Between past...
...and future

The Trilateral Commission at

Intelligent men came drifting in from the sea and from the west border,
And with them, and with you especially
There was nothing at cross purpose,
And they made nothing of sea-crossing or of mountain-crossing,
If only they could be of that fellowship,
And we all spoke out our hearts and minds, and without regret.

from Li Po (701-762?)
[Tr. from the Chinese by Ezra Pound].
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EDITOR’S NOTE

Is the story told, of an extraordinary 25-year-long and still going international adventure, in seventy pages? No. It is told in six concise lines, as the Chinese poet did on our title page, with the precision of a dream, thirteen centuries ago. Or it is spread into exhaustive volumes for the library shelf.

Or...?

The modern translator of the old poet gave us a clue: It just might be done— for brevity's and rhythm's sake— through the systematic use of what he called the "luminous detail."

Unable here to do justice to the abundant trilateral material which flowed from our beloved "fellowship", all I could do was pick here and there some luminous details which have punctuated the life of the Trilateral Commission and express, if only in a flash, the unfinished job we had set for ourselves a quarter of a century ago. This grid-like collage runs around today's testimonies and prescriptions from long-time Commission members.

Perfect recall usually characterizes gone-by events. The imperfect, somewhat trembling picture of the Trilateral Commission which unfolds in these pages should be blamed on an old weakness of our's: looking forward.

Berlin, March 21, 1998
From the Trilateral Commission’s Chairmen

A full quarter of a century has passed since a small group—Japanese, North American, and European—met at the initiative of David Rockefeller. His challenge was direct and timely: How could our three democratic, economically advanced regions be encouraged to work more closely together in the face of the oil crisis, the monetary disturbances, and the new opportunities and uncertainties in Asia?

The group clearly recognized that array of problems was symptomatic of the need for increasingly interdependent societies to reach common understanding and to maintain cooperative approaches. Out of those discussions, three distinguished participants—Takeshi Watanabe, Gerard C. Smith and Max Kohnstamm—agreed to chair a new effort to engage a larger group of respected and committed men and women from each of the three areas.

Fortunately, they were able to enlist Zbigniew Brzezinski as Director. Thus, the Trilateral Commission quickly found its name, identified its purpose, and began its work.

The “Trilateral process” was set in motion. Few would now question, we think, that the time was right and the purpose relevant— that we were on the “cutting edge”.

Our work has helped stimulate the closer collaboration of the G-7 countries. We have observed, too, that a number of other, typically more specialized forums, have developed in the non-governmental world.

Wisely recognizing the reality of change and the need for evolution, our founders insisted that a time limit be set for the work of the Commission. They contemplated that after three years our work and relevance would be reviewed. The life of the Commission would be continued only if its relevance could be maintained. The rule of three-year renewal has remained to this day.

In retrospect, how does that record stand up? Have the initial principles been maintained and the assumptions been relevant? Are we still at the “cutting edge”?

The answer seemed clear at the time of the momentous developments of 1989/90, so powerfully symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Cold War was over. But the end of
that common threat only reinforced the need to deepen our cooperation while needing to enlarge our partnership.

The Commission, moving with characteristic caution and care in our internal debates, has continued to find its way forward.

Our three regions have long shared a common devotion to democracy and to free and competitive markets. And it is still true that Europe, Japan and North America remain both the dominant economic areas and the key partners in maintaining a secure and open international system. At the same time, it is obvious that over the life of the Commission the ideals of free and democratic societies have spread powerfully around much of what used to be called the Second and Third Worlds. It is also true that the emerging nations have become more and more significant participants in and open world economy, helping to shape the destinies of all of us.

That is why, extending its practice of inviting a few key voices from other areas to its debates, the Commission is now including on a regular basis other leaders from Asia, from Latin America, from Eastern Europe, from the Middle East, and from Africa. In joining in our work, these participants symbolize and represent the simple fact that collective responsibility for maintaining a peaceful and prosperous world is necessarily becoming even broader.

As we look ahead to the new challenges of our ever-more integrated world, we remain conscious of one of the basic convictions of our founders. The core countries with which the Commission started – with all their weight in the community of nations – need first of all to maintain the vitality of their own societies, their democratic traditions of governance, and their economic freedom. Only strong and self-confident nations, secure in their own ideals and principles, will have the moral and material strength to cooperate together in dealing with the implications of their growing interdependence.

We now stand on the threshold of a new millennium. Far from symbolizing the “end of history”, the turn of the calendar only emphasizes the range of challenges – technological, environmental, economic and political – in a world of accelerating change. These challenges are without precedent, full of large opportunity but also enormous risk.

Plainly, the purposes that brought the Commission into being some 25 years ago remain relevant today. In that context, we have renewed our mandate once again.

Yotaro Kobayashi
Otto Graf Lambsdorff
Paul A. Volcker
Present were: Messrs. C. Fred Bergsten, Robert Bowie, Zbigniew Brzezinski, McGeorge Bundy, Karl Carstens, Guido Colonna di Paliano, François Duchene, René Focht, Max Kohntamm, Bayless Manning, Kiichi Miyazawa, Kinhide Mushakoji, Saburo Okita, Henry Owen, Tadashi Yamamoto (observer), David Rockefeller (Acting Chairman), George Franklin (Secretary, pro tem). S. Frederick Starr, Edward Morse, Rapporteurs.

Mr. Rockefeller welcomed the participants. He expressed his concern over the impact of growing economic competitiveness and the accelerating pace of technological and social change on policy-making in major industrialized states. At a time when such transformations make it imperative that governments devote more attention to the problems of the future, they are compelled instead to concentrate more than ever on issues of the moment. In such circumstances, he felt, there is danger that the advanced industrialized states will drift aimlessly into a situation in which they may inflict harm upon each other and other states. Now is a propitious time for persons from the private sector to make a valuable contribution to public policy. This could be accomplished, Mr.

Commission to-be...

Rockefeller suggested, if individuals from the academic communities, labor and religious groups, as well as business, were to join together to consider neglected longer-term issues and to translate their conclusions into practical policy recommendations.

He also reviewed discussions concerning such an international commission held with Japanese leaders, with United States officials, including Mr. Henry Kissinger, and with many participants in the present meeting. All had been strongly encouraging.

He also reviewed discussions concerning such an international commission held with Japanese leaders, with United States officials, including Mr. Henry Kissinger, and with many participants in the present meeting. All had been strongly encouraging.
Mr. Kohnstamm addressed himself to the need for a new "conception" of the international order as fresh as that once posited by Keynes, and for a body as effective in implementing that conception in a world of growing inter-regional dependencies as the Monnet Committee had been in the intra-European context. Mr. Bergsten and Dr. Carstens supported this view in their remarks, but gave particular emphasis to the need for organizing concepts. Later, Mr. Bundy asked whether the underlying community of interest in preventing political conflict between Japan, the European Community and North America did not, itself, provide such a conception for the present commission.

Mr. Mushakoji, however, observed that an important test of the effectiveness of the commission would be whether it works to reduce the walls dividing power and economic blocs from one another. Mr. Bundy suggested that the formula "large advanced economies" would be preferable to "developed non-Communist nations" for it would leave the way open to the inclusion of the U.S.S.R. He doubted, though, whether that country would have the ability to participate in such a non-governmental group as the proposed commission.

Similar arguments were applied to the question of participation by persons from less developed nations. Mr. Bergsten found difficulty in separating out these nations, for otherwise the commission would experience difficulty in dealing with the impact of industrialized economies on other parts of the world. Prince Colonna agreed that the global impact of policies of the industrial nations must constantly be borne in mind, and, with Messrs. Manning, Mushakoji, and Rockefeller, insisted that the commission not be based on any form of exclusion. These participants all considered that at the outset members should be drawn from the three "trilateral" regions, but that persons from both less developed nations and Communist states might be invited as observers or in some other appropriate capacity agreed upon by the commission members.

Mr. Foch proposed that the commission might begin its activity with a task force on issues relating to trade, monetary and investment problems affecting the three regions together. The participants agreed to formulate the topic as "The New International Economic System". As Messrs. Brzezinski and Kohnstamm indicated, it is important that the commission achieve visibility quickly and in a manner which would merit the attention of governments and the enthusiasms of influential private citizens: This topic combined immediate political importance with such longer range concerns as the cohesion of the advanced, industrialized nations and the fate of the nation-state. Finally, work in this area would surely generate further topics for investigation...

Mr. Okita then expressed his belief that a second focus for study should be more philosophic in character and with the broadest implications for the future relations among industrialized societies. He proposed that such a topic might be the future value systems of the industrialized societies. Considerable discussion followed. It was agreed that such issues, inasmuch as they have implications for the cooperative efforts of Japan, Europe and North America, should be a constant concern of the Commission's task force work.

Mr. Rockefeller stated that an immediate need is for all those present to assemble names of persons in each region qualified to serve on these topics and to forward those names to Mr. Franklin or himself.
In the beginning...

David Rockefeller

NEW YORK, November 21, 1997 — From a private conversation with Mr. Rockefeller, at his Manhattan office, with Charles B. Heck and François Sauzey:

1. What We Had in Mind

It all really began in the early months of 1972.

At this time, the Atlantic Alliance, even if it had fissures, was well established and recognized. The United States was enthusiastically supportive of Europe and its efforts to unify — to the point of having, Cold War oblige, a large number of troops stationed there.

But what became clear during the post-World War II period was that Japan was emerging from the ashes of the War, and had become a significant player in the world economy, as well as the dominant economic force in East Asia. However, even though Japan had achieved enormous economic power, it had little social or political contact with the other industrial nations of the world. This led to my thinking that it might be desirable to have a forum that would include individuals from the North Atlantic community and the Japanese — if only to ensure that the Japanese and their economic and political counterparts in Europe and North America could get to know each other. My initial concept was, in short, to bring together the leading industrial democracies,
serious risks to the global environment. At the same time shortages in world resources could breed new rivalries, and widening disparities in mankind’s economic condition are a threat to world stability and an affront to social justice.

4. While it is important to develop greater cooperation among all the countries in the world, Japan, Western Europe, and North America, in view of their great weight in the world economy and their massive relations with one another, bear a special responsibility for developing effective cooperation, both in their own interests and in those of the rest of the world. They share a number of problems which, if not solved, could cause difficulties for all. They must make concerted efforts to deal with the challenges of interdependence they cannot manage separately. The aim must be effective cooperation beneficial to all countries, whatever their political systems or stage of development.

II

To be effective in meeting common problems, Japan, Western Europe and North America will have to:

1) consult and cooperate more closely, on the basis of equality, to develop and carry out coordinated policies on matters affecting their common interests;

2) refrain from unilateral actions incompatible with their interdependence and from actions detrimental to other regions;

3) take advantage of existing international and regional organizations and further enhance their role;

Trilateral cooperation will be facilitated as greater unity is achieved in Europe through the progress of the European Community and as Europe and Japan develop closer relations.

III

It will be the purpose of the Trilateral Commission to generate the will to respond in common to the opportunities and challenges that we confront and to assume the responsibilities that we face. The Commission will seek to promote among Japanese, West Europeans and North Americans the habit of working which essentially produced some eighty percent of the world’s Gross National Product.

Early in 1972, in a speech I made in Europe on behalf of the Chase Manhattan Bank, I expressed some of these thoughts, which were picked up by a surprising number of people. Subsequently some of them – Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Owen, Robert Bowie – came to me to see how the idea could be pursued.

Several months later, in the spring of 1972, Zbig Brzezinski and I met again, in Belgium, for that year’s Bilderberg Conference. I suggested to our Bilderberg friends that – rather than forming yet another international organization – we might invite the Japanese to join Bilderberg. This was promptly shot down in flames by some of the participants. Despite our defeat, however, Zbig and I felt the idea had merit and, on our plane trip back to New York, decided to take it a few steps further.

How would we go about it? Zbig was then teaching at Columbia University. He agreed to shepherd our effort and we decided to bring in George Franklin, who had just retired from his directorship of the Council on Foreign Relations and was ideally equipped to meet the task at hand: getting together a selected group from the three regions to consider our idea in the first place, and see how we might move forward.

We consulted, rapidly and intensively, in the three regions. I recall how helpful George Franklin and Max Kohnstamm (who would become a year later the first European Chairman of the Commission) were in the process of identifying an initial core-group of European “bellwethers” for this kind of endeavor. I remember, too, the very positive reactions I received in Tokyo from the then-Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda and then-MTI Minister Kakuei Tanaka, which led us, with the help of Tadashi Yamamoto, to gather around our Commission-to-be a number of Japanese participants who would later lead their country, including Kiichi Miyazawa and Saburo Okita. And I cannot forget, on the American side, how McGeorge Bundy, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Gerard Smith and so many others helped us to complete this early “feasibility” group from the three regions.

The group met informally in Pocantico, for a day and a half, on July 23 and 24, 1972 [Key notes from this Pocantico “founding” meeting appear on the previous pages, together with a list of the participants]. We decided then and there that the Trilateral Commission should exist; that, unlike so many other seemingly eternal organizations, it should have a finite mandate
of three years, after which we would evaluate its contribution and whether it was worthwhile to continue; and that a small contingent of Japanese, North-Americans and Europeans would be formed to work on some of the most important "trilateral" issues of the day, with a minimal staff in the three regions under the overall directorship of Zbigniew Brzezinski (who served us so well in this capacity during the Commission's first three years, before moving to the White House as President Carter's National Security Adviser).

2.

The World, Then and Now

...It isn't, as some people have said, that the leadership in the United States was faltering in the early Seventies, either because of Vietnam, or of President Nixon's famous bilateral "shocks". Indeed, America remained a major world power. At the same time, however, other nations were rising in strength – most notably, Germany and Japan.

* Think of ASIA twenty five years ago. The pioneering overtures by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger in China were just beginning, but that country still remained a big unknown. The little "Tigers" were starting to emerge, though it would be many years before any of them would achieve the stature they have gained today. Japan, on the other hand, was assuming a role of dominance in the region which few of us would have anticipated only a few years before – and yet our relations were at the government level, and we had no understanding of the people of Japan, nor they of us. Japan seemed a natural partner for our trilateral effort.

* Back in the early Seventies, the hope for a more united EUROPE was already full-blown – thanks in many ways to the individual energies previously spent by so many of the Trilateral Commission's earliest members. That, at least, hasn't changed: Europe has remained remarkable in the successive steps it has taken to become more integrated, and the solidification of Maastricht should prove to be an extraordinary accomplishment. In addition, the inclusion of key Central European countries – in NATO, and even more significantly in the European Union – makes sense on balance, even if there are risks involved for our evolving relationship with Russia. The consolidation of Europe is, clearly, one of today's most positive developments.

* The scene in my own country, the UNITED STATES, is, more than ever, a "mixed bag". On the one hand, our economic, political and military power has grown in absolute and relative terms. The old Soviet Union no longer exists and Russia has disappeared as a major military power. The technological revolution – which looked for a while as if it might be led by Japan – now seems to be falling more and more into our hands. And the sheer power of our financial institutions (the global "power-house" role of some of our commercial banks and many of our

together on problems of mutual concern, to seek to obtain a shared understanding of these complex problems, and to devise and disseminate proposals of general benefit.

The cooperation we seek involves a sustained process of consultation and mutual education, with our countries coming closer together to meet common needs. To promote such cooperation, the Commission will undertake an extensive program of trilateral policy studies, and will cooperate with existing private institutions as appropriate.

The Commission hopes to play a creative role as a channel of free exchange of opinions with other countries and regions. Further progress of the developing countries and greater improvement of East-West relations will be a major concern.

COMMUNIQUE

The Executive Committee of the newly formed Trilateral Commission held its first meeting in Tokyo on October 21-23. It discussed the reports prepared by two trilateral task forces on political relations and monetary affairs, and agreed on a statement of the Commission's purposes largely derived from the political report and the discussion thereon.

The Committee agreed that the report of the task force on monetary problems is an important contribution and urged members of the Commission and the broader public to consider its proposals. International monetary problems will be considered again by the Executive Committee in the light of the intervening developments.

To promote closer trilateral cooperation on matters of common concern, the Executive Committee considered a program of trilateral policy studies, with initial priority assigned to monetary problems, trade relations, the question of natural resources, the problems confronting the LDCs, and East-West relations. It also intends to commission a long-term study on changing values in our societies and their international implications. To carry out these studies the Trilateral Commission will bring together experts
from the three areas who will consult closely with the members of the Commission. The resulting reports will be published in order to stimulate a wide public discussion, and may form the basis for specific policy proposals by the Commission.

The Committee will meet again in Brussels on June 23-25, 1974.

[EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING – The executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission met in Tokyo from October 21 to 23. Those in attendance included, for NORTH AMERICA, Robert W. Bonner; Robert R. Bowie; Patrick E. Haggerty; Jean-Luc Pépin; Edwin O. Reischauer; David Rockefeller; Paul C. Warnke; and Marina Whitman; for JAPAN, Chuziro Fujino; Yukitaka Haraguchi; Kazushige Hirasawa; Yusuke Kashiwagi; Kiichi Miyazawa; Kinbide Mushakoji; Saburo Okita; and Ryuji Takeuchi; and for EUROPE, P. Nyboe Andersen; Georges Berthoin; Marc Eyskens; Otto Lambsdorff; John Loudon; Cesare Merlino; Alwin Munchmeyer; Myles Staunton; Otto Greg Tidemand; Sir Kenneth Younger; and Sir Philip de Zulueta. Also present were the three regional Chairmen, Gerard C. Smith, Takeshi Watanabe, and Max Kohnstamm; the Director of the Commission, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski; Task Force rapporteurs Richard N. Cooper, Motoo Kaji, François Duchêne and Claudio Segré; and the three regional Secretaries, George S. Franklin, Tadashi Yamamoto and Wolfgang Hager.]

investment banks) is emerging as greater than that of Europe or Japan. In many ways, we are more of a force in the world than ever in America's history.

On the other hand, some Americans seem to be turning inward: to care only about what happens at home; and not even to be interested in the rest of the world, and if they are, then only to want to meddle in other peoples' affairs rather than play a constructive role. Protectionism is again becoming a major threat. And single-interest fundamentalist forces are gaining unparalleled importance in our politics.

All this, to put it simply, is preventing the United States from exercising the kind of constructive leadership in the world, leadership which we have both the means and historic opportunity to exercise, just when it is most needed – in the aftermath of the collapse of communism – to help the world at-large come into the age of global interdependence.

3.

Under an Evolving Trilateral Concept: the Enduring Value of Leadership

Clearly, we live in a wholly different world from that which we knew at the birth of the Trilateral Commission. The Berlin Wall has fallen. The Cold War has come to an end. International trade has grown at a pace which even we would not have predicted – and more often than not to the benefit of a "Third World" to which we devoted so much of our work from the start. The Asia we knew, or set out to know in the first place, is hardly recognizable, with new forces which appear every year to grow in importance for the future.

Trilateral will, and should, evolve. I am enthusiastically in favor of the present experiment of inviting individuals from a number of nations which are not currently members of Trilateral – but which now play a much more important role in world affairs than they did 25 years ago – to participate in the Commission's work for the duration of the current triennium. This step should help us determine how to proceed, while remaining faithful to the principles which guided us from the start.

As a general proposition, the longer I live the more convinced I am that the role of individuals in the world – be they in government or in the private sector – is critical, whether for good or for bad. I also believe that "things happen" in most cases as a result of individual leadership rather than mass movements or
decisions. Obviously, such leadership cannot operate in a vacuum; it must come to be accepted by a large number of people. Then it can give impetus and direction to movements and ideas.

I think that the idea of bringing together opinion-makers from the leading industrialized democracies of the world made sense, and continues to make sense, in that their collective leadership can have an impact on the course their respective countries take in relation to the world as a whole.

This has already proved to be the case. What alchemy made it possible? I am not sure. Perhaps our decision in trilateral to avoid taking positions as a group — for we wanted to have very diverse points of view, not a forced and watered down consensus, on many controversial issues — was a good one. Surely, too, the Commission's ability, while always eschewing the extremes, to hold to the central body of thoughts in our various countries and keep together a balanced, mainstream representation has been one of our strengths. At one time or another, some political parties or governments made it difficult for us to achieve this balance. But they came around in the end, and Trilateral today represents a broad and balanced political spectrum.

In many ways, the ultimate impact of an initiative like the Trilateral Commission has been that it cannot be pinned down in any specific formula or program. Yet, I believe that the concept of “trilateral” cooperation was greatly encouraged and fostered by our group's work; and will continue to plant its more than ever needed seeds, thanks to an invaluable, 25-year “knock” in bringing together a few of the brightest, best-informed and respected people from our three regions to address some of our most burning one-world problems.

BOSTON, 1973 — The interests of North America, Western Europe and Japan now interlock in so many fields: trade and monetary questions, security and defense, energy supplies, social and environmental issues, aid to developing countries. It is essential for the future... that these three advanced industrial regions coordinate their policies and learn to work together. It is essential that Japan be treated as a full and equal partner. And first and foremost the communications gap with Japan must be overcome. It is good to hear that a group of distinguished citizens from all three areas is getting together... Of course, the primary effort in formulating common policies must come from the governments concerned. But a non-governmental effort along the lines of Jean Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe can do much to improve the atmosphere through trilateral contacts among scholars, economists, industrialists, labor leaders, and journalists.

(from The Christian Science Monitor).
Oil and the Middle East are only one example of a pervasive reality. Interdependence among Western Europe, Japan, and the U.S. is a fact of life — in monetary policy, trade, resources, environment, and relations with the developing nations and the Communist states. They can assure their well-being and security only if they work together to cope with these massive problems. Triilateral cooperation is a necessary precondition for moving toward any solid structure of global order and peace.

But achieving such collaboration will require overcoming serious difficulties. A major one is the U.S. trend toward unilateralism, displayed in the Middle East crisis. Neither Japan nor Western Europe is content with U.S. hegemony or unilateral action. They will expect to be treated more like partners in the future.

Yet at present neither is ready to fulfill the role. Western Europe is not yet unified or able to act as an entity in many fields. And Japan is still seeking to clarify its role in the world. Moreover, both are uncertain about the United States and its priorities. They are concerned by Nixon's stress on superpower relations and by the tendency toward unilateralism.

Together these factors create distrust and tensions which severely impede cooperation. Overcoming these obstacles is the prerequisite for the joint action essential for coping with the many common problems.

Obviously only governments can ultimately initiate and carry on the necessary consultation and coordination of policy. But there is also a role for private efforts to generate a wider awareness of common needs and to propose common approaches and solutions for specific issues.

(October 31, 1973
The Christian Science Monitor).
WASHINGTON, D.C., January 21, 1978 – Twenty-five years after the inauguration of the Trilateral Commission, it certainly is timely to ask:

— is the Commission’s underlying concept still relevant?
— is its geographic scope still appropriate?
— is its modus operandi in need of any change?

1. The Concept of a Special Relationship Among the Globe’s Three Most Productive Democratic Areas Remains Valid

Trilateralism was an innovative concept that defined both the scope and the essence of a new and wider relationship. It was based on two key elements. The first was that the most advanced democratic nations should have a forum for informal consultations and for the joint development of policy proposals for dealing with their common problems, both at home and abroad. Second, as of twenty-five years ago, advanced democracy was...
3-Cornered Commission Opens World Parley

TOKYO. Oct. 23—Non-governmental leaders from the United States, Europe, and Japan appealed here today for three-sided cooperation among the major industrial grouping to cope with a world in which American power is losing its position of dominance.

The occasion was the founding of the Trilateral Commission, a 190-businessmen, political scientist, and their leaders described today as “the leading citizens of their continents.” The idea for the three-cornered commission was attributed to U.S. banker David Rockefeller, who expressed hope that the new forum will help the major industrial nations acquire the habit of working together rather than at cross purposes.

The initial public session, held in the conference hall of Japan’s big business confederation, Keidanren, featured statements of high purpose and ambitious goals from the commission’s leaders and expressions of caution and reserve by some of the Japanese members.

Those of us who first formulated the idea were also motivated by the added conviction that Japan of the mid-Seventies, with its postwar economic recovery successfully completed, could no longer be confined to a junior status in an essentially bilateral relationship with America. Japan needed a wider global vision, but one based on shared democratic values. It was also important that Western Europe be encouraged to look beyond its Atlanticist perspective and become more aware of the Far East. Both Japan and Europe needed to get to know each other, and America could play a constructive role as the crucial strategic link between them. (Indeed, it is ironic to think today how much that simple and timely idea was at the time opposed by both the Europeans and the Japanese).

In my view, both the emphasis on democracy as a shared value, and the practical benefit for the world of a closer relationship between the globe’s three most productive democratic areas, remain valid. There are some in the Commission who would like to abandon these criteria by inviting China (which is certainly an economic success) and/or Russia (which is struggling to create a democratic system) to join— but one should have no illusion as to the consequence of such a change. It would mean that the Commission would no longer be a special forum for the most successful democracies but would simply become an international assembly. Something important, something quite distinctive, something worth propagating would thereby be lost.

For the same reason, I would oppose the inclination of some participants to favor a membership composed predominantly of bankers and businessmen. The Commission has thrived because of its diversified membership, and that diversity in composition—with emphasis on pluralism and democracy—should be deliberately preserved.

2.

The Asian Side Can no Longer be Confined to Japan Alone

But precisely because the basic concept retains validity, an important change in the scope of the Commission’s geographic membership has become timely: Japan is no longer the only advanced democracy in the Far East. Today’s South Korea and Taiwan have standards of living no worse than Japan’s a quarter of a century ago. And they are also democracies. Their exclusion, and Japan’s sole inclusion, no longer makes any sense. The third
corner of Triilateralism can no longer be confined to Japan alone, especially while Europe's composition is widening even farther because of the emergence of democracy in Central Europe.

The inclusion in the Commission's membership of new entities (we should use that term so that China will not think that we support Taiwan's independence) would help not only to make the Commission more relevant to today's world, but also to make Japan more relevant to its own region. It would help Japan to promote the kind of relations with its democratic neighbors—indeed, the right word is reconciliation—that Germany has successfully cultivated in Europe. And the Triilateral Commission would cease to be anomalously limited to only one nation in Asia while based on regional memberships both in North America and in Europe.

3.

Modus Operandi

The Commission has become very big, its sessions more formal, its inner dialogue less intense. That is in part a price of its success. However, in the early years, the Commission very deliberately strove to make policy proposals and to propagate them actively. It was not an accident that the very idea for the annual summit of the advanced democracies (the G-7) originated from the Commission. So did a number of other proposals.

Lately, one gets the feeling that the Commission's very able trilateral papers serve primarily as the basis for the annual meeting's formal agenda—but not as the point of departure for any serious advocacy. Their impact is not very visible. Moreover, the meetings tend to lack policy significance, though they still remain useful as occasions for an exchange of views and for congenial networking. The meetings are certainly prestigious, but they are not truly influential.

A practical initiative that could generate greater impact would be for the Commission's three chairmen to issue annually a brief joint report on the state of trilateral relations. That report could contain several timely recommendations regarding trilateral responses to common internal and external problems. The report could be submitted to the annual meeting, discussed at it, and

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The outspoken Japanese expressed a fear that the proposed three-cornered leadership could give rise to resentment and suspicion "from Communist powers and from poorer nations in the non-Communist world.

These Japanese delegates called for extreme caution in public statements by the new commission and one of them proposed unsuccessfully that a political task force study on the world political crisis be withheld from publication to avoid controversy.

Among other things, the report declared that confusion about fundamental changes in the relations between nations was a major cause of two world wars within this century and presents a great challenge to the stability and well-being of the world today.

The United States, Western Europe, and Japan produce two-thirds of the annual output of the entire world and thus the problem of money, trade, investment, resources and peace cannot be creatively tackled unless they cooperate," he reported.

In a statement of purpose, the 25-member executive committee of the trilateral commission called upon their governments to cooperate more closely and "to refrain from unilateral actions incompatible with their interdependence and from actions detrimental to other regions."

Among the harmful unilateral actions mentioned in discussion today was the recent United States embargo on soybeans and other agricultural commodities. Shortages of world resources, including food and petroleum, could breed new rivalries and cause widening disparities which are a threat to world stability and an affront to social justice, the policy statement declared.

Former U.S. arms control negotiator Gerard C. Smith, chairman of the North American delegation of the new commission, said the United States might find in the trilateral relationship...
means of retreating from its dominant role in the world since World War II. Smith and other expressed a lack of confidence in the "universal" approach of the United Nations as a problem-solving device, but saw hope for gains through the proposed three-sided dialogue of major economic powers.

Max Kohlmann of the Netherlands, chairman of the Western Europe delegation, declared that unless there is some common purpose among the three corners of the proposed trilateral alliance, no progress can be made toward solutions of many major problems facing the world. Kohlmann welcomed the new commission as a step toward "a fruitful trilogue" which can deal with international conditions on a realistic basis.


The report's discussion at the annual meeting would increase the salience of that particular event by generating greater engagement on the part of Commission members. It would inject new life into somewhat ritualized proceedings while the publication of such an annual statement as an op-ed in leading European, American, and Asian papers could greatly enhance the Commission's relevance to the timely issues of the day.
LONDON, MARCH 23, 1980 — When a few of us here today first met in New York in the summer of 1972, to charter what has now become the Trilateral Commission, we were motivated by our common perception of the importance of expanding communication and consultation among the countries of Western Europe, North America and Japan, countries which share many common values and commitments to freedom, democracy and an open world economy. Although we did not intend that the Commission would be an actor in any ideological struggle with the Soviet Union or other communist countries, we nevertheless perceived that the values and common interest that brought us together were not shared by them. We sought to have an open forum for free discussion among private citizens in which we could air our differences with confidence that, in the final analysis, we sought the same basic goals. The distance between the tripartite countries on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other is not narrower now than then. Although there have been times during the past decade when we thought we saw signs of improving relations, by the end of the decade it became apparent that the gap, if anything, has grown wider. While we should by no means abandon the effort to seek an improved dialogue across the gap, we feel today that the need is greater for us to close ranks in our endeavor to strengthen what I may call an alliance of common values in order to defend freedom and democracy against the challenges arising out the most recent world developments.

I am using the word “alliance” not in a narrow military sense but in a much broader context to mean the network of cooperative relationship among the industrialized democracies for their threefold common objectives: to maintain international peace and security; to promote a sound development of the world economy; and to defend our basic values of freedom and democracy.

This alliance relationship is presently undergoing a testing period, calling for the mobilization of the wisdom, imagination and skill of the leaders of the industrialized democracies if the alliance is going to maintain its cohesion and vitality. There is obviously no need for me to recount the events and trends of the history of the past three decades, during which we have witnessed enormous structural changes of the international community in the political, military and economic fields. We are all aware of the fact that as a result of these changes, we no longer live in a world in which America occupied the dominant position and exercised her leadership in a way befitting her position on such global issues as the security of the free world and the reconstruction and development of the international economy. Gone is the time when America carried almost singlehandedly the burden of responsibility as the leader of the free world because she alone had the power and influence commensurate with such responsibility. Today, with the global diffusion of power, America has lost her once dominant position, though, in relative terms, she is still by far the greatest power among the industrialized democracies and the stronger of the two superpowers. Thus, we are now confronted with a twofold question:

- Have we adjusted our mutual concepts of the alliance relationship to the reality to the new power structure of the world?
- What are the requirements to make this relationship truly responsive to the needs of the times?

When the alliance relationship between America and her partners was overwhelmingly one-sided, it was America that defined the interest of the alliance and the policies to be pursued. In short, what was good for America was also good for the alliance as a whole. And America’s partners concurred in this proposition. Pax Americana was accepted by the alliance because, as I said before, America alone had the power and responsibility to deal with the global issues and because she had the vision and magnanimity to define her own national interests in such sufficiently broad terms as to accommodate those of her allies.

Since then, the power structure of the world has undergone a profound change... Is the diffused power structure which we witness today something essentially undesirable? Do we want to see America regain the dominant role she used to play, assuming that is possible? If we look back in perspective at the history of nation states, we will find that there is nothing unusual about one particular state being unable to monopolize the dominating position in world affairs. Nor is there anything basically undesirable about a diffused structure of power relations among states. The crucial issue is not the power structure as such but whether states can cooperate among themselves to share the responsibility for maintaining a stable political order and for undertaking sound management of the world economy in the absence of a single dominant power. And
which we can submerge differences of secondary importance for the sake of our common objectives. This, I realize, is by no means easy since it calls for a great deal of skillful political leadership to create domestic support for making immediate and tangible sacrifices in exchange for longer-term gains which are often not apparent. Nevertheless, it must be done if we all agree that we should act together to meet the challenge of our times.

Another factor, which is related to the second, is the need for America to acknowledge the plurality of interests of her allies and accept its consequences. When America alone carried the burden of global responsibility, her partners willingly let her define the interests of the alliance. If, however, America recognizes, as she does, the need for sharing responsibility with her allies in a manner reflecting the existing power relations, then the definition of the interests of the alliance on any issue has to become a collective exercise. And, given the various factors which determine the interests of the individual members of the alliance, this collective exercise should aim, as I said a few minutes ago, not at an unachievable goal of defining an identical interest but at reaching a common position based on mutually compatible interests which will enable America and her partners to work in concert toward the shared objectives. America's leadership remains essential and will continue to be so in the future. But the nature and the modality of her leadership must evolve at the circumstances in which such leadership is exercised change...

...I believe that the subject I have taken up today is an area in which the Trilateral Commission can make invaluable contributions, because we in the Commission have successfully developed the habit of working together on matters of common interest, and, after all, it is this habit that is urgently needed today not only among our governments but at all levels. Let us hope that the industrialized democracies will demonstrate to the world their wisdom, imagination and skill to make our alliance relationship truly responsive to the needs of the 1980s.

(from a speech by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, at the London 1980 Plenary meeting of the Trilateral Commission, as the Commission was entering its third triennium).
PARIS, January 21, 1998 – From a private conversation with Prime Minister Barre at his Paris office, with Paul Révay and François Sauzéy:

* On joining the nascent Trilateral Commission:

I became a member of the Trilateral Commission upon my return from Brussels, in 1973, when Paul Delouvrier asked me to join the small French group of Trilateral Commissioners which he was constituting then – at the request, I understand, of President Pompidou.

I gladly accepted to be a part of it because the experience I had had in Brussels had shown me how indispensable it was to organize a dialogue among the European Community, the United States and Japan. As Vice President of the European Commission in charge of economic and monetary affairs, I had just lived five years that had been dominated by the international monetary crisis, and it had become very clear to me by then that dialogue between the personalities involved – either official or private – in Europe, in America and in Japan – could contribute to a much needed “better understanding” among us, and thus to the emergence of concrete solutions. It is this Brussels experience which made obvious to me the interest of the concept of trilateralism.

I should also note that I had had, since 1967, friendly relations with David Rockefeller, who had often shared with me his desire to set up something viable to promote such a “dialogue”.

I vividly recall that our first Trilateral meeting in Tokyo, in 1973, concretized somehow this will on the part of a number of

TOKYO, NEW YORK, PARIS, MAY 1983 – The Williamsburg Summit at the end of this month provides an occasion for reflection about the state of relations among the industrialized democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. In this context, we thought the following thoughts might be of interest, drawn from the Trilateral Commission meeting in Rome last month – from the session on the afternoon of Sunday, April 17. This session – entitled “The State of Trilateral Relations” – was opened by a distinguished speaker from each of our three regions: Raymond Barre, former Prime Minister of France; Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State; and Nobuhiko Ushiba, former Japanese Minister of External Affairs and former Ambassador to the United States.

Takeshi Watanabe
David Rockefeller
Georges Berthoin

Nobuhiko Ushiba:
The second World War had a profound effect on all of our countries, but the lessons which we drew from the war were not necessarily the same. For the United States and parts of Europe, the primary lessons lay in the need for collective security, deterrence, and, for Europe, integration. For Japan there was a more simple revulsion against militarism and war; Japan wanted to avoid power politics, a course initially encouraged by the Occupation authorities. Although joined to the U.S. by an alliance, this alliance was not genuinely collective in view of the interpretation of the Constitution prohibiting Japan from undertaking security commitments to foreign countries. And although Japan hosted U.S. forces, it sought to minimize any involvement in issues of U.S. global strategy.

Another legacy of the war was a heightened awareness of Japan’s weak agricultural, economic and resource base. Few Japanese had realized before the war how awesome an economic gap existed between Japan and the United States. After the war Japan devoted itself almost single-mindedly to econom-
ic development and improvement of the people's living standards. This effort was not particularly export-oriented; we relied in the early stages on heavy protection and assistance from the United States.

Japan was not accepted after the war as part of the developed world. It was treated basically as a defeated and developing country. It was only in the late 1950s and early 1960s that Japan began, primarily because of the insistence of the United States, to be brought into international organizations such as the OECD, CATT, and the IMF as an industrial country which would have to assume the same burdens and be subject to the same treatment as other industrialized countries. This was an important step in Japan's history, and it was not without debate either internally or externally. There were many in Japan who believed that Japan's economy was still too weak to accept trade and capital liberalization. On the outside, there were those who felt that Japan should not be included in these institutions because of its low wage structure, cultural differences, and other reasons. Despite Japan's inclusion in CATT, some European countries and even developing countries refused to give most-favored-nation treatment to Japan.

In other words, Japan was partly in the trilateral world and partly still outside. But its continuing rapid economic growth, which made it the second largest free economy by the 1970s, and the economic crises at the beginning of that decade created a need for more intense international consultation and cooperation in which it was vital that Japan be included. Both Japan and the other trilateral countries realized this.

The creation of the Trilateral Commission in the early 1970s was symbolic of this need for more intensive consultation and for the active involvement of Japan as a fully-engaged member of the developed, democratic world.

The new annual summit also had a very important symbolic significance in Japan. Hitherto Japan had joined ongoing U.S. and European-led institutions as a latecomer; now, for the first time, it participated in the summits as a founding mem-

people who had all had experiences similar to mine and who felt that such an initiative would be useful. For that meeting was not an encounter among mere "veterans" or "zealots", but indeed one of people who were in a position to attempt to do something useful.

* On the novelty of the Japanese dimension:

A fundamental reason why I came to participate in the Trilateral Commission was, clearly, the awareness I had acquired in Brussels of the importance of Japan—especially, at the time, in monetary affairs. And the fact that, while U.S.-European relations were on the front stage, Europe's relations with far-away Japan were still very much in their infancy.

On the occasion of the many monetary crises of the time, I had often met the Japanese, who did pay considerable attention to the European Community. Besides, they used to send numerous missions to Brussels where I was their natural interlocutor. I became thus very conscious of the fact that Japan had to be integrated somehow, and that a purely bilateral dialogue was not sufficient. In addition, Japan happened to be an essential element in the then bipolar world balance. And, behind Japan, Asia as a whole was looming large. Thus, in my view, one of the most original and important aspects of the Trilateral Commission consisted precisely in including Japan from the start, in a normal, regular fashion, in our discussions.

* On "applied trilateralism" – the experience of the G-7:

At the beginning, the exercise was called the G-5—a of which I was one of the first "sherpas", I can testify that the G-5 has been a limited, yet excellent, framework—for we, the initial participating sherpas, were in direct relation with our respective heads of state and government. As a result, working independently of our bureaucracies, we were able to promote solutions for effective "trilateral" cooperation among the initial participants. Subsequently, the G-5 became the G-7, for it was no longer possible to exclude Italy and Canada. Today, I am not sure that a further enlargement of the G-7—of which it is difficult to say who the additional members would be in the future—would serve
to consolidate the original effort we had launched. I fear it might in fact dilute it. After all, the difference between the early summits and the current ones is already evident, as one has steadily moved away from a discussion among responsible, hands-on people to an official, more and more mediated encounter, with little gained in the process.

* On Europe-Asia as the “weak side” of the triangle:

Strengthening the Europe-Asia relationship is more necessary than ever, as personal experiences have shown me time and again. I remember for instance, shortly after the constitution of the U.S.-Pacific APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), being in Singapore for a meeting of the World Economic Forum during which many of us were struck to see that Europe was singularly absent at the governmental level. We spoke about this to our Singaporean friends – Mr. Lee Kwan Yew, as well as the Prime Minister of Singapore – and on my return to Paris I made it a point to tell our Quai d’Orsay and our Prime Minister how important it would be for us, Europeans, to be in a position to respond to the offer which Singapore was about to make to us: For we had agreed there that Singapore could indeed express the wish to organize something by way of a regular Europe-Asia forum where the countries of the European Union and Asia would meet regularly. This in the end was done. And it is indispensable, for one cannot deal with such matters exclusively through Japan; It is essential that there be an “individualized” dialogue with the countries of Asia, most notably ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations).

* On the Euro – towards a better-balanced “trilogue”:

The Euro clearly represents a considerable novelty – one that is doomed to alter deeply world monetary relations. After all until now, we only had one true world currency to speak of. The Euro marks the introduction of an important new “player”. A telling sign is the acute attention which Japan pays to the gestation of this single European currency. As so many Japanese have pointed out to me, the Euro means for them a new possibility to diversify their investments rather than staking them all in the United States. As a result, this possibility represents in turn a new element which the United States will have to take into account in its monetary and interest rates policies. Thus, I believe it can go a long way in giving new strength to a better-balanced trilateral relationship, with a more solid European pole.

* On the vitality and governance of our democracies:

Our democracies, in an uneven fashion, are undergoing a crisis which is the direct consequence of the years of great prosperity which they have known following World War II. This prosperity led to a growing individualism and a loss of the collective spirit. It has generated too a cult of money for money’s sake, threatening to undermine the respect for, and practice of, a number of values which had been the very strength of our societies. The emphasis on a trilateral relationship foisted around the summit carried enormous benefits for Japan. First, in the turbulent 1970s, Japan was concerned about its position as a lone outpost of the advanced, industrial world in Asia. The evolving trilateral relationship provided a kind of psychological safety net that reassured Japan that the international systems that protected its interests would be maintained and that Japan’s voice could be heard. Secondly, for Japan the trilateral relationship as a small multilateral grouping was in some ways more comfortable than the bilateral relationship with the United States; not as a substitute, but as a supplement to the U.S. relationship. Trilateralism gave Japan an opportunity to be associated with European countries of similar size and with some interests that were more compatible than those of the United States. Moreover, because the summits were initially more economic in nature, in view of Japan’s military phobia, it could participate more readily than in a more politically-oriented grouping.

Japan, however, was still unable to fully articulate its interests and positions, as was often only too painfully obvious; nor was Japan accepted into the formal summit inner core of the U.S., Great Britain, France, and West Germany.

In sum, the trilateral relationship has been enormously beneficial to Japan, in reinforcing its ties to the West and in helping develop a fuller sense of participation in international institutions and regimes which affect Japan’s welfare. At the same time, Japan was gradually improving the quality of its participation in such institutions.

This process of the assimilation of Japan into the postwar international system is an important test of whether the system is flexible enough to accommodate new countries, whose participation may create difficulties. We are still unsure of the outcome of this test because the recessionary atmosphere of the 1970s and early 1980s has placed new strains on the system.

(Rome, 1983).
Henry A. Kissinger:
I also want to say a word about the debt problem. I am no expert on how to solve the problem financially. But I do not believe that the crisis of last year was the end of the process. I believe a new crisis is almost inevitable. Of course, if the United States has a huge economic recovery, if commodity prices go up, if the trade balances of the developing countries go into surplus dramatically, then my prediction may be delayed or it may never come to pass; but the economists here have not convinced me that any one of these "ifs" is going to occur, much less a combination of them. Indeed, the measures that have been taken to overcome the crisis last year make a long-term solution less likely, simply because I do not believe that fifteen countries can practice austerity simultaneously without undermining the export possibilities of the developed countries and therefore their own export possibilities.

I know we are warned against sweeping plans that are not practical. And I'm not calling for a sweeping plan, much less an impractical sweeping plan. It seems to me we have two choices. One is to wait until a crisis occurs and then deal with it on an ad hoc basis. In those circumstances, it is highly likely that the crisis will be triggered by some radical government, that this government

will then be rewarded by having many of its demands met, and that we will therefore have contributed to the radicalization of the Third World. The other possibility is to analyze, at least quietly, what is likely to happen. It seems to me likely that somebody somewhere along the line will not live up to the conditions that the IMF is setting for them and will try to enforce a change in the terms. The trilateral
countries ought to address now, at least on a standby basis, what the wisest course is in such circumstances. Even better would be to try to channel the relationships of the developing countries to the developed countries into a positive direction before some radical political change in one of the key countries forces us to move.

(Rome, 1983).

Raymond Barre:
We can express our worry on two points:

- The policy mix in the United States has given too predominant a part to monetary policy. Budgetary policy has to contribute more to a balanced economic policy. A reduction of the budget deficit in the forthcoming years is the necessary condition for a durable deceleration of real interest rates in the United States and, consequently, in the world. This would make less difficult the solution of the debt problem and could contribute to more realistic exchange rate relationships.

- The wide fluctuations of the dollar, in the absence of any intervention by the Federal Reserve, is a factor of uncertainty and disequilibrium in world monetary relations. We wish that the American monetary authorities would agree to participate in a collective management of exchange rates through adequate interventions by central banks. Such interventions would not be intended to defend unrealistic exchange rates, but would reduce the erratic fluctuations of exchange rates. A new "Bretton Woods Conference" would take a long time. We can already initiate an exchange rate stabilization policy on practical grounds. Such a policy would help, in my opinion, to correct the undervaluation of the yen.

I have discussed present problems. But trilateral cooperation should not be limited to solving today's problems. Our main objective should be to work together in order to meet tomorrow's challenges. We need more confidence; let us show broad vision and statesmanship, for the benefit of all of us, for the benefit of world peace and progress.

(Rome, 1983).
ROME, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
TOKYO, SUMMER 1976 — To
improve trilateral consultation, we
offer certain additional, specific rec-
ommendations:

Trilateral Staff Group

A Trilateral Staff Group should be
established which would:

1. oversee the whole range of trilateral
   consultations and cooperation;

2. identify issues or problems on which
   such consultation is inadequate or non-
   existent and provide the necessary
   political drive to rectify this, through
   either the Trilateral Political
   Committee referred to below, the
   OECD or other agencies;

3. where no consensus exists and where
   no existing body can reasonably be
   charged with responsibility, designate a
   special consultative group, possibly of
   "wise men", to examine the problem and
   report back to the governments;

4. serve as an "early warning" system,
   alerting governments when a problem
   threatens to get out of hand or when a
   new problem appears on the horizon;

5. monitor the effectiveness of interna-
   tional institutions of particular inter-
   ests to trilateral governments.

These functions are essentially those of
coordination and the provision of the
necessary political direction, rather
than operational or policy-making
functions.

This group would meet regularly (not
less than twice yearly), but could also
be called into special session. Because
of the need to coordinate policy across
the whole range of governments' interna-
tional interests and to be able to give
high level political direction, its mem-
bers should be senior governmental
advisors with the personal confidence
of the heads of government. They might
therefore either be from the heads of
government's central staffs or from for-
ign ministries. Identification and des-
ignation of such officials would be
inevitably difficult for Japan and for
the European Community. For Japan,

The latter need was demonstrated by Japan's central role in the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, and
America's abandonment of the dollar's link with gold, in 1971-73. A sharp
rise in Japan's trade surpluses was the main counterpart to America's
rising deficit, which led the United States to seek a sizeable dollar
evaluation (mainly against the yen) and to apply an import surcharge
(aimed mainly at Japan) to promote that result. The United States even
applied its Trading with the Enemy Act against Japan during this period to
force economic concessions - a chilling reminder of discriminatory
American policies toward Japan in earlier eras.

In light of these developments, a few farsighted leaders in North
America and Western Europe concluded that it was essential to start
including Japanese leaders in an ongoing process of non-governmental
collaboration and consultation - what we would now call "track II"
diplomacy. The long-standing Bilderberg Group, which had already been
bringing North American and European leaders together for almost two
decades, was unwilling to include Japan despite proposals from some of the
same people. Hence it was necessary to create a new institution and the
Trilateral Commission was born.

There were of course other motives for creating the Commission. The
international economic order of the postwar period had collapsed, as noted,
raising the interwar specter of competitive depletions and trade
wars for the first time in the postwar period [1]. The first oil shock
intensified these economic problems and added to their potential political
implications. Detente had been launched but soon floundered and the Cold
War deepened. Informal discussions among the big industrial countries
were deemed essential for coming up with new ideas to deal with all these
problems and to build consensus, both among and within these countries, for
doing so.

But Japan was correctly viewed as an essential participant, indeed
hopefully a partner and eventually a co-leader, in all these areas. Its inclusion
was required both to help resolve "bilateral" problems between it and the
more mature industrial counties, and to incorporate its formidable assets in the
common struggle (a) against Communism and (b) for global economic
prosperity and stability. "Engagement with Japan" was the key strategic order
of the day and the Trilateral Commission was the chosen non-governmental
instrument to pursue it.

* The Trilateral Commission and China

The analysis that applied to Japan in 1973 applies to China today.
China is clearly the emerging superpower, already the third largest economy
on the basis of purchasing power parity. China has experienced almost two
decades of super-growth, just as Japan had done prior to 1973. China is
playing a central role in a global economic crisis, the Asian financial crisis, just
as Japan played a central role in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the
early 1970s [2].

Indeed, China in 1998 supersedes Japan in 1973 in several respects.
Its economic weight, relative to the other leading industrial economies, is
greater. Its holdings of foreign exchange are far greater; as late as 1967,
Japan's reserves were less than its 30-day liabilities to US banks. Its political
and security role, as a member of the Security Council and a nuclear power, is
undoubtedly greater. It has played a crucially constructive role in the Asian
crisis to date, by avoiding devaluation and speeding the acceleration of its
own economic reforms, whereas Japan had helped bring on the crisis of the
global trade and finance system in the early 1970s (and is exacerbating the
Asian crisis today) [3].

The imperative of concerted international effort to integrate China
now is, if anything, greater than the case for Japan a generation ago, China
is of course enormously wary of foreigners as a result of the invasions and occupations of the past century and a half, and particularly the contrast between that period and China's perceived global superiority for previous centuries (or millennia). China was indeed the world's largest economy as late as the middle of the nineteenth century, and the world's richest economy as late as 1600, so these self-perceptions have some validity. China's combination of superiority complex and paranoia makes extremely difficult its integration into the mainstream of the world community.

That difficulty is compounded by several other structural features of contemporary China. Despite its aggregate size and rapid growth, China is still a very poor country. On the most generous estimates (by the World Bank), its per capita income (about $2500) is only about 10 percent of the OECD countries. Quite appropriately, China thus thinks like a poor country on many issues and would have a very different perspective than other countries represented in the Commission.

Second, China is not yet a market economy despite its rapid progress toward reform. State-owned enterprises still account for about half of national output. At least one quarter of the loans of the banking system are nonperforming. The reform process is moving ahead rapidly and Li Peng has sent a goal of full marketization by 2010. For their part, the triilateral countries embrace significantly different models of capitalism. Nevertheless, the large element of command-and-control that still pervades China renders it qualitatively different from the other triilateral members.

Third, and perhaps most important, China is not a democracy. Some of the key creators of the Trilateral Commission, notably Zbigniew Brzezinski, argue that this is a defining characteristic of the countries that are represented in the Commission. He concludes that including China and Russia "would mean that the Commission... would simply become an international assembly".

Yet Zbig also agrees that "the third corner of triilateralism (Asia) can no longer be confined to Japan alone". He notes that a broadening of the membership would promote essential "reconciliation" between Japan and its neighbors. It would end the anomaly under which triilateral membership is "limited to only one nation in Asia while based on regional membership both in North America and in Europe". I would see no need to include Russia at this stage, though it could be brought in at a later date if it became a central global player, and would advocate simply that the Triilateral add China and thus become the Quadrilateral Commission.

There is another powerful reason to invite China to join the Commission. Unlike Japan in 1973, China is not a member of the key international governmental economic organizations. It has recently joined the BIS but is not in the G-7 or the OECD or even the WTO - nor is it likely to join them soon (4). Hence the Commission could play an even more central role with China that it did with Japan.

In light of the factors cited above - China's low level of per capita income, its lack of full marketization, its lack of democracy - it is of course true that the nature of the Commission would change if China became a member. This loss of clubboness, however, must be set against the potentially huge benefits of engagement of China in this way:

- Exposing a sizeable number of Chinese leaders to triilateral ways of thinking on a wide range of issues on a regular basis;

- Exposing triilateral leaders to Chinese ways of thinking on such issues, which may be at least as important for working successfully with them in the decades ahead;

- Signaling the willingness of "the West" to open one of its most prestigious nongovernmental institutions, and hence the importance it attaches to real engagement of China; and

the difficulty would derive from the lack of experience of high level staff officials working directly with the Prime Minister. For the European Community, the aim should be to have a single representative, though achievement of this aim would be made difficult by the primitive state of Community development and the certain resistance of the nine member governments to designating one person for this task.

Trilateral Political Committee

A Trilateral Political Committee should be established to discuss and, where possible and desirable, seek ways of coordinating foreign political activities of triilateral governments. The European Community Political Committee should be asked to designate the European representative on this Committee, and the CIEC pattern might be followed: one official from the European Commission and one from the member state currently president of the Council of Ministers.

United Nations

There should be regular triilateral discussion and cooperation with respect to United Nations business, principally in New York but also at other appropriate locations, such as Geneva.

OECD

The triilateral nations should recognize the value of the OECD and should agree to make more effective use of it as a flexible instrument at hand, ideally suited for more effective consultation - both among ministers and among high level experts.

Egidio Ortona
J. Robert Schaezel
Nobuhiko Ushiba
WASHINGTON D.C., PARIS, TOKYO, SUMMER 1976 – The objective of our proposals is to bring all issues of international interdependence under the governance of effective international rules and institutional arrangements. This requires the creation of a few new institutions and the reform of many existing institutions, each to pursue functionally specific tasks. It requires engaging all relevant actors in the decision making process, while at the same time developing collective leadership of the system and better coordination within and across issue-areas through joint management by small groups of key countries. It requires national willingness to submit important issues to international institutional determination and to accept representation by other countries at some stages of the decision making process, and more effective management in the institutions themselves to win confidence in national capitals and hence spur the process.

History has shown that effective international institutions can diffuse conflicts among nations and deter globally harmful outcomes, which are not only possible but probable in the absence of such institutions. Indeed, such institutions can often promote outcomes in which all countries benefit from higher degrees of international cooperation. International interdependence is expanding rapidly in a whole range of issue-areas. So is its antithesis, nationalist opposition to international approaches. Hence a high priority must be attached to the further evolution of international institutional arrangements.

- Importing a new mission and sense of purpose to the Commission itself.

The alternative of inviting a few individuals from throughout Asia, the course on which the Commission is now embarked, is decidedly inferior. It is more likely to lead, as Zbig puts it, to the Commission’s becoming “simply an international assembly”. It treats China just like Thailand or the Philippines – which it is not, and which message it is not likely to appreciate. It means that only a handful of Chinese will ever be involved with the Commission, clearly limiting the scope of potential engagement benefits. Most importantly, this alternative foregoes an opportunity to induce China to take the Commission and its work seriously — which it would certainly do if invited to join as a country, requiring a high-level political decision to do so at the outset and the assignment of top people to the effort on an ongoing basis.

* A new mission for a Quadrilateral Commission

It would admittedly be a gamble for the Commission to invite China to join. The result could be stifling, formalistic discussions that destroyed the relative spontaneity and candor that now mark our discussions.

On the other hand, the payoff could be enormous. China’s integration into the world community is probably the paramount foreign policy challenge of the next decade or two. “Track II” procedures can be extremely useful in such circumstances. The Commission could generate a quantum leap in the engagement of the next global superpower.

From the standpoint of the Commission, adding China would generate a new mission and purpose. As now structured, the Commission can continue to have interesting discussions and offer a useful opportunity for contact among the members. But it is unlikely to recreate the dynamism of its early days without defining a new purpose that could trigger new enthusiasm, new participants, new funding and new impact.

The creation of the Commission in 1973, with its focus on integrating Japan into the world community, was also a gamble. A small group of far-sighted Japanese were intensely interested but even they were unsure whether their country would participate meaningfully and whether the effort would pay off. The impact is difficult to judge, even ex post, but most of us believe that the results, if far from perfect, were positive and substantial.

I therefore believe that the time has come for the Commission to become Quadrilateral rather than Trilateral. The inclusion of China at the outset of the twenty-first century would parallel the inclusion of Japan at the outset of the last quarter of the twentieth. The second Asian superpower would be treated and encouraged like the first. The effort would bring the Commission a new mission worthy of those who have labored so long and so well to guide it successfully through its first quarter century, and to challenge a new generation of leaders to guide it through its second.

3 On the other hand, China’s currency is not yet fully convertible and it is not yet a member of the World Trade Organization. See below.
4 I personally advocate early Chinese membership in the G-7 of Finance Ministers but agree that it should not be invited to G-7 summits until it democratizes.
TOKYO, February 27, 1998 – Japan’s participation in international policy dialogue had just begun when Japan was asked to be a founding member of the Trilateral Commission. The Shimoda Conference, perhaps the first major private-level conference on the U.S.-Japan relationship, took place in September 1967. It was the first large-scale conference to use professional simultaneous interpreting services. We discussed the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, and we debated one of the first bilateral trade disputes – the textile conflict. A large leftist demonstration visited the conference hall, and they taunted me, as a secretary of the conference, as the “running dog of American imperialists!” The central committee of the Japan Socialist Party banned its members from participating in the conference.

In the following years, as Japan suddenly emerged as a major economic power, Japanese participation was expected in many major international conferences. I characterized Japan’s participation in the international dialogue around this time as the “Okita syndrome”. Saburo Okita, an economist and later foreign minister, was one of a handful of Japanese who were capable of attending these conferences. It seemed that Okita was the only Japanese in all the important international meetings around that time.

There was a great deal of skepticism on my part about Japan’s participation as a co-equal partner of the dialogue when I accompanied Kiichi Miyazawa, Saburo Okita, and

The world has already entered its third postwar wave of institution-building. The first wave came immediately after 1945, with the creation of the United Nations system and its economic components – particularly the Bretton Woods institutions. The second came around 1960 and included the Common Market, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the regional development banks and – though it was barely noticed at the time – OPEC. The third wave began around 1973 and continues to this day. It has witnessed creation of a United Nations Environment Program, a World Food Council, an International Energy Agency, a series of “producers associations” of exporters of primary products, and most recently the CIEC (Conference on International Economic Cooperation) with its four standing commissions.

The first and second postwar waves of international institution-building made the world safe for the explosion of interdependence of the last generation, which has been a central element in the explosion of prosperity and the maintenance of peace. Imaginative conclusion of the third wave is necessary to insure such results for the next generation. It must rank high on the foreign policy agendas of all countries.

C. Fred Bergsten
Georges Berthoin
Kinjiro Mushakoji
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1996 — ... I was immediately drawn to the idea of a Trilateral Commission that was laid out for me by Henry Owen and Zbigniew Brzezinski as I was finishing my duties as head of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1972. In one of my talks with Nixon and Kissinger in January 1973 before I left government, I broached the subject. Both men said they had heard of the Trilateral Commission proposal and indicated they thought the idea of my joining was great. Kissinger even said he would like to help the Commission as much as possible...

...So, after resigning from the Nixon administration, I became the North American Chairman of the Trilateral Commission. I served in this capacity for more than four years and attended meetings in Europe, Japan and North America. My counterparts in these early days were Georges Berthoin and Takeshi Watanabe who had played, and would continue to play, a key role in postwar Japanese international economic policy...

...Success of the Trilateral Commission was not preordained, and it went through struggles and debates before becoming firmly established as a major voice in foreign policy debates. Its founders clearly had their eyes upon this goal. As stated in a letter sent to prospective members in 1973, the Commission's aims were:

(a) to propose policies which the Member States of the European Community, and the European Community itself, the United States and Canada, and Japan could follow in

1. their economic relations;
2. their political and defense relations;
3. their economic and political relations with developing countries;
4. their relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and with China;

(b) to gain acceptance of these policies.

One important objective of the Trilateral Commission was to bring the Japanese members into closer relations with the members from North America and Kihide Mushakoji, and English- and French-speaking international relations expert, to Pocantico in 1972 to join the discussion on the feasibility of creating the Trilateral Commission. I remember pointing out in the meeting the difficulties of recruiting Japanese members who could speak in English or express their views in a large international gathering. Miyazawa suggested that the most the Japanese group could raise for this kind of exercise would be about 7 million Yen a year.

Yet, Japanese leaders did not feel badly about the invitation David Rockefeller personally extended to Japan to be a founding member of the new international forum. Takeo Fukuda, then foreign minister, strongly endorsed the idea when Rockefeller, along with Zbig Brzezinski, presented it to him. This was the time when Japan was beginning to be awakened to its role and responsibility as a global power. I had been noticing the changing pattern of Japan's international dialogue. It was not enough any more to explain Japan's peculiarities. The question then was not so much how Japan decides as what Japan decides upon; less how Japan goes than where Japan will go. Japan was expected to start defining its international role.

The Trilateral Commission provided Japan, at that important juncture of its post-World War II history, with the opportunity to participate in the joint analysis and exploration of the future shape of the international order along with the "Western powers" Japan had been emulating throughout its modernization process.

The early period of Japan's participation in the dialogue was timid and faltering. I remember that in the earlier plenary meetings I used to pass a note to the Japanese participants urging them to speak out. It was not uncommon to witness some leading Japanese figures standing alone at the cocktail receptions, not joining the circles of animated conversation among the North American and European members. The Japanese group refused to take up the international security issues until 1983, for fear of being criticized inside Japan for engaging in discussion of collective security, an act considered to be unconstitutional. I believe it was at the time of the Paris plenary meeting in 1975 that Rockefeller, concerned about the uncertain participation of the Japanese group, took me for a walk after a dinner meeting to ask me in what ways he might be able to help the Japanese group, in a discreet manner of course.

It did not take so many years, however, before the Japanese commissioners began to participate more actively and more confidently in the policy discussion, perhaps reflecting the growing influence of Japan in the world economy and even in
international politics. Brzezinski, at the plenary meeting in 1979, tallied the number of interventions of the participants from the three regions and declared that the frequency of Japanese interventions equaled that of the other two regions.

Then came the "Miyazawa speech" (see page 19) at the London Plenary in 1980 titled "To Meet the Challenge". The enthusiastic reception of the speech by the North American and European commissioners, who regarded the speech to be a "watershed" in the life of the Trilateral Commission, was almost surprising to me. The speech, which emphasized the importance of maintaining "alliance relationship" among the three regions, was taken as a clear sign that Japan had finally become a full-fledged trilateral partner.

For Japan to explore its international role commensurate to its economic power, the trilateral context was opportune and productive. Just before the creation of the Trilateral Commission, Japan was shaken by the "Nixon Shock" of a sudden rapprochement between the United States and China in July 1971. It put into doubt the previously unshakable assumption of Japan's foreign policy, namely, sticking close to the United States. It was perhaps a healthy development to think of ways to fulfill its international responsibilities, getting away from the post-war mentality of hierarchical relationship with the United States. Moreover, the format of the Trilateral Commission provided Japanese leaders with the opportunity of "developing a habit of working together" with the leaders of other advanced industrial democracies.

Nevertheless, the challenges for Japan to be a fuller partner of the dialogue still continue. While Japan started getting better represented in the work of the Trilateral Commission, some fundamental constraints against fuller participation have remained. They include a shortage of human resources qualified to carry out international dialogue; a lack of emphasis on policy research in Japan's intellectual tradition; a dearth of independent policy research institutions, and very limited private funding sources. Such constraints have become more pronounced as Japan was expected to be represented in an increasing number of private level international fora. The demand side of Japan's international involvement has been getting larger than the increase of the supply side.

There is another kind of challenge for Japan as one of the three pillars of the Trilateral relationship. A growing influence of the Asian region in the international affairs can no longer allow Japan to be a single-nation region. In what ways participation of these Asian nations in the dialogue process in the work of building a new international order is a new challenge for Japan which is a leading nation in Asia. Obviously, Japan can meet such a new challenge only through ever closer collaboration with its trilateral partners with whom Japan has developed such a close sense of alliance relationship over the past 25 years. and Europe, and so engage Japan more strongly in international affairs, giving them a voice, and responsibilities commensurate with their growing economic power. To achieve this, it was important to have Japan as an equal partner within the Commission from the outset. I was very keen on this point in particular. In all of the chairmen's meetings, I was concerned to make sure Japan pulled its weight as an equal, and so I put pressure on the Japanese members to this end. I worked to pull Watanabe into discussions and planning. I believe the Trilateral Commission performed a useful and important function in bringing Japanese members into the European-American dialogue. This was not easy because at first the Japanese found it awkward and unfamiliar to engage in the freewheeling exchange of views preferred by the Americans and the Europeans. After the first meetings, though, the Japanese became more at home in this type of international exchange and I think that it proved to be a useful instrument for discussing matters of common interest. As recent developments underscore, ranging from the tensions during the Gulf War to long-standing trade frictions, the effort to engage the Japanese more deeply in international affairs is an ongoing one that remains crucial to U.S.-Japanese relations...

...Far from being an international conspiracy, the Trilateral Commission actually debated seriously in 1976 whether it should consider its work done and close up shop after its initial three-year run. The consensus was that the Commission still had important work to do.

Gerard C. Smith
Europe –
Deepening and Enlarging Too

BRUSSELS, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, OCTOBER 19, 1991 – ... Such is therefore the web which we are weaving; yet it does not prevent us from asking, as early as today, the question which enlarged membership raises: "What will be tomorrow's Community?" And here, it must be said at the outset, there is on our part no reticence nor refusal to consider that the Community might include one day 24, 30 and – if Yugoslavia separates into six republics – 35 countries. The question becomes: "What will this Community be like?". On this, I believe that we have to consider this issue in a pragmatic fashion, in two stages. In the first stage, we have to decide what marriage contract will come out of Maastricht; What type of configuration and commitment for the Community; What advantages are to be expected, but also what constraints, and what concept for a European foreign and defense policy. For there will be an agreement at Maastricht: Our only worry is that it might be ill-conceived. Whatever agreement we reach in Maastricht, all those who ask to adhere now, as well as those who have already applied like Sweden or Austria, will be able to judge for themselves whether they want to enter into this marriage contract.

Second, and in spite of what many intellectuals and experts are saying, I believe that if Messrs. Walesa, Antall

ABOARD THE "EUROSTAR", February 18, 1998 – Back in the early Seventies, as the Representative of the European Commission in London, I had the good fortune to cross the paths of some of the best diplomats and colleagues of the time – people who held Europe at heart, and didn't hesitate to risk going beyond their respective instructions from headquarters. As a result, in 1970, 1971 and 1972, we had many personal discussions as to how to take fully into account two important new realities:

* One was the emergence of JAPAN, from an erstwhile "developing country" into a highly industrialized democracy, on the world scene.

* The second was EUROPE's "comeback" as an increasingly united entity, as the Six were preparing to enlarge for the first time to include the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland.

By then, the government of Japan had already taken official initiatives to establish some sort of "trilateral" structure – but they had been quickly shot down in Paris, London and Bonn. Thus, when I first heard of the private initiative undertaken by David Rockefeller at the suggestion of Zbigniew Brzezinski, I devoted my efforts to help it gain ground, especially in Europe.

Having become a private citizen in July, 1973, I was then in a position to dedicate all my energies to the success of this initiative – in the face, initially, of strong hostility from French official circles enamoured with an empty-chair policy. Which led me, as
a European, to attend the inaugural meeting of the Trilateral Commission only as an observer, in the absence of a French group. However, that also gave me complete liberty to militate strongly, from a purely European point of view, in favor of a genuine trilateral relationship among equals. This European dimension helped bring about that remarkable trilateral structure and method of working which explains, in turn, why our Commission has been able to remain as legitimate, relevant and dynamic, 25 years after its fledgling beginnings.

For it became clear, very early then, that the internal problems of the European Community were thwarting the role many of us had in mind for Europe. With a few friends, I decided therefore that, in the trilateral context at least, we might seek the kind of cohesion which our governments were so slow to achieve. Hence the creation of the annual meetings of the Trilateral Commission's European group, which were by now recognized by our Japanese and North American colleagues as outstanding and, in their own way, almost as significant as the Trilateral Commission's annual conferences. And we went even further, pioneering over the years the Commission's opening to the South, and to the East, even before our governments had decided to do so for the European Union.

In that very same spirit, some of us today remain very active in trying to help the Trilateral Commission play an equally pioneering role meet the challenges of managing globalization in a multipolar world which is very different from that which existed back 1973.

In many ways, the European experience I had gathered working for so long at Jean Monnet's side helped us in turn as a Commission to "influence", in a discreet, low-profile fashion, the course of events. Thus the question of our so-called influence has been raised so often, and in most cases in a polemical way. The truth of the matter is that, always respectful of the roles of governments, corporations, trade unions, and other political or voluntary organizations, we never perceived our role as that of lecturing or lobbying them. For we were fully aware that we had no legitimacy for that. Rather, we concentrated on selecting those issues or challenges which, to our collective mind, seemed to warrant a decidedly trilateral approach. Thus, the Japanese, North American and European authors of our reports had the

and Vaclav Havel were to join the Community within two years – and even if we were to increase our assistance to their countries – their economies would not be in a position to meet the competitive constraints as they are today at work on the European market. When some, in France for instance, say that we are trying to substitute a Curtain of Money for the Iron Curtain, I tell them that it is pure and simple propaganda. This has no connection with realities – and even if, for instance, we multiplied by four sums which we already dedicate now to regions which are experiencing difficulties and tried to explain to our taxpayers what it is all about, I know their economies could not stand the shock. Let us therefore try the gradual way.

Simply, the Community must know that after Maastricht it will have to deliver a strong political signal allowing each and everyone that there will be room one day, if they so wish, within the Community; and that this strong political signal will have to be reflected – in my view at least – most notably in the area of foreign policy, through close concertation among the current twelve Community members and the other European countries.

Thirdly, many people reproach our Community for concentrating exclusively on Europe. That is wrong, but it could become true. This is why the
Community must be constantly reminded of its worldwide responsibilities – if indeed it is capable of sharing global responsibilities, and if its member states wanted to (of which I am not certain for the moment) ... In my view, it must affirm itself in particular with regard to the North-South problem – for the Eastern flank which has preoccupied us so far must never allow us to forget its Southern flank. In any event, the Community, beyond the transatlantic dimension of its external relations, must solidly determine its attitude towards Japan and, beyond, the whole of Asia.

Jacques Delors
(from his address to the European group of the Trilateral Commission).

mandate to make a trilateral diagnosis and submit propositions and recommendations to be discussed both inside and outside the Commission during their often intensive process of consultations as well as at our plenary meetings. In this fashion, when a given issue would arise as a practical policy problem, we were often able to show that a solution was indeed possible, and even to elicit a substantial degree of acceptance from people who, in a different context, would not have been prepared to take into consideration the interest which they had in common.

There are bound to be many more instances, on today's and tomorrow's world scene, which will require this fundamental quest for this often elusive "common interest". To have developed over the years a natural ability to spot such instances in advance and to freely suggest among ourselves practical, realistic solutions is in my view perhaps the greatest virtue of an independent, private organization such as the Trilateral Commission. □
PARIS, February 12, 1998 – The first time I attended a Trilateral Commission meeting as a participant was maybe a dozen years ago. At lunch time one day, I decided to show I understood the spirit by sitting down at a table where there were already several Japanese. It was a misery. They were too shy, or self-contained, to speak to me so I tried to initiate some conversation. I asked some banal questions. They showed consternation. I made some trite remarks. They giggled. There was no way to launch an exchange. Finally I gave up and finished the meal in silence, relieved when the speaker stood up and provided someone to listen to.

There has been a dramatic change. I noticed it particularly each time I went to a meeting in Tokyo. Over the years, Japanese participants began to speak more and more openly, even self-critically as we Americans and Europeans do about our own countries’ affairs. At first, the trilateralism was purely formal, a polite encounter that added nothing to my understanding nor. I must suppose, to that of the Japanese I met. Gradually, taboos disappeared and it became possible to talk about culturally and politically sensitive subjects. I learned about gaijatsu, the subtle Japanese way of advancing reform considered desirable but likely to meet vested resistance by claiming that foreign pressure made it inescapable.

And the people who told me about it laughed. Now we can share jokes on ourselves. Maybe something similar happens with other east-west groups after a while, but I doubt that there is
Die Trilaterale Kommission stellt sich neuen Themen

Como funciona a Comissão

Un «gobierno mundial» de 300 miembros

La Comisión Trilateral estudio en París "la Europa de 1992"

Suomi isännöi viikonlopen huippuluokan konferenssia

Korkea taso keskusteli Naton laajenemisesta

Per la «Trilaterale»

Un discorso di Fanfa

Die Vordenker sind nachdenklich geworden

loggia occulta o innocuo club?

Europe Must Keep Its People Involved if Union Is to Survive

La «Trilatérale»: société influente

Six Steps for a Trilateral Grand Egalité

Una certeina élite

Owen, Saburo Okita y Zbigniew Brzezinski

Su la tecnica al servizio di uno sviluppo pluriattersale
another forum which has succeeded so well as the Trilateral in bringing this comfortable atmosphere to meetings of so many representative and influential people. Now it is a real equilateral triangle.

But of course the sides have major differences, that's why it's worth bringing them together. It amused me at a meeting to see a line of a hundred or so ardent young pickets standing across the street from the hotel. They had banners denouncing the Trilateral Commission as a conspiracy of multinational capitalists to take over the world and run it for their own benefit. The same theme was often heard from political commentators in many European countries. Trilateral was a menace and an enemy.

At the same time, in the United States there was a steady stream of attack from right-wing groups denouncing the Commission as a communist conspiracy, a menace and an enemy with that secret communist David Rockefeller at the head. I don't think either the leftists or the rightists were aware that the Trilateral was under fire from both sides. But in the end, this double barrage probably helped to establish the perception that the Commission's motives were just what is said they were, to help establish warmer and smoother relations among the three sides.

In the post-war period, there had been an intense effort to bring individuals from the American and European establishments together for this purpose and it worked to good effect. The Dutch-sponsored series of annual meetings called Bilderberg, after the place of the first session, was the prime example. The time came when Japan was playing too big a role in the world to be left out, so a new model was launched. There was a deliberate attempt to recruit "corners", not so well-known people in not so evident positions of power likely to have growing influence. That was how a young Governor of Georgia named Jimmy Carter developed some experience in foreign affairs through the Trilateral well before he won the responsibility of conducting U.S. policy.

Now there are always old friends and fascinating new people to meet here, a special occasion. I hate to miss it.

Finis.

THE sort of people who used to believe the Freemasons ran the world are now more likely to get paranoiaic about the Tri-
lateral Commission. They may be closer to the mark. The commission, founded 19 years ago to bring together the rich and powerful from Japan, North America and Europe, has been highly successful in this endeavour.

Consider: the chairman of the North American branch of the commission is Paul Volcker, the former head of the Federal Reserve; the Japanese end is run by Akihiko Morita, the head of Sony; and the European chairman is Count Otto Lamborghini, the leader of the Free Democratic Party in Germany. The list would be even more impressive were it not that trilateralists have to resign from the 325-member commission when they take up any position in government.

Both George Bush and Jimmy Carter were once trilateralists, and both filled their cabinets with fellow travellers: men like Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger and Richard Darman under Mr Bush, and Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance under Mr Carter. Bill Clinton joined the organisation in the late 1980s, although the North American organiser of the commission says sorrowfully that he was "not an active member"—ie, he never turned up for meetings.

The fact that so many powerful people of different political persuasions and nationalities meet periodically for secret discussions has inevitably attracted the attention of conspiracy theorists. Pat Robertson, the evangelist and one-time candidate for the American presidency, suspects the Trilateral Commission of trying to create a world government and has said that he thinks it springs "from the depth of something evil".

The trilateralists deny this. They say all they do is hold seminars and publish reports. Dull, perhaps, but hardly evil.

(December 26, 1993
The Economist)
OTTAWA, 1993 — ...Not long after we were married in 1976, Jeannette and I were listening to a public-affairs broadcast on CBC radio. A commentator was waxing eloquent about a nefarious international conspiracy, said to be led by David Rockefeller and multinational corporations, called the Trilateral Commission. 'Darling', I said, 'do you realize that, according to that speaker, you married an important man. David Rockefeller and I are trying to run the world!'

I had by that time stepped down from cabinet and had just become the head of the Canadian group and deputy chairman for North America of the Trilateral Commission...

...Its greatest contribution to international cooperation, in my opinion, arose from the inclusion of Japan as a founding member of the triangle, equal in status to the United States and Europe. Until then, the membership of most such international organizations was drawn mainly from the Atlantic countries. At first, the Japanese members were slow to participate in this unfamiliar setting and in the English language. Within a decade or so they were taking up about a third of the discussion time at trilateral meetings, even differing among themselves. Discussions revolved around studies on important issues of the day selected by the executive and written by three authors, one from each region, ensuring that the Japanese point of view was never ignored. Over the years, there were a number of distinguished Canadian authors.

Mitchell Sharp
(from "Which Reminds Me... A Memoir", Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

TORONTO, DECEMBER 1973 — From the Canadian members of the Commission:

One of the unusually promising features of the Trilateral Commission proposal is its commitment to a continuing dialogue over a period as long as three years (as contrasted with many "one-shot" international endeavours) and its

Ottawa, January 15, 1998 — Anniversaries serve not only to commemorate events in the past. They can also be a powerful stimulus to reflection.

On this, the 25th Anniversary of the founding of the Trilateral Commission, it is timely to think of how the world has changed since the organization was founded and what lies ahead.

How different the world was when David Rockefeller and Zbig Brzezinski decided to launch the Trilateral Commission as a demonstration to the United States' allies that there was another dimension to American foreign policy than that represented by the Nixon "shocks".

I remember how incensed we in Canada were when, in 1971, the President introduced across the board import surcharges. Even though Canada had a trade surplus with the United States, our current account was in substantial deficit. So we felt in no way responsible for the U.S. deficit and considered that we were being unfairly picked upon. The fact that 75 per cent of our trade was with the United States made us particularly worried. But when we sought an exemption from Secretary Connally — as had been granted some years earlier when the United States had introduced financial measures with significant international impact — our urgent request was rebuffed.

In the face of this experience, it was natural that Canada welcomed the proposal to establish the Trilateral Commission. Not surprisingly, Canadians felt economically vulnerable in the face of the harsh measures adopted by President Nixon. The natural reaction was to look for ways to build stronger relations with other countries. Accordingly, David Rockefeller's invitation to the industrialized nations — Canada's other main trading partners — to join in forming the Trilateral Commission was extremely attractive, in that it responded to Canada's own interests.

In retrospect we can now see that by 1972, when preliminary discussion on establishing the Commission was
launched, the United States had arrived at a crossroads in terms of its international economic relations. America’s easy and overwhelming economic dominance of the post-war world was coming to an end. The United States government had concluded that it could no longer afford to turn the other cheek and ignore the protective actions of other states.

There were other prominent features of the context in which the Commission was formed. The European Common Market had only just (January, 1972) agreed to its first increase in membership, with Britain’s efforts to join finally approved by the six founding members (along with Ireland and Denmark). Japan was still an insecure ally, linked almost exclusively with the United States. Not surprisingly Japan shared Canada’s view of the “Nixon shocks”, seeing them as a kind of betrayal by a close friend.

Rendering these emotions more intense was the fact that the Cold War remained in its acute phase, with the non-Communist world dependent for its protection on United States power. The Helsinki process was only just getting underway and East-West rivalry remained intense. Communist China was just beginning to recover from the extremes of Maoism and to break out of its almost total isolation.

In this bipolar world the Rockefeller initiative – launching the Trilateral Commission – was welcome as evidence that influential members of the U.S. body politic remained committed to and wished to affirm its internationalist perspective on relations among allies. The bridges built through the Trilateral Commission have had widespread ramifications. They have surely contributed significantly to facilitating the development of good and easy relations between Japanese and other Commissioners from North America and Europe, initially within the Commission and subsequently in the wider world.

The reputation of the Commission in Canada, and probably also in the United States, has suffered from a perception that developed when Jimmy Carter, a former Commissioner, was elected President in 1976. When he proceeded to appoint some eight American Commissioners to his cabinet, an unfortunate impression gained currency that the Commission was a powerful hidden force. Even now the conspiracy theory based on this misperception continues to affect the way that some Canadians view the organization. While this still very occasionally results in sensational commentaries in the popular media, it fortunately has not affected its reputation among international policy makers.

The Commission has from the first provided a forum for discussion among extremely knowledgeable people of current problems. Discussions assisted by excellent papers prepared by international experts from all three continents.

By design, membership in the Commission has not been open to representatives of the executive branches of member states, although they are invited to speak at the annual meetings. Efforts that have been made to include trade union leaders as Commissioners have borne little fruit. Few have chosen to participate. Membership has as a result been drawn mainly from the upper echelons of the private sector, academia and former public servants. As a consequence, apart from a sounding board on policy, the Commission has served primarily as a superb forum for international networking among the private sector.

recognition that the first priority is to "develop the habit of working together" among participants from the different regions. Given the basic nature of some of the communication gaps we are attempting to bridge, this process cannot be overly rushed.

The Canadian Group would, therefore, suggest the following points as general guidelines for our endeavours, at least for the first year. After that time, it would be appropriate to reassess the approach in the light of experience.

1. The first priority must be to establish confidence and communication among Commissioners. This should involve members of the Commission to the greatest possible extent.

2. We must work to establish the credibility of the Commission among broad groups in our countries. The setting of realistic targets for achievement and the fullest possible involvement of every Commissioner in expanded trilateral dialogue are prerequisites to effective impact.
3. While our discussions must focus on important issues in order to have relevance and precision, the Commission should not necessarily attempt to advocate very specific plans of action for immediate implementation by Governments. In many areas, any number of specific plans might work if the underlying principles were commonly accepted. This latter area is, perhaps, the most appropriate domain for the Trilateral Commission.

4. Another role which might be a very valuable, and probably unique, contribution of the Commission in the near future would be to attempt to provide "distant early warning" of areas where breakdowns in international co-operation might occur over the next few years. To counteract one of the most important root causes of present international problems – the inability to anticipate international difficulties early enough for effective common action – the Commission might also give high priority to devising continuing international machinery for "distant early warning" of problems just over the international horizon.

(a Canadian contribution on the role of the Trilateral Commission).

LONDON, 1973 - The men organizing the Commission want it to take new looks at things. But not for abstract purposes... they want to bring about action, and hence they want the new body to be a marriage of the intellectual and the influential."

(from the Economist).

The basic structure of the Trilateral Commission – separate Commissions in Europe, North America and Japan with some countries having the status of quasi-autonomous groups within their continental entities – has served the organization well. For Europe the formula has been especially effective. With the exception of Norway which had been admitted in the expectation that it would join the Common Market, membership has been open to countries as they have joined the Community. In this way the European Commission has been able to adjust easily to changing circumstances.

From the Canadian perspective, the structure initially raised a concern: Was Canada at risk of being smothered in the North American commission? To avoid such a situation, Canadian Commissioners insisted from the start on being recognized as a quasi-autonomous group within the North American Commission. Initially Zbigniew Brzezinski was apprehensive, fearing that Canadians would use Commission meetings to try to secure international support for Canadian positions when the two countries were in dispute. He even wondered out loud whether it might be a mistake to include Canada in the Commission. Happily it was agreed that Canadians could set up a small secretariat on their own and maintain contact with their own Commissioners. In fact, I cannot remember any problems arising. The decision taken some years later to invite the chair of the Canadian group to serve as vice-chair of the North American Commission demonstrated that this initial concern was not justified.

With the adoption in 1988 of the Free Trade Agreement in North America, the North American Commission achieved a situation comparable to the European Commission, that is to say, the Commission membership coincided with the members of the Free Trade Agreement in the continent of North America. However, the subsequent entry of Mexico, which is not a member of the Commission, into the expanded North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 ended this symmetry and highlighted a dilemma which the Trilateral Commission continues to face. Globalization, combined with the end of the Cold War, has enlarged the number of actors on the international stage and has raised questions about the representativeness of the current membership of the Commission. Efforts are being made to address this deficiency by inviting prominent citizens of major countries that are not members of the Commission to participate on an ongoing basis in a personal capacity. This has been a welcome development. But we Canadians believe it would be desirable to go further, lest the potential of the Commission be diminished.

For Canada the Commission in microcosm conforms closely with its basic foreign policy objectives. We have and wish to retain close and special relations with the United States. At the same time, we want our separate identity to be recognized. We also appreciate and welcome membership in a larger group of countries with whom our interests coincide.

As Mitchell Sharp, a former Canadian Minister of External Affairs and subsequently a chairman of the Canadian group, wrote in his memoirs, the structure of the North American Commission has served to demonstrate "that North America is not synonymous with the United States and that there is a distinctly Canadian point of view".
MADRID, January 27, 1998 – The Trilateral Commission was born 25 years ago with, as one of its cardinal goals, to improve an open society in Japan, the incorporation of its most influential elements into the Atlantic oligarchy, and to promote among the Japanese society democratic and liberal values.

Other fora, no matter how prestigious, had met insurmountable obstacles to such overtures. To succeed, it took the patrician dynamism of David Rockefeller who launched what was to become the Trilateral Commission. With the Commission holding a plenary meeting of its members every three years in Japan, we have been able to witness the growing and irreversible success of its project: Japan, with its peculiarities and problems, but also with its remarkable capabilities, has in effect become a more and more active member of the world’s leadership. In contrast with past historical experiences, Japan plays on the same field and elbow-to-elbow with the other great political democracies with open societies and market economies.

Through its work of information, analysis and contacts, the Commission has contributed decisively to this process. This is why, now that the time has come to promote these same values of economic, political and social freedom in the Russian society, the Chinese society or among the great South American nations, many are those who think that somehow a “Trilateral” Commission – only, with a tetra-or penta-partite scope – could assume again, in its quiet and efficient way, the same pedagogical role. Trilateralism would thus reflect a better future for all, while nurturing

LISBON, APRIL 24, 1992 – We will not succeed in exporting our values and our way of living, if you allow me to be trilateral for a second, if we are not patient in persuading others of the need for a sustained change in economic regime, including the understanding that inflation is a hidden tax, a regressive hidden tax. We’re trying, and we will continue to try until the next election. We believe there is a great deal of consensus that will emerge, because we don’t believe there is any other way. We don’t believe in a brutal engineered recession, which some fundamentalist countries have attempted to introduce in order to get rid of inflation, with results that are idiosyncratic, attached to a particular person no matter how courageous. That’s not the Portuguese way. I propose this to you with very profound political conviction. The battle against inflation must be sustained. If it is not sustained, if you are too ambitious at the beginning, you fail...

... Let me conclude with a point that is philosophical in nature. We wonder often in Portugal about how long you have to be virtuous to be taken seriously. The Calvinist would say, “You gotta do it for a long, long time”. Catholics are a bit less exacting, I would say, and I think they are right – we are right. Reputation is something you can lose very quickly, and you should not be discriminated against because you are acquiring it fast, independently of where you were. You might say, “Well, Portugal has managed to bring back sound fiscal management because even when it was a picturesque village it already had that.” You might argue the same way for some of the Central European countries. We don’t like that. What we like is a popular proverb which I will leave with you and which exactly states, I would say, the philosophy of the government and of our country: “Slowly, we go far away.”

Jorge Braga de Macedo
(from discussion at the 1992 Trilateral Commission Plenary Meeting in Lisbon).
MADRID, MAY 18, 1986 – I am pleased that you are in Spain and that you chose to meet in Spain for the first time since the creation of the Trilateral Commission, for it implies a recognition of Spain and a recognition of the transition and changes which have occurred in our country.

I believe Spain is living through thrilling moments, although with some technical difficulties which can be overcome. This decade has been full of events. I would summarize them as a profound internal transformation towards democratization, living together in peace and freedom, overcoming some of our contemporary history, a history which was not easy.

The transition has occurred peacefully, by overcoming problems of intolerance and impatience which accompanied us during the 19th century and into the second half of the 20th century. The result has been free and peaceful cohabitation, a deep, serious understanding of the democratic rules of the game. The society is tolerant and is politically situated in the temperate zone, excluding extremism and sectarianism of any sort. This is the real force of our system. This is the key which explains the political process, over and above who has the majority and who is minister at any given time. Society prevents any partisan or governmental attitudes from going beyond this limit; this zone tempered by a certain intellectual relativism and the acceptance of contraries not as enemies but in all cases as political adversaries to be respected...

...At the same time as this internal democratic political transformation, there also occurred a phenomenon related to it, that of overcoming the historical isolation of Spain. Spain has opened itself to the world in which it belongs; it strengthened the ties which unite it traditionally, historically, culturally, and I would say alsoaternally, with the Latin American continent. And it has opened to Europe in a short period of time.

Recent events express what I wish to say, not as Prime Minister but as a Spanish citizen, of the historical and political evolution of Spain. Between the present solidarity among the great open societies and enlarging their horizons.

It is clear that such a project, when it was first initiated, could only appeal to a Spain which, throughout the second half of the Seventies, was evolving from authoritarianism to democracy; from a still overprotected economy to internationalization; and from a closed society to an open one. Spanish society, which had grown economically during the Sixties, was eager to draw the political consequences of its development. The transition to democracy, led by the King between 1976 and 1978, did turn these aspirations into reality. And as soon as this historic process was completed, our country gained entry into the Trilateral Commission, in 1979.

Spain, together with Portugal, was a laboratory for an early process of democratization which has become today a global one. To such an extent that inviting Spain to take part in such an experience was in itself a challenge for the Commission.

Thus - even though Spain's candidacy to the European Community had been merely accepted and while full Atlantic membership was still far away - the Spanish group of Trilateral promptly organized itself and became active as soon as the democratic Constitution was approved by referendum. Today, with Spain being part of all international fora and Spaniards leading a number of them, the doubts of this earlier period have evaporated. And yet, it must be recalled that, at the time they could well have seemed justified. The Spanish public opinion and many of its political forces repeatedly expressed strong reticence towards NATO and the European Community. Negotiations with both organizations were paved with difficulties and obstacles. At that time, as on later equally decisive occasions, the Commission's bet, along with David Rockefeller’s personal initiative, were both risky and fecund. We, Spaniards, who feel that we had to participate in the main instances of the West, haven't forgotten this.

Ever since, the Spanish group has been most active in the work of the Commission. It hosted one of its plenary meetings in Madrid (in 1986), as well as two of its European meetings (in Madrid and Barcelona). It was responsible for various Reports and other communications and spared no input in the Commission's internal workings. And it played its part in the periodic meetings of the Commission's Chairmen.

Today, what does Spain mean to the Commission, and what does the Commission mean to Spain?

In the first place, Commission membership entails the presence at the heart of Spain's society of a group of personalities in a variety of fields, including politics, business and academia. Members are regularly renewed, and meet quite frequently. They take part in working sessions with the President of the government, the main cabinet ministers, the leaders of the
opposition and the many Spaniards within the international organizations. In each case, this allows for an exchange of information which we deem useful for both parties. In addition, we discreetly project ourselves on the national scene through the media. Belonging to the Commission is prestigious and provides its members with a useful reservoir of information, analyses and contacts. Furthermore, we want it to be a commitment to serve the values of an open society.

Second, the Spanish group can and must continue to contribute together with the Trilateral Commission to address those problems to which it is especially sensitive. Perhaps because of the geographical “land’s endism” which characterizes Spain, some of these problems face us in a particularly acute way, and can thus generate the kind of alternative reflection which can enrich what sometimes, in Europe and in the Trilateral world at-large, risks looking like the “conventional wisdom”. To be sure, we know we cannot, and therefore do not wish to, offer magic, universal solutions. Yet we should turn our geopolitical, economic and social specificity into a source of original and non-arbitrary ideas, capable of adding to the common heritage.

Thirdly, what precedes applies with a particular relevance to the field of international relations as well as to the future of the Trilateral Commission. This is apparent in connection with the South American world and finds its expression in the very composition of the Spanish group. This group, together with its Portuguese counterpart, has always demonstrated a particular interest in serving as a meeting point with the countries of Latin America: witness the important visit which the Commission paid to Mexico in 1990, the recent discussions about enlarging the Trilateral Commission and including non-permanent members, and the Reports which it has devoted to the crisis in Central America (1984) or “Latin America in a Global World” (1990). The point is obviously not to enter into rivalry with anyone, let alone the United States whose critical role in the Western Hemisphere cannot be reasonably questioned. It is, rather, to contribute to the common task with an age-long experience and capacity that are equally manifest. Just as, in the eyes of Trilateral, China or Russia are global, not merely Asian or European, problems, addressing Latin America is also a global issue where the linguistic and cultural ties of Spain acquire a particular value.

In many ways, the Trilateral Commission served as precocious pillar to Spain’s opening to the contemporary world. Spain, today, can help the Commission keep its sights high in these times of profound change. Those of us who have had the privilege to take part in the tasks involved have been able to confirm the fruitfulness of the trilateral ideas, globally as well as for the various national groups which express the best they have in a larger framework.

January 1 and March 12, 1986 - in three months - Spain has been integrated as a full member in the European Community; has accepted, by a voluntary and majority decision of the Spanish people, its membership in the organization of security and peace of Europe (which is none other than the Atlantic Alliance); and at the same time, Spain has proceeded to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel...

...This has been made possible by overcoming intolerance, and also historical impatience. It has also been possible because Spain is meeting, and seriously so, the challenge of modernity. I would say that a dictatorial system, or situations of historical authoritarianism, corresponded to political isolation and, in the political economy, to a situation of hyperprotectionism of our economy. The hyperprotectionism and isolation of Spain had its impact on our development. Spain has not followed the development of the countries to the north in Europe, and now has the vocation, breaking with its isolation, of overcoming the hyperprotectionism and creating international relations in freedom and peace, of meeting the challenge of modernization.

I believe that this framework defines what has happened in Spain during the last ten years. But to be fair, I should also add that Spanish society already had democratic habits when it began its democratic political transition. The medium on which is based the entire transformation process has two protagonists: first of all, the Spanish people; and second, the political intuition, the public spirit and the ability of the chief of state, the King of Spain, who has been capable of moderating attitudes during these years, attitudes which at times, due to political passion, could have been excessive...

Felipe Gonzalez
(from his address to the 1986 plenary meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Madrid).
Your Holiness,

On behalf of each of us in this group, my first words cannot be anything else than gratitude and respect.

To be welcomed in Rome by the Successor of Peter, 1950 years after the death and the resurrection of Jesus Christ, is, for the Trilateral Commission, the most moving and inspiring encouragement.

We are Japanese, Americans, Canadians, Europeans from Norway, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Britain, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and France. We are all citizens of democratic countries and, as such, in our thoughts and in our deeds, not only do we share a common respect for the dignity of man but we enjoy the freedom to make our respect a fact.

We represent, in a voluntary association, a rare, if not unique, combination of experiences and responsibilities in the art of government, in the representation and defense of workers, in the leadership of business, either public or private, in the pursuit and transfer of knowledge, in the gathering and dissemination of information, in the management of an increasingly interdependent world.

We are members of the Christian Community or we follow the teaching of other religions or we experience doubt, but in our diversity we are all united in the same respect for the values Your Holiness brings so fervently to mankind through your faith, your teaching, your courage, your pastoral visits.

We cannot fail to be impressed by such huge crowds, in so many countries, in such different religious and political contexts, who welcome the messenger of hope and through him, express, almost physically, their ardent quest for the unity, the dignity, the peace of the world.

For our modest part, we meet, from time to time, to study and discuss the mechanics of hope.

This week in Rome, we learn about new Italian developments. We examine what divides and unites Japan, North America and Western Europe; how to keep money as a productive tool, not an erratic and destructive master. We listen to the appeals of our Jewish and Moslem brothers for peace in Jerusalem.

We measure the obstacles still existing on the way to further an essential, urgent European unity. We immerse ourselves in the formidable problems of defense and arms control as necessary components of international peace through a properly managed balance. We try to find, in interpretation, both realistic and generous, of our own responsibility, more effective ways to bring harmony between the poorer and richer parts of the world. We try to understand, with increasing concern, the path contemporary Russia follows and which transforms, in the eyes of the whole world, this part of the great and patient Slavonic family into the very negation of the principles of its foundation.

There are some of the mechanics of hope in which we are involved with a strong dedication to the understanding of others and the search for common solutions, with a sense of purpose which explains our own creation ten years ago and which has never weakened since.

But, we know well our limits. We know enough of the world to feel that, beyond the mechanics, there must be a message of hope, that it must reach each man, each woman, individually, in the quietness and uniqueness of human privacy. This explains why each of us here, whoever we are, wherever we come from, whatever faith or creed we embrace, goes towards you, the messenger of hope, with humility and open arms.

This is why this visit “ad limina apostolorum” to the Successor of Peter is, for our group, an occasion to show our gratitude, our respect, but is, above all, the blessed opportunity to receive the message.

Holy Father, we have no fear, because you told the world: “There is hope,” and the world heard you.

Georges Berthoin
Dear Friends,

It is a pleasure for me to meet the members of the Trilateral Commission, and it is also, and perhaps especially, an occasion for reflection. For I am aware that you represent a rare concentration of ability, expert knowledge and experience. This great accumulation of knowledge in the political, economic, financial and sociological spheres provides you with the means of considerable power. And how can power be exercised morally if it is not accompanied by an acute sense of responsibility?

It is not for me to interfere in your technological researches. However, the subject of your work is so closely connected with human beings that you constantly find yourselves at the frontier between technology and ethics. In this respect I am very much interested in your work on East-West relations, international cooperation, the search for peace in the Middle East, and arms limitation, as well as other issues.

This ethical dimension of your activity is heightened by your geographical origins. You all come from the wealthy parts of this world, and for this reason you have a responsibility for encouraging people to face their duty of international human solidarity, for, as my predecessor Paul VI said in his Encyclical Populorum Progressio, “This duty is the concern especially of better-off-nations” (no.44). Again, when one speaks of human solidarity and politics, and international solidarity and politics in particular, one cannot forget the words of John XXIII:
"The same moral law, which governs relations between individual human beings, serves also to regulate the relations of political communities with one another" (Pacem in Terris, part III). International solidarity applies not only to the relations between nations but also to all the instruments of relations between nations, including those at the level of government and of multinational companies. In every sphere there are ethical and moral exigencies. These ethical and moral exigencies touch the many factors of technology and bear directly on the productivity and profit of enterprises, as I have alluded to in Laborem Exercens (cf. no. 17). In a word, all activity must be at the service of life—the life of individuals and communities wherever they may be—and this activity must not violate the laws of life, the generation of life, the dignity of life, especially the life of the poor.

I am pleased to learn that you are spending these days discussing a study of strategies of development—a study which must emphasize the double effort to be made: on the one hand by the poorer countries, to secure their self-development; and on the other hand by the richer countries, to create economic and trading conditions that will help to meet the essential needs of the people in the developing regions, and that will also favor a more just sharing of resources. But here I ask myself a question—a question that I put to you as well: why, at the end of the first third of the Third Development Decade is the global situation of North-South relations more alarming than it was at the beginning of the Sixties? Why is the gap between rich and poor constantly growing wider? In reply, one may point to the energy crisis of the Seventies, which brought the developed world itself face-to-face with a striking number of social challenges. Permit me to mention, as a complement to this, the inadequate attention given to one of the main themes of Populorum Progressio: "The integral development of the human person."

It is an illusion to pursue solely material development. Everything, including the dynamism of production and profit themselves, is rooted in the awareness of human dignity. Attacking this dignity weakens all efforts for development. On the other hand, creating social, cultural and spiritual conditions which protect people from all situations of oppression, exploitation and degrading dependence is a guarantee of the success of development projects. "In brief, to seek to do more know more and have more in order to be more" (Populorum Progressio, 6).

In addition, peaceful relations between peoples equally figure among your concerns. This is a matter much more closely connected with development than appears at first sight, for the ethical truth that I have just evoked is at the root of authentic peace. Certainly, one must not neglect the patient efforts of negotiators, or studies full of technical solutions that would make it possible to fix the balance of power at an ever lower level. On numerous occasions I have encouraged them. At the beginning of the year, I devoted a Message to the importance of dialogue as a means for guaranteeing security. This presupposes, of course, that such dialogue is sincere, is without deception, and is free of any intention of deceiving the other party.

Here I would repeat in your presence what has already been proclaimed before the United Nations: "The production and the possession of armaments are a consequence of an ethical crisis that is disrupting society in all its political, social and economic dimensions."

Peace, as I have already said several times, is the result of respect for ethical principles. True disarmament, that which will actually guarantee peace among peoples, will come about only with the resolution of the ethical crisis. To the extent that the efforts at arms reduction and then of total disarmament are not matched by parallel ethical renewal, they are doomed in advance to failure. The attempt must be made to put our world aright and to eliminate the spiritual confusion born from a narrow-minded search for interest or privilege or by the defense of ideological claims: this is a task of first priority if we wish to measure any progress in the struggle for disarmament. Otherwise we are condemned to remain at face-saving activities" (Message for the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament, 12).

As you see in the spheres with which you concern yourselves with competence, it is impossible to separate technology and ethics. Without the aid of ethics, political activity does not secure the common good but becomes an unbearable and detestable exploitation of man by man.

And so I would urge you to continue with good will your efforts and researches without ever neglecting or transgressing the moral dimension of international relations—and to do everything for the service of the human person.

And may God, the Creator of the human person and the Lord of life, render effective your contribution to humanity and implant peace in your own hearts.

John Paul II
HELSINKI, February 19, 1998 – The invitation issued four years ago by the Trilateral Commission to Finnish Members anticipated by more than a year Finland’s accession to the European Union. It was an important signal of the coming change in Finland’s status in Europe.

In the western view, Finland had been something akin to a split personality; a western country in all aspects except security. In spite of its unbroken record of democratic rule since the beginning of the century, Finland was assigned at the end of the Second World War to the Soviet sphere of influence. It had to find a way to satisfy what at the Yalta conference were called the “legitimate security interests” of the Soviet Union without yielding to the ideological aspirations of its powerful neighbour. The solution was a policy of neutrality tailored to fit Finland’s unique position – unique in the sense that, unlike Austria and Sweden, Finland could not count on western support in case its neutrality was violated.

Throughout the Cold War, Finland’s position in the international community was defined in terms of the ups and downs of its relationship to its eastern neighbour: oppressed by, liberated from, victim of, showcase of coexistence with... By joining the European Union Finland finally moved out of Moscow’s shadow. At this stage the Trilateral Commission provided an invaluable opening for Finland to be judged, no longer as a function of Russian policy, but on its own terms, by its economic performance and the quality of its political life. The meeting of the European Group in

LISBON, APRIL 26, 1992 – In 1335 at Visegrad, then capital of Hungary, the Kings of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia agreed to encourage trade between the three countries. After the bilateral Anglo-Portuguese trade treaty of 1297 of Methuen, this was the first trilateral inter-state agreement of the New Age of Europe while also constituting the first appearance of a cooperative Central European subregion extending from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic. The Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland – together comprising the greater part of the one-time zone of cooperation – again signed a treaty on furthering sub-regional cooperation on February 15, 1991. In addition to the (at first loose then gradually deepening) cooperation evolving in the area of foreign policy, the establishment of a free trade zone among the three countries has also begun, hopefully to be completed this year. Also, it is becoming more and more evident that some coordination in defense matters is unavoidable.

It is an honor and pleasure for me to be able to speak about the spirit of Visegrad on behalf of these three countries at the annual meeting of the Trilateral Commission, as the Trilateral Commission proposed first, already at the beginning of 1989, that the European Community conclude association agreements with the countries of Central Europe.

... Finally, what do the Central European countries, in the spirit of Visegrad, expect from the advanced market economies, or rather, from the Trilateral Commission comprising their decision-makers? The Central European countries expect understanding for the
fact that they have embarked on the transition from a centralized political and economic system to a market economy and a pluralistic political system under the conditions of a comprehensive crisis. The frequent conflicts and clashes of political and economic views in the course of the comprehensive transformation mean that these countries also require favorable external conditions to ward off the threat of crisis inherent in the transformation. The "no man's land" from a security perspective cannot be maintained for ever; it would not be wise to neglect the expansion of advanced and stable Europe by including these countries in the in-depth development of European integration. The radical restructuring of national economies in Central Europe cannot be envisaged without the opening of Western markets to their goods. Although the implementation of the transformation process is the historic task of the countries concerned (which they deal with by mobilizing and regrouping their internal resources), this process cannot be accelerated without external support, without the transfer of external resources. Since the resources of the world are scarce and limited, it would be expedient to focus them where the conditions for their absorption can most efficiently develop international relations. Central Europe, already in the process of stabilization and moving forward, could itself directly take part in facilitating the more prolonged transformation processes of the East European countries – as suppliers underaid programs and in the transfer of experiences. Indirectly, Central European countries could exert a beneficial influence on the East European region by enriching the patterns and forms of transformation.

The world, much torn during World War II, went through the development of the past four decades in stages and groups. Starting out from the North American center in the 1950s and 1960s, first it was Western Europe and Japan and then, in the 1970s and 1980s, Southern Europe and the Far East that joined the group of advanced countries modernizing themselves at a fast pace. Presently, it is Central Europe and a few Latin American countries that face such a turnabout in their fortunes. The second millennium began with these three, formerly heathen countries joining the family of

Helsinki in October 1996 was specifically useful in this respect. And it was helpful too in opening the way to further enlargement of our Triilateral debate in the future, having greeted as it did remarkable participants from Eastern European countries.

Now that Finland has established itself as a respected member of the European Union and is on its way into Economic and Monetary Union as well, it is reasonable to ask what Finland in turn can contribute to the deliberations of the Triilateral Commission. I believe there are two important subjects on which the Finnish experience may be of general interest.

One is of course the future of Russia. According to a widely held belief Finns have some special knowledge, hidden from others, of what is going on in Russia. This is a myth. We were as surprised as everybody else by the collapse of the Soviet Union. But having practiced for a couple of centuries how to live with the ebb and flow of Russian power Finns may have developed an instinctive skill for deciphering the often contradictory signals emanating from Moscow.
Today, Finland’s relations with Russia are better than they have ever been, mainly of course because of the change that has taken place on the other side of our border, but partly also as a result of the greater self-confidence gained by Finland as a member of the European Union. In the words of President Boris Yeltsin, Finnish-Russian relations are free from “the pretence and hypocrisy” that marked Finnish-Soviet relations.

It would be misleading to suggest that there exists a single Finnish view of the Russian future. Finnish experts are as divided as all others on this question. On the whole, however, Finns tend to emphasize continuity rather than change in Russian developments.

The other subject on which the Finnish contribution may be of value to the discussions in the Trilateral Commission is the effect of deepening integration on national independence. In Finland, as in many other EU countries, public opinion tends to be against EMU, yet the government – a coalition of Social Democrats and Conservatives – is determined to press ahead, acting on the simple but compelling view that for a small nation like Finland to join carries less risk than to stay outside. Thus Finland, unlike Sweden, has moved, to quote Prime Minister Tony Blair, “beyond right and left”. The new dividing line is not between federalists and nationalists – there are no federalists in Finland – but between different concepts of national independence. The traditional view is that a small nation must limit its international commitments in order to retain as wide a margin of freedom as possible. Against this, it is argued that the true measure of national independence in our interdependent world is the degree of influence a country can gain on common European policies. To secure a seat at the table at which decisions are made must therefore be an essential goal.

As Max Jakobson, former Finnish ambassador to the UN, told the Trilateral group, “The first business of a small nation is to survive.” As Finland’s prime minister, Paavo Lipponen, told them, people do indeed fear a loss of sovereignty, but what the European Union can do for its members is “recover the part of sovereignty which the state is obliged to yield to market forces” in the globalizing economy.

This is not widely understood, or has been forgotten, in the countries that take for granted the benefits they reap from building the institutions but cavil at what might be lost by going further. For the initial Common Market countries, it is two generations since the radical ideal became everyday practice, and everyday grievance sometimes drowns out the sense of accomplishment.

Flora Lewis (October 19–20, 1996 The International Herald Tribune).

European Christian peoples. It is in the interest of a sound international system to begin the third millennium with the perfection of the spirit of Visegrad, with the full membership of these three Central European countries in Europe.

Bela Kadar
(from discussion at the 1992 Trilateral Commission Plenary Meeting in Lisbon).
Their Right to Stay
Where They Are
By Antonio Garrigues Walker

BARCELONA — “Comprehensive policies that address the cause of political and economic migrations will require a fundamental shift in the outlook and actions of the trilateral democracies of North America, Europe and Japan. That shift should be anchored in a new international imperative: the right of individuals to stay where they are. Most international migration today is an act of desperation, not choice. The vast majority of individuals prefer home and will stay there, if conditions are even barely tolerable. It is that impulse that policy must build on.”

Two years ago, the Trilateral Commission asked Doris Meissner (who has since been appointed head of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service by President Bill Clinton), along with Robert Hormats, Shiguro Ogata and myself, to submit a report on “International Migration Challenges in a New Era.” We proceeded to take a thorough look at today’s three major migration divides: The Rio Grande, the Oder-Neisse divide and the Mediterranean Sea. We came to the inescapable conclusion that the above definition of “the right to stay” is at the heart of any constructive answer that our countries might find to the most complex and vexing problem of international migrations. These problems will be efficiently dealt with only if greater awareness of their true dimensions is developed in our countries — and if we resolutely offset the growing xenophobic and racist movements that the extreme

Sadako Ogata

THE GREAT LAKES, AFRICA, February 15, 1998 — Since its inception 25 years ago, the Trilateral Commission has contributed to the promotion of individual rights and the rule of law in the industrialized democracies of North America, Western Europe and Japan.

These objectives — enshrined in the Commissioner’s 1973 “Statement of Purposes” — remain valid as we embark on a new millennium. They have greatly helped the Commission, and those closely involved in its endeavours, in addressing the new international challenges since the end of the Cold War. From my perspective, there is no democracy without respect of human rights. Likewise, human rights are not fully respected if the rights of refugees are violated. There is thus a direct link between true democracy and a generous refugee protection regime.

As the 1991 report on Global Cooperation after the Cold War stressed, “... the Trilateral Commission will need to think of itself as helping to formulate transnational coalitions that advance the common good... and define new common objectives”. I wish here to underline the Commission reports issued in 1993 — Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era and International Migration Challenges in a New Era — which both clarify what I called in the UNHCR’s 1997-98 State of the World’s Refugees “A Humanitarian Agenda”. Both Commission reports singled out how vital it is to strengthen multilateralism in an era when the forces of nationalistic and ethnic conflicts oppose globalization.

I can only subscribe to the conclusions of the Commission’s report on migration and refugees, which underlined that “movements of people are challenging fundamental concepts of
the state which date back many centuries. The dilemmas can no longer be seen as a problem for a few nations, for democracies are being drawn ever closer by the common external circumstances we face. Nor can nations afford to act alone as individual gatekeepers trying to build higher and higher walls. International migration is a new fact of national and international life that requires new kinds of cooperation among all nations”.

In this respect members of the Trilateral Commission have a key role and responsibility. As leaders in our respective countries, we have a moral and political duty to counter the increasingly negative attitude threatening asylum policies. To resist the easy appeal of xenophobia. To depoliticize refugee issues and to promote a message of acceptance and tolerance. To raise public awareness about the suffering and needs of refugees and to convince our Governments that international peace and stability depend on the security of people at home and beyond.

As we meet in Berlin this Spring 1998, I recall another European Trilateral meeting held in 1992 in Europe, in Dublin, where together with David Owen we discussed the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and noted how Europe had remained faithful to its tradition of granting asylum to people fleeing persecution and war. I am confident that Europe, North America and Japan shall jointly continue to uphold the principles upon which democratic societies are founded. Together they shall find new ways to manage the multiple facets of global forced population flows.

right (with the more or less conscious complicity of other political parties) has set in motion, manipulating the sensitivities of many citizens to a point where they actually feel threatened by an uncontrolled "invasion" of immigrants.

As we emphasize in our reports, the problems of international migration will not be solved merely through police and legal measures — despite the momentary success of the reinforcement of harsher measures in France and Germany — and even less by erecting new Berlin Walls and Iron Curtains. The abysmal economic disparities, the different levels of political and sociological evolution, and the existing demographic data force us to find alternative solutions.

“State of World Population,” a United Nations report, estimates the actual number of emigrants at more than 100 million, or about 2 percent of world population. This figure could easily triple (and some experts think that even this forecast is optimistic) by the year 2000, when world population will be an estimated 6.2 billion, 80 percent of it in less developed countries.

By the year 2025, although fertility rates are slowly beginning to decrease, the situation will be even more dramatic, with a world population of an estimated 8.5 billion, of which some 84 percent in the less developed countries.

It becomes obvious that the aging developed world is going to have to question many of its strategies, and to devise new ideas to facilitate the transition to a genuinely new era with honest and responsible dialogue between North and South.

We will have to start questioning many of our beliefs, and give up the easy excuse of “insurmountable” difficulties or “unsolvable” problems. Consider the recent start of a constructive dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, seemingly “unthinkable” not so long ago.

As I reflect on our just completed trilateral work — which was sided greatly by Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees — I see an urgent need for the creation of a genuine international regime capable of responding to the full range of international migration situations.

The need for such a mechanism has been alluded to by the OECD’s Council of Ministers, by the summit meeting of the Group of Seven industrial democracies in Tokyo, and by the UN Population Fund. There are now few more urgent tasks before us than to translate this into reality.

Migrations have often had a positive and decisive impact on human progress. We simply cannot afford to allow that phenomenon to be turned into a crisis of gigantic proportions.

If we forget the existence of “the right to stay,” we will have no title to prevent the enormous and unstoppable exercise of “the right to migrate.”

(October 20, 1993
The International Herald Tribune)
On Democracy

KYOTO, May 31, 1975 — I start with three simple things - simple to put in words but much less simple to cope with in fact. First, there is a growing desire for immediate participation on the part of many citizens in the developed countries, which confronts national governments with unfamiliar but extremely serious problems and makes it more difficult for them to give direction to developments in their countries. This is, of course, what Mr. Huntington in his chapter calls the democratic challenge to authority. It is a development which may be regarded as a natural consequence of the development of citizenship over the last century or two. This development of citizenship has led more and more people in local communities and industrial enterprises and other institutions to express a desire to be a part of the machinery of decision-making to a much greater extent than may have been the case in the past. And governments have in fact found it difficult to make decisions, even apparently simple decisions such as those about the sites of nuclear power stations. Participation is not merely the taking of responsibility but is very often an attempt to check government action or object to it.

The second aspect is that for many important problems the national political space has become evidently and largely insufficient, although at the same time we do not have satisfactory institutions, let alone democratic ones, to cope with new problems as they arise in new, international political spaces.

The third aspect is new for governments. The democratic governments find it difficult to cope with the power of extraparliamentary institutions which determine by their decisions the life chances of as many (or in some cases more) people as the decisions of governments can possibly determine in many of our countries. Indeed, these extraparliamentary institutions often make governmental power look ridiculous. When I talk about extraparliamentary institutions, I am essentially thinking of two powerful economic institutions - giant companies and large and powerful trade unions.

All three of these developments have a common denominator. The greater demand for participation, the removal of effective political spaces from the national to the international level, and the removal of the power to determine people's life chances from political institutions to other institutions are all signs of what might be called the dissolution, perhaps the dilution of the general political public which we assumed was the real basis of democratic institutions in the past. Instead of there being an effective political public in democratic countries from which representative institutions emerge and to which representatives are answerable, there is a fragmented public, in part a non-existent public. There is a rather chaotic picture in the political communities of many democratic countries. A public of citizens who cast their votes from individual interests and thereby influence the choice of representatives who in turn feel their responsibility to an identified public has to some considerable extent disappeared. To that extent, representative government has become very different indeed from the sort of creature that was described in The Federalist Papers, or by John Stuart Mill, or by many others before and after.

I would argue that the main thing to think about is what we can do to reestablish an effective general political public under the changed conditions in which we are living today. One would have to discuss the ways in which the legitimate demand for immediate individual participation can be linked to national and international decisions. One would have to discuss what in this Commission has been called the renovation of the international system, not only in terms of the new international institutional changes but also in terms of their democratic quality. This would raise familiar and yet new problems of the relation between representation and expertise, between democratic election and knowledge of those standing for election.

I am quite certain that a number of things must not happen if we want to reestablish an effective political public (or perhaps establish an effective political public for a very large number of citizens for the first time in history of democratic countries). I for one believe that one of the things that must not happen under any condition is a deliberate policy of educational renunciation - a policy in which educational institutions are once again linked to economic output and economic performance rather than to the need to give every individual a chance to take part in the political process. I also believe that one of the things that must not happen is that we establish any greater dependence of the media on governments. On the contrary, I believe that the media in most of our democratic societies are in need of protection. They are endangered by a number of processes, some of them economic. At the same time I believe they are some of the main media of expression for what is left of a general political public, and we should keep them that way.

My main point here is that as we think about a political public in our day, we cannot simply think of a political public of individual citizens exercising their common sense interests on the marketplace, as it were. In rethinking the notion of the political public, we have to accept the fact that most human beings today are both individual citizens and members of large organizations. We have to accept the fact that most individuals see their interests cared for not by an immediate expression of their citizenship rights (or even by political parties which organize groups of interests) but also by organizations which at this moment act outside the immediate political framework and which will continue to act whether governments like it or not. And I believe, therefore, somewhat reluctantly, that in thinking about the political public of tomorrow we shall have to think of a public in which representative parliamentary institutions are somehow linked with institutions which in themselves are neither representative or parliamentary. I think it is useful to discuss the exact meaning of something like an effective social contract, or perhaps a "Concerted Action," or "Conseil Economique et Social" for the institutional political structures of advanced democracies. I do not believe that free collective bargaining is an indispensable element of a free and democratic society. I do believe, however, that we have to recognize that people are organized in trade unions, that there are large enterprises, that economic interests have to be discussed somewhere and that there has got to be a negotiation about some of the guidelines by which our economies are functioning. This discussion should be related to representative institutions. There may be a need for reconsidering some of our institutions in this light, not to convert our countries into corporate states, certainly not, but to convert them into countries which in a democratic fashion recognize some of the new developments which have made the effective political public so much less effective in recent years.

Ralf Dahrendorf

(from his remarks during the Kyoto, 1975 Plenary meeting, at the time of the presentation of the Trilateral Commission's Task Force Report on "The Crisis of Democracy", written by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watansuki. This theme was taken up again in subsequent Reports to the Commission - in "Democracy Must Work", by David Owen, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saburo Okita, in 1984; and in "Revitalizing Trilateral Democracies", by Robert D. Putnam, Jean-Claude Casanova and Seizaburo Sato, in 1995).
NEW-YORK, DECEMBER 1980 - I get tired - and "getting tired" is a mild way of putting it - of all the talk about "what are the Germans doing?" for the following three reasons: First, the record of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Atlantic Alliance speaks for itself. The quality of our army, our military expenditures, the way we honored every single agreement reached within NATO - we have lived up to our obligations. Second, our allies in the past have signed treaties upon treaties, issued communiqués upon communiqués, telling us they would help in bringing about German unity. Was it all just words? We are nowadays asking for much less than that. We know that, as things stand, there will continue to be two German states: We know that only if the division of Europe ends sometime in the future, the Germans may (or may not!) decide to enter into a closer association - in the cultural field, for instance, where it would seem most natural. In any case, that will be long after my time and must be left to the generations to come. I become emotional when I see the hypocrisy of those who, having "promised" the Germans their national unity, object when those same Germans, in the context of a divided nation, try at least to make it possible for the members of divided families to visit each other. Thirdly, there has been much talk recently about human rights. That starts at home! During my term as Mayor of Berlin, nobody could help me when the wall was brought up - as a result of Yalta, a division line was drawn not only through a country, but through a city, violating that basic right of the citizens of one city to live together. We do not ask for German reunification; we have merely been trying to alleviate in a modest way these human conditions, make visits possible and what not, knowing very well all along that all this will disappear if the overall situation between East and West makes it impossible to continue on this road.

Willy Brandt
(from an interview for "Trialogue" #25).

BELGRADE, SEPTEMBER 20 and 21, 1983 - One such prejudice is that communism will disappear with the Soviet Union. Absolutely not! Communist will survive the Soviet Union - not necessarily this variety of Leninism, but whatever form of utopian teaching humanity will come up with. Utopia seems to be very much a part of human nature; it is also deeply rooted in Christianity - and communism does have some roots in Christianity: See this idea of fraternity, equality and brotherhood, also found in the utopian aspects of the French Revolution.... Communism as an idea may be unrealistic, but it is also inspiring, as is every utopian teaching. The Soviet Union and its system may well disintegrate one day, but a new form of utopian thinking is doomed to arise - in China, in Europe, or elsewhere. This is one of the reasons why I think the danger today is not communism as such, but the Soviet Union and its expansionism; and why to identify the idea of communism with the Soviet Union actually helps to enlarge and strengthen the very basis of the Soviet Union.

This is not to say that non-communist political leaders or thinkers should not fight ideologically against communism; the ideological struggle must, of course, go on. It is important to explain the communist system and the Soviet system. But I repeat: What is essential is Soviet expansionism, not communism in and of itself. In this regard, I think Solzhenitsyn is wrong when he assimilates all communism, from China to Yugoslavia, to one unique devilish idea.

Milovan Djilas
(from an interview for "Trialogue" #34).
WASHINGTON D.C., OCTOBER 13, 1983 – I do not want to fit what the Pope is trying to achieve into this picture – I know it would result, three weeks from now, in a new attack in Pravda to the effect that the Pope and I are orchestrating some kind of joint strategy. (As you know, I have been accused by the Soviets of having had something to do with the selection of the Pope.) Therefore, what I am advocating has to be seen as totally separate from what appears to me the Pope is doing.

What he is doing is, I think, historically fundamental. He views the West as beset by growing hedonism and materialism, and in need of genuine spiritual revival. He sees the East as dominated by a bankrupt ideology and potentially very ripe for a genuine spiritual revival far beyond the frontiers of Eastern Europe and including Orthodox Russia. In other words, my impression is that the Pope's vision is an extraordinarily dynamic and optimistic one. Too many Western observers, in my judgement, have focused exclusively on his interest in Poland. I believe that his interests are far broader than that and historically very ambitious. A remarkable book has been published on the last days of Cardinal Wyszynski, when he was dying in Warsaw, which includes some conversations he had by telephone with the Pope. It was rather interesting to see the extent to which Cardinal Wyszynski too, while dying, was expressing the view that the East is becoming ripe for a spiritual renaissance. Right or wrong, and these views may be too optimistic, I think the Pope sees today's West and East as terrains for new missionary zeal – a zeal not in relationship to a very remote task but a zeal in relation to genuine potential.

Zhigiew Brzezinski
(from an interview for "Triologue" #34).

MOSCOW, FALL 1978 – In contrast to the imperative nature of the majority of political philosophies, the ideology of human rights is in essence pluralistic, allowing various possible forms of social organization and their coexistence. It also offers the individual a maximum freedom of choice. And I am convinced that precisely this kind of freedom, and not the pressures exerted by dogmas, authority, traditions, state power or public opinion, can insure a sound and just solution to those endlessly difficult and contradictory problems which unexpectedly appear in personal, social, cultural, and many other aspects of life. Only this kind of liberty can give people a direct sense of personal happiness, which after all comprises the primal meaning of human existence. I am likewise convinced that a worldwide defense of human rights is a necessary foundation for international trust and security; it is a factor which can deter destructive military conflicts, even global thermonuclear conflicts which threaten the very existence of humanity.

Andrei Sakharov
(from a contribution to "Triologue" #19).

COPENHAGEN, APRIL 23, 1995 –

Kichi Miyazawa: This is a very critical moment. You mentioned about "stones falling upon our heads". At the Budapest OSCE meeting in December, President Yeltsin mentioned something to the effect that the termination of the Cold War may end up being a "Cold Peace". Do you feel the same way now?

Andrei Kozyrev: I think what President Yeltsin did is warn — he sent a warning — that, yes, there is a chance, there is a danger of the "Cold Peace" rather than the full-scale and full-fledged effort to create a united Europe, if we continue going on without answers to urgent questions, and if we continue to go along without strategy of a real united Europe. And as I said, yes, the stones are already falling. In internal politics in Russia, the nationalists are using the unclear purpose of debate of hastily enlargement of NATO to demonstrate the failure of the present government — including myself. Because it only demonstrates that instead of creating something new (which we promised the Russian people) with our natural partners and allies (democratic countries in Europe and the United States), we are met with the extension of an old mechanism, of a mechanism which was created to counter the Soviet threat. So we need clear answers: we need clear strategy. And then we will avoid the Cold Peace – which is not our preference, not a threat to other countries. But this is something which we could face if we fail to elaborate, agree upon, and effectively install the strategy of united Europe and united world.

Henry Kissinger: You asked what is it that could be done in the enlargement of NATO now being discussed that could not be done in Partnership? What could be done is to give political guarantees against military pressure or aggression. If the idea of partnership...
Communism could not satisfy the material needs of Eastern Europe, still less its cultural and political aspirations. Post-World War II history is replete with efforts by East European countries to change this unnatural relationship by revolution or by more subtle means designed to avoid a Soviet counteraction.

Gorbachev’s perestroika constitutes an admission that the Soviet Communist economic system has not worked for the Soviet Union, hence even less for Eastern Europe; glasnost implies that this fact can and must be openly admitted. The economic inefficiency and challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling Communist parties are more starkly evident than ever. This underlying reality is the cause of growing ferment.

Our countries face a dilemma in their policies toward Eastern Europe. We are committed to see progress toward enabling the peoples of Eastern Europe to determine their own future. But we do not wish to provide a pretext for new Soviet intervention that would set back the evolution toward liberty in Eastern Europe and strengthen more conservative forces in the Soviet Union. Clearly, we should continue to stress the differences between democracy in the West and the way political systems actually function in the East. We should give support to any movement toward market economies and democratic institutions. We should continue a strong effort to break down the barriers to the freer flow of people and ideas across the center of Europe. And we must insist on the removal of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which has been used to justify Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Gorbachev’s phrase “a Common European House” ignores the fundamental differences between Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On one level, we can recognize in this phrase the desire for a more open and peaceful pattern of relationships, a framework provided for in the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents. In that sense, there is scope for collaboration in some practical areas. Environmental problems, including nuclear safety, and improvements in communications and transport are examples deserving of high priority.

On another level, the concept of a “European House” can be interpreted as an effort to dissociate the United States from Europe. We categorically reject any such policy.

Our European policy should, therefore, distinguish among three separate European realities:

1. Western Europe, composed of the 12 EC countries increasingly integrated into a single European Community with its own system of external relations, together with the EFTA countries.

2. The Soviet Union, extending far into Asia and therefore not a fully European country.

3. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have a special character. They are members of the Warsaw Pact and as such participants in conventional arms control negotiations between East and West. At the same time, they have historically been part of Europe and they have a growing wish to participate in certain aspects at least of European unification, as well as to achieve greater control over their national political destinies.

For these countries, it is therefore important to devise a category of association with the European Community based on Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.1 This kind of association should be regarded as a new type of relationship adapted to the special circumstances of the countries concerned. This relationship will not include, for the foreseeable future, any political or security dimension. But such an agreement should be accompanied by a full commitment to implement all the obligations of the Helsinki accord and subsequent agreements regarding human rights together with effective provisions for monitoring them.

We suggest that the European Council (the Heads of State and Government of the European Community) should announce its intention to embark on an examination of the modalities of such an arrangement. This should not be linked specifically with the case of any single East European country, but should provide the framework for the kind of association which could ultimately be negotiated in detail with those countries which manifest their interest and meet the necessary conditions.

As to the relationship of Eastern Europe with the USSR, the key question is whether the USSR is prepared to undertake a reappraisal of its security interests in Eastern Europe. We note Gorbachev’s statement that “security can no longer be assured by military means.” We should seek new patterns in Eastern and Central Europe that would allow a political and economic evolution reflecting popular aspira-

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
Yasuhiro Nakasone
Henry A. Kissinger

is developed in the sense that you propose, then Russia will join NATO – that’s the logical evolution. NATO gives no guarantees internally to member states that might be in conflict with each other. And then one could argue (if one has old-fashioned thinking) that one would face a situation of a country of 180 million, extending over eleven time zones, surrounded by a group of small, relatively impotent countries – no longer guaranteed by any arrangement because they would now be part of a general system of collective security. And to the exponents of old-fashioned thinking, this might look, in the hands of less enlightened Russian leaders, as a device for what used to be called hegemony. Now is that a totally unfriendly way to analyze the problem? – that it would dissolve an alliance into a vague system of collective security which has no internal guarantees and in which then the specific weight of the individual members would become dominant.

Andrei Kozyrev: That’s exactly, it seems to me, the self-fulfilling prophecy – not only of the Cold Peace, but probably of a new confrontation. Because, again, who is conceivably putting a threat of aggression to a Central European state – like Poland, for instance?

History was mentioned, that both of our countries should not forget history. A historian would probably point to Napoleon, imperial Germany, imperial Russia. What else? No more than that probably. But the question is: Do we really want to re-create the structure in Europe which would presuppose that Germany again becomes an aggressor – or Russia again becomes an aggressor against Poland? Or do we want to create a structure, to create a mechanism which would engage Germany, Russia, Poland, everybody in a constructive effort to overcome historical anxieties and suspicions – and, yes, into a new collective security mechanism.

My answer is the second. Let’s try, however difficult and however new this challenge is, to conceive a model of security, and resources and a mechanism for that, which would engage us in a new effort and exclude by itself the coming back of aggressive or imperial Russia or imperial Germany or even imperial France. Otherwise we are doing exactly the wrong thing.

That is exactly the message which is read by a larger part of Russian public opinion: “What do they enlarge for? Who is the potential aggressor?” Russia? Why? Because it’s communist? No. It is not communist. And it will probably not fall into communism at the next elections. I do believe that we have the potential and that we will sustain democratic movement at the new election, which are coming at the end of this year. But nationalists, of course, they do use this argument. They say: “Whatever you do here in Russia… Even if you, stupid Kozyrev, contributed to overthrowing communism and the empire, and recognized Estonia, even if you withdraw all your troops from abroad, whatever you do… Even if you sign the agreement cutting the nuclear arsenals with the United States (like START II), even if you de-target the warheads, whatever you do, you will still be regarded as an enemy. And they will still create and enlarge the military alliance against you. That’s the answer to your stupidity, in domestic and in foreign policy. And that’s why Mr. Zhirlinovsky’s right: that they will always see us as an enemy, and that we have to mobilize. And while we still have the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, let’s stop the cutting the stupid democrats imposed on us – and rather reinforce the military arsenal.”

That’s the question we face at the elections; and that’s why we are so alarmed and we are so concerned; and that’s why I try to explain to everybody why the stones are already falling. They are already falling – right on my head here – very personally. I would hate to write in my memoirs, probably in the Gulag, that we missed the opportunity.

(from a discussion with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the Trilateral Commission’s 1995 Plenary meeting in Copenhagen).

OXFORD, NOVEMBER 1983 - There are a number of aspects of Sovietism which make it utterly incompatible with Polish cultural tradition and have resulted in the instinctive rejection of the graft by the overwhelming majority of the Polish population, quite aside from all the atrocities suffered by the Poles at the hands of the Soviets during the war. Poland has never produced despotic forms of government unless they were imposed from outside (e.g., by Catherine II or Stalin); it developed, not unlike Western Europe, the concept of the autonomy of law and thereby the concept of freedom as defined by a legal order. This concept emerged mainly as a result of conflicts within the privileged classes; yet it was strong enough to make Poland probably the most tolerant country of Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century; it was never forgotten in much worse historical periods, and remained active later on in the preparation of the (very democratic by the European standards of the time) Constitution of 1791 (which was never enforced because of partitions). Sovietism means, among other things, the abolition of law – not only as a matter of actual practice, but in terms of the definition of communism by its very founders, notably Lenin and Trotsky. The degree of repressiveness might vary; to be sure, but the basic principle according to which individuals are entirely in the hands of the state and have no protection against it, remain intact. Of course, there are legal rules in the Soviet system, but there is no law in the sense of a mediating device between citizens and the state, and no legal barrier to limit the omnipotence of the state in dealing with its subjects. No people brought up for centuries in the tradition of European legal ideas and the spirit of Western Christianity can reconcile itself with institutions that convert human persons into state property.

Leszek Kolakowski
(from an interview for "Triialogue" #34).
NEW YORK, THE U.N., FEBRUARY 1982 – The Long Road to a New International Order: I come from the Third World; to me, a “new international economic order” is clearly necessary. But we have to keep in mind that international economic relations will not be transformed overnight – this is a very long, very slow process, involving profound structural changes, which for some of them could well take over a generation, if not a century. As we try to find ever broader common denominators among us as to what this new order should be, I think it is imperative that we remain always realistic and always prudent; few things can be more cruel and dangerous than to create great hopes and premature expectations.

On the other hand, it is equally imperative not to lose sight of the urgency of our problems, and not to wait until there is agreement on everything before we start to work in those areas where a common denominator and a solution are achievable.

We may not be able to agree today on all the elements of a new economic order. Yet, it seems obvious that some important changes and adjustments need to be brought to the existing international economic “rules of the game” – to reflect, among other things, the fact that the world has become more interdependent, that it now counts a much greater number of partners than at the time when Breton Woods, the GATT and the other post-war institutions were created. We are faced with an international economic crisis to which the existing system is not responding effectively. The fact that structural changes in international economic relations may take a very long time should not make us feel that we are in no rush; on the contrary, faced as we are with today’s crisis and the attendant dangers of an erosion of international cooperation, we must counter-attack without delay. In so doing, we should be guided by pragmatism, and concentrate on what is feasible now; but also by a determination to keep present in everybody’s mind the great urgency of the present situation – one which, as usual, has implications far beyond the economic

sphere per se: Think, for instance, of its potential social consequences in both South and North; or think even, in a parallel area, of the dangers of the proliferation of arms and the impact it already has on the South (on the continent where I come from, Latin America, it is a source of alarm).

Message to the Trilateral Countries. The most important thing is to keep the dialogue alive. I would therefore ask of the “trilateral” countries flexibility, and a better understanding of the problems of the developing countries; and I would urge not only their leaders but their public opinions to realize the formidable political stakes involved in this North-South dialogue. Transposing an old European saying – “When the U.S. sneezes, Europe catches a cold” – I would also remind America, Europe and Japan that when you, in the North, have a cold, the South catches pneumonia, and more often than not with no available antibiotics! In other words, the industrialized countries must take the true measure of their own economic crisis and harmonize their policies in their own interest: By curing their “cold”, they will also protect the others from a potentially deadly disease. It is imperative therefore that they agree among themselves – not behind the back of the developing countries, but to contribute to the general well-being by putting first their own economic affairs in order. We now see alarming, “everybody-for-himself” trends in the industrialized world. By coordinating their actions –

instead of launching into interest-rate wars and the like – the countries of the North will reduce the others’ fever… This, I should add, does work both ways: Malaise in the South has serious implications in the North. Such is the lesson of today’s interdependence; our commonality of interest in the last analysis on these matters of survival.

Javier Perez de Cuellar
(from an interview for “Triologue” #28).
MILAN, CHICAGO, TOKYO, OCTOBER 1977 - The report proposes a fifteen year international program for doubling rice production in South and Southeast Asia, focused on irrigation improvement as the leading factor in generating production increases. The emphasis is basically on farm ditch construction neglected in the past. The core of the program is the conversion of 30.4 million hectares of rainfed areas and 17.5 million hectares of inadequately-irrigated areas to adequately-irrigated areas in the fifteen years ending in 1993. The total capital cost of this effort is estimated at $52.6 billion in 1975 prices ($7 billion for conversion of inadequately-irrigated land, $45.6 billion for conversion of rainfed land), plus $1.4 billion in associated costs - a total of $54 billion, or 3.6 billion per year.

Our best guess of current annual budgets for irrigation in South and Southeast Asia is $1.7 billion (in 1975 prices), including foreign exchange granted or loaned from abroad - about one-half of the annual cost of the proposed program. In order to achieve the 1993 target, it is proposed that developed countries and OPEC countries provide increasing levels of capital resources while the developing countries in the area continue their utmost efforts to share the burden. It may not be unrealistic to catch up with the required national investment level around 1985. With subsequent increases, the average annual irrigation investment would reach $3.6 billion for the entire period to 1993. It must be stressed that we recognize that these improvements in water control will not automatically and in themselves bring about the desired production increases. A wide range of actions will be needed, including the critical need to develop rural institutions. The difficulty in achieving social change, however, should not lead to defeatism about the prospects for the program proposed here. The institutional innovations would not be likely to emerge unless public investments in irrigation and progress in agricultural technology increase the profitability of making such innovations.

The proposed plan will have the effect of injecting a momentum into rural society for inducing institutional innovations. Today, unless a major effort is made to increase food production in the form of a feasible program, we are bound to lose what is now a dead heat between population and food supply; this will result in great misery and greater social injustice.

The proposals in this report must take more concrete shape as implementation occurs. But implementation cannot be assumed to result directly from this report or any other report, for that matter. A series of follow-up activities at many levels must be carefully planned and executed if the proposals are to achieve their potential for reducing malnutrition in the developing countries. Developing countries must take the primary responsibility for preparing plans for expanding and improving irrigation facilities, as well as for modification of domestic policies and programs required to facilitate effective use of the expanded irrigation facilities. Developed countries and international agencies have the responsibility for creating the necessary mechanism for the transfer of resources, and for facilitating the speedy approval of appropriate projects for agricultural growth and improvement in the developing countries.

Umberto Colombo
D. Gale Johnson
Tosho Shishido

(from "Reducing Malnutrition in Developing Countries: Increasing Rice Production in South and Southeast Asia", a Task Force Report presented to the Trilateral Commission at its 1997 Plenary conference in Bonn).

NEW YORK, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, FEBRUARY 1975 - An extra $6 billion a year in Official Development Assistance (ODA) will be needed in the period 1976-80 to assure a 2% growth rate in per capita income in the approximately 30 low-income developing countries containing 1 billion of the world's people. Although there will be pressures to "write off" these countries as economic and political
crises deepen in the trilateral region, such a policy would be politically unrealistic as well as morally unacceptable. Moreover, a joint trilateral-OPEC initiative that brings forth more capital for development would serve some very immediate trilateral-country interests. In a time of stagnant growth and rising unemployment, it is obviously advantageous to move funds from OPEC countries which cannot spend them on trilateral-country exports to developing countries who will.

Knowledgeable officials estimate that ODA from OPEC countries will reach approximately $3 billion a year in the 1976-80 period. In these same years, the trilateral countries should, at a minimum, increase the size of their own ODA (about $9.4 billion in 1973 dollars) to keep pace with inflation. This will still leave $3 billion a year of ODA to be found.

To meet this need, it is proposed that a "Third Window" be opened in the World Bank to borrow $3 billion a year of OPEC country funds at 8% and lend it to low-income countries at 3%, in loans with 20-year maturities and 4-year grace periods, in each of the years 1976-80. This would require an annual interest subsidy of $900 million, of which $100 million could be raised from World Bank earnings, $500 million from trilateral countries, and $300 million from OPEC countries.

The "Third Window" fund should be managed by a tripartite governing body, with representation and voting power equally shared between trilateral countries, OPEC countries, and other developing countries. Moreover, to encourage the participation of the OPEC countries in the regular activities of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund, OPEC quotas and voting rights should be raised from the present 5% to between 15 and 20%.

Richard N. Gardner
Saburo Okita
B.J. Udink

(from "OPEC, the Trilateral World, and the Developing Countries: New Arrangements for Cooperation, 1976-1980", a Task Force Report to the Trilateral Commission discussed in draft form by the Commission's Executive Committee in December 1974 in Washington, D.C. Its proposals were subsequently considered by the Joint Development Committee of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which urged in January 1975 an immediate study of a "third loan window" for the Bank, based on the interest subsidy idea, which would be soon implemented by the World Bank).
On the Middle-East

TEL AVIV, JANUARY 2, 1983 – Since 1977, the Labor Party has supported the Allon plan, that is, the concept of territorial compromise. Speaking for myself, I say now that we are ready to give back roughly 65% of the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip where over 80% of the population now resides; the area in which we are mainly interested has to do with Israel's security – the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the Judea and Samaria hills, thus securing the Jordanian River which is the defense line of Israel to the east, with the exception of a corridor through Jericho that will link the bulk of the West Bank to Jordan under one single territorial sovereignty.

I believe that today Israeli public opinion would be split roughly 50-50 on such an outline. But once it looks possible and feasible, there will be more and more Israelis in favor of such a compromise. If we speak of a proposal that the public can look at as a concrete one, I am sure that the majority will support it. Today, since it is hypothetical, the public can say: why not start with the utmost?...

On the subject of settlements, we in the Labor Party do not oppose, in principle, settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but we are against them in territories that are densely populated. In accordance with the Allon plan, we are ready to give back the latter; therefore there is no purpose for building settlements there. At the same time, we are in favor of certain settlements in the Jordan Valley, the greater Jerusalem area, Gush Etzion and the southern part of the Gaza Strip.

What is the solution to the facts that have been created on the ground by now, or might be created in the future? My answer is very simple: I believe that we will have to work out a solution with Jordan whereby there will be Israeli settlements in which Israelis live under foreign sovereignty – under Jordanian-Palestinian sovereignty. At the same time, we will allow the same in Israel. At present, for example, there are, in eastern Jerusalem, between eighty thousand and one hundred thousand Palestinians who even today maintain their Jordanian citizenship; while they are residents of Jerusalem, they are not citizens of Israel. Thus, on a mutual basis, Jordan and Israel could agree to have Israeli citizens living under Jordanian sovereignty and vice-versa. After all, we are talking in a context of peace, the essence of which must be the kind of interrelationships, economic and otherwise, that have been established in the meantime. I do not believe that the idea of up-rooting people from where they live, for a short time or for a long time, is feasible.

Yitzhak Rabin
(from an interview for "Triologue" #32)

AMMAN, JANUARY 9, 1983 – In view of the nature of the developments in the region, particularly in Lebanon, and, of course, of the fact that after fifteen years of occupation so much damage has been done, one cannot be overly optimistic on the fate of the occupied territories. But at the same time, I think that the situation is so bleak that change has to evolve, with us or without us – or despite us... It is either a change for the worst in terms of a populist breakup of the Middle East – Jacobo Timmerman made this point quite clearly in his recent reference to populist movements in Israel; and we can see populist movements in Lebanon and Iran as well. Or possibly a rapid change towards a more centrist identity for the countries of the region, appreciating that east is east and west is west and that the countries of the region should – in concert, I think, with the European Community – choose a centrist path. That may lead us to “turning the corner,” to a possible shift away from confrontation. Let me add that it would be very interesting to see what Japan’s role could become in this context; His Majesty recently travelled to Tokyo and was under the impression that Japan has a very important role, possibly as important as Europe’s, to play in defusing global polarization and helping a more centrist outlook prevail.

Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan
(from an interview for "Triologue" #32).

WASHINGTON D.C., OCTOBER 1980 – I think that those of us who are working on the Commission Middle East Task Force report, from a trilateral point of view, have a very special responsibility. It is very important in my view that we try to delineate as clearly and unequivocally as possible what the common elements and the common interests are among the three regions, and also where the differences of interest and perception lie; in the absence of such a clear picture, the Middle East over the next year or two can potentially become the kind of source of division between ourselves and our allies in Europe and Japan that will not only hinder progress in the Middle East itself but, more broadly, could weaken our alliances and our common security.
Western Europe, Japan and North America have a major interest in stability and peace in the Middle East, and we share a number of common objectives. All of us want a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, because we know a partial settlement will not bring peace to the area. That comprehensive settlement
- has to insure Israeli security on the one hand and satisfy the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Arab world on the other;
- it has to be a comprehensive settlement which minimizes the possibilities of internal upheaval in Saudi Arabia itself;

which is a settlement that assures continuing access to the area's oil resources for all of us;
- it has to be a settlement that constrains any Soviet expansionist attempt, and one that leads us to the avoidance of a possible confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Now, I believe that you would find very little quarrel between the United States, Western Europe and Japan on these objectives. But we have to make it very clear, it seems to me, as we develop a joint report, that the interests of each of us are not identical, and that we are very apt to face over the next year or two different assessments and different approaches on the part of the three regions. For example, while all the Western powers recognize Israel's existence and statehood, the U.S. commitment to Israel's survival and security is more explicit and special, for a number of historical reasons. While the United States is dependent on Middle East oil, the dependency of Western Europe and Japan is even greater. While the West as a whole has a common interest in deterring, and if necessary physically preventing, USSR expansionism, only the United States has the strategic capacity to make this a practical reality. While Western Europe seeks a role in the diplomacy of the Middle East, only the United States is acceptable to both sides and carries the weight to bring about the mutual concessions. It is not in the interest of any of the Western partners to mask these differences, since it would lead to unrealistic

assessments and perceptions, contribute to a confusion of roles, and could in the long run undermine the unity of our alliances on matters of common security which bind us. And therefore the closest possible consultation is going to be indispensable in the years ahead between our trilateral governments, and at least as a minimum to avoid conditions which could adversely affect the relations between ourselves and our allies. In the Middle East generally our allies can be very helpful in assuming a greater military burden. If we are required to shift a number of our resources from Europe in order to maintain the military balance in the Gulf, the Europeans have a special responsibility to try to pick up as much of the 'slack' as possible in the Western European theater. Moreover, in economic terms, if all of us are concerned as we are about maintaining and bulwarking Egypt, for example, and in particular the leadership of Sadat as well as the continuing economic viability of King Hussein's Jordan, then it seems to me that these are areas where we can jointly work, but we have to be very realistic about what our respective roles are, lest we cause further difficulties within the alliance. The roles of the United States, Western Europe and Japan must be complementary.

Joseph Sisco
(from a contribution to "Triadogue" #24 as North American author of the Task Force report presented to the Commission in March 1981. The other authors were: Garret FitzGerald; Arrigo Levi; and Hideo Kitahara).

TOKYO, JULY 1980 - I believe the last several months represent a kind of turning point in the general character of Japanese diplomacy. In the past, most of the major diplomatic issues for Japan were bilateral in nature – U.S.-Japan, China-Japan, Soviet Union-Japan, Korea-Japan, etc. But now, we are involved much more in multilateral diplomatic issues.

This was in a sense necessitated by the Iranian hostage problem and also by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We faced very difficult policy choices between Iran and the U.S., for example. While we did not want to injure our very fundamental relationship with the U.S., we wanted to continue a friendly relationship with Iran. This was not only because of oil. Iranian oil accounted for about 10 percent of our total imports in recent months and it was completely suspended two months ago.

On April 11, I held a foreign press conference to avoid misinterpretation of Japan's position. In fact, one of the reporters then raised the question of whether Japan valued oil more than other relations and commitments. My answer was that although Iranian oil is vital to our economy, if there are bigger, more important causes, we will value those causes more highly. This was interpreted by the press as saying that if the U.S.-Japan relationship is jeopardized, we will take this U.S.-Japan relationship as more important than just getting oil. The Prime Minister was in Hokkaido at the time, and he fully supported my remark.
We have shifted our policy emphasis somewhat away from so-called economic diplomacy to economic plus political diplomacy. We have more or less decided that when necessary, we should sacrifice economic considerations for the sake of larger issues and larger causes. I said at the joint G-7 press conference in Venice that in a way all seven nations are in the same gondola when it comes to the broader, basic issues. We value highly the free democratic institutions we share with North American and European countries. Our public recognizes this more and more. Also, we feel that our global responsibilities must increase because of our expanded GNP, which now accounts for nearly 10 percent of total world economic output. As a matter of fact, in 1978, Japan's GNP was about equal to that of France, Britain and Italy combined. So naturally, we have more responsibilities in international affairs.

_Saburo Okita_
(from an interview for "Triologue" #24).

NEW YORK, OCTOBER 1980 – In the Middle East, just as in other parts of the world, it is very important that America work closely with our allies in a common effort. The problem, at the present time, is that our allies have serious doubts about the United States; until those doubts are allayed, working together is difficult. Part of the problem is personality. Part is the European and Japanese need for Middle East oil. Part is the traditional American impatience – our insistence on finding ready solutions, and the way our mood swings so easily from pessimistic nadirs to euphoric zeniths. An example is the latest uproar over the statement on the Middle East by the countries of the European Community: At first, Americans were convinced by headlines that the Europeans were going off by themselves to "make a deal with the PLO." When we finally engaged in real dialogue with them, they understood what the dangers were if they went too far. In the end this statement turned out to be relatively mild. The outcome was not totally salubrious, but did not approach the disastrous results which had been so loudly proclaimed at first.

We live in a new era, a different world with which we still must learn to live. This new world need not be worse than what preceded it; it could be a good deal better. The emergence of the Third World – so often described in ominous terms – could turn out to be a great plus for America and the free world. The coming of age of newly more prosperous areas, far from being negative, provides us with considerable opportunities economically and politically. It opens up vast potential markets for our technological development, it brings the free world closer together, and it makes possible dramatic improvements in the living conditions of areas which have been plagued with problems.

Also our allies in the developed world – Western Europe and Japan – have become very strong economically and financially. If we can learn to work together with them, this, too, will afford us greater economic opportunities; and among other advantages such cooperation can make our diplomacy more effective – in the Middle East and elsewhere. In short, great opportunities are there to be seized, provided we learn to practice a new, more balanced kind of cooperation required by a changed world where the old, somewhat simpler pattern of relationships is no longer feasible.

_William W. Scranton_,
(from an interview for "Triologue" #24).

THE HAGUE, OCTOBER 26, 1997 – I would like to repeat a passage of our 1981 report to the Trilateral Commission which I consider to have been rather far-sighted and still basically true. This is what we wrote:

"The principal approaches for the West Bank and Gaza are: indefinite continuation of Israeli occupation; 'autonomy' as in the transitional period under Camp David; or a territorial approach which would involve return of territory as part of a peace agreement. The latter two approaches are not necessarily alternative nor ultimately incompatible."

We then went on to say: "Indefinite continuation of Israeli occupation of the territories is an untenable alternative... Such an approach is not in the interest of Israel, the Arabs or the trilateral countries; and ultimately it would be a prescription for war, not peace."

I feel that I can repeat that view, after so many years and so many events, without changing a single word. The fact that most large Palestinian cities are no longer under Israeli occupation and that most of the Palestinian population in the territories is now largely under the administration of a Palestinian National Authority, while a "Palestinian Parliament" sits in Ramallah and Yasser Arafat is back in Palestine at the head of the PNA (all events which nobody could even have dreamt of 16 years ago), makes "indefinite continuation of Israeli occupation" even more untenable. It remains today, as we believed it was at the time of our 1981 report, "a prescription for war, not peace." Our conviction led us to support the alternative approach of negotiations (which might involve, as we then put it, 'a role for the PLO...') depending upon its "willingness or
unwillingness to recognize Israel's right to exist"), leading gradually, possibly through a period of Palestinian "autonomy", to "return of territory as part of a peace agreement."

Arrigo Levi
(from "State and Prospects of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", a report to the European group of the Trilateral Commission which appears in "Near East Checkpoints").

NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 29, 1980 – As far as Iraq itself is concerned, here is a country which is important to the region. It has had a role to play in the past, it presently has the capabilities to play a very important role and it must play such a role in the future. That role can only be a healthy role – Iraq is a country that has stakes in the region; it is only natural that it be should active there (just as it is natural that the countries of the region should feel it a duty to cooperate with each other for the stability and progress of the region). We see no threat whatsoever from the contributions of Iraq in the region: We should see threats if other countries that have no stake in the region came into play. On the subject of Iraq’s claims, we see that the Iraqis’ announced proposal for settlement speaks about Shatt al Arab and the three islands: These are not problems that cannot be resolved through negotiation between Iraq and Iran. The islands, of course, are the direct responsibility of the [United Arab] Emirates – they are supported in their claim by all the Arab countries, not only Iraq.

Prince Saud al-Feisal
(from an interview with the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia for Triologue #24)

SCHVENINGEN, OCTOBER 25, 1997 – An Israeli-Palestinian exchange on the Palestinian National Charter between Uzi Arad, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahiu, and Nabil Sha'at, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation in the Palestinian National Authority.

Nabil Sha'at: Again, here is another of these issues which have become meaningless. The Charter has been cancelled altogether by the Palestine National Council. The resolution to cancel it was based on continuous negotiations with Israel and the United States. It is no longer a secret that we were on the telephone with then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres to agree on the exact wording of the P.N.C. resolution cancelling the Charter and the preamble to this cancellation. In addition, the U.S. was constantly present in these sessions, monitoring down to the smallest detail the wording of this resolution. And the P.N.C. did not proceed to pass the resolution in question before we received direct word from Shimon Peres and the White House that it was satisfactory and met all the requirements of Israel and the United States. Here is, once again, a non-issue -- for we are clearly committed to the Madrid principles, the Oslo principles and the mutual recognition with Israel that seals our adherence to U.N. resolutions 242 and 338.

Uzi Arad: True, we shouldn't make too much of the issue of the Palestinian Charter; yet we cannot ignore it completely, for there is a definite declaratory value involved in it, and the job has not been completed: In the latest of the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority, the U.S. and Israel in January 1997, under Palestinian obligations, comes as the first item the requirement "to complete the process of revision of the Palestinian National Charter." Clearly, since the Palestinians have signed this letter, it means that such a process of revision still needs to be completed. It would indeed serve a useful purpose if the right declaratory stance be spelled out in unequivocal terms.

(from a panel discussion on the Middle East at The Hague's 1997 European meeting).
On the Far East

Xinhua News Agency
News Bulletin

Beijing, May 23 (Xinhua) -- Deng Xiaoping, vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, said today that the meetings held between members of the tri-lateral commission and Chinese representatives over the last three days were a new and "very good effort" for promoting mutual understanding and cooperation.

The vice chairman made the comment at a meeting with members of the commission at the great hall of the people.

He welcomed the guests and thanked them for offering their experience and knowledge and for exchanging views with the Chinese side, "this is beneficial to both sides," he said.

Answering a question on the drive to foster greater moral awareness in China, Deng Xiaoping said: "While making efforts to meet the needs of the people and to raise their living standard, we must also pay attention to political and ideological work.

"We should develop spiritual civilization among the people, and particularly educate the youth into disciplined and polite people with ideals and knowledge, that means we should educate them in five traditional standards -- decorum, courtesy, public health, discipline and morals and four "points of beauty".

(May 24, 1981
People's Daily).

Pyongyang, 9 April 1984

Monseur l'éditeur,

Désolé, je ne sais pas écrire du cambodge. Je veux dire que le pays est à un autre écart (comme la Compagnie des Indes, par exemple) et que je ne peux pas vous aider.

Avec mes salutations distinguées,

M. MOSER

Nguyen Sinh Huu

1981.5.24.
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21 Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Ottawa Plenary meeting, May 1976
22 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Acting Japanese Chairman Kiichi Miyazawa, North American Deputy Chairman Allan E. Gotlieb and European Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Vancouver Plenary meeting, April 1996
23 Chairmen Rockefeller, Yamashita and Berthoin with Their Majesties the Queen and King of Spain at the Royal Palace, Madrid Plenary meeting, May 1986
24 Oscar Fanjul, Antonio Garrigues Walker, Miguel Herrero de Miñon and Santiago de Tamarón, Barcelona European meeting, October 1993
25 Sirkka Hämäläinen, Max Jakobson, General Gustav Hägglund and Krister Allström, Helsinki European meeting, October 1996

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26 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with Otto Wolff von Amorongen at 10 Downing Street, London European meeting, October 1989

27 Marco Tronchetti Provera, Peter Sutherland, Otto Graf Lambsdorff and President of the European Monetary Institute Willem F. Duisenberg, The Hague European meeting, October 1997

28 Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn Plenary meeting, October 1977

29 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, Copenhagen Plenary meeting, April 1995

30 Richard Holbrooke, Paris Plenary meeting, April 1989

31 Lord Owen and Carl Bildt, The Hague European meeting, October 1997

32 David Rockefeller, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, German Defense Minister Volker Rühe, Max Jakobsen and Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati at press conference, Helsinki European meeting, October 1996

33 President of Estonia Lennart Meri with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Copenhagen Plenary meeting, April 1995

34 President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing during discussion of his report on “East-West Relations”, Paris Plenary meeting, April 1989

35 Chairmen with authors Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Henry Kissinger and Yasuhiro Nakasone meeting President Mikhail Gorbachev at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, January 1989

36 Henry Kissinger and Kiichi Miyazawa with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Copenhagen Plenary meeting, April 1995

37 Trilateral North-South Food Task Force meets with Asian experts in Manila, July 1977

38 Chairmen meet with President François Mitterrand at the Elysée Palace, Paris Plenary meeting, April 1989

39 Giovanni Agnelli and Paul Delouvrier, Bonn Plenary meeting, October 1977

40 Garret FitzGerald with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in his office, Jerusalem, March 1990

41 Now Palestinian Authority Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo, Garret FitzGerald, Chairman Yasser Arafat and Paul Révay at FLO headquarters in Tunis, March 1990

42 Arrigo Levi, Japanese Deputy Chairman Yoshih Okawara, Giovanni Agnelli and David Rockefeller, Washington Plenary meeting, April 1984

43 Middle East panel discussion with Israeli Foreign Policy Adviser Uzi Arad, Palestinian Authority Minister Nabil Sha'at, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, EU Special Envoy Miguel Angel Moratinos, Judith Kipper and author Arrigo Levi, The Hague European meeting, October 1997 (inset: Arad and Sha'at)


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