percent.

However, a mere quantitative comparison of military strength is less significant than the difference between the two nations in their outlooks on security, which lies at the root of the military disparity. What counts most is the fundamental attitude toward armament, for it is what conditions the actual size of military strength. We must realize that, like the Northern Territories issue, the military disparity is only the visible tip of an iceberg; it is crucial that we find out and explain what lies beneath.

- Among Japanese writers there are those who try to revise in a more radical fashion than I do, or even totally reject, the statements of Western specialists in international politics which I have cited above. Some Japanese political scientists declare emphatically that the most effective security measure Japan can take is “military imbalance,” i.e., to maintain security through armaments that neither surpass nor equal those of other countries. Some say that the best way to facilitate reciprocal and interdependent relations with the Soviet Union, Japan’s potential enemy, is through commerce, economic or technological cooperation, cultural exchange, etc. The common characteristic of these political scientists is the diminished importance they attach to “strength” as an effective element in security and international negotiations. Instead they emphasize diplomacy, economic power, governability, leadership, national unity, adjustment of differences between nations concerned, and so on.

In conclusion, rather than examine and criticize these views in detail, let me simply stress one point in the context of what has been discussed above. The attempt by Japanese political scientists to formulate a unique Japanese view on security should not be discouraged; rather, it should receive all our support. However, on questions of security and in all negotiations, there is always another nation involved. If that nation does not accept Japan’s unique view, the limitations of that view become manifest no matter how good it may sound. If one persists in a view that is so limited, he becomes the victim of wishful thinking and one-sided judgment. This kind of one-sided thinking is another major impediment to Soviet-Japanese relations. Indeed, the views of Western specialists should perhaps be modified as follows: What makes negotiations difficult is less military disparity than the blind, self-righteous belief in one’s own outlook, as well as any fundamental divergence in thinking with regard to the question of “strength.”

In that sense, it should be stressed again that what impedes Soviet-Japanese negotiations and hinders relations between the two nations is not so much the issue of the Northern Territories or the Soviet increase in military strength, but a deep discrepancy in the way the Japanese and the Soviets perceive and understand their world and the convictions they hold. I believe that the current deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations is not a priori something that will never improve, but part of a historical process. Therefore, a good possibility exists that Tokyo and Moscow can become good neighbors—if only the two nations can modify their present attitudes.
François de Rose

How to Respond to Moscow

Exceptionally, we reproduce here large excerpts from an interview with François de Rose which originally appeared in the Paris weekly magazine L'Express (January 31, 1981 issue).

A member of the Trilateral Commission—and a past contributor to Trialogue—François de Rose served as France's Ambassador to NATO from 1970 to 1975. One of the most respected strategic experts in Europe, he is the author of La France et la Défense de l'Europe (Paris, 1976).

The interview was conducted for L'Express by Jérôme Dumoulin and Sophie Lannes. The selection of the following excerpts, translation and subtitles are Trialogue's.

In addition, Ambassador de Rose slightly revised and amplified some of his comments for publication in this Trialogue.


If you look at demography (the billions of people who starve, the tens of millions who literally die of hunger) the East-West conflict may look like an anachronistic preoccupation of the industrialized countries—these countries which will soon make up less than 20 percent of the world population and still own most of its wealth. And yet, we do face a conflict . . .

. . . The Soviet Union has a strategy—the West does not. Moscow views world problems from the perspective of a confrontation (not necessarily an open conflict) which, for ideological and political reasons, it deems to be in the nature of things. For the Soviets, there is an absolute incompatibility between their system—which they think is destined to dominate the world—and the Western system. Be it in the political, military, cultural or geopolitical field, everything is geared to this confrontation so that in a crisis, when the two opponents look at each other eyeball to eyeball, the West should be the first to blink. In the West, on the contrary, only military policy is seen from this perspective of confrontation. Otherwise, Western policy is seen within the broad framework of détente—or at least such was the case until very, very recently.

Another important observation on Soviet strategy: What the Soviet Union lacked until now was economic leverage. It has acquired precisely such leverage by its invasion of Afghanistan—a half-hour flight away from the Straits of Hormuz: In a crisis, the Soviet Union is thereby in a position to threaten the oil supplies of the Western countries. When these same countries plan, as they now do, to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union over the building of a gas pipeline which is to bring from 40 to 50 billion cubic meters of gas to Western Europe—making France and the Federal Republic of Germany dependent on the USSR for some 30 percent of their gas consumption—they literally agree to enchain themselves.
Détente vs. Cold War: False Dilemma

I think it is recognized nowadays that détente is not perceived in the same fashion in the West and in the East. The Western countries have long wondered what would be the outcome of the [1975] Helsinki Conference for security and cooperation in Europe. There used to be two schools: Some argued that contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union should be multiplied, “because such contacts will force the Soviet Union to open up, and because in the end the free regimes would have the upper hand in influencing the totalitarian regimes.” Others argued that such overtures are fraught with danger, because they will make it “all the more difficult to justify in the eyes of public opinion in Europe defense efforts which will then be seen as contradicting the spirit of détente.” The least one can say is that détente—which was supposed to lead to entente and cooperation—has not answered the hopes that were placed in it.

[If the word ‘détente’ is now going out of fashion], so much the better. Yet, only a few months ago, the official position of Western governments—not only that of the French Government—could be summarized as follows: “There is no alternative to the policy of détente.” It is a disastrous formulation—one which implies clearly that, whatever the Soviet Union does, we are condemned to pursue such a policy of détente. In other words, it is as if we had lost vis-à-vis Moscow the independence which some of us so vehemently claim vis-à-vis our own allies. This could not make sense.

After Afghanistan, and in view of the evolution of Soviet strategy, I do not see how the West could continue to expand systematically economic, cultural and political relations with countries whose concept of détente accommodates itself perfectly to open challenges of Western positions, while somehow the West would not be entitled to take countermeasures. I think it is imperative that we modify our vocabulary.

Nobody is condemned to choose between détente and cold war. Of course, we do have to pursue relations with Eastern countries—if only to keep open the possibilities of evolution. Yet we have to place these relations within their true context, i.e., today’s global situation, and the true nature of the Soviet Union, which, besides pursuing its national interest as every state has the duty to do, is also something different—“a conspiracy which advances under the guise of a state,” as it has been said . . .

* * *

[In re-assessing détente], we in the West must look at the similarities and differences between the world situation at the time when the idea of détente was launched and today’s situation. Our strategy—if indeed we decide to adopt one—must stem from such an analysis. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the military situation was characterized by U.S. nuclear superiority and Soviet conventional superiority—thereby creating a “balance of imbalances.” In addition, the dollar was strong, the awareness of the problems of the Third World was still minimal and, within Europe, the Federal Republic was wholly aligned with American policy. Today, we are witnessing the end of this “balance of imbalances”: America’s strategic superiority has disappeared, Moscow is now dominant in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe as it is, obviously, in conventional arms. Within Europe, the Federal Republic is strongly committed to Ostpolitik. For a long time, we thought it would be a mistake to ask West Germany to choose between Paris and Washington. Today, there are politicians in Germany who think they should not be asked to choose between Ostpolitik and the policy of Western solidarity.

The Federal Republic and the Alliance

That is not to say, and I do not believe at all, that the Federal Republic of Germany is about to face a choice between Moscow and Washington; yet Moscow and the German Democratic Republic now have considerable leverage upon public opinion and the economy in the Federal Republic, a leverage that the latter cannot ignore. This is one of the consequences of Helsinki.

We have to understand that the key to the Soviets’ policy in Europe is their policy towards Germany, and we are beginning to see what this entails.

First, we must understand the constraints of German policy. Having long criticized the Federal Republic of Germany for being “the best pupil in the Atlantic classroom,” we French are in no position to criticize an evolution for which we are at least partly responsible. When the Federal Republic had difficult decisions to make, we could have—and should have—publicly given it the support it needed. When the Atlantic Alliance was faced with the question of whether the neutron bomb—and later the Pershing II missiles—should be deployed in Europe, the ultimate decision obviously had to be Germany’s, since those weapons were to be deployed on its territory. The neutron bomb issue, it is well known, has been a masterpiece of diplomatic bungling by President Carter. Then comes the problem of the Euro-missiles—it is also up to Germany to decide whether to accept them in the face of formidable pressures from Brezhnev. As a result, the Germans are entitled to tell their current critics: “Listen, we made a very difficult political decision, despite the Soviet Union’s threats. Don’t ask too much of us; we did what we had to do for the defense of Europe.”

Defending Europe in the 1980s

[The recent debate over Europe's capacity to defend it-
self] has been considerable, turning at times into something like a psychodrama, with very ingenious proposals put forward—most of them related to Dr. Kissinger’s declarations in Brussels in 1979. “Do not count on the United States to destroy 100 million Russians and cause as a result the death of 100 million Americans to defend Europe,” was his basic message then. And the reaction of many people was to clamor: “This is the end of the American guarantee.” In reality, no such American guarantee ever existed—at least not in this sense. The Americans never said, “We will destroy the Soviet Union, even if it means causing our own destruction, to defend Europe.” And if they had said it, nobody would have believed them. Instead, what they have always said is that the independence and security of Europe were of vital interest to them, and that they would use all necessary means to defend them. Now, for a country the size of France, deterrence means above all nuclear deterrence and the capacity to inflict damages out of proportion to the stakes of the conflict; as a result, we French have made deterrence and all-out nuclear strikes against cities synonymous. This applies naturally in the case of a confrontation between weak and strong. However, such a concept is mistaken in the case of a confrontation between two alliance systems where deterrence relies on a whole panoply of means—from the very first infantryman up to strategic weapons.

Based on the false assumption that there was no longer an American “guarantee,” many people started fantasizing about a Europe which would be militarily independent of the United States. Some suggested a joint Franco-German nuclear effort; others resuscitated the idea of a Franco-British nuclear force; still others urged that 15 French nuclear submarines be built. I believe these ideas reflect a wrong assessment of what nuclear deterrence can be in the Soviet-European equation. The fundamental problem is not so much that of the volume of strategic forces, but rather that of the credibility of their use. Having 15 submarines rather than 6 would not allow us to say: “If you touch one hair of Norway, Germany or Turkey, I will destroy 100 Soviet cities.” This would have no credibility whatsoever. Only a truly European government, responsible for the security of Europe to the extent that the French Government is responsible for France’s security, could carry such a message. But this European government does not exist and is not likely to see the light of day soon.

In the absence of such a European political structure that could give strategic nuclear deterrence alone a sufficient credibility, European defense ought to rely on a capability to oppose Soviet forces at all levels. This capability we do not even have with the presence and help of the United States—and a fortiori we couldn’t demonstrate it without them. Europe lacks two fundamental attributes of the superpowers: space and natural resources. However, in the present circumstances, we do not need to have the same conventional forces as the Soviet Union—because the alliance naturally couples our defense with America’s strategic forces . . . .

The fundamental imperative is indeed to ensure that this “coupling” is maintained—and not to create a counterforce against the Soviet [medium-range] SS-20 missiles: In any case, their sheer number, as well as their range and mobility keep them out of reach. Soviet missiles and Backfire bombers have Europe at their mercy. In case of conflict, or in the dialectics of a crisis, the Soviet Union would therefore be in a position to threaten and destroy all of Europe—and, above all, Europe’s military means—thanks to the improvements of Soviet technology . . . .

The Function of the New Euro-Missiles:

We have to keep in mind all other existing weapons with a shorter range—all of which are a direct threat to Europe. If, in case of conflict, nuclear exchanges are limited to Western Europe and a small part of the Soviet Union’s satellites, the Soviet Union becomes de facto a sanctuary. It is therefore essential that any conflict in Europe imply for the Soviet Union the risk of an escalation of nuclear strikes to its own territory. This is what the reach of the new Pershing II and cruise missiles makes possible.

Indeed, the Soviet Union would then be placed before the following dilemma: Either it retaliates with nuclear strikes on the American territory—and doing so, it opens the great Pandora’s box and no longer knows what can happen. Or, fearing such an escalation, it does not retaliate on the American territory—thereby consenting to the actual “sanctuarization” of the United States while its own territory is no longer a sanctuary, which is of course unacceptable. It is therefore the function of the Pershing and cruise missiles to ensure this vital “coupling,” to the extent that they make it impossible to dissociate the Soviet territory from the territory of Western Europe. It is probably the only case where geographic contiguity between Europe and the Soviet Union plays to the latter’s disadvantage. One can easily understand the Soviet Union’s frantic attempts at preventing the deployment of these new missiles. Bismarck used to say that geography was the only permanent factor in politics. For once, let us take advantage of it.

It is a mistake [to link the deployment of these new missiles to a decision to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union]—although it can be explained by domestic political reasons. If the Europeans had an accurate sense of the threat which confronts them, they would have done everything to prevent the negotiation from including these theater weapons. Again, Europe is not threatened only by the Soviet SS-20s or Backfire bombers. There are also all the other Soviet arms of shorter range—tactical nuclear missiles as well as fighter-bombers. If we focus the negotiations only on those
weapons whose range corresponds to the distance that separates Western Europe from the territory of the Soviet Union—roughly 1,500 to 1,600 kilometers—we will end up limiting only those Western weapons which are capable of ensuring the above-mentioned “coupling” with the American strategic system. In so doing, we will perhaps reduce a little the number of Soviet weapons with a 3,000-kilometer range—and we will ignore all those weapons whose range is less than 1,500 kilometers and have nevertheless the same capability with respect to Western Europe’s territory.

Clearly, this is an unacceptable deal. Suppose you achieve the elimination of all weapons with a range superior to 1,500 kilometers. You would thereby deny the West all capability to reach the territory of the Soviet Union from Europe, and you would leave to the Soviets the nuclear means to destroy us. This obviously is absurd! The Americans, unfortunately, have entered this negotiation—at the encouragement of the Germans—and I fear that the pressures of a public which is not well-versed in these problems will finally prevail upon the requirements of our security.

The Alliance: The Need for a Common Awareness of the Nature of the Danger

Turning our economic summits into strategic summits would demonstrate our common interests in the face of global problems, and it would be useful if those summits led to a common vision of what is to be done. In this respect, however, the problem in my view is above all not of structure or forum, but one of will on our part to concert within the alliance.

... The Atlantic Alliance is a very useful cadre in that it offers an exceptional forum for permanent contacts among the 15 allied countries. I know from experience that the exchanges which take place constantly within the Atlantic Council can go very deeply into the issues. Yet, if today we wanted to extend the zone of action of the Alliance beyond its present confines, one would immediately meet the refusal of a number of European countries. Furthermore, I do not think that it would be good vis-à-vis the countries of Africa and the Middle East if we in the West appeared to be dealing with them within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance: Those countries hate the idea of being drawn into the East-West conflict. They know that, if there is a confrontation one day, they will be engulfed in it like everybody else—still, they pretend to stay on the sidelines.

As a result, except for occasional summits, a global strategy must be conceived and conducted in a discreet fashion; it must be the product of a common awareness of the nature of the danger, especially in the areas not covered by the Atlantic Alliance. We could then agree upon mutually supportive actions to prevent disasters. At the time of the Kolwesi affair [in Zaire, in 1978] French and Belgian paratroopers were flown to combat zones by American planes. Similarly, if there is one day a direct threat to the Middle East, the Europeans will be called upon to provide some kind of logistical support. At the time of the Yom Kippur war, without the use of the Portuguese base in the Azores the United States could not have given Israel in sufficient time the support it needed to redress the situation. This took place quickly, and quietly—the right method. But again this presupposes a firm resolve on our part that destabilization in zones that are vital to the West will no longer be tolerated without response. Without such a resolve, as Churchill said, one simply feeds the crocodile and its appetite will never cease to grow.

Poland: What Response to an Eventual Soviet Intervention?

The Soviets are intervening in Poland! Every day! Otherwise the Communist regime couldn’t maintain itself in power for a minute. This is also true of the other satellite countries. A military intervention would be but one particular modality of this policy of intervention. It is obvious that the Soviets hesitate very much to go that far. For them, the Polish problem is probably, above all else, one of retaining their logistical control of the lines of communication to the heart of Europe. How can such control be best secured? With a Poland which maintains itself at the edge of socialist orthodoxy and whose devotion to Moscow, albeit suspect, is basically maintained? Or by a Poland crushed and occupied—but one that would secrete guerilla resistance and/or generalized sabotage, provoking thereby an indescribable chaos within the Soviet overall logistics? This is a crucial point to keep in mind.

We have to ask ourselves what it is that we are actually after in our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. In the case of Poland, our criteria should be the future of the liberalization achieved by the “Solidarity” trade unions, and not the form taken by an eventual repression. If the results of what has occurred in Poland prove to be durable, then the pursuit of détente would make sense. If, on the contrary, the gains of the trade unions are denied after a time, if in the end there is no modification of the system—even though the forms of repression might prove to be less brutal than others—then, in my opinion, we should basically take the same measures we would take in the case of a military intervention.

To Sum Up—

I doubt we can expect the Soviet Union to understand that the concern it has caused us for the last 30 years is quite similar to that which it feels at the idea of China’s becoming a superpower within the next 30 years. There-
fore, the Soviet leaders must be made to realize that, from now on, they will no longer be able to trample Western interests worldwide while they continue with us the “lullaby” of détente.

A Policy of Firmness Towards the Soviet Union—Based on What?

The problem is complex—because the Soviet Union is a most formidable power; because we cannot forget the debt of gratitude we owe the Soviet people for the major part they played in the defeat of Hitler and because we have to take into account our own economic and unemployment problems. However, states being “cold monsters,” as General de Gaulle used to say, we need not be more sentimental or less realistic than the men in the Kremlin. That means we should pursue the defense policy which seems to us the more likely to strengthen deterrence. It means also that, having basically assessed the objective of Soviet policy, we discard wishful thinking from our motivations; we deal with the Soviet Union only on the basis of reciprocal interests; we avoid trading short-term profits for us against long-term advantages to the Soviets or commercial benefits against political benefits; and we abandon any hope of achieving political results by economic, scientific or technological trade-offs.

A most important (but very difficult) thing for the Western powers should be to try to coordinate better their policies in such matters as the supply of advanced technologies.

Wheat—A Weapon?

The Soviet Union occupies one sixth of the world’s land mass and disposes of considerable areas that are among the most fertile in the world. In the last century Russia was the wheat reservoir of Europe. Today, a billion people are starving. Since the Soviet Union, out of ideological obstinacy, maintains an economic regime which makes it incapable of even feeding itself, it must be held partly responsible for world hunger. The West, for its part, is morally guilty when it agrees to sell the Soviet Union because it pays, and does not give to those who die of hunger. It was shocking to see the substantial increase of some Western European countries’ trade with the Soviet Union in 1980—the very year Afghanistan was invaded!

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In the next issue of Dialogue, we will feature a summary of the Gespräche 1988 plenary conference to be held in Washington, D.C., in late March. (Details will follow.)

Also in that next issue, a selection from the numerous reactions we received to our special Summer/Fall 1988 issue on "The Middle East: What Chances for Peace?"