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TRILATERAL SECURITY
DEFENSE & ARMS CONTROL POLICIES
IN THE 1980s

Report of the
Trilateral Task Force
on Security & Arms Control
to The Trilateral Commission

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The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together among these regions.

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The Trilateral Process

The report which follows is the joint responsibility of the three authors, with Gerard Smith acting as principal author. Although only the authors are responsible for the analysis and conclusions, they have been aided in their work by many others. The authors would like to express particular appreciation for the invaluable help of Christopher Makins, who has provided vital support—including vital drafting support—throughout this project. The various persons consulted by the authors spoke for themselves as individuals and not as representatives of any institutions with which they are associated. Those consulted or otherwise assisting in the development of the report include the following:

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SCHEDULE OF TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES

January 1982—Smith and Makins complete preliminary outline for report and circulate it to Saeki and Vittorelli.
April 2-3—Authors meet for first time just before Tokyo plenary of Trilateral Commission to develop outline and consult with Japanese experts.
June 23—Smith and Makins consult with North American experts in Washington, D.C.
September—Smith and Makins circulate first draft of Chapter III to co-authors and consultants. Authors meet in The Hague on Sep-
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

Trilateral Security:
Defense & Arms Control Policies
in the 1980s

This is the first Commission task force report concentrating on defense and arms control policies and programs from a trilateral perspective.

We recognize that defense and arms control are components of a broader concept of national and international security. In particular we believe that a revitalized world economy is an indispensable foundation for the security of all the trilateral countries. But because these political and economic issues have been fully treated in other reports to the Trilateral Commission, we only touch upon them here.

A major theme running through the report is that the security of the trilateral regions is indivisible—that there is in fact a trilateral community of security interests and that a trilateral approach to meet the dangers of the 1980s offers the best chance of success.

The authors believe that in a time of inevitable nuclear parity, the principal, perhaps exclusive, usefulness of nuclear weapons will be to deter their use by an adversary. Some 30 years ago, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, in an allusion to what he believed was then the suicidal state of nuclear parity, called the superpowers “two scorpions in a bottle.” But the United States and its allies have continued to rely on the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons, possibly early in a conflict, to deter Soviet non-nuclear as well as nuclear aggression.

The heart of trilateral security will continue to rest indefinitely on strong survivable nuclear deterrent forces. This fact must not be underestimated or depreciated. The report considers certain measures to maintain such forces. But with belated recognition of the diminished credibility of the threat of first use in a situation of nuclear parity should come acceptance of the need for some changes in the ways the trilateral nations must handle their deterrence and defense arrangements. This is what this report is all about.

Reducing allied dependence on the use of nuclear weapons to meet a large-scale Soviet non-nuclear aggression will not be without cost. But it does not require, and this report does not call for, a change in
agreed NATO strategy and doctrine. We believe the needed human and material resources can be made available if trilateral governments make sustained efforts to gain public support.

Nuclear weapons control remains an urgent concern. A comprehensive approach is called for, involving controls over weapons numbers and characteristics, over their use, and over their spread to nations other than the present nuclear five. The report tries to illuminate some of the linkages between these three aspects of nuclear weapons control.

In spite of all the activity of recent months, the authors think the control of arms is still being given second place to their buildup. We believe that the only path to improved security requires a more balanced combination of the two types of policy. Although the Cold War is hopefully a thing of the past, there is little prospect of Soviet acceptance of a relationship with the trilateral nations which gives promise of a just and lasting peace. In the interim the best we can hope for are arrangements to regulate armaments with the USSR which permit trilateral deterrent and defense arrangements with the least possible risk of war, nuclear or non-nuclear. The report spells out some possibilities.

On the much agitated question of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, on the assumption that the European region continues to favor them, we believe deployment should proceed in parallel with continuing efforts to limit this class of weapons—perhaps by an interim agreement to be folded into any Soviet-American treaty to limit or reduce intercontinental nuclear weapons.

The authors believe that the dangers of proliferation beyond the present five nuclear nations are as great if not greater than those posed by Soviet military power. Officials making defense and arms control decisions should not overlook this key fact. Limitation of the numbers and characteristics of superpower nuclear weapons could help persuade non-nuclear nations not to pursue a nuclear option. The prestige motivations tempting such nations to go nuclear must be lessened if a nuclear-stable world is to be reached. Export controls and international safeguards are not sufficient. The major nations, friends and adversaries alike, should cooperate to head off the grave proliferation danger to the nuclear stability of the world.

As already indicated, we believe that in a time of nuclear parity a greater appreciation is required of the deterrent effect of conventional forces and of possibilities for strengthening that deterrent effect through the use of weapons technology now being developed and other force improvements. The goal should be, as the Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has proposed, to place on the Soviet Union the wartime onus of having to decide whether to resort to nuclear weapons. It may well be that explicitly adopting this goal would have a galvanizing effect on support for conventional defense programs in Western Europe, North America, and possibly in Japan.

The report stresses the dangers of conflicts involving several regions of the world simultaneously. We believe that the trilateral nations are taking unnecessary risks in not mounting sufficient conventional forces to deter and if necessary defend against such aggressions. On this score, the possible role of long-range non-nuclear cruise missiles needs further examination.

For these purposes, the roles and missions of all the trilateral nations' forces will need to be examined, their military manpower policies are likely to require review, and both a fair sharing of defense burdens and collaboration in weapons procurement among all the trilateral countries will assume new significance. The report makes some proposals on these subjects. However, we do not foresee any lessening of the need for keeping strong U.S. forces deployed overseas.

We discuss the issues involved in the limitation of conventional arms and how such limitation could lead to a non-nuclear military balance at a lower level of risk for the trilateral countries and we make a number of specific recommendations.

Separate sections of the report discuss the security situation in the Middle East and the position of China.

Lest the obvious be overlooked the report stresses the importance for the trilateral regions of the alliance arrangements which guarantee their safety, and the risks now being run when parochial interests are allowed to weaken these precious international ties. The security arrangements themselves need confidence-building measures. Better consultation has often been called for. It would do much to restore the confidence lost in recent years. Our governments must integrate and give greater depth to existing consultative arrangements in matters involving deterrence, defense, arms control and security relations in general. Specifics are given in the report.
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Appendix: Summary of Discussion at Plenary of Tri bilateral Commission, Rome, April 1983 | 89 |
I. INTRODUCTION

This report is the work of the first task force set up by the Trilateral Commission to deal exclusively with security issues. Previous task forces and meetings have given some attention to particular facets of security. Most recently, the Task Force on Sharing International Responsibilities among the Trilateral Countries, which reported to the Commission meeting in Tokyo in April, 1982, gave some attention to security threats and policies. Its report, and the Commission’s discussion of it, provided a valuable point of departure for our work.

The impulse behind the establishment of our task force has come from at least two sources. First is the multifaceted debate which has developed in recent years within and among our countries on various defense and arms control issues. In this debate, searching questions have been raised about fundamental aspects of policies concerning nuclear and conventional forces, arms control and disarmament. This debate has been most intense in Western Europe and North America. However, the security debate has also become increasingly important within Japan. It seemed timely for the Commission to address these issues of defense and arms control policy which are stirring emotions within the trilateral world.

The second source of impulse for this report is the fact that trilateral security interests have become less divisible than in the past. Many of the changes which have occurred over the past decade in the security situations of the trilateral countries have made more common the sources of insecurity they face and have evoked a need for more common solutions. One such development has been the rise of concern about the Persian Gulf region as a result of oil supply and price disruptions, the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Early in 1980, Kiichi Miyazawa, speaking to a Trilateral Commission meeting, described the Afghanistan issue as “the first global issue on which the effectiveness of the alliance relationship among the industrialized democracies in the politico-security field is being tested.” Recent alleviation of anxieties about oil prices and supply in the short term has not removed the problem of instability in the
Gulf region from the trilateral security agenda. Second, the emergence of China as a stronger, independent force in the geo-strategic balance has created a set of common problems and opportunities for the trilateral countries in managing their relations with China. Third, the Soviet military buildup in the Far East in the 1970s, although primarily related to Soviet concerns along the Sino-Soviet border and only partially a response to a perceived threat from the West, has increased the weight of Soviet power on the Far East region at precisely the time when European and North American countries' economic interests there have increased. This military buildup, and specific issues such as concern about a possible redeployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles from Europe to Asia, have increased in Japan the sense of a Soviet threat such as has for many years clouded the security horizons in North America and Western Europe.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the separate alliances formed between North America and Western Europe and between the United States and Japan to cover local or regional security sufficed to meet the perceived security needs of the time. By the late 1970s, however, as a result of the developments mentioned earlier, this system of alliances was in need of being strengthened and broadened. In the 1980s, this need will become greater. This report and its recommendations will, we hope, contribute to finding policies which can respond to these challenges and attract the consensus needed to sustain them not only from the trilateral governments, but also from public opinion in the trilateral countries, the support of which has become increasingly important to the success of any security policy.

The authors take a broad view of security. While the maintenance of military balances remains essential, policies in other fields—arms control, the attempt to achieve more cooperative relations and to promote eventual accommodations across the gulf that separates the communist and free nations, sound domestic political and economic structures, economic assistance and trade—are also essential components of what has recently—and aptly—been described in Japan as 'comprehensive national security'. Likewise, the United Nations Organizations and other mechanisms created over time for the settlement of international disputes have made, and will continue to make, important contributions to the maintenance of international security. These other aspects of policy—especially arms control—and these mechanisms are not only sources of security in themselves, but can be important tools for maintaining the necessary confidence in democratic countries. While, therefore, the focus of this report, in accordance with our terms of reference, will be primarily on defense and arms control policies, we do not wish to give rise to a perception that we believe that security should be maintained only by arms which would hopefully be under some degree of international control. That would be too limited a view of the security options which the future holds for us. What we address in this report is an interim solution—necessary, but not sufficient. Our recommendations should not be taken as reflecting despair about the possibilities of developing an increasingly cooperative relationship with the communist countries, beyond the technicalities of arms control, and of achieving an increasing level of cooperation through organizations representative of all the members of the international system in an attempt to solve the great planet-wide problems we face. Only in such solutions can lasting security lie.

This report falls into three main sections. Chapter II deals with the differing perceptions within the three trilateral regions of the sources of danger and insecurity they will face in the 1980s. Chapter III covers the search for policies which can provide greater security in the fields of nuclear and conventional forces and arms control and, more briefly, discusses certain economic issues. Chapter IV summarizes our principal conclusions and recommendations.
II. SOURCES OF INSECURITY

A. WESTERN EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS

Historical Fundamentals
Perceptions of threat and feelings of insecurity in Western Europe are quite diverse. They differ from country to country within the Alliance; and they differ even more between NATO and non-NATO countries. They differ despite one common perception which extends from one end to the other of the whole Western part of the European continent: the threat from Soviet Russia since the Second World War.

In each nation where parliamentary democracy was preserved and consolidated after the war, or could be restored after a totalitarian intermission, the ways through which the USSR expanded its influence over the whole of Eastern Europe caused a nightmare that has never been forgotten. The great majority of Western Europeans became aware that, whatever the degree of influence granted to the Soviets by the wartime agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom, the USSR was exploiting its military occupation of each country in order to attain its full Sovietization, and would never withdraw its military forces—if at all—until a communist-led régime was established. Although the Soviet Union did not explode its first A-bomb until 1949, it defied the U.S. nuclear monopoly by keeping impressive conventional forces in place—both to preserve communist order in Eastern Europe and to serve as a tremendous instrument of indirect influence over the rest of Europe.

There is no need to remind the reader of East-West relations in that period of Europe's history to explain why and how, step by step, North America and Western Europe came to the conclusion that it was not a time for wavering. So the United States decided to contain any further Soviet pressure and to contribute to building a system of economic solidarity with Europe, ultimately extending that solidarity to the political and military fields as well. The Berlin crisis of 1948-49 became the symbol of Western opposition to any further Soviet attempt at expansion. The Western Alliance that resulted from that tormented period was fundamentally based on the stout resolution never to permit any new expansion over the 'Iron Curtain'.

The military basis for such resolution was, at the outset, U.S. nuclear superiority. Although NATO countries—as proclaimed in Lisbon in 1952—were aware that they should maintain or rebuild their conventional forces in Europe in order to balance undiminished Soviet conventional strength, the U.S. nuclear umbrella seemed to take away the urgency of this problem. The conventional forces imbalance became a revived cause of concern as the Soviets, at an uninterrupted pace, gradually attained nuclear parity with the United States (and sought, some argued, to achieve superiority); but the target of 50 NATO divisions established in Lisbon has never been attained.

As the Soviet Union became a more and more imposing nuclear superpower, the nuclear doctrines of the Western Alliance also had to be adapted to the new balance of forces, going through a process that started with the threat of massive retaliation to any aggression—conventional or nuclear—against the Western allies. When the credibility of such a response began to vanish, a new doctrine based on 'flexible response' was elaborated. Such a doctrine aimed at better coupling the fates of North America and Western Europe and included three levels of possible responses—conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear—to a possible Soviet attack.

This gradation of possible Western responses was necessitated both by the permanent imbalance between Soviet and Western conventional forces in Europe and by what one might call a geo-strategic asymmetry between the two Alliance leaders. The United States was too far away across an ocean to be able to match with its own territorial forces the vast deployment of Soviet conventional forces and weaponry. And the Soviet Union kept menacing the full sovereignty and democratic constitutions of all Western European nations during the Cold War decade that followed the end of World War II—and later, on such occasions as Khrushchev's threats against Berlin in the late 1950s and the Cuban crisis of 1962.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union repeatedly used its conventional forces, in both direct and indirect ways, to help crush any sign of discontent, any endeavor at more independence or political freedom, any attempt to revolt, in Eastern European nations that had begun to feel much more secure against any resurgence of German militarism. And when the Federal Republic of Germany had the courage and the
intelligence to start its Ostpolitik, then Eastern Europe came to realize that the only threat maintaining its state of ‘limited sovereignty’ came from one side alone, the Soviet Union.

This state of permanent alarm in Europe caused uncommitted nations to stick unhesitatingly to their positions. Neutral nations (such as Sweden and Switzerland), nations neutralized by their peace treaties (Finland and Austria), non-aligned ones (Yugoslavia), or disengaged ones because of ideological differences with the Soviet Union (Albania) were glad not to be committed to either of the two blocs and anxious to remain uninvolved in the strife in Europe.

**Differences Among Alliance Members in Western Europe**

Important asymmetries and other differences became evident not only between the two alliances and between the two alliance leaders, but also within each alliance. Yugoslavia and Albania never joined or later left the Warsaw Pact (although for almost opposite reasons), Hungary attempted to do so with Imre Nagy in 1956 when it proclaimed its neutrality and was consequently invaded by the Soviet Army, Poland launched its Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free zone soon after Gomulka’s removal of the old Stalinist leadership in 1956, and Rumania has periodically endeavored to assert more independent international views. But differences within the same alliance have been more manifest in Western Europe, where liberties at home and a mutual respect for each other’s political independence have allowed various asymmetries to develop without restraint.

The Western nations committed to the Alliance, although freely accepting commitments to each other for the pre-established common purpose of defending collectively their freedoms against any threat coming from without, maintain and constantly reaffirm a jealous sense of independence. Moreover, the Atlantic Alliance, contrary to most previous alliances in history, has endeavored to transform the purely juridical bonds of mutual assistance established by classical alliances into a permanent peacetime military organization among its members, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—which is difficult for sovereign, independent states.

Apart from historical differences, which have proved to be more deeply rooted than was hoped during and immediately after the war by convinced European federalists, Western European nations display in fact a wide variety of geo-strategic positions, which engender a great diversity in their vulnerability to conventional attack from the East. While no nation in the world can be said to be invulnerable to modern nuclear weapons, their greater or lesser proximity to Warsaw Pact territory leads to a great diversity of reactions—and of military postures—in the face of the threat of a conventional attack. Those national postures depend on particular perceptions of threat and consequent feelings of insecurity. While admittedly the threat from the other side of the Iron Curtain is politically similar for each one of them, the peculiar ways such a threat can develop—from indirect pressures to actual and direct strategic threats—arouse different reactions in different nations related to national circumstances and conditions.

To take first the factor of geography, Europeans note that the United States and Canada (leaving aside nuclear threats for the moment) cannot possibly feel any sense of insecurity for a long time to come because of a Soviet conventional threat to their territory. In European eyes, this absence of threat is why some North American experts seem to take delight in sketching out conventional war-games in Europe that terrify their Western European friends. Europeans, who see themselves in the front lines and the Americans far behind, tend to regard any American ideas of ‘limited war’ or ‘protracted war’, whether conventional or nuclear, as a sign of decoupling both risks and ultimate fates between the United States and Western Europe. In many European eyes, it does not make much difference whether the ‘limited’ or ‘protracted’ war in Europe is conventional or nuclear, because, short of an apocalyptic nuclear confrontation, Europeans argue, a conventional war with modern sophisticated weapons can be almost as devastating as a tactical nuclear one.

The geographic factor works in exactly the opposite way for the Federal Republic of Germany, with the longest and most vulnerable border with the Warsaw Pact. It is quite logical that no deterrent will ever give complete security to the citizens of the most exposed among NATO nations and that a basic condition for safety is to stick to the Alliance and its military organization. This exposed geographic position is a legitimate reason why West Germans are more disturbed than others by any arguments casting doubt on the credibility of the doctrine of flexible response, or proposing ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons, or ‘nuclear-free zones’. Above all, West Germany is sensitive about any hint of reductions in the American or the British military presence in Europe at large and in West Germany in particular. This military presence is vital in German eyes both as a symbol of solidarity and for the actual contribution it makes to maintaining a tolerable balance of conventional forces with the East. The word ‘decoupling’ therefore has the most obnoxious sound in the Federal Republic. It seems synonymous with disengagement by other NATO nations from any responsibility for West Germany’s security against invasion from the East.
The geographic factor may of course play the other way in Germany, by inducing a relevant part of the West German public to seek to avoid such a threat by offering the possible aggressor the guarantee that it has nothing to fear from West Germany and that there is no need for it to have recourse to invasion in order to attain its political aims. Only a slight minority of Germans go all the way to 'better Red than dead.' But such a tendency extends across a spectrum from that extreme posture to those sections of the leading class that, even without leaving the Alliance, would like to avoid any arming measure—like, for instance, the deployment of the new NATO theater nuclear weapons on German soil—in order not to increase tensions with the other side.

It has been a constant concern of all Federal Governments, at least since the late 1960s, to demonstrate by all means the peaceful aims of post-war Germany, while not giving up its legitimate right to ensure its security within the Alliance and through the Alliance. Consequently, the German model of defense is to keep strictly with the Alliance and its military organization. The German government has always refrained from endowing the Bundeswehr with any kind of nuclear weapon (including neutron weapons); and it has even surrendered all claims to have a 'double-trigger' system on any intermediate-range nuclear weapons deployed on German soil. But it could not possibly give up its claim to receive full support, both conventional and nuclear, from the Alliance and particularly from its major partner, the United States. West Germany is the only major power in Western Europe to have a common boundary with the Warsaw Pact. It would be on the front line in any East-West confrontation. Its vulnerability in a conventional conflict is so great that it feels entitled to receive a firm guarantee of tactical support.1

Geographic position also plays an important role for Italy, the United Kingdom and France, which are all clearly aware that they are second-line nations—although Italy feels itself to be more vulnerable than France and Britain, because it is covered only by two neutral or non-aligned nations (Austria and Yugoslavia), while France is covered by a strong NATO continental first line in Germany, and Britain by that first line and the sea.

Let us take Italy first, which presents more geo-strategic similarity with Germany and also has some historical and political similarities with both Germany and Japan, because of the bonds that linked it to those two powers during the first part of World War II. To take first this latter aspect, Italy—along with Germany and Japan—took many pains after the war in reconstructing a peaceful and democratic image. This has been one major factor that contributed, as with Germany and Japan, to Italy’s determination to exclude without reservations any nuclear weapon from its arsenal and to rely therefore only on the nuclear cover provided by the United States.

The conventional role assigned to Italy within NATO, which it has to adhere to because of its strategic importance and its nuclear vulnerability, is forward defense of its northeastern border. Italy’s sense of vulnerability was among the causes that determined the Italian Government to accept the ‘double-track’ decision taken by NATO on December 12, 1979. For reasons partly similar to the Federal Republic’s, Italy would feel reassured if some kind of agreement could be achieved in Geneva about Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF).

At the same time, there is one geo-strategic difference in comparison with West Germany that serves to increase Italy’s sense of insecurity: its position in the Mediterranean Sea. While Germany is only under the threat—covered by NATO assurances—of Warsaw Pact nations, Italy is confronted with many neighbors on her southern flank whose weaponry is in some cases far superior to Italy’s, at least in the field of air forces. The constant strife between Turkey and Greece, meanwhile, weakens the whole NATO southern flank, increasing the incentives for a sort of ‘Schlieffen Plan’ that might be conceived as a couple of pincers squeezing the central front through its weak northern and southern flanks. The threat by the Greek Government to withdraw from the Alliance’s military organization increases that sense of insecurity.

In the case of the United Kingdom and France, the differences in geo-strategic positions relative to Germany and Italy combine with historical and military differences. Historically, Britain and France were on the winning side of the last war. They have no peaceful or democratic image to defend. On the military side, Britain embarked on its nuclear weapons program shortly after World War II, while France decided to do so in the 1950s and not to be a partner in any nuclear agreement with other nuclear powers or participate in any nuclear negotiation.

Since the Polaris Sales Agreement reached in Nassau in 1962 between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, British governments of both parties have shown their determination to maintain a modern independent strategic nuclear force, albeit by relying on technological assistance from the United States. This determination was

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1The only other nations which have a common border with Warsaw Pact nations are Norway, which has a short border with the Soviet Union itself; Turkey, which borders both the Soviet Union and Bulgaria; and Greece, which has a border in common with Bulgaria. But the reactions of these three are quite diverse and partly opposite to Germany’s.
most recently demonstrated by the British Government’s choice of the Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missiles to replace their existing Polaris A-3 missiles.

Why did Britain feel the need for Trident, whatever the final judgement on that choice? Britain did not feel any political need, like that of de Gaulle’s France, to part from NATO in order to emphasize its independence from the United States. But Britain has, ever since the end of World War II and the U.S. decision to curtail the close wartime collaboration on nuclear weapons development between the two countries, seen a security and strategic need to defend with its own weapons a British sanctuary and to deter, independently from NATO’s deterrence policies, any potential enemy from using its missiles against British soil. Thus, although British governments have rarely emphasized this, British policy, like that of General de Gaulle and his successors, has rested on a fundamental doubt about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

For France, it was when United Nations talks on conventional disarmament failed in the mid-1950s, during the war in Algeria, that the Fourth Republic started studies about a French nuclear deterrent, a program which was expanded with the arrival of General de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic in 1958. It is likely that France’s second-line position with regard to a Soviet conventional threat contributed to the growing importance given to its nuclear deterrent. And when France rescinded its ties with NATO, although remaining within the North Atlantic Alliance, that national deterrent became of pre-eminent importance.

It is significant that this choice was not disavowed by President Mitterrand, who is further developing the same policy of preserving and developing a French nuclear deterrent capable of ensuring the security of a French sanctuary. While no formal change has taken place under the Mitterrand Administration with regard to NATO, a more cooperative climate is being established. But even though the French five-year defense plan for 1984-88 contains a substantial modernization of French non-nuclear forces, including the creation of a new ‘rapid action force’ suitable for deployment in Europe or elsewhere, France sticks to the pre-eminence of nuclear deterrence, and the overall size of its ground forces will be reduced. The French Defense Minister, Charles Hernu, is strongly critical of ‘no first use’, ‘nuclear-free zones’, General Rogers’ ideas about the possibility of ensuring more adequate conventional deterrence, hesitations in deploying Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, etc.

Paradoxically it is within the ranks of the former Gaullist majority that critics of France’s present reduction of its conventional forces can be found. At the same time, some eminent personalities in the same political camp are trying to remove the causes that led General de Gaulle to draw the conclusion that France would be safe only if it had its own nuclear deterrent, and did not rely any more on the American ‘umbrella’. These personalities have appealed to U.S. leaders to remove the fear—widespread in Western Europe—that a nuclear response could be doubtful, and to re-establish America’s commitment to an ‘inflexible response’ against a possible threat to Western Europe’s security.

The discrepancies among the four national postures we have been examining until now are not unbearable. Yet, the spectrum of postures that flows from existing asymmetries—of history, politics and geo-strategic position—within the Western Alliance is anything but homogeneous. We can summarize and extend our analysis to other countries as follows:

**Federal Republic of Germany**

The Federal Republic relies for its security entirely on NATO and its nuclear weapons. There is a current hostility against such proposals as ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons or ‘nuclear-free zones’ and a dramatic hope that ‘flexible response’ remain effective. New theater nuclear weapons on German soil have been accepted and will be deployed if no positive conclusion is reached in the Geneva INF negotiations. And such nuclear forces as are required will continue to be entirely managed by the United States. At the same time there is some anxiety about the possibility that the conventional presence of other NATO countries in Germany could be reduced. Because of the uncertainties of the situation, it is difficult to forecast the intensity of pacifist pressures on future German governments.

**Italy**

Although there is not a considerable difference with Germany’s position, Italy has requested a ‘double-trigger’ system on any cruise missiles deployed in Italy. A wide spectrum of political forces accepts NATO as the natural framework to ensure Italy’s security. Even the Italian Communist Party (PCI) nominally accepts Italy’s membership in NATO. The peace movement has not had a large following, but this could suddenly be reversed if the Communist Party and large sections of the labor movement associated with the Catholic Church decided to oppose drastically the deployment of missiles—to be placed in Sicily. Unpredictable consequences could also come from a change in the official German position.
Belgium and The Netherlands
Belgium and the Netherlands have still not decided finally whether to accept the deployment of cruise missiles on their soil. Both countries are awaiting the outcome of the INF negotiations in Geneva. Two contradictory geo-strategic impulses are at work here: First, these two countries suffered invasion during the Second World War and react passionately against any possibility of facing again the horrors of war; and this leads their peace movements—deeply rooted also on religious grounds—to resist any nuclear involvement, such as the deployment on their territory of new theater nuclear missiles. Second, however, is that the governments of Belgium and the Netherlands share NATO’s belief that only a firm stand against the Soviet deployment can give security to their respective countries. While their second-line position makes them less anxious about their security, they do not feel far enough from the first line to be able to stay aloof.

Norway and Denmark
Although loyally committed to NATO, Norway and Denmark feel their proximity to the Soviet border and therefore stick very firmly to their unwillingness to have nuclear weapons on their soil in peacetime. Sweden’s and Finland’s different types of neutrality may not be uninfluential on Norway’s leanings.

United Kingdom
Britain is faithful to NATO and its alliance with the United States, but does not feel it can exclusively rely, as Germany and Italy do, on the American nuclear ‘umbrella’. Britain accepts the value of the U.S. guarantee and has consistently allowed U.S. nuclear forces to be based on its soil. Despite the opposition of the Labour Party and the insistence of the Social Democratic Party on a dual-key arrangement, the Conservative government has agreed to accept the deployment of U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Britain. However, as already mentioned, Britain has continued to enhance its own independent nuclear deterrent in order to feel safer about the defense of the British sanctuary, thereby approaching France’s position. Recent advocacy by the Labour Party of a unilateral nuclear disarmament policy appears to have contributed to its electoral decline.

France
There is no hint of a possibility of reversing General de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France from the military organization of the Alliance. Better links are being established, but there is no evidence that France will cease to rely exclusively on her own force de dissuasion to assure the security of the French sanctuary.

Greece and Spain
The new governments of both Greece and Spain have had doubts about membership in NATO, more or less along the same lines as France. Greece is at present more concerned about a Turkish than a Soviet threat and feels that its security has been given less attention within NATO, notably by the United States, than Turkey’s. Spain sees itself far enough from the Soviet Union to feel no direct Soviet threat to its security. But neither country has yet taken a final step to seek a special status within the Alliance as a member which, like France, is not a participant in the integrated military structure of NATO.

Other European NATO Nations
Turkey, which borders the Soviet Union, has consistently adopted the stance of a loyal member of NATO. Portugal, Luxembourg and Iceland present no particular problems.

Centrifugal Trends in the Alliance
The spectrum we have just reviewed presents the most variegated postures. No one denies the nature of the threat. No one has crossed the ideological/strategic frontier between West and East, as many were tempted to do from the other side. No country has ever threatened to denounce the North Atlantic Alliance. No one has ever stated openly an unwillingness to implement mutual assistance treaty obligations. On the contrary, since the Atlantic treaty was first signed in 1949, new members have entered the Alliance.

But it cannot be denied that dissatisfaction has gone on spreading among some members. Part of the disaffection is from the rigors of a permanent military organization. Few nations have respected their commitments to continue a strenuous conventional buildup. Occasionally, when involved in local conflicts where national pride or interest were concerned—like the wars in Algeria, Vietnam, or, more recently, the Falklands—the concerned NATO nations have withdrawn forces assigned to NATO without any actual agreement with the organization. When the organization started to age and the immediate post-war fears were forgotten, new national deterrent strategies were conceived that led France to withdraw from NATO, without denouncing the Alliance. More recently, Greece and Spain (the latter having just joined the Alliance) have shown signs that they might follow the French example, though neither has yet taken any final decisions.
There are other more subtle ways, however, to participate in centrifugal trends. In Europe, one way is by associating one's country without reservations with all major NATO decisions and then taking a different position, due to specific national interests, to deep feelings at home against a particular decision, or to many other reasons, as in the case of Euro-missiles. In the United States, as Europeans see it, one way is by hinting—as some quarters do—that mutual assistance might not go so far as to exclude any possibility of a war limited to Europe, or that troops may be withdrawn from Germany. In European eyes, the lack of American leadership or the excess of tentative leadership is not the least cause of a centrifugal disruption.

The outcome of these centrifugal trends has largely been laid out above:

- One of the founding nations, France, is no longer within the military organization.
- Two others which joined later, Greece and Spain, have been tempted to follow the French example.
- Two of the founding nations, France and Britain, have their own nuclear deterrents, and do not completely rely on NATO's commitments to defend their national sanctuaries.
- Among the nations that unanimously joined in the December 1979 NATO resolution on theater nuclear forces, only three have agreed to deploy the new theater missiles: Britain, Germany and Italy.
- Belgium and Holland, which committed themselves to participate in the December 1979 decision, have not yet accepted it through their national Parliaments and have not agreed to deploy the missiles on their own territories.
- Some NATO nations would never accept a nuclear deployment, at least in peacetime, even if that became the declared strategic need of the Alliance.

These diversities are not a matter to be shocked about; but they present a factual situation which has never been faced as bluntly and frankly as it should have been. And these diversities themselves provide an additional cause of insecurity in Europe.

Most Europeans believe there still are large margins for reviewing seriously the present state of intra-Alliance political and strategic relations, extending such a review through a trilateral approach also to Japan. Yet, Europeans emphasize, some points should be established very clearly:

- Any hint about decoupling U.S. strategic commitments to Europe must be clearly dispelled.

- Equally urgent is dispelling any idea about the possibility of a limited or protracted war in Europe.
- Whatever the strategic doctrine (either flexible response or some complementary or alternative one), such a doctrine must be compulsory for all members of NATO, whatever their specific strategic posture.
- Given national differences in the intensity of the feelings of threat and specific national vulnerabilities—because of proximity to the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces, or because of accepting deployment of NATO missiles, or because of any other differences with the rest of the NATO nations—the political guarantees collectively given to each nation by the Alliance as a whole and the strategic provisions that derive from them must be persuasive for each single component of the Alliance.
- Any decision to withdraw troops from West Germany in the near future may have a definite disruptive effect on the Alliance as a whole.
- There is a growing sense in Europe that battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons may be more devastating for the Western European battlefield in case of a sudden conventional attack than to the enemy. At the same time the nuclear buildup in Europe is starting to cause an obnoxious feeling that preparations are being made for a conflict that, if it cannot be deterred and prevented, would be limited to Europe, so that the Soviet Union would not be compelled to expect to face global consequences in such a conflict.
- Ultimately, intra-Alliance economic relations, as well as the lack of technological cooperation, both in the specific field of weapons and more widely, are not a small cause of concern to those in Europe who felt that the original alliance was the first step to a political and an economic community.

**Europe's Current Nightmare:**

**Centrifugal Crisis in the Alliance**

A nightmare is today confronting all NATO partners, a nightmare fed almost equally from each side of the Atlantic partnership. The nightmare is that, long before the dispelling of the post-war threats that caused the Alliance to be negotiated and agreed upon in 1949, and despite the later adherence of new members and acceptance by many people who were originally hostile (such as the Italian Communist Party after 1975), NATO faces a centrifugal crisis.

More and more Europeans fear a return to some form of isolationism by the United States, to some extent in reaction against allied resent-
ment of military policies which they criticize, justly or not, as overly adventurous. More and more nations in Europe are taking—partially or globally—a stand corresponding to the same trend, by attempting to ensure their own security by their own means. In the case of some European nations, the alternatives they face are drastically different: The choice is between a stronger military and possibly nuclear commitment of their own and an opposite trend leaning to unilateral disarmament, opposition to any nuclear deterrent, and ultimately, neutralism.

It is not by unilateral decisions of the United States or of any single European nation that this crisis can be settled or by-passed. A joint effort in facing the deep sources of the crisis is urgently required. Many Europeans believe that this effort should associate them much more closely in the common responsibility of finding ways to stop the race in nuclear armaments. They argue that NATO security bonds will be consolidated by being collectively more audacious in attempting to bring the other side to participate in a common effort in arms control. Arms control policy, which should deliberately aim at reversing the trend leading to an unrestrained race of armaments and at ultimately achieving agreements on arms limitation and on arms reduction, is something too important for Europe’s security to be left to the United States alone. Moreover, some Europeans sense that U.S. and European priorities in the field of arms control, limitation and reduction are different. While the United States will feel secure only through an acceptable balance of strategic nuclear forces, Western Europe can feel secure only if such a balance is preceded or accompanied by a balance of conventional and nuclear—both tactical and theater—forces in Europe. These differing needs must be reconciled both by a larger share of responsibility being attributed to Western Europe by its major—but still equal—partner in North America, and by dispelling the growing fear in Western Europe that the priority given by the United States to strategic negotiations is just the first step towards decoupling the responsibilities and ultimate destinies of the American and European partners in the Alliance. The state of disruption of the Alliance in Western Europe, increasingly weakened by the cancer of unilateral pacifism, is becoming so serious that such a sharing of responsibilities and risks has become the most urgent priority for the mutual security of the two sides of the Atlantic.

B. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS

Despite local armed conflicts in Asia and increased East-West tensions, Japanese tend to be more concerned about threats to their material well-being than military threats. While there was concern in the past about potential Japanese involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars and the possibility of a general nuclear war resulting from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Japan has avoided involvement in any post-war military conflict. On the other hand, economic crises, such as President Nixon’s devaluation of the dollar in August 1971, the 1973 petroleum embargo, and the oil price rises have been serious ‘shocks’ to the Japanese economy and body politic. Similarly today, the growth of economic protectionism appears to be regarded as a more serious threat to Japan than the much-debated Soviet military threat.

The Soviet Military Challenge

Given this general background, there is a tendency in Japan to discount any direct Soviet military threat to Japan in the absence of a broader conflagration involving the United States. Yet the Soviet Union has consistently been the least-like foreign country in Japan and the recent arms buildup in the Soviet Far East and a series of annoying incidents have created more public consciousness of a Soviet threat. Japanese military/security experts display considerably more concern, taking note of the following:

- The military command for the Soviet Far East has been placed under the direct control of Moscow.
- Soviet ground forces deployed east of the Urals expanded from 46 divisions in 1980 to 51 divisions in 1981.
- The Soviet Pacific Fleet has become the largest of the four Soviet fleets, accounting for 30% of Soviet naval forces.
- The Minsk, one of only two Soviet carriers, has been deployed in Vladivostok, and Soviet warships often sail between Soviet Pacific ports and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.
- There are now an estimated 40 long-range Backfire bombers deployed in Asia, capable of destroying major targets in China, Japan, and many other parts of Asia and threatening sea-lanes in the South and East China Seas as well as the North Pacific.
- There are reported to be more than 100 mobile intermediate-range SS-20s deployed in the Soviet Far East.

The Soviet Union has also deployed one division-size force on three of the four islands north of Hokkaido over which Japan claims sovereignty. Soviet air activity has increased, as evidenced by the 939 times Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces intercepted Soviet warplanes in 1981, compared to an average 500 times a year during the 1970s. Other recent irritants included the 1980 towing of a disabled Soviet nuclear submarine through Japanese waters despite official Japanese protests and
the 1980 spy scandal involving a Soviet military attaché based in Tokyo and a retired Japanese general.

Japanese security specialists are also concerned that Soviet actions elsewhere in Asia could be detrimental to Japanese security and economic interests; for example, if the Soviets provided indirect support for a North Korean invasion of South Korea or, more remotely, a Vietnamese thrust into Thailand. They note that the use of Soviet military facilities in Vietnam gives the Soviets a considerable advantage in being able to harass U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea and cut sea-lanes vital to Japan.

This does not mean that Japanese specialists on Soviet military affairs believe that the Soviet Union has gained strategic superiority over the United States either globally or regionally, or that the Soviet Union is likely to make a direct attack on Japan. These specialists generally regard the United States as maintaining qualitatively superior forces, despite the larger number of Soviet ICBM launchers. It is frequently noted, for example, that the Minsk is little more than an anti-submarine attack carrier, far inferior in size and fighting capabilities to American carriers deployed in the Pacific.

While Japanese defense specialists are concerned about increased Soviet military capabilities in the Far East, the general view is that Soviet expansionism is directed towards targets of opportunity on its southern flank and that Europe continues to be the strategic focus of the Soviet military. However, it is recognized that if there are serious tensions or a conflict in the Middle East or Indian Ocean, a part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be diverted away from Northeast Asia, thinning U.S. forces deployed around Japan and making Japan that much more vulnerable. Considerations such as these are behind Japan’s current defense programs emphasizing the expansion of self-defense capabilities to permit patrolling to 1,000 miles southward and Prime Minister Nakasone’s expressed belief that Japan has a role to play in defense against Backfire bombers.

Japanese Views of the U.S. Posture
The Japanese government generally welcomes President Reagan’s efforts to maintain a strategic balance with the Soviet Union. However, Japan has found it difficult to form a strong public consensus on the nature of the security relationship between Japan and the United States. Public opinion polls show that 60 to 70 percent of the public generally support the existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. But an October 1982 poll by NHK, the National Broadcasting Service, showed that 78 percent fear that Japan might be drawn into an American-initiated war. The same poll showed that 54 percent believe that the arms buildups by both superpowers are threatening to world peace. A June 1981 poll by Asahi Shimbun showed that some 47 percent opposed and only 33 percent favored allowing American warships with nuclear arms aboard to pass through Japanese waters or stop in Japanese ports. The October 1982 decision of the United States to deploy F-16s in northern Japan was welcomed by the Japanese government as increasing U.S. deterrent capabilities, but it was highly criticized by pacifist segments of Japanese society.

Obviously U.S. defense policies themselves can be sources of great insecurity for many Japanese who fear that U.S. miscalculation or irrationality may ignite a conflict into which Japan will inevitably be drawn. From this perspective, the apparent preoccupation of the Reagan Administration with meeting the Soviet challenge through a military buildup has increased the problems which Japan has in reaching a public consensus about its own appropriate security posture. While Japanese welcome a carrot and stick approach to dealing with the Soviet Union, they fear the carrot is conspicuously lacking in present U.S. policy.

Moreover on both the governmental and public levels, Japan has been dissatisfied by the quality of consultation with Washington on issues relating to Soviet policy. Economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, such as the American sanctions against the natural gas pipeline to Western Europe, are regarded as of doubtful effectiveness and considerable cost. While Japan supported the U.S. position, its sympathies lay with the Western European countries, who were also annoyed by the lack of consultation and by U.S. sanctions against private European companies. Japanese also fear that having once backed U.S. policies, an abrupt shift in the U.S. position, as in the case of the cancellation of the grain embargo by President Reagan, could leave Japan out on a diplomatic limb. Much more recently, concern has been expressed that the Soviet Union and the United States might reach an agreement over intermediate nuclear forces in Europe, resulting in a shift of SS-20s to the Soviet Far East.

If Japan fears dangers from the U.S. buildup, dangers also lie in the reduction of U.S. forces. The initial decision of President Carter to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea in 1977 caused considerable concern within the Japanese establishment. Significant U.S. withdrawals could have a serious polarizing effect on Japan’s defense debate, simultaneously encouraging pacifists and those Japanese who would support an expanded but autonomous defense, while undermining the position of ‘mainstream’ policymakers who advocate a
closer alliance relationship with the United States based on the present mutual security arrangements. Even the appearance of an absolute or relative decline in U.S. defense capabilities, if coupled with a more self-assertive posture on the part of some Japanese encouraged by the achievement of economic ‘pre-eminence’, can cause significant changes in the nature of the Japanese defense debate.

A perceived decline in U.S. capabilities also affects Japanese views of the likelihood of the United States honoring its defense commitments to Japan. Asked whether the United States would really defend Japan in the event of a war, a March 1981 poll found only 22 percent responding affirmatively and 59 percent negatively. Since then, Japanese perceptions of U.S. willingness to maintain its military strength and honor defense commitments may have increased because of the Reagan defense programs.

Japanese Views on Arms Control
As a nation committed to the ‘peace’ constitution, the three non-nuclear principles, and the three principles of arms exports, there is broad support in Japan for the notion of arms control. However, there is a general feeling that Japan cannot have a major influence on the process of arms control efforts. Much of the discussion on arms control seems to most Japanese to be highly technical, which only has direct relevance to the superpowers and in which it is hard for the Japanese to participate. This means also that Japanese support for arms control or opposition to the arms race is quite moralistic and emotional in nature, and is not a well-informed effort to affect policy changes.

Paradoxically, Japan is under pressure from its allies to expand its military capabilities. U.S. requests for Japan to develop military equipment jointly and provide the U.S. military with electronics and other materials have encouraged the development of the arms industry. Some Japanese are concerned that the growth of a Japanese arms industry will make it difficult to limit Japan’s military buildup. They are also concerned about Japan’s contribution to the global arms race through arms exports once the three principles on arms exports are nullified. Those principles were first introduced in the Diet in 1967 and stipulated that Japan would not export arms to 1) communist countries, 2) nations to which the United Nations have forbidden arms exports, and 3) nations involved in armed international disputes or likely to be in such disputes. The Japanese government elaborated these three principles and in 1976, the Prime Minister said that Japan, observing the spirit of the Japanese constitution, will refrain from exports of arms not only to the countries in these three categories, but to any country.

Equipment for arms production would be seen as equivalent to arms.

The Japanese see the strategic arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States (START) basically as a bilateral issue. The Japanese perception is that START does not directly affect Japan’s security. Unlike the NATO countries, the Japanese are not troubled or alarmed by an idea that the United States may be lured into sacrificing the interest of its ally for the sake of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union. However, the Japanese do believe that the ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to reach arms control agreements that are fair and even-handed will make the prospect of war considerably more remote, thus indirectly contributing to Japan’s security.

Many Japanese believe that it is impossible to bring about arms control without the trilateral world achieving a general equilibrium with the Soviet Union and that Japan’s participation in efforts to build a stronger military capability for the free world is feasible and desirable.

Japan and Nuclear Non-Proliferation
The Japanese commitment not to produce nuclear weapons is quite sincere, and the government’s repeated claims of having no intention to acquire nuclear weapons is never challenged because the best informed Japanese nearly all agree that the hazards of going nuclear far outweigh any advantages. Japanese generally oppose nuclear proliferation out of genuine fear of nuclear holocaust. The Japanese government’s ‘three non-nuclear principles’ have been supported by the majority of the Japanese people.

Proliferation of nuclear capabilities continues as a source of international concern. But the Japanese think halting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons among the ‘haves’ is as vital as halting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons among the others. Japan signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, accepting the fact that the NPT created two quite separate classes of states. The Japanese concede that the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear weapons powers and non-nuclear weapons powers are quite different.

Global Stagflation
As previously mentioned, economic difficulties are regarded as the most serious sources of danger to Japan. Despite Japan’s own relatively good economic performance, heavy dependence on external resources and markets makes it extremely conscious of its economic and hence, ultimately, security vulnerability.

Unemployment rates have continued to rise in North America and Western Europe, especially in those industries where Japan has the
competitive edge. The high U.S. interest rates, raising the value of the dollar against the yen during much of 1981 and 1982, sharply aggravated the trade imbalance between Japan and the United States, while Japan has a similarly large surplus in merchandise trade with Europe. The daily repetition in newspapers and on the television of protectionist statements directed against Japan naturally looks very threatening to the Japanese public. Yet, despite official concern about the importance of maintaining global trade and monetary systems, most of the Japanese public emphasize Japan's own vulnerability and discount Japan's ability to share in revitalizing the world economy. Among Japan's economic experts, the general consensus is that the solution to Japan's trade problems lies in the revitalization of the U.S. economy, and they fear that U.S. defense programs may jeopardize this more important U.S. priority.

Political Instability in Developing Countries
Japan is also concerned about economic threats arising from political instability in such areas as the Middle East, Southern Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America. In general, Japanese tend to stress internal or local factors that cause political instability—such as ethnic tensions, religious conflict, civil wars, and economic problems. They give more limited attention to Soviet manipulation in developing countries, another point of contrast between U.S. and Japanese views of the Soviet danger.

Political instability in the Middle East has already demonstrably affected the Japanese economy, particularly during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war resulting in the oil embargo. After the Khomeini revolution, Japan's dependence on Iranian oil declined from 17 percent of total oil imports in 1978 to 3.5 percent in 1981, and the Iran/Iraq conflict contributed to a decline in Iraq's share from 7.4 percent in 1980 to 1.5 percent in 1981. A civil war or radical religious revolution in a remaining large supplier, such as Saudi Arabia, or similar unrest in Egypt affecting the Suez Canal, could have a large adverse impact on the Japanese economy.

Japanese industrial activities depend heavily upon southern African countries for rare metals of strategic importance (such as manganese, chrome, platinum, and cobalt) without which major industrial products (including automobiles, airplanes, jet engines, computers, and space satellites) cannot be manufactured. Japan relies upon foreign supplies for 98 percent of its manganese needs, 99 percent of its chrome, and 100 percent of its platinum and cobalt; and a majority of all these rare metals are found in South Africa and Zaire (and, incidentally, the Soviet Union). Present Japanese stockpiles of these basic mineral resources equal no more than a week's consumption. Only recently have Japanese government officials and experts begun to pay close attention to this vulnerable state and the effect that Soviet-supported 'liberation' movements might have on supplies.

Japan has paid relatively more attention to political instability in Central America and the Caribbean region, given the more visible strategic importance to Japan of the Panama Canal, through which a major portion of Japanese trade with the southern and eastern coasts of the United States takes place. Japan has responded affirmatively to the U.S. call for economic assistance to the region.

Still, the importance of Central America and the Caribbean region does not, for the Japanese, match that of Asia. Political instability in East and Southeast Asia is an important security issue for Japan, not just because the region offers a large market for Japanese goods, but also because Japan prefers a safer neighborhood. A Korean or Indochinese peninsula completely under Soviet hegemony would threaten the position that Japan has held historically in these areas. Similarly, China's behavior toward the Soviet Union, the United States, Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia is also a major foreign policy concern. China, although a communist country, is today regarded as no threat to Japan. However, China's sudden and sharp criticism of alleged Japanese government distortion of school history textbooks in mid-1982 illustrated that Sino-Japanese relations are still far from solid. This is a formidable potential source of insecurity in Japanese perceptions.

'Comprehensive National Security'

In the Japanese debate, the various aspects of security discussed above come together under the general heading of 'comprehensive national security'—introduced in the July 1980 report prepared by the Comprehensive National Security Study Group at the request of the late Prime Minister Ohira. Much of informed Japanese opinion feels that 'comprehensive national security' is the only feasible organizing concept for Japan's security policy, for several reasons:

- Responses to diversified sources of insecurity should also be diversified.
- In this age of advanced nuclear armaments and international interdependence, a totally independent security effort is not feasible for Japan.
- Japan is committed by its constitution to renunciation of war and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes
(although it retains both individual and collective self-defense rights).

Nevertheless, as many informed Japanese recognize, the comprehensive national security concept at this stage of its development is not yet convincing in the eyes of Japan’s allies, given the failure to clarify, qualitatively and quantitatively, what it should mean in terms of Japan’s military and non-military contributions to the international community. In such a situation, there may be some suspicions that “comprehensive national security” is an excuse for Japan not to make a greater contribution in trilateral security efforts.

In determining Japan’s fair share of trilateral security efforts, several factors should be taken into consideration. They include 1) the trend in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, 2) the Soviets’ external behavior in the face of mounting domestic socio-economic problems, 3) political instability in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, 4) the Soviet arms buildup in the Asia/Pacific region, and 5) the narrowing gap of economic strength between the United States and Japan. All these considerations, however, must remain within a basic policy framework: The degree of Japan’s security contribution should not be determined in a manner which would adversely affect Japan’s commitment to its “peace” constitution, to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, to the exclusively defensive posture of its military forces, and to the so-called ‘three non-nuclear principles’ (not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan). If Japan were to depart from this basic policy framework, either voluntarily or under external pressure, it would face major domestic political turmoil in which its positive security contributions would become impossible or greatly constrained.

To be more specific, Japan should focus its efforts on improving the quality, readiness, and sustainability of existing and planned forces rather than expanding the scope of defense power beyond that which already has been planned. The Defense Agency has recently decided to achieve the National Defense Program Outline set in 1976 through a new five-year Defense Agency program. The new 1983-1988 program, known as the ‘Medium-Term Operating Plan’, puts the emphasis on strengthening capabilities for air defense, anti-submarine efforts, and coastal operations to fit the geographical features of Japan. This program, however, is not likely to be achieved unless the government revises the cabinet decision made during the Miki Administration in November 1976 to keep defense expenditures within one percent of GNP. The level of Japan’s military spending will have to go beyond one percent of GNP, but should be kept under the two percent level in order to adhere to the commitment to the basic policy framework mentioned above.

There is a need to review whether the National Defense Program Outline itself should be revised in the light of international developments since the plan was drawn up. This review would include the question of whether the scope of air and maritime defense should be broadened, given the situation in Southwest Asia and the Middle East following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the possible need to dispatch U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf from the U.S. Seventh Fleet deployed in the Pacific. More specifically this brings us to the question of whether the Japanese defense forces should or even could patrol or control the sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles.

While this task would involve a slight expansion of the current scope of the plan, this could be effected by adjusting the specifics and does not require altering the National Defense Program Outline itself. After all, it falls within the bounds of self-defense of the Japanese mainland, and can be met by improving the performance of the equipment involved rather than by extension of the functional scope of defense forces. In other words, this can be resolved by making the appropriate choice among types of anti-submarine patrol craft and by adjusting the range of escort warships and submarines to be deployed, without necessarily increasing their number.

Comprehensive security, of course, goes considerably beyond the issue of what Japan should do to defend itself militarily. Quite apart from the question of self-defense, Japan must be prepared to make an active contribution to the broad security of Asia and the Pacific, and of the wider world including the Middle East. Japan is unable to contribute by dispatching troops to regional or global trouble-spots since its constitution is interpreted to limit its self-defense effort to defense of Japan itself. Japan, however, must be prepared to expand its contributions in the fields of economic assistance and diplomatic activity. Moreover, Japan should be ready to make a greater effort to decrease the U.S. financial burden related to the U.S. troop deployment in Japan. Japan would do well to realize that still greater efforts are needed to reach a fair level of burden-sharing with America in this regard. As for the level of Japan’s development assistance to Third World countries, the present policy goal of doubling development assistance in five years will not amount to such a substantial increase. Sustained and much greater efforts in the development assistance area are required for Japan to make its comprehensive national security policy credible.
C. NORTH AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS

Feelings of insecurity and perceptions of danger in North America are diverse and do not admit of generalization. In the first place, the prevailing views in the United States and Canada are, and are likely to remain, somewhat different. In the United States, the dominant security concerns derive from the country’s position as a superpower with global military and economic interests. By contrast, Canada’s status as a power of lesser rank creates attitudes closer to those of Western European countries than to those of the United States. The range of opinions within both countries on any given security issue is broad, with security policies supported by shifting coalitions with rather different views of the dangers. Several different types of insecurity are generally perceived, though the respective importance attributed to them varies widely. For the purpose of this discussion, these can be divided into dangers to military (or physical) security; dangers to economic security; and dangers to psychological (or political) security. In practice, however, the divisions are not clearly drawn.

Perceptions of Growing Insecurity

In general, North American concerns about security increased steadily during the 1970s and early 1980s as a result of both international and domestic developments. Prominent among these were the increasing concern about the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland, which undercut the promises of détente, the successive oil crises, with their adverse impact on the trilateral and world economies, and the growth of both independence and instability in the developing world, primarily caused by social and economic tensions. This combination of circumstances created in some quarters, especially in the United States, a judgement that the early- and mid-1980s would be a time of special vulnerability for the trilateral countries. This judgement gave rise to a sense of urgency and to a belief that the speed of adjustment of trilateral security policies was not great enough. This sense of urgency in turn gave rise to a sense of impending crisis within the North Atlantic Alliance and the U.S.-Japanese alliance and to recent pressures by the United States on its allies to match the ambitious budgetary and policy changes in the security area proposed by the Reagan Administration. In addition, especially in Canada, the economic problems of the developed and the developing world caused renewed attention to be directed to the question of poverty as a source of insecurity—and a magnet for external intervention—and to the consequent need to ensure that North-South economic policies receive a fair share of the limited resources of trilateral governments.

The growth of this sense of vulnerability has been accompanied by—and has also in part stimulated—the growth of public debate about security and, especially, nuclear security throughout North America. The recent successes of the nuclear freeze resolutions in several U.S. states and in the U.S. Congress and of similar initiatives, including at the municipal level, in Canada and the discussion of the pastoral letter on nuclear policy from the U.S. Roman Catholic bishops testify to the extent of this debate. The likely consequences of this surge of public interest in the nuclear threat cannot be confidently predicted. The freeze may become an important issue in the U.S. presidential elections of 1984. However, some believe that support for simple freeze measures has peaked and that the public has increasingly come to understand the complexities of dealing with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons matters. Opinion polls have clearly shown that public support for arms control goes hand-in-hand with concern about Soviet behavior. And in Canada, growing support for stronger arms control policies and anxiety about support for U.S. nuclear policy (as, for example, by allowing cruise missile testing over Canadian soil) has been matched by a growth of support for stronger defense policies. In the view of those who think support for simple freeze proposals has peaked, the primary significance of support for a freeze was to send a message to governments—and especially the U.S. government—that the vigorous pursuit of some realistic arms control proposals must be a major element of any U.S. security policy if it is to have broad support. This interpretation will probably prove more nearly correct, at least as long as officials avoid further inflaming the public debate with careless pronouncements on U.S. nuclear strategy.

Part of the anxiety reflected in current U.S. attitudes derives from the psychological difficulty for the United States of adjusting to the unavoidable diminution of the strength of its military and economic position vis-à-vis allies and adversaries during recent years. That source of insecurity is of considerable importance. Among other things, it helped to create much of the recent polarization in U.S. informed opinion. This polarization has been between those who nostalgically yearned for a return to nuclear superiority and those who hoped that Soviet attainment of strategic parity and the increased economic strength of the major allies of the United States would lead both the Soviets and the allies to changes of attitude and policy which would result in a more stable international system. In such a system, they believed, the United States would be able to lay down some of its burden as a guarantor of the security of others. Whether this psychological insecurity is alleviated or intensified during the 1980s will
depend in part on developments in the world beyond the trilateral countries. But it will also be strongly influenced by the security policies adopted by the trilateral countries in their attempts to deal with other, more tangible dangers to their security.

The Soviet Danger
Among these tangible dangers, the most generally recognized and the most pervasive is that from the Soviet Union, which threatens the security of the United States and Canada in many ways. It poses the only direct military threat to North America, while the shadow of Soviet power hangs over the allies and friends of the United States militarily, politically and economically, thus challenging U.S. political and economic, as well as military, interests. But there is disagreement within the United States and Canada on the precise extent and nature of these dangers.

At one end of the spectrum there are those—relatively more numerous in the United States than in Canada—who see Soviet intentions and actions as being driven directly by Marxist-Leninist ideology and based, in effect, on a master plan for world domination. In this conservative view, the Soviets are willing to promote their goals by aggression where circumstances are favorable. Soviet professions of interest in peace and stability, commitments to arms control, and reassuring statements (such as those about nuclear no first use) are seen as propaganda to lull Western opinion into a sense of false security and so to frustrate Western security policies. Supporters of this view in its most extreme form are few. But relatively minor variants are widely supported and have been influential in shaping the policies of the Reagan Administration. Policies which flow from this view emphasize the importance of taking no actions which might give any encouragement or support to the military and economic systems which underpin Soviet policy. Thus stringent controls on exports and on the availability of Western credits to the Soviet Union and strenuous resistance to the expansion of Soviet influence in the world are seen as essential. According to this view, arms limitation agreements should only be entered into with extreme caution. U.S. security is seen as requiring a major effort to demonstrate to the Soviets the futility of their goals and the need for change in their internal and alliance arrangements. To this end, redressing the U.S.-Soviet military balance, which supporters of this view see as being in favor of the Soviets in both nuclear and conventional forces, and matching the present levels of Soviet investment in military strength are given high priority, while the search for U.S.-Soviet agreements on arms control is given lower priority.

In the middle of the spectrum there is a variety of opinion from which it is hard to draw clear-cut distinctions, but which can, for convenience, be separated into two clusters. The first and more liberal cluster became influential in U.S. policy in the late-1950s and was the dominant view during most of the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in the Nixon Administration’s policy of détente. In this view, Soviet policies should be seen primarily in terms of traditional Russian nationalism, interested in maintaining the security of Soviet borders and promoting the expansion of Soviet influence as a means of protecting the Soviet state and enhancing the status and reach of Soviet superpower. In this view, the Soviets are determined to exploit—and to some extent to create—opportunities to expand their influence where this can be done at relatively low cost and risk, notably of confrontation with the United States. The Soviets are typically seen in this view as cautious and pragmatic, with goals like those of other major powers in history and with internal problems which are likely to have some moderating influence on Soviet behavior. This view does not discount the competitive nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and the importance of maintaining a U.S.-Soviet military balance. But it takes more nearly at face value Soviet statements about the destructiveness of nuclear war and the importance of taking steps (for instance through balanced arms control agreements) to avert it, even though Soviet behavior on other international issues may be quite contrary to other U.S. interests. Those who hold this view also tend to believe that, because of the needs of their economy, among other things, the Soviets can be induced, by a judicious combination of Western sticks and carrots, to see advantage in a partially cooperative relationship which could enhance both Western and Soviet security. This view sees U.S.-Soviet relations as a game with positive-sum outcomes, whereas the first view sees both countries as playing a zero-sum game, at least until Soviet policies are radically changed.

The more conservative of the two clusters in the middle of the spectrum has grown stronger in recent years with the failure of the limited détente of the 1970s. In this view, Soviet goals are seen as more persistently expansionist and more concerned with promoting growing Soviet dominance of world affairs than the more liberal centrist view would hold. However, the ideological motive for those goals, which the ultra-conservative view described earlier emphasizes, is seen as less influential and other motives—such as Soviet concerns for security on their borders, perceptions of U.S. hostility, and traditional Russian nationalism—are seen as playing a larger part. In this view, while Soviet caution is recognized, consistent with their respect for the
more liberal view, however, will certainly require some new evidence of Soviet willingness to accommodate priority Western concerns on arms control and other international issues.

North American judgements of the seriousness and urgency of particular dangers to trilateral military security are diverse. Few people believe that a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on any trilateral country is likely to come out of the blue. But the possibility that the Soviet leaders, emboldened by the attainment of nuclear parity and local conventional superiority, might overstep the bounds of U.S. tolerance, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean or Gulf region, and force a U.S. military response is not ruled out. Nor are various possible scenarios in which such a Soviet move could spill over into a major, perhaps world-wide U.S.-Soviet military confrontation, including on the central front in Europe and in Northeast Asia. Even more plausible is Soviet exploitation of the ambiguities created by nuclear parity and Soviet conventional superiority to undercut the self-confidence of free world countries and to take advantage of instabilities around the world to prejudice the political, economic, and strategic interests of the trilateral countries. Recent Soviet policies towards Western Europe in connection with the theater nuclear force modernization issue are seen as characteristic in this respect.

The region of greatest concern in the 1980s, in the dominant U.S. perception, will be the Middle East and the Gulf. Not that Europe and Northeast Asia are overlooked. But the force relationships and military strategies in Europe and Northeast Asia are relatively well established and understood, while those in the Middle East/Gulf region are less so. In the Middle East, the two major threats to Western security are seen as the prolongation of the Arab/Israel dispute and the Soviet threat to the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.

The perceived importance to the United States of Israel's security has been heightened in the eyes of a significant section of informed people in the United States by the confluence during the 1970s of pro-Israeli and anti-Soviet sentiment. Support for Israel is seen by some as a critical aspect of the U.S. effort to stem the advance of Soviet influence world-wide. For this reason, among others, U.S. policy is likely to continue to be heavily influenced by Israeli perceptions of Israel's security requirements. By contrast, Canadian opinion has in recent years become more divided, with a distinct shift, notably among French Canadians, to a less strong support for Israeli positions.

In the Gulf area, the fall of the Shah's régime and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have led to growing fears that the Soviets will expand their influence so as to control the flow of Gulf oil and to unsettle—and
perhaps ultimately cause the collapse of—régimes in the region friendly to the West. Either development is seen as a major threat to Western security. This concern is shared in varying degrees across much of the spectrum of views about Soviet behavior. Again, the danger is not primarily seen as a sudden military intervention. More likely, the Soviets would await a situation in which they had, as in Afghanistan, gradually gained some credence in the international community as a whole for the idea that 'legitimate' Soviet interests in Iran or Pakistan were being threatened and had to be protected.

Apart from these direct military dangers, many North Americans are concerned about ways in which Soviet actions could threaten trilateral security indirectly. These include political, financial and military support to subversive and revolutionary groups within other countries (and also international terrorist groups, such as those supported by the Soviets in the Middle East and Turkey). Such activities could result in risks to significant Western interests in the Philippines, Egypt, Central and South America, or elsewhere. Almost all shades of opinion about Soviet behavior recognize that such dangers would, like that to the Gulf, have causes and sources of support other, and perhaps more significant, than the Soviets. In Canada in particular, the domestic social and economic problems that cause political instability tend to be emphasized and to shape Canadian attitudes on, for example, problems in Central and South America and the Caribbean rather differently from more conservative U.S. attitudes. But many North Americans recognize that direct or indirect Soviet support can—and often does—contribute to the development of instability and so to trilateral insecurity. U.S. perceptions of this aspect of the Soviet danger are frequently criticized in Europe and Japan on the grounds that the United States sees all international developments in East-West terms. Predictably, Americans reverse the criticism by insisting that Western Europeans and Japanese typically overlook the extent to which indigenous instability is stimulated and exploited by Soviet actions.

At least those who hold more conservative views about the Soviets see a serious danger to trilateral security in the Soviet manipulation of European and Japanese economic interests and political sensitivities. The Western European reaction to the Soviet-sponsored repression in Poland is seen by some as a characteristic example of the results of Soviet efforts to promote the neutralization of Western European opinion and to exploit its military superiority to this end. More recent Soviet attempts—not always very subtle or effective—to manipulate German opinion before the recent elections and to pressure the new Japanese government to modify its policy on defense collaboration with the United States are examples of the same phenomenon. The U.S. reaction to the Soviet-European gas pipeline project has been the most visible manifestation of this U.S. concern. The danger is seen as the establishment by the Soviets of a degree of leverage over either the economies or the public attitudes of key allies sufficient to deter them from taking steps necessary to protect their security, with consequent damage to their—and to U.S.—interests. While this concern is not held generally within the United States and is even less widely found in Canada, it has become more influential in recent years and is unlikely to disappear.

The Proliferation Danger
The dangers of nuclear proliferation are variously assessed by different people in North America. Some see the prospect of proliferation as one of the most likely triggers of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation. While the precise mechanisms which might trigger such a confrontation are difficult to identify, there is an anxiety that, through miscalculation or misunderstanding, a local war involving one or two nuclear proliferators could suck the superpowers into nuclear war. People who discount this possibility nonetheless believe that in a world of many nuclear powers, including several in less stable areas, such as the Middle East, the general level of insecurity of nations would be much higher and the prospects for a stable international order conducive to trilateral interests and values much bleaker. Some observers disagree with even this more cautious concern and believe that proliferation could actually increase international stability by deterring local conflicts. But the dominant view has been, and is likely to remain, that proliferation poses a threat to trilateral security interests so great that high priority must be given to efforts to forestall or at least delay it. In general, Canadian opinion has given at least as high a priority to non-proliferation efforts as U.S. opinion.

Economic Insecurity
Of all perceived dangers to trilateral security, that presented by economic weakness is probably the most generally accepted and assessed in a common manner in North America. Differences of view on this subject are primarily on remedies rather than on diagnosis. It is generally recognized that economic difficulties—low growth, high unemployment, industrial obsolescence, declining productivity—have combined in much of the trilateral world to cause an excessive preoccupation with domestic problems which constitute a serious source of weakness and insecurity. While the immediate concern about renewed
oil supply disruption or oil price problems has receded with the growth of the current oil glut, the possibility that these problems could recur during the mid- and late-1980s intensifies this concern. So do continuing North-South economic tensions, though these are viewed more seriously in Canada than they are in general in the United States.

D. CONCLUSION

Not unexpectedly, the three preceding sections have illustrated the diversity of perceptions of security and insecurity within and among the trilateral countries. They have also highlighted the familiar distinction between the position of the United States as the Western superpower, for which security problems are seen largely as a function of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and the positions of Western Europe, Japan, and Canada, where security is often perceived more in terms of the policies and attitudes of the United States, which are variously seen as the primary source of reassurance, a frequent source of anxiety and, on occasion, a source of danger and insecurity for other trilateral countries.

On this diverse canvas, however, one impression of central relevance to this report stands out. In all the trilateral regions, recent events have created an unusual combination of security-related tensions and problems. Whether it be the centrifugal crisis of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is Western Europe’s current nightmare, or the dangerous conjunction of global economic weakness and doubts about U.S. policies which concern Japan and, in differing ways, Canada, or the fears that the trilateral countries will show insufficient resolve to withstand Soviet military pressures and political blandishments which preoccupy the United States—all the trilateral regions are anxious about the future of their security relationships. It is to the fostering of policies that can allay these anxieties, while commanding support from the diverse strands of opinion in the trilateral countries described in this chapter, that the remainder of this report is addressed. In their task, the authors, all of whom have had extensive experience in government, have been conscious of the complex problems with which the trilateral governments have recently been confronted and which they have been attempting to resolve. When we have ventured to draw conclusions and make recommendations which differ from current official policies, we have done so not in any disputatious or partisan spirit, but in an attempt to contribute to a serious debate about security among our countries, on the outcome of which our success in dealing with the novel security challenges of our time depends.

III. THE SEARCH FOR GREATER SECURITY

A. THE CHALLENGE TO THE TRILATERAL COUNTRIES

There is no disagreement among the trilateral regions that the range of potential security problems in the 1980s will be broad. The differences concern the scale and the relative importance of these problems and the most appropriate ways of dealing with them. Such differences of view among the trilateral countries are natural—and unavoidable—and should not be a cause for alarm. However, the fact that they are unavoidable is no reason why the trilateral governments should tolerate the present level of disarray. Dissension has often served domestic political purposes, particularly in the Atlantic Alliance, and a case can be made that governments have well understood—and accepted—that such divisions are hard to avoid and relatively easy to live with. They have also been the inevitable accompaniments to the progressive shift from a U.S.-dominated alliance system to the more nearly equal partnership of the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of these divisions has been to provide our adversaries with opportunities to make mischief among the trilateral countries and to bring us close to losing that degree of unity of purpose which is the surest guarantee of security. One of the major challenges for the trilateral countries in the 1980s is to establish the policies and consultative procedures necessary for a minimum essential degree of unity and to manage disagreements.

There is at least one essential precondition for responding successfully to these challenges—the revitalization of the economies of the trilateral countries and the world economy as a whole. The economic problems of the 1970s and early 1980s—and notably the deep recession of the last few years—have made it harder for many of the trilateral countries to sustain the defense policies to which they had previously committed themselves. They have also weakened confidence in the ability of our democratic societies to sustain the social and economic values which, among other things, our security policies are designed
to protect and fostered parochial and selfish tendencies. These tendencies have undercut the ability of governments to find common solutions to common problems of economic as well as military security. Any enduring reversal of this harmful trend must be preceded by economic recovery and the return of confidence in the medium- and longer-term economic prospect. Detailed examination of these economic issues is outside the scope of this report. But we wish to emphasize at the outset the powerful link between these issues and the defense and arms control subjects we will address in detail.

Perhaps the most fundamental source of differing perceptions between the three regions concerns the nature and extent of the danger which the Soviet Union represents for the trilateral countries and the world as a whole. While it is appropriate to stress the extent and implications of Soviet military strength, the Soviet Union’s weaknesses should not be overlooked. The Soviets are in a sense encircled by nations which are by now alarmed by the aggressive nature of the Soviet system. The invasion of Afghanistan has led to a seemingly indefinite military entanglement for the Soviets which is proving costly in men and resources, as well as in its prejudicial impact on world public opinion. The Soviet-sponsored repression in Poland has set back, perhaps for a generation, the Soviet aim of having a stable situation on its Western marches. And to the East, China gives every indication of remaining a strong rival of Soviet influence in Asia and elsewhere. Internally, many observers expect that the stagnation of the Soviet economy will deepen during the decade, and the shifting balance of nationalities will place non-Russians in the majority. These developments will increase the Soviet régime’s difficulties in dealing with external problems.

Economic problems in the trilateral world and pervasive weaknesses within the Soviet bloc combine to place the trilateral governments and their adversaries at a crossroads. In one direction, they can find ways of controlling their rivalry, reducing the mutual threats they perceive and curbing the costs of their defense programs, which few on either side can believe will result in a real and lasting improvement in their security, but which neither side feels it can avoid in the absence of restraint by the other. Or, in the other direction, they can fail in—or abstain from—the serious pursuit of such accommodations and so open the door to a more dangerous world situation, in which the economic burden of defense will continue to grow.

We believe that the trilateral countries must clearly demonstrate their desire to move down the road that leads to East-West accommodation. Success cannot be guaranteed. It will depend, among other things, on the pursuit by both sides of a judicious combination of defense and arms control policies. In the trilateral countries, the realities of Soviet military strength and the ways in which it might be used to exert Soviet influence in peacetime and to expand control in war must be faced and understood in the context of what we know of broader Soviet aims and policies. At the same time, the trilateral countries’ defense policies should be such as to create incentives for gradual East-West military détente, without compromising trilateral security in the meanwhile. It is to the definition of policies that meet these exacting requirements—which would place on the Soviet Union responsibility for success or failure of the effort—that the four following sections of this chapter are devoted. The first will deal with the problem of nuclear weapons and the challenges of their control. The second will deal with the role of conventional forces and the prospects for their control. The third will cover the special cases of the Middle East and China. The fourth will briefly discuss the role of economic policies in improving trilateral security.

B. THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear Strategy

The Nuclear Balance

Short of a nuclear holocaust, the debate over the role of nuclear weapons will continue. Its recent resurgence in most of the trilateral countries results from the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has yet learned to live with a situation in which, as long as both sides continue the competition, the only possible strategic nuclear relationship is one of approximate parity.1 While one side may obtain an edge in one or more components of nuclear forces, offensive or defensive, this edge is unlikely to be either enduring or, given the vast uncertainties associated with nuclear war and the massive arsenals of both sides, exploitable in either political or military terms.

The prospect of ‘inevitable parity’ has engendered in the United States a sense of hesitation and has in turn hurt allied confidence. It has left the United States divided on the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union. By contrast, their new strategic position has given the

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1The term ‘parity’ means different things to different people. We use the term ‘approximate parity’ here to refer to a situation in which the two sides’ nuclear forces are generally comparable in size and capability across a range of measures and in which each can expect that, following the first strike by the other, a sufficient proportion of its forces will survive to enable it to undertake a significant range of retaliatory strikes. The term is, therefore, quite different in our usage from ‘minimum deterrence.’
Soviet leaders enhanced self-confidence, apparently without yet convincing them that, even in the nuclear age, there are limits to how far they can push their quest for influence without overstepping the bounds of U.S. tolerance. However, there is no reason to suppose that Soviet leaders’ statements about the destructiveness of nuclear war and the damage it would do to the communist system do not reflect genuine concerns.

Some, especially in the United States, question whether approximate parity is inevitable. They believe that an aggressive research and procurement policy by the United States in offensive nuclear weapons could restore a measure of strategic advantage. Some also think that the United States should pursue an advantage in strategic defense by space-based directed-energy systems which could neutralize an enemy missile attack. Others, including apparently President Reagan, believe that the Soviet Union already has acquired a position of superiority in offensive forces which has practical significance. We do not share this view.

For the foreseeable future and barring some improbable breakthrough in negotiations, the shadow of nuclear weapons will continue to hang over the international scene. This shadow will, as in the past, impose caution on the superpowers in their dealings with one another, which some will choose to criticize as weakness, and which others will commend as prudent. The way in which the nuclear shadow will affect the policies of the superpowers is hard to foresee. But it is of profound significance to the trilateral countries.

**Requirements for Deterrence**

At a minimum, the very existence of a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons in the hands of an adversary is likely to deter a nation’s use of nuclear weapons. But even this apparently simple form of deterrence has been the subject of changing opinions. At a time of U.S. nuclear superiority, an undifferentiated threat of massive nuclear response seemed an adequate deterrent. With the emergence of strategic nuclear parity, the idea that deterrence required a range of more limited options in addition to that of massive retaliation gained support. More recently, some students of nuclear strategy have argued that only nuclear forces able to survive and operate after enemy nuclear attacks, perhaps for a prolonged period, can adequately deter such attacks. Thus, operational characteristics such as survivability of weapons, delivery systems and command, control and communications (C3) systems have come to be seen by many to be essential elements of what is, in effect, a much more complex kind of deterrence based on what is known of Soviet views of nuclear war, which appear not to be mirror images of Western views.

These changing opinions have been reflected in successive pronouncements on U.S. nuclear strategy, starting from the Schlesinger doctrine of the early 1970s, through the “countervailing” strategy of the Carter years, as now further developed by the present Administration, with the aim, among others, of dispelling any Soviet belief that they would have an advantage in a protracted nuclear war. Paradoxically, however, these efforts to maintain and increase the effectiveness of U.S. deterrence of the Soviet Union have been partially responsible for the decay of consensus on nuclear policy in some trilateral countries.

This evolution of strategic thinking corresponds not only to the changing U.S.-Soviet strategic force relationship, but also to advances of technology which could in the foreseeable future permit the flexible operational planning—and survivability—for nuclear forces and their C3 which the new strategic concepts require. However, both in the United States and, even more, in Western Europe, Japan, and Canada there are those who view as dangerous increasing reliance on wartime operational capabilities of nuclear forces as a source of deterrence. In this view, the surest deterrent is the doubt in the adversary's mind that a nuclear conflict could be anything but massive nuclear exchanges. Especially for many Western Europeans, the idea of flexible nuclear options and capabilities suggests that the flexibility would be used to limit nuclear attacks to areas outside the superpowers’ homelands—an idea to which U.S. statements have at times lent credence.

If there are uncertainties among the trilateral countries about how best to achieve a convincing degree of deterrence of nuclear attack, the uncertainties about the deterrence of conventional attack by planning first use of nuclear weapons are even greater. At present, U.S. strategy retains this option explicitly in the defense of Europe and Korea and implicitly in the defense of Japan. It has also been discussed in connection with the Gulf region. Few regard this strategy as entirely satisfactory, especially at a time of nuclear parity. But the alternatives appear even more unattractive to many.

Most well-informed people in Western Europe, Japan and North America do not believe that war is likely, although some, notably some members of the peace movements, would disagree. Nevertheless, political sensitivities about nuclear weapons and the prospect that a first-use strategy could lead to an unravelling of domestic support for allied defense policies have led to renewed attention in unofficial quarters to moving away from conventional and nuclear force postures and plans that make early first use likely and towards a no-first-use
posture. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has called for the acquisition of non-nuclear forces of sufficient strength to shift onto the Soviets the wartime onus for any decision to use nuclear weapons.

The question of whether the allies should move towards a no-first-use posture, backed by adequate non-nuclear forces in all the likely theaters of conflict, remains controversial. Some would argue that history shows the dangers of relying only on conventional forces to deter conventional attack, while others argue that reliance on nuclear weapons to deter conventional war will not deter either conventional or nuclear war. Whatever may be the conclusions of these strategic and historical arguments, under the present political and economic conditions, the prospect that the conventional force changes needed to support the approach advocated by SACEUR could be quickly mounted is not good. Concerns exist in Western Europe about any moves which might appear to call into question current NATO strategy. Many people believe that the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO creates a healthy uncertainty for Warsaw Pact military planners which a no-first-use posture might reduce, even if it would probably not remove it entirely. The lack of wartime endurance of non-nuclear NATO defenses is seen by many as a serious obstacle to the avoidance of an early decision to use nuclear weapons, an obstacle which they believe could be quite expensive to overcome.

The trilateral countries have little option for the next few years but to pursue a hybrid policy, which will not wholly satisfy any school of thought, but may permit the maintenance of the consensus within each trilateral country necessary for a sufficient sense of security. The authors of this report believe, however, that the trilateral countries should work towards force postures that in time will permit them to avoid being the first to use nuclear weapons. SACEUR has estimated that in Europe such a posture could be had at a cost higher by only one percent than current NATO targets (i.e., a four percent real increase in defense spending over six years, as compared with the current three percent target agreed in NATO). A recent private study indicates that, allocated in the proper manner, the resources which would be made available by a three percent annual increase would be sufficient. The governments should consider whether the political will needed for such an effort could be more readily galvanized if the aim of shifting onto the Soviets the onus of a nuclear first-use decision, as proposed by SACEUR, were adopted.

This policy would retain the option of first use as a deterrent to conventional attack and would not require a change in NATO doctrine, while initiating an allied study of the circumstances in which the Alliance could avoid having to face an early decision to use nuclear weapons and in which the onus of a first-use decision could progressively be shifted to the Soviet Union. The objective would be to undertake the military planning and level of conventional force modernization compatible with this goal, within the framework of whatever arms control arrangements may be achieved. At the same time, however, the United States should make plain its determination to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to any use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union.

Goals of Nuclear Force Policies
The maintenance of robust deterrence of both crisis and war must be the primary goal of both the military and arms control policies of the trilateral countries. But there are other important goals. The first of these is to retain strong confidence among the trilateral countries. It cannot be repeated too often that this is the indispensable element of Western security and should govern the defense and arms control policies of the trilateral countries.

A further goal is the achievement of the greatest possible stability in the nuclear balance in times of peace, crisis, and war. This means that the United States must not be in a position, in crisis or wartime, in which it is under pressure to use nuclear forces for fear of losing them and perhaps, as a result, facing a desperate decision whether to escalate to an even higher level of nuclear violence. Stability in peacetime implies the avoidance of actions which could contribute to a further phase of arms competition from which neither side would emerge with advantage. Arms control can help here by providing a degree of predictability in the nuclear force relationship which discourages ‘worst case’ thinking. The control of nuclear proliferation is also a central, though often overlooked, element in maintaining nuclear stability in peace, crisis, or war.

It must be recognized that there may well be conflicts between these goals. The achievement of crisis and wartime stability in the military balance may suggest the desirability of weapons programs that would tend to reduce peacetime, or ‘arms race’, stability. The requirements of strong deterrence may seem, at least to some, to call into question the wisdom of substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals which could contribute to averting proliferation by honoring the superpowers’ commitments in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The recommendations made in this report reflect the authors’ judgements as to the best trade-offs between these goals—in effect, the trade-offs
most likely to help reduce the risk of nuclear war, which is, we believe, what our publics are, above all, looking to their governments to achieve.

The discussion which follows will address nuclear force posture and arms control issues and the problems of non-proliferation policy in the light of these goals.

**Nuclear Force Posture**

*Intercontinental Offensive Forces*

There must be maintained nuclear forces and associated command, control and communications systems capable, within the bounds of whatever arms control régime can be achieved, of reaching these goals. The goals of strong deterrence and crisis/wartime stability—and to some degree that of alliance cohesion—require that the United States retain for the time being survivable land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber forces, since both have distinctive characteristics as compared with other systems. Such forces should be designed with the aim of reducing Soviet incentives to threaten to strike them preemptively and so of increasing crisis and wartime stability. One means to this end would be to increase rather than reduce the number of land-based launchers which the Soviets would have to attack in a preemptive strike, without increasing the number of U.S. offensive warheads.

Some changes in current U.S. programs and plans could help to achieve this. For example, the planned deployment of 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads apiece would concentrate 1,000 warheads in only 100 aimspoints for Soviet missiles. One of the reasons for the prolonged controversy over the basing scheme for the MX is the importance of achieving high confidence that its strategically valuable warheads cannot be destroyed by a Soviet attack with a much smaller number of warheads. By contrast, the deployment of an equal number of warheads (1,000) on a new, single-warhead, ICBM would create 1,000 aimspoints against which the Soviets would have to target at least 2,000 warheads in order to have high confidence of destroying them. Thus, even if the missiles were deployed in fixed silos which could easily be targeted, the Soviets would have to use up a substantial fraction of their present force to destroy them. Such a new ICBM would provide a more flexible system than the MX to ensure adequate ICBM survivability.

The report of the U.S. President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission) in April 1983 supports this general line of argument, but makes a case for the deployment of "on the order of" 100 MX in existing Minuteman silos as one of three components of its preferred approach to modernizing the U.S. ICBM force. In summary, the Commission's argument for MX deployment rests on the following points:

- MX deployment is essential in order to remove the Soviet advantage in ICBM capability and to help deter the threat of conventional or limited nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies. MX is seen as adding to the deterrence exercised by the existing Minuteman force because the Soviets would realize that any MX that survived a Soviet first strike would constitute 10 warheads with good potential to kill hard targets, as opposed to three less capable warheads on the Minuteman III it replaced. This enhanced capability for a range of controlled, prompt, limited attacks on hard Soviet targets should be seen by the allies of the United States as a valuable additional source of reassurance.

- Since deterrence is in part a matter of Soviet perceptions of U.S. national will and cohesion, unilateral cancellation of a program supported by four Presidents would communicate lack of resolve.

- MX production could help hedge against a Soviet decision to 'break out' of the ABM Treaty limitations and also provide the United States with a good launcher for strategically important satellites, reducing sole reliance on the space shuttle.

- MX deployment is necessary to encourage the Soviets to move towards a more stable arms control régime. Without it, the United States will have no effective leverage at the negotiating table to reduce the Soviet ICBM threat.

In the Scowcroft Commission's view, none of these short-term needs can be met by any other ICBM than the MX.

While recognizing the force of these arguments and the weight of the judgement of the Commission, with its broad bipartisan composition, we remain doubtful whether MX deployment is desirable. We doubt whether the deterrent effect on the Soviets of the MX would significantly add to that already created by existing U.S. nuclear forces, enhanced, as they will be, by the ongoing U.S. Trident and cruise missile programs and by the B-1 and advanced technology (or 'stealth') bombers. It also seems unlikely, based on past experience, that the commitment to deploy MX would lead to a significantly greater Soviet willingness to accept a U.S. arms control initiative which would involve changing the nature of their ICBM force. Indeed, the Soviets might well see an initial deployment of 100 MX as merely the first step in an attempt by the United States to achieve a first-strike capability against
forces and more on their survivability against both nuclear and non-nuclear attack. Without survivability, TNF cannot serve either the military purpose of threatening enemy forces with destruction or the political purpose of demonstrating the ‘coupling’ between the Alliance’s conventional defenses and U.S. intercontinental nuclear forces. For these reasons any modernization of forces of intermediate ranges (300-1,800 km) should be combined with a substantial reduction of shorter-range weapons (e.g., nuclear artillery weapons, which probably make little contribution to deterrence and less contribution to ‘coupling’ than longer-range forces, including those that can threaten Soviet territory, while being sources of pressure for early escalation). This would allow the needed capability, while in all probability substantially reducing the overall number of nuclear weapons in Europe. Assuming continued European support, deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) to Europe should, in the authors’ view, proceed on schedule unless the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations prove successful and even if this results in some Soviet counter-move (such as stationing SS-20s in the Soviet Union in areas from which they can reach U.S. territory). In short, both elements of the so-called ‘two-track’ decision on longer-range TNF of December 1979 should be pursued with equal commitment. All aspects of this issue should, moreover, be handled in such a way as to ensure that strengthening security in Europe is not achieved at the expense of security in Asia. This point will be discussed further below in connection with policy on TNF arms control.

The issue of a ‘two-key’ arrangement for the operation of the Pershing II and GLCM has arisen recently in several prospective host countries. Such an arrangement was used for the deployment of Thor missiles in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. This idea could broaden the consensus supporting the deployments and symbolize the collective nature of Alliance nuclear decision-making. If it is officially pursued by the host country governments, it should, especially in view of the precedent, be given careful consideration. However, whether the practical and budgetary costs of a two-key system can be mitigated or shared among the United States and the host governments in such a way as to outweigh the advantages is a matter for detailed negotiation and decision by those governments.

A review of shorter-range nuclear forces is also required in the Asia/Pacific region, where the Soviet nuclear threat has increased significantly, while the United States nuclear posture has remained substantially unchanged. To the greatest possible extent, changes, if any, should be made with longer-range sea- and air-launched weapons.
rather than with ground-launched or relatively short-range systems. The latter, at least in Japanese eyes, would be likely to have less value as sources of deterrence than long-range systems, while public sensitivity to them could well be greater.

**Ballistic Missile Defense and Civil Defense**

The role of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and to a lesser extent civil defense in the strategic approach advocated here is debatable. It is a debate which has become highly topical following President Reagan's appeal for renewed attention to defenses in his speech of March 23, 1983. The minimal ceiling on BMD imposed by the ABM Treaty of 1972 involved the acceptance by both superpowers of the aim of avoiding nuclear war by virtue of the mutual vulnerability guaranteed by the absence of BMD. This was a very important achievement. Theoretically, the ability to destroy incoming missiles and to shelter in timely fashion a substantial fraction of the population and economic assets from attack might help improve deterrence. But the most important issues concerning BMD and civil defense are, as in the past, ones of technical feasibility, political acceptability, and, to a lesser extent, impact on U.S. alliances.

Technically, the evidence suggests that even the simplest type of BMD—point defense of military targets such as ICBM silos, using interceptors in the atmosphere—is still a considerable distance from a high-confidence solution. (This fact underlines the undesirability of the United States committing itself to a new ICBM, like the MX, in a basing mode which might require BMD for its survivability even in the medium term.) Systems which would be required for the defense of both military targets and population and industry on a scale that would have major strategic significance (exoatmospheric interceptors, space-based lasers, etc.) are still two or more decades from operational feasibility. And even if they could be technically achieved, current estimates of the cost of any substantial level of defense range from 100 billion (current) dollars to many hundreds of billions (for a full scale space-based laser defense). Such expenditures would inevitably divert defense investment from other urgent needs.

For the foreseeable future, the best posture would seem to be to continue an aggressive R&D program on BMD, compatible with the ABM Treaty provisions, both to ensure that if an effective and affordable system comes within reach, the option to deploy it could be considered (bearing in mind that such a system would be incompatible with SALT I) and, more importantly, to discourage the Soviet Union from any belief that it can hope to gain an advantage. If and when effective and affordable defense does come within reach, the impact of its deployment will need careful examination. Deployment of BMD by both the United States and the Soviet Union would be likely to precipitate a further competition in offensive nuclear weapons designed to overcome the defenses, which could be both costly and dangerous. Deployment of BMD would also necessitate a parallel U.S. effort in air defense, an arena in which the Soviets currently have a great advantage. For while a robust defense against ballistic missile attack would greatly lessen, if not remove, anxiety about an effective Soviet preemptive strike, the United States would still be disproportionately vulnerable if it did not have an ability equal to that of the Soviets to defeat a cruise missile and bomber attack.

Deployment of BMD could, lastly, affect the interests of the allies of the United States. For while it can be argued that effective defenses at least of ICBMs and related C4 could increase U.S. confidence in the adequacy of its nuclear forces, and therefore strengthen its guarantee of allied security, they could also prove highly divisive if deployed so as to provide coverage only for the United States. Such a deployment could not only leave Western Europe and Japan exposed to Soviet missile attacks, but also increase the temptation for the Soviets, under cover of their own BMD, to exploit any local conventional superiority and undercut the effectiveness of the French and British nuclear forces. Any BMD deployments beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty of 1972 would be viewed by many, both in Western Europe and Japan, as well as in the United States, as an abandonment of arms control's most effective achievement to date and as prejudicial to prospects for improved East-West relations.

As to civil defense, the prevailing political sentiment in most tri-lateral countries is very negative, although in some countries, such as Japan, the subject is little discussed. A significant civil defense program would likely reduce, not increase, support for nuclear programs. The apparently high expense of civil defense preparations has also deterred serious efforts, despite the success of Switzerland's and Sweden's efforts in this direction over the years. Many people have recoiled from such efforts because of the brutalizing effect that preparations to deal with nuclear war could have on the population and because they arguably make war somewhat more likely. There is little prospect that more ambitious civil defense programs will be accepted by parliaments and publics as either desirable in principle or tolerable in cost.
Nuclear Arms Control

The Goals
What can nuclear arms control agreements contribute to the achievement of a stable strategic relationship which would create a higher level of security for the trilateral countries? Complete nuclear disarmament is not a realistic goal for our times. The goal of arms controls (including reductions) should rather now be to achieve a more stable nuclear balance. Public opinion should not expect more. But it should support the search for arms controls with sufficient defense programs, which need not jeopardize the ultimate aim of disarmament.

For the immediate future, nuclear arms control agreements are likely to serve two primary purposes. First, they could help to create a nuclear relationship between the major nuclear weapons states which is more stable in crisis and in wartime by reducing the incentive on either side for early use of nuclear weapons, either for fear of suffering destruction in a preemptive attack or because of the hope of achieving a successful preemption. But arms control agreements cannot be expected to solve problems such as the theoretical vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force. Second, they could help to encourage stable relationships among the trilateral countries by enhancing their sense of security.

These purposes would be facilitated if both sides’ nuclear strategies were responsive rather than initiatory or preemptive. For different reasons, neither side has an exclusively responsive strategy at present. As was discussed above, the West may not be able to change its strategy in the immediate future, though it should be working towards a posture in which it could. Soviet statements about no first use are not credible to many. No first use is a plausible declaratory strategy for the Soviet Union, assuming it retains conventional force superiority in major potential theaters of war and assuming further that Soviet preemption of what they believe to be an imminent U.S. nuclear attack were considered retaliatory rather than initial use. However, the propaganda value of such a pledge on Western European opinion is obvious. One important, but difficult, challenge for arms control negotiators could be to explore the basis on which both sides could have confidence that the force posture of their adversary foreshadowed only nuclear retaliation.

Achievement of such postures would make major reductions in nuclear arsenals of all ranges politically and psychologically more manageable. This would require improving conventional force balances. The primary reason why the United States and its NATO allies cannot adopt such a posture at present is their perception of significant conventional inferiority. Many Japanese observers see a reasonable balance of conventional forces in Northeast Asia, although the trend has recently been favorable to the Soviet Union. For this reason, a no-first-use posture in Northeast Asia would be seen as acceptable by many Japanese.

Intercontinental Weapons
Even if U.S. and Soviet strategies do not converge on a retaliation-only strategy, both the goals and the political realities of the trilateral countries require that they continue to put forward reasonable arms control proposals which could enhance trilateral security and help to alleviate the burden of expenditures on nuclear weapons. Lessening this burden may come to seem attractive to a new Soviet leadership beset with economic difficulties. For intercontinental nuclear forces, we believe that stability can be more readily reached by arrangements that result in survivable forces and a measure of predictability of the strategic relationship than by starting the arms control process by freezes or reductions per se. These factors—and others, such as the different technological capabilities and preferences of the two sides—suggest that, if current arms control proposals do not result in agreement, a desirable alternative would be an agreement which would limit (at equal levels) the aggregate numbers of weapons (i.e. missile warheads and bombs) on delivery systems with a greater-than-specified range, while permitting flexibility in the types of delivery systems deployed, provided that these could be monitored with confidence. (The specified range might appropriately be 1,000 nautical miles, which would cover most systems the Soviets consider 'strategic' and would permit an agreement on a limit close to the present deployments on the two sides. Aircraft could be included in such an agreement, probably based on their unfueled ranges and with an agreed number of weapons per aircraft.) An agreement of this kind, which would be similar in conception to that recently suggested by the U.S. President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, would permit the United States, if it so chose, to emphasize the deployment of a single-warhead ICBM and long-range cruise missiles (though the latter should, if possible, be designed in ways that facilitate better verification than is possible with present models). This flexibility should enhance U.S., and therefore allied, confidence in the U.S. nuclear posture.

An approach focusing on the limitation of weapons would involve
several changes in the current U.S. and Soviet negotiating approaches in START and INF. On the U.S. side, it would involve attaching less importance to controlling MIRVed ICBMs and reducing the emphasis on controlling numbers of ballistic missile launchers; reducing the significance attached to controlling throw-weight or ‘destructive power’, which, given inevitable increases in ballistic and cruise missile accuracy, is increasingly becoming of secondary importance; and postponing the attempt to achieve reductions in the numbers of weapons deployed until after a new agreement putting a ceiling on the number of weapons permitted had been achieved. On the Soviet side it would involve, among other things, abandoning the attempt to make the United States give up its major strategic force modernization programs and accepting more cooperative verification procedures. A stronger commitment to continued observance of the SALT II limitations pending the achievement of such a new agreement would be a valuable step towards sustaining the momentum of the strategic arms control process, as well as salvaging the SALT II counting and verification rules which a new agreement would require. And as the expiration date of SALT II (December 1985) approaches, and U.S. programs approach the SALT II limits (e.g., the limits on MIRVed launchers), some transitional agreement may be needed to prevent the automatic collapse of all limits simply through the passage of time.

This approach would have several advantages over current U.S. START approaches. Some of these advantages (e.g., flexibility in force deployments) have already been mentioned. In addition, a proposed limit on weapon numbers could have the simplicity and public appeal of the ‘zero option’ proposal, even though in practice both would require complex agreements. This aggregate weapons ceiling approach would lend itself to subsequent reductions. A simple percentage cut in the agreed figure could be made. And, finally, such an agreement would build directly on the counting rules already agreed upon at SALT and should require relatively little innovation.

The Nuclear Freeze
Pressures for a bilateral freeze on testing, production and deployment of nuclear delivery systems have provided a valuable counterweight to the growth of skepticism about nuclear arms control among some groups in the United States. Skeptics include some people in the Reagan Administration. But a comprehensive freeze could tend to inhibit rather than encourage agreements which enhanced crisis and wartime stability, though it would enhance ‘arms race’ stability. And the freeze proposal in its most familiar form suffers from the serious problem of verification of weapons production. It provides a less satisfactory goal for negotiations than the approach centered on limitation and then reduction of nuclear weapons as proposed here. However, this does not mean that agreements to freeze certain weapons systems or activities for a period during negotiations may not be useful.

Ballistic Missile Defense
As for strategic defense, the arguments presented earlier about BMD suggest that the best interests of the trilateral countries lie in honoring the ABM Treaty. Circumstances can be imagined in which it might be desirable to try to amend or abrogate the treaty to permit defenses to play a major role in the strategic relationship. But the technical immaturity of BMD and the astronomical costs involved make it undesirable to engage in a race to deploy BMD which would have an unforeseeable, but very likely adverse, impact on the trilateral countries—and the Soviets—perceptions of their security. A BMD race would probably also result in intensified offensive weapons programs as each side tried to ensure its ability to penetrate the developing defenses of the other.

Space Weapons Platforms
Further examination must be given to ways of limiting a competition in space-based weapons platforms for BMD and other purposes (air defense, anti-satellite weapons). Such a competition would be extraordinarily expensive and a source of strategic uncertainty for both sides in view of growing reliance on space-based systems for communications with their forces, early warning, reconnaissance and other purposes. The potential value of space systems for communications between the superpowers in crisis and wartime is also a relevant factor. The feasibility and desirability of any limitations is not clear, given the many different types of weapons systems and the broad issues of strategic policy involved. But the United States, which is more dependent on the use of all types of space systems than the Soviet Union and should therefore benefit more from limitations on space warfare systems, should renew its commitment to their serious exploration, including further exchanges with the Soviet Union, before technology makes effective limitations harder to achieve. Verification is potentially a serious problem because some of the systems for space warfare are similar to those used for peaceful space activities and some space warfare systems could be extremely difficult to monitor. A major effort to understand these problems and solve them is called for.
Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF)

For theater nuclear weapons, a separate agreement affecting but one part of these forces—missiles with a range greater than 1,000 nautical miles—as is currently proposed in the INF negotiations would have more political than strategic significance. Both the Soviets and the United States and its allies see longer-range theater nuclear forces as linked to intercontinental systems. For the Soviets, both types of weapons can hit their homeland; for the trilateral countries these weapons are an element of the "linkage" between conventional defense in the theater and the threat of retaliation with U.S. intercontinental systems. For both sides, merging the INF negotiations with those on intercontinental forces should make more strategic sense. Such a merger would be consistent with the emphasis on flexibility in deployments proposed here as a major goal of arms control agreements, since there is a growing number of systems (such as the Soviet Backfire and the U.S. SLCM) which are hard to categorize within the present negotiating structure, yet must be covered by any general arms control regime that is likely to be both strategically meaningful and politically acceptable.

Internal politics in Western Europe are likely to dictate that the separate INF negotiations continue at least until the planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs is under way in 1984, if only because its earlier merger with START might make it seem that an agreement affecting the proposed deployments was not likely. While the "zero option" proposal has obvious psychological attractions, the essentially political nature of the proposed deployments suggests that an effort to find compromise arrangements (e.g., allied abandonment of the Pershing II in exchange for a substantial reduction in SS-20s) would be acceptable provided that it did not increase strains within the Alliance. It would also be essential to ensure that Japanese interests in not seeing a shift of SS-20s from Europe to Asia were fully protected under any agreement. The primary aims should be to increase consensus on nuclear policy among the trilateral countries and to leave open the way to a broader agreement on long-range nuclear weapons (including INF) as outlined above.

Interest in arms control proposals for shorter-range or "tactical" nuclear weapons has been at a relatively low ebb in recent years, although from a Western European point of view, limitations on longer-range nuclear weapons unaccompanied by parallel limits on shorter-range ones would do little to reduce the overall nuclear threat.

In the past, arms control proposals for shorter-range nuclear weapons have concentrated on three ideas:

- nuclear-weapons-free zones on either side of the Inner-German Border;
- inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in an overall theater nuclear weapons ceiling, with eventual reductions;
- "hybrid" proposals, such as that introduced by NATO into the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, in which some NATO nuclear weapons would be withdrawn in exchange for Soviet tank withdrawals.

In one form or another, these ideas are again being canvassed. The first type has roots going back to the 1950s. Such a zone might, however, be disadvantageous. If it were large enough to be of any military significance, it would almost certainly hamper NATO's defense planning considerably more than the Warsaw Pact's, which has a much greater depth of territory to operate in. Even with a relatively large zone, nuclear weapons could be reintroduced quickly for artillery and aircraft launchers, though less so for surface-to-surface missiles. Furthermore, the military case for such a zone would depend heavily on the parallel and substantial reduction of heavy, non-nuclear armaments by the Warsaw Pact. An agreement of this kind would thus resemble one of the third type listed above, which is discussed further below in connection with conventional force arms control. Although the second type is not now widely discussed, it is perhaps interesting from NATO's point of view because it recognizes that the Soviet Union can attack the same critical NATO targets close to the front line with theater nuclear weapon systems of almost any range. This being so, placing a limit only on selected categories of such weapons merely invites circumvention by an increase in the number of weapons in unlimited categories.

While these concepts deserve further investigation, this must be done with careful attention to the implications for Alliance strategy and force postures and to inter-allied relationships. If such agreements could be worked out to satisfy NATO's military requirements, as outlined above, they would probably be of more symbolic than practical significance. In the meantime, the highest priority now for the NATO allies is to rationalize their own force postures and doctrine affecting tactical nuclear forces. Such a rationalization would, as was suggested earlier, likely lead to a significant reduction in the deployment of very short-range nuclear systems, which even some U.S. Army studies have suggested to be of little military significance and which would create a bias in favor of early nuclear use in battle.
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)
The measures to reduce the risk of accidental war agreed upon in 1971 should be improved. This could include modernizing the Washington-Moscow hotline, establishing a U.S.-Soviet crisis management center, devising procedures for dealing with the exploitation of nuclear weapons by terrorists, providing pre-notification of developmental and operational test launches of long-range missiles and of certain types of strategic exercises, and routine high-level military staff talks (such as were started in 1979, but not continued). These confidence and security building measures could have merit in providing greater assurance that nuclear war would not start through accident, mistake or miscalculation. Some are already under consideration in the START negotiations. While negotiating CSBMs should not substitute for the much harder task of devising limits on nuclear weapons systems which make nuclear war less likely, they can be a useful complement to such efforts by enhancing crisis stability and reducing the risk of surprise. High-level military staff talks, in particular, could make a contribution to an improved mutual understanding of nuclear strategies, as discussed earlier.

Nuclear Weapons Test Bans
The arguments made above for the unavoidable persistence of nuclear weapons in the coming years suggest that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to accept a test ban which prevents them from developing the nuclear forces each believes it needs. Whether or not either or both are now in a position in which they no longer need to test at all in order to maintain and modernize their forces is a technical and uncertain issue, which has given rise to much debate. However, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) continues to be of importance because of its impact as a non-discriminatory measure to prevent nuclear proliferation.

There is little doubt that a comprehensive test ban would raise the political cost for a signatory nation of demonstrating a nuclear explosive capability. Whether a ban negotiated now would be broadly enough subscribed to achieve this effect is uncertain: some countries might either delay before subscribing or do so with reservations which would weaken its impact. Nevertheless, the existence of such an agreement would, over time, put pressure on non-parties to sign and on those that signed with reservations to withdraw them. The acceptance of a ban by the major nuclear weapons states would give evidence of their good faith in implementing their commitment under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. For these reasons, the trilateral countries should make a renewed effort to promote a CTB. In the meantime, the United States should ratify the Threshold Test Ban and the associated agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) and should seek to extend it to tests below the initial threshold of 150 kilotons. By bringing these agreements into force, the United States would give earnest of good intentions and consolidate useful steps towards stronger verification provisions in U.S.-Soviet agreements and towards tightening the international non-proliferation régime by discouraging the use of the PNE pretext for proliferation.

Non-Proliferation Policy
The discussion of test bans leads to the broader aspects of the proliferation problem. The emergence of new nuclear weapons states would increase trilateral, and world, insecurity. Among other things, it would increase the risk of acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. Arresting such proliferation should therefore remain a prime objective for the trilateral countries. It is wrong to hold that further proliferation is inevitable and that the important thing is to find ways of living with it. Such an approach would merely weaken the available means, which are not negligible, for containing the spread of nuclear weapons. But real questions persist as to the best ways of using these means and the price which should be paid to do so.

The basic policies required to discourage proliferation are still sound. They consist of strengthening the international régime, established in the 1950s and confirmed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, combining encouragement of the peaceful use of nuclear energy with safeguards against proliferation. The central feature of this régime is to assure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel services, technology and equipment if states forebear nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on their nuclear facilities. In recent years, this has increasingly (but still not uniformly) been interpreted by the trilateral countries to require safeguards on all of an importing nation's nuclear facilities, although such a comprehensive commitment was often not required in the past.

The case for insisting on such 'full-scope' safeguards is strong. The trilateral countries should do all they can to broaden their acceptance. Strengthening the arrangement by which export of certain nuclear-related equipment and technology 'triggers' a requirement for safeguards remains an important goal. Useful progress has apparently been made in this direction in recent months by the major supplier nations. For the future, however, it is important for the suppliers, and
especially the trilateral countries involved, to do all they can to press countries that have not accepted full-scope safeguards to do so. Another type of measure which could help to strengthen the international régime would be a program for the storage of spent and reprocessed nuclear fuel under international control.

But more may be needed to deal with states that actually may be developing nuclear explosives or proposing to test them. As more than one recent case has shown, present export restraints are insufficient to prevent countries from making substantial progress towards an un-guarded nuclear fuel cycle on which a weapons program could be based. In the aftermath of the Indian nuclear explosion, the trilateral countries which are nuclear suppliers found themselves uncertain and divided as to what to do. Both as a deterrent and as a response to any new case of proliferation, the trilateral countries should seriously examine the possibility of agreeing in advance to take—with the participation of others, including the Soviet Union if possible—effective measures against any country that acquires a nuclear explosive capability, to last until it agreed to accept full-scope safeguards. Subscribing to such an agreement would doubtless present serious difficulties for the trilateral supplier countries—not least the United States—since the more likely proliferators are countries towards which, for various reasons, the United States would be reluctant to take such measures. But the imperative of averting proliferation seems to call for such an agreement which, with sufficiently broad participation by major countries, should not impose intolerable costs, or offer unfair advantages, for any country. Studies of possible measures should be undertaken promptly by supplier nations, with the participation of representatives of the recipient countries.

The third element of policy involves actions to remove the sources of insecurity which can encourage proliferation—what has been called the ‘demand side’ of the proliferation problem. Such actions would be designed to reduce pressures within non-nuclear countries to acquire a nuclear explosive capability. Involved might be either bilateral security commitments (including the supply of conventional armaments) or multilateral agreements which could enhance local or regional stability and confidence (e.g., nuclear-weapons-free zones). Both types of arrangements present difficulties. Bilateral commitments and arrangements with potential proliferators may lead to a series of difficult choices for the supplier/guarantor countries between cutting back on the ‘supply’ of non-nuclear security or appearing to acquiesce in a nascent nuclear explosive program. The case of Pakistan is relevant. Nevertheless, the trilateral supplying countries should continue to recognize the importance of regional stability as an element in non-proliferation policies and do all they can to promote it. Multilateral arrangements are attractive in theory, but hard to realize in the most important areas (Far East, Middle East). However, the relative success of the Latin American nuclear-free zone (NFZ) established by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco has shown what can be done, even though it has yet to come into effect for some important countries in the area. Efforts to perfect the Latin American NFZ should continue. Any opportunity to make progress towards a zone in the Middle East as part of on-going negotiations should be vigorously pursued. And the possibility of a zone in Africa is deserving of renewed study.

Avoiding proliferation is as important, if not more so, for the security of non-nuclear weapons states as for that of the nuclear weapons states. The trilateral countries should take the lead in promoting the non-proliferation policies discussed above. The difficulty resides, among other things, in the fact that the prospects for nuclear disarmament by the existing nuclear powers, towards which they undertook in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue good faith negotiations, are not bright. Moreover, there is a direct relationship between NATO's present posture of retaining the option for the first use of nuclear weapons and the temptation of other nations to keep open a nuclear weapons option. These considerations reinforce the emphasis in this report on pressing forward with nuclear arms control proposals and on trying to shift the onus of any first-use decision onto the Soviet Union. Renewed high level commitments are needed to pursue vigorously the whole range of policies which can help to arrest further proliferation.

C. THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL
(OR NON-NUCLEAR) FORCES

The Role of Conventional Forces
If the role of nuclear forces were limited to deterring an adversary’s use of nuclear force, non-nuclear general purpose forces would become once again the principal form of usable military power. The advent of nuclear parity makes conventional forces critical for trilateral security, as a source of reassurance and political stability for friends in peace and in crisis and as a means of meeting aggression if it occurs.

The predominant view throughout much of the trilateral world for most of the post-World War II period has been that the primary aims of such forces have been deterrence and the provision of means to fight limited (though perhaps, as in Vietnam, large-scale) conflicts. Although the United States has in theory consistently based the size of its
conventional forces on a strategic concept which involved fighting at least one 'major' war against the Soviet Union, budgetary pressures have combined with skepticism about the likelihood of such a war to relegate deterrence of Soviet aggression principally to nuclear weapons. While U.S. military planning has explicitly dealt with the worldwide (or general) war case, it has focussed mainly on the central front in Europe (to which most of the U.S. military forces in the Pacific were due to 'swing' in wartime). Few people, however, have had much confidence that the European center could be held by conventional forces for long. This dominant concern with limited conflicts in U.S. force planning has influenced U.S. forces in different ways. A prime example is the Navy's continuing emphasis on aircraft carriers, whose role in general war has become less and less obvious as the Soviet land-based air threat to them has grown.

Deterrence of general war through reliance on nuclear weapons has also been embraced in Western Europe, Japan and Canada. In these countries, decisions about the size of conventional forces have rested more on the basis of what was needed to ensure continuation of the U.S. defense commitment, and especially the U.S. nuclear guarantee, than on a realistic assessment of what would be needed in a major war. This approach fostered the view that if the alliances between North America and Western Europe and between the United States and Japan remained strong, Western European and Japanese security interests would be assured. And, since the early 1970s, efforts have been made to stabilize the conventional force balances in key regions, especially Europe, by means of arms control measures.

The steady growth and modernization of Soviet conventional forces, especially in the late 1960s and 1970s, and the increase in Third World points d’appui available to the Soviets have changed the context for the trilateral countries’ thinking and planning about security. Although it would be wrong to suggest that the trilateral countries’ forces have not improved during the same period, especially in quality, the improvement in Soviet forces has been relatively greater. As a result, the trilateral countries now find themselves faced by a situation in which the Soviets might think they could successfully execute non-nuclear offensive campaigns in Europe and in Asia. At the same time, no significant progress has been made towards limiting conventional forces through negotiation.

The shifting balance of influence in the world outside the trilateral regions has sharpened the significance of these developments for the trilateral countries. The most important changes have been in the Middle East. The Soviets’ position in the region has suffered in Egypt under Sadat and more recently as a result of the war in Lebanon. Neither the revolution in Iran nor the Iran/Iraq war which was one of its consequences has been an unmixed blessing for the Soviets, heightening the Soviet dilemma as to which side to back in the Upper Gulf. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has also had ambivalent results—leading to a costly and politically embarrassing war, while potentially increasing the weight of Soviet military power in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the Soviets have by no means lost their leverage in the Middle East. As long as the Arab/Israel dispute remains unresolved, the Soviets will be the primary source of military assistance to the unsatisfied Arab states and movements. Even more importantly, the change of régime, and subsequent political volatility, in Iran has weakened the trilateral countries’ ability to provide security and reassurance in the Gulf area against either internal instability or external intervention. Similarly, the growing Soviet access to Vietnam and the pro-Soviet alignment of Libya have diminished the trilateral countries’ ability to provide protection in Asia and the Mediterranean and enhanced the Soviets’ global strategic position. At the same time, the strategic importance to the trilateral world of the Gulf region, which will not disappear with the recent decline in oil prices, and of other areas (notably in the Pacific basin), has increased, thus heightening the security dilemma. Instability in other regions, most recently in Central and South America, has also challenged the security interests of certain trilateral countries and provided opportunities for Soviet meddling. This combination of greater internal instability in key areas and strengthened Soviet positions of influence around the world inevitably has some impact on the peacetime perceptions and alignments of other states, in addition to the complications it would create for the trilateral countries in a war.

The divergent perceptions of Soviet interests and motives discussed in Chapter II suggest rather different responses to these changing events. In the United States, one trend has been to take more seriously the need to plan for the possibility of widespread hostilities with the Soviet Union and to recognize that the focus of such a war might not be as strongly on Central Europe as has been supposed in the past. As a result, notably, of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, which considerably exceeds what could have been expected as a response to the more independent position of China, some thinking in the United
States has moved away from the 'swing' strategy and now gives greater priority to maintaining U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Asia/Pacific region, both for reassurance in peacetime and for military operations in wartime. The growing U.S. emphasis on the security of the Gulf is intended to deter Soviet adventurism and so to provide reassurance and support to friendly states in the area. In the longer run, the aim of the current U.S. Administration has been to build a pro-Western security system in the Gulf area which could defeat anything except a major Soviet attack.

This change of attitude is by no means general in the United States. The majority still regard the threat of a large-scale war with the Soviet Union as extremely remote and as being adequately deterred by the combination of allied conventional strength and nuclear weapons. In Western Europe, Japan and Canada, the evolution of attitudes has not gone as far as it has in the United States, nor has the willingness to act grown as fast. But in these countries, too, there has been some movement of opinion in this direction. However, economic and budgetary stringency in Western Europe, Japan and Canada and constitutional and political constraints in Japan impose severe limitations on what can be done to respond to Soviet conventional force developments and have made it easier to retain previous assumptions about Soviet actions than to adopt new and more challenging ones.

This divergence of opinion is similar to that about nuclear deterrence discussed earlier. On the one side, the case can be made that only stalwart conventional forces capable of being deployed at any potential trouble spot and of sustaining military operations worldwide against a Soviet attack can provide robust deterrence of the Soviet Union. In this view, although the Soviet Union may not currently intend to launch such a major attack in any part of the world, there are plausible circumstances in which it might well find itself tempted to do so. In an age of nuclear parity, the argument continues, the trilateral countries cannot rely on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet attempts, including by the use of force, to expand Soviet influence. The Soviets might treat a Western nuclear threat as a bluff in situations (such as that of Afghanistan or, prospectively, Iran) in which the Soviet Union has previously, and carefully, built up a position of 'legitimate' influence. This could leave the trilateral nations facing a situation in which they had inadequate conventional forces in a critical area and therefore faced the choice of backing down or carrying out a threat of nuclear attack.

It is argued on the other side that, while the Soviets undoubtedly wish to expand their influence at Western expense, they will continue to be cautious, and not risk a direct confrontation with U.S. forces. The important thing, in this view, is for the United States and its allies to move swiftly and effectively to assert their interests in the face of Soviet probing, if necessary with relatively modest forces, rather than to mount a conventional force capability sufficient to meet the Soviets at all potential trouble spots. A modest capability, linked to the even-present threat of escalation to nuclear war, would, it is said, suffice to deter Soviet adventurism, while reducing the risk that a Western conventional force build-up could precipitate a Soviet response in kind and increase insecurity all around.

The choice between these two general approaches, while obviously not quite as stark as presented here, is also that between a comprehensive insurance policy and one which provides only limited coverage. There is no absolutely right choice. However, failure to select the comprehensive policy will mean that the trilateral countries will have to live with greater insecurity, vis-a-vis the potential adversary and within their own alliances, since relative weakness is a fertile source of anxieties of the kind that have afflicted both the North Atlantic and the U.S.-Japanese alliances in recent years. The risk of catastrophic loss would be higher. By contrast, a commitment to work steadily towards a higher level of insurance through improved conventional forces could generate renewed confidence and trust among the trilateral countries and a renewed respect for them in the world.

Whichever way is chosen, the lesson of recent events is that trilateral security is much less divisible than the attitudes of the trilateral countries have traditionally assumed. The likelihood that any local conflict involving the United States and the Soviet Union will spread has become greater with the steady increase in Soviet military strength. Any such conflict would be likely to involve a 'virtual war' in other regions and so require preparations for the possibility of its spreading. The trilateral countries should therefore pay greater attention on a trilateral basis to the likely nature and requirements of conflicts involving several regions of the world simultaneously. Force posture and operational planning should take explicit account of such world-wide conflict possibilities and the ways of deterring them. So should policies on arms exports, economic assistance and collaboration among defense industries, since all these can complement the force postures of the trilateral countries and help to reinforce their common security in peace and in the event that the peace breaks down.

The authors of this report believe that the trilateral countries should adopt a lower-risk approach which involves having sufficient forces for deterrence and reassurance and that they should not run the higher
risks of division and weakness inherent in an approach which would be satisfied with less capable conventional forces. They believe that a sustained effort to this end over several years is not beyond the political and economic resources of the trilateral countries. Such an effort would require additional defense expenditures. It should be accompanied by a renewed effort to reach agreements with the Soviet Union which could at least place a ceiling on, and hopefully reduce, the levels of forces needed. While this approach would not be without difficulty for the trilateral countries, we believe that it is within the reach of carefully formulated and consistently implemented policy. In the remainder of this section, some of the approaches and programs, including arms control policies, needed to achieve this objective will be discussed in more detail.

Sharing the Conventional Force Burden

The strategies of the trilateral countries and the division of burdens between them are largely determined by the geostrategic asymmetry of the East-West military relationship. This asymmetry provides advantages and disadvantages to both sides. The trilateral countries are at a disadvantage because the principal areas of strategic importance to them—Western Europe, the Gulf, Japan—are all on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass, on which Soviet military operations can be conducted predominately (though not, as the Polish crisis has underlined, exclusively) from homeland bases and with internal lines of communication which are protected either in its homeland or in countries under its control. However, the Soviet Union is at a disadvantage in the projection of maritime power because of its dependence on passage through a relatively small number of chokepoints and the exposure of its, also relatively few, principal ports to icing in winter.

The military strategies of the trilateral countries must aim to neutralize the Soviet advantages and exploit Soviet disadvantages. From a military point of view, neutralizing the Soviet advantage of operating against the Eurasian periphery from the Soviet homeland would require at least robust local conventional defenses of the trilateral countries’ territories and their adjacent ocean areas and also, preferably, a capability to strike the threats to them directly at their source, whether in the Soviet Union or outside. As long as the effective long-range, penetrating strike capabilities in Western hands were almost exclusively nuclear, this second approach, which implies the attack of targets, such as airfields, in the Soviet homeland, would have been extremely risky and unlikely to be attempted in the early stages of a war. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the likely advent of more effective long-range conventional strike systems, including cruise and ballistic missiles with advanced munitions, will probably make available non-nuclear means for such missions with reduced risks of nuclear escalation.

The implications of this development have been little discussed. Clearly, non-nuclear strikes of this nature in retaliation for Soviet aggression could lead to nuclear war and should therefore not be lightly planned or undertaken. Indeed, the fact that the first of the new systems, the conventionally-armed Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), is effectively indistinguishable from the nuclear Tomahawk may make it difficult to exploit the SLCM’s potential as an effective conventional attack system because of the fear that the Soviets would perceive it as a nuclear attack. Future systems, however, may not suffer from this drawback. In short, the advent of highly accurate, long-range conventional delivery systems may open up new possibilities for non-nuclear deterrence. But the risks and benefits associated with these systems need much further analysis.

This distinction between the direct defense of the land areas vital to the trilateral countries and the posing of a conventional threat to the Soviet homeland suggests an initial division of tasks between the trilateral countries. The difficulty of moving ground forces and direct air defense and air superiority forces in large numbers and quickly over long distances puts a premium on in-place forces. While some of these forces can, and should for the foreseeable future, be provided by the United States and Canada, as will be discussed further below, these tasks are most suitable for the Western European countries and Japan. But the strategic sensitivity of the mission of retaliating against the Soviet homeland with long-range conventional systems, the advantage of their being based on mobile and relatively invulnerable platforms, and the exacting intelligence and command and control requirements for their use all suggest that this task should be primarily the responsibility of the United States, as the major Western military power.3

This distinction can also be applied to maritime tasks. Direct defense of the sea areas surrounding the Western European countries and Japan, including responsibilities for mine and countermine operations, require forces in place which can most easily and economically be

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3This does not mean, however, that similar systems for the direct defense of Western European territory against Soviet attack should not be acquired by the allies. Indeed, as will be discussed below, it will be vital that all the allies participate in such programs for military as well as for political and industrial/economic reasons.
provided by countries in the region. If, following its decision to join the North Atlantic Alliance, Spain enters NATO, it could increase Western Europe's role in this respect. Oceanic area sea control operations and long-range power projection missions are better suited to the larger U.S. maritime forces trained and operated principally under a single national command system. A larger defense role could be allocated to other allied navies in the inner seas where they mainly operate (the Mediterranean, North Sea, Channel and the sea areas surrounding Japan).

An argument has been advanced recently in the United States to support a 'maritime' strategy under which the United States would concentrate almost exclusively on maritime (and long-range nuclear) forces and leave land and air defense to its allies. This approach would flow logically from the arguments advanced above were they pushed to an extreme. But that would ignore the strong political needs of the alliance relationships, which continue to require that the United States and Canada base air and ground forces in Europe and that the United States do so in the Pacific as a source of reassurance about the linkage between the security of all the allies. Any significant reduction, especially in the present circumstances of strained intra-Alliance relations, would send a signal of weakness to the Soviet Union out of all proportion to budgetary savings that might be achieved and undercut the goal of building up conventional forces sufficiently to diminish, if not end, reliance on the threat of nuclear weapons. Nor would such a reduction serve the important U.S. interest in ensuring that Western Europe remains free of Soviet control. In exchange for maintaining these deployments, however, the United States can reasonably expect that host governments will not only maintain and improve their own forces in step with the changing Soviet threat, but will also continue to provide a significant and perhaps increased proportion of the support costs of U.S. forces.

The provision of the active-duty and reserve manpower needed for the conventional forces of the trilateral countries is likely to become an increasing challenge during the 1980s. There are several aspects of this problem, which has already stimulated serious discussion and study in several countries, notably Germany, Italy, and the United States. First, the shrinking of the relevant age cohorts which the United States and most Western European countries will experience in the 1980s will affect their ability to fill planned force structures—both in those countries that now have conscription and in those that do not (i.e. the United States and the United Kingdom). This problem is likely to be especially severe for the countries that rely entirely on volunteer forces, although during the recent recession they have found it relatively easy to meet their recruitment goals. Secondly, the new military tactics and technologies of the 1980s and 1990s may create new demands for skilled manpower that will be hard to meet either through volunteers or through the use of relatively short terms of conscription (e.g., 12 months) now prevalent in several allied countries. Thirdly, the probability that the defense of Western Europe will, for a variety of reasons, require a greater reliance on the rapid mobilization and deployment of reserves by both Western European and North American countries will make the availability of an adequate pool of trained reserves more important. Countries which rely on all-volunteer armed forces will less easily be able to ensure this availability.

These complex factors suggest that the defense manpower policies of several of the NATO countries will have to be reviewed. They point particularly to a need for the United States and the United Kingdom to consider seriously the institution of some form of universal national service which would, among other things, help to ensure an adequate supply of active-duty and, more especially, reserve military manpower. The political difficulties associated with this proposal in both countries are formidable. There would also be some practical drawbacks for the armed forces themselves, though we believe the advantages would outweigh them. No other move would so swiftly communicate resolve to allies and adversaries alike. Not the least advantage of having some form of national service in all Alliance countries would be the general reaffirmation it would involve of the individual's responsibility for active support of the state in a democratic society and the parallel demonstration of Western solidarity, which would lay to rest recent rhetorical disputes across the Atlantic about the 'value' of conscription in Western Europe in calculations of the fairness of the current sharing of defense burdens.

The Conventional Force Posture
The allocation of defense resources by the trilateral countries should so far as possible be determined by these principles for sharing the burden, worked out in greater detail and coordinated in a new multiyear plan for conventional force modernization. This would involve both the Western European countries and Japan taking on increased responsibilities for air defense. The Western European countries should, in addition, modernize and somewhat expand the ground forces immediately available to NATO in Central Europe, whether by means of an increase in standing forces, or by larger and more rapidly deployable reserves, or both. For this purpose new technology of
highly accurate, conventional munitions for attacks on fixed and moving ground targets on and behind the battlefield offers promise, which all allied forces should exploit. Although there are differing views on this subject, there is a good prospect that these new technologies, linked to improved target acquisition systems, passive or 'barrier' defenses and possibly some changes in force organization and tactics and the development of a larger and more rapidly exploitable industrial mobilization capacity can lead to substantial increases in defense power for relatively modest costs.

In Asia, Japan should expand significantly its naval defense capabilities, either by increasing the procurement of coastal defense and anti-submarine forces or by improving the performance of its present forces and those it now plans to procure or both. For Japan, the priorities are similar to those which have recently been under discussion between the Japanese and U.S. governments (about the extension of Japanese responsibilities for air and anti-submarine defense out to 1,000 nautical miles south and east of Tokyo Bay and a substantial increase in air defense responsibilities). Japan has already made a substantial commitment of resources and energy to this end.

The absence of a more reliable French commitment to participate in the conventional defense of the NATO region has contributed to the inadequacy of the Alliance's conventional deterrence. Most recently, there have been conflicting trends. Senior NATO commanders have expressed growing satisfaction with liaison arrangements with France. But French defense experts remain concerned about whether—and equally importantly when—French forces and facilities would become available to NATO in a crisis. The prospect of Spain's entry into NATO has intensified some of these concerns. Similarly, the early 1980s appear to have brought a reversal of the trend of the late 1970s towards greater emphasis on French conventional forces, although the French government has recently taken steps, notably by the formation of a rapid action force, suitable for operations in Europe or elsewhere, to strengthen the French forces' land warfare capabilities.

The roots of French defense policy, with its focus on the role of nuclear weapons, run deep. The categorical French commitment to honor its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty in the event that it judges Article V of the Treaty to be called into play is not to be undervalued. Nor would it be fruitful to revive the idea of reintegrating France into NATO. But the difficulties created for European defense by France's reluctance to recognize the importance of a stalwart allied conventional defense capability and extend its participation in NATO's conventional defense planning beyond the existing understandings are substantial. The authors believe that priority should be given by both France and its allies at a high political level to exploring ways of mitigating these difficulties especially in the field of commitments for logistic support. They hope that all available fora, including the recently established bilateral Franco-German discussions on military matters and the new bilateral Franco-Italian consultations, can be used to promote this objective.

This program would in all probability mean increasing defense expenditures by all the allies somewhat beyond current commitments. For Western Europe and Canada, it would probably involve an annual increase greater than the three percent real annual increase currently targeted by NATO, perhaps to the four percent rate of real increase for the period 1983-88 advocated by SACEUR. However, the precise costs would depend on the details of the programs which were chosen and the degree of success in rationalizing defense tasks among the allies. For Japan, a defense budget rate of growth somewhat more than four percent in real terms is to be expected in the coming years. And in any case, a change in government policy will be necessary to allow defense expenditures as a fraction of GNP to rise above one percent—but remain less than two percent.

While budgetary increases are primarily important because of the additional defense capabilities they make possible, they are also important as indications that the allies are sharing in the effort to accelerate the strengthening of conventional deterrence. In 1950, around the time of the formulation of the Atlantic Alliance and the signing of the first U.S.-Japan security treaty, the U.S. GNP was 62 percent of the combined GNP of the U.S., Canada, Japan, and Western Europe (current EC and EFTA members, plus Spain). Canada represented 4 percent, Japan 3 percent, Western Europe 32 percent. By 1980, the U.S. and Canadian shares had declined to 37 percent and 3 percent. The Japanese and European shares had risen to 15 percent and 45 percent. This change in the relative weights of the trilateral economies represents the most fundamental reason for concerns about whether there is now a fair sharing of the defense burden among the three regions, as well as among the countries of North America and Western Europe. Without evidence that all the trilateral countries recognize, and are willing to act on this change, there is a real risk that impatience in the U.S. Congress at having to endorse large increases in U.S. defense expenditure without parallel allied efforts could grow to dangerous levels.

The attempts in recent years to create a more coherent Western European voice within the framework and policy of the North Atlantic
Alliance and without undercutting the effectiveness of NATO's integrated military structure have achieved only limited results. A recent report published by the leading foreign policy institutes of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands has recommended that the European Community should make a deliberate effort to become a European pillar of Western security policy within the Alliance framework. Such an effort is proposed both as a means of demonstrating Europe's commitment to playing its part within the Alliance and as a way of demonstrating to the smaller European nations within the Community the importance of their contributions. Progress in this direction could make a valuable contribution to the cohesion of the Alliance.

A renewed commitment is needed to reach more satisfactory collaborative arrangements between the trilateral countries' defense industries. As has been mentioned earlier, such collaboration is essential if all the allies are to derive the greatest advantage from advanced technology weapons and equipment for conventional defense. While in the past has been the quality of U.S. military technology (the situation being quite different from that in civil technology). Thus, much U.S. defense equipment has remained more advanced than its European (and, still more, Japanese) equivalent, so that if non-U.S. equipment were procured by the United States or other countries, by and large their defense capabilities would be less than would otherwise be the case. Protectionist measures taken by the U.S. Congress in the past and others now under consideration have also hindered the U.S. ability to follow through on important initiatives, such as that for a ‘two-way street’ in defense procurement. The collaborative approach developed in the late 1970s of devising ‘families of weapons’, using the most advanced technology available, with Alliance countries dividing the development responsibilities, offered promise of escaping from these dilemmas. But it has only been applied on a very limited basis. This approach ought to be aggressively pursued and, when the political situation in Japan permits, expanded to include Japan, even though there is little prospect of its covering major weapons platforms (e.g., tanks, fighter aircraft, major ships). Without an improvement in this area, vital resources for defense will continue to be wasted as the allies, for understandable reasons, pursue competing programs in order to sustain their national defense industries.

Japan has had a long-standing policy of not exporting defense equipment and technology to any country. The present Japanese government has decided to relax the restriction on the exchange of technology so far as the United States is concerned, in the context of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Given the special sensitivity of this issue in Japan and in the Asian region, there are great difficulties involved in harnessing Japanese technology and industry to the cause of trilateral security.

**Arms Control and Conventional Forces**

Thus far, the problems of conventional forces have been considered from the point of view of measures to redress the military balance, as a means of creating a higher degree of self-confidence and a lower level of risk for the trilateral countries. What contribution can arms control agreements make?

Limiting conventional forces by agreement is difficult. The force relationships involved, the types and capabilities of equipment and the two sides' strategic and tactical purposes all raise complex issues. No simple measures of the capabilities of such forces to be used as the basis for agreements have been devised: yet ad hoc 'horse trades' that have at times been proposed covering certain conventional force elements (e.g., in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [MBFR] negotiations) have proven unfruitful. The definition of the geographical area to be covered and the ease of moving forces into a given area always present problems.

History is scarcely more encouraging than theoretical analysis. The naval limitations agreed in the 1920s and 1930s had, on a sympathetic interpretation, only ambiguous results and insufficient strength to survive the conditions of the 1930s (Admiral Gorshkov once characterized them as the ‘war of the diplomats for supremacy at sea’). The Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, while broadly subscribed to, have apparently been breached repeatedly when it has suited states to do so, most recently by the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. This experience has again highlighted the dilemma of agreements concerning weapons which are inherently hard to monitor.

None of the recent efforts in this field has shown great promise. MBFR has demonstrated the difficulties involved, notably in reaching agreement on the size of existing forces to be reduced. The promise of proposals which have been made for naval limitations (e.g., in the Indian Ocean) also seems slight, given the perceived strategic requirements of the major powers. The U.S.-Soviet talks on conventional arms transfers in 1977-78 yielded no lasting results and failed to answer the
question of how, given the constant shifts in force balances as a result of developments beyond the control of the major arms suppliers, the parties to a long-term agreement could have any confidence that the regional balances important to their security would be maintained. Recent events, including the Falklands/Malvinas war, have again demonstrated the implications of the spread of sophisticated conventional weapons around the world. However, the difficulty of achieving any consensus among the trilateral counties on arms transfer policy would be considerable even if they could achieve more effective collaboration among their defense industries as discussed above. Without such collaboration, the hurdles seem insurmountable.

**MBFR**

The effort to reach quantitative limits on conventional forces in Europe is unlikely to be successful in the short term. But the attempt should not be abandoned. MBFR should be continued in the hope of finding some basis for agreement. The recent thrust of MBFR towards limiting total numbers of ground and air force manpower in a specified reductions area has merit, not least because it is relatively simple and would leave both sides free to structure their remaining forces as they chose. However, such an agreement has proved elusive in negotiation and would be hard to monitor with high confidence.

Other ideas have been proposed which could fit into the MBFR framework. These include reductions in the 'most threatening' elements of the two sides' forces—tanks on the Warsaw Pact side and battlefield nuclear weapons on the NATO side. This idea was introduced early in MBFR by the NATO negotiators and was subsequently withdrawn. A similar idea would involve a mutual thinning out or withdrawal of heavy armor for an agreed distance behind the East-West border, which might be inherently desirable and might also facilitate a move towards a posture less dependent on nuclear weapons. Such an agreement could serve to create a more acceptable balance of forces in the front line and, with increased warning time of a major attack, the NATO allies might be able to mobilize enough forces to hold the line. Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether such an agreement could be devised that would satisfy Western security needs, even if the political difficulties in the Federal Republic of Germany of an apparent diminution of the commitment to forward defense could be overcome.

The difficulties of attempting to isolate a few aspects of the conventional force posture and find equitable and militarily acceptable limitations on them should not be underestimated. Some such arrangements or major progress through MBFR (which would probably have to involve some reduction in armored units in the front line) could be an important companion to movement by the Alliance away from its nuclear first-use option. But the trilateral countries should not base their defense policies on the expectation of early progress towards such agreements.

**CSBMs**

Another area of modest promise is that of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). Even in the relatively narrow scope within which these have in the past been discussed for Europe, notably at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—e.g., limits on troop movements and exercises and pre-notification of (and observers at) various military activities—they can serve some useful purposes, although they have also aroused more than a little friction among the NATO allies. The French proposal to pursue these ideas in the first phase of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe is deserving of allied support, though without being worth compromise on important aspects of its terms of reference (e.g., coverage of a major portion of the western Soviet Union). Such a conference would enable France to re-enter the mainstream of arms control efforts and so help to remedy an unfortunate division within the Alliance.

Beyond Europe, confidence and security building measures might be applied to the Far East. CSBMs have been discussed in Japan, partly as a response to Soviet suggestions. The idea is still very general in character. As applied to Korea, there might be some advantages, in terms of improved warning and fewer false alarms, in adopting some of the measures already discussed, and to some extent agreed, in the CSCE. With respect to other parts of the region, it is harder to conceive of measures which take due account of allied security requirements. But, in general, the approach is more promising than quantitative limitations in the Asia/Pacific region, where the trilateral countries' conventional forces are already tightly stretched against a large, and growing, threat. It deserves to be further studied in the light of Japanese and U.S. security interests.

**D. TWO SPECIAL CASES: THE MIDDLE EAST & CHINA**

The Middle East

The problems of the Middle East and Gulf areas present special political as well as military challenges to the security interests of the trilateral countries. These are almost as important as those in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. The reliability of oil supplies is the security inter-
est most common to the trilateral countries. But attempts to deal with these challenges have been even more divisive of the trilateral countries than the other issues already discussed. Western Europe and Japan, whose interests in Middle Eastern oil are somewhat greater than those of the United States and Canada, tend to see the problems of the Middle East as calling primarily for political and economic remedies. Prominent among these remedies would be a more forceful U.S. role in persuading Israel to accept a comprehensive settlement with its Arab neighbors and trade and economic arrangements with the Arab countries, rich and poor, which will encourage a pro-Western alignment and stable political, economic and social development. By contrast, while not rejecting these propositions, the United States, whose interest in dealing with Soviet influence in the region is somewhat greater than that of its allies, has increasingly seen a need to create, in addition, a military counterweight to Soviet and pro-Soviet radical influences in the region. To this end it has equipped the Shah's Iran, Saudi Arabia and other countries, developed the capability for more direct interposition of U.S. forces from the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), now entrusted to the new CINC Central Command, and made arrangements for the use of Turkish air bases.

A judicious combination of all these types of measures is required. There is a Soviet political and military threat to the region, though opinions differ as to how immediate it is. The Soviet move into Afghanistan has not led to total military control as quickly as the Soviets hoped. But there is as yet little reason to believe that the Soviet military presence there will soon disappear. This poses a direct threat to Iran and to Pakistan and a general danger to the whole region. In this situation, the need for a military counterweight by the major Western powers is strong. In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the fall of the Shah, and in an age of strategic nuclear parity, the task of creating a pro-Western security system in the area is complicated. If such a system were too visible or highly structured it would only serve as a lightning rod for internal instabilities in the region. But the attempt must continue and it deserves greater practical, diplomatic and public support from Western Europe and Japan.

By the same token, Western European and Japanese criticisms of U.S. attitudes towards the Arab/Israeli problem and their effect on the Western position in the region have often had merit. U.S. policy has, at several critical times since 1967, been more strongly aligned with Israel's definition of its security requirements than the best interests of either the United States or the other trilateral countries (or even, perhaps, the long-run interests of Israel) would have dictated. It is generally accepted that Israel's security from attack along its borders must be ensured. But the security of land borders requires more than military measures. No borders will be safe in the absence of political arrangements which satisfy the reasonable interests of all the peoples of the region. If Western Europe, Japan and Canada are to support U.S. efforts to strengthen a military counterweight to Soviet power in the region, they can reasonably expect the United States to make a more sustained and determined effort to promote a settlement of the Arab/Israeli dispute which accommodates the interests of all the trilateral countries and the Arab states as well as those of Israel. At the same time, those trilateral countries with influence in the Arab world should use it to encourage Arab states and movements to help to reduce Israeli anxieties about security.

In practice, it would be extremely difficult to achieve trilateral agreement on the policy outlined here. But some key steps could be taken which would help set the wheels in motion. These steps should include at least the following:

First, Western Europe, Japan and Canada should endorse and support U.S. efforts, with the states of the region, to create a military and political counterweight to Soviet power in the area. There should be trilateral consultations both on the overall strategy to be adopted towards the region and on the specific requirements for such a counterweight, reflecting the approximately equal importance of the region for the security interests of all the trilateral countries. In keeping with the overall division of responsibilities outlined earlier, the United States should provide the bulk of the forces required. Additional forces would be made available by the European allies to enable the United States to reduce the tasks currently performed by U.S. forces in Europe. Japan would increase its self-defense efforts along the lines discussed earlier.

Secondly, the search for an Arab/Israeli settlement must be pursued vigorously and in a sustained manner. President Reagan's 'new American policy' towards the problem, announced on September 1, 1982, went a long way towards enunciating an outline of a settlement. This policy, which needs and deserves much stronger and more enduring bipartisan political support in the United States than it has so far received, should also constitute a basis for support by other trilateral countries provided it is firmly and consistently implemented. This will, however, require the United States to set limits beyond which it is unwilling to go in its diplomatic, military and economic support for Israel. The territorial key to such a policy would be the status of the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The United States should strongly discourage further Israeli settlements in these territories (and react
vigorously against any such Israeli actions). With these provisos, the current U.S. policy provides a valuable marker by which all the countries of the region, including Israel, can steer their future political courses. Other trilateral countries should use their best influence to persuade Arab states to accept it as a basis for further diplomatic efforts. In this way, the Reagan initiative should in time have a substantial beneficial influence on the prospects for a lasting settlement. In the meantime, U.S. and European participation in the international observer forces in the Sinai and Lebanon has been a constructive form of involvement by some trilateral countries.

Thirdly, the trilateral countries should coordinate their security-related policies towards the area, including economic assistance, trade and military supply policies. The aim should be to arrive at an understanding of the ways in which the different policies of different countries fit into an overall trilateral security policy for the region. Already, the orientation of Japanese aid in the Middle East towards key countries such as Egypt and Oman and projects with security significance (such as the widening of the Suez Canal) has shown what can be done. Another important step for the longer term is for those trilateral countries that are in a position to do so to work to try to develop and strengthen links to Iran.

Finally, the potential importance of other countries should be recognized and their contributions solicited. Australia's naval and air power could be of value in strengthening deterrence along—and actually defending if necessary—the long lines of supply and communication to the Gulf. Several other countries of Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia) are also of importance for the same reason. They would doubtless not wish to be formally a part of any trilateral security arrangements or consultations concerning the Gulf region. And many of them remain concerned about a larger Japanese defense role. Australia may also have a key role as an intermediary between the trilateral countries and the members of ASEAN in strengthening military and intelligence exchanges and consultations. Arms supply and other policies towards those countries should be formulated with a broad strategic vision. Turkey is also important to the task of deterring and, if necessary, meeting a Soviet military move through Iran. Its key role has been recognized both by the NATO countries and, in its aid policies, by Japan. The problems of Turkish defense are politically difficult and expensive. But they need to be addressed in any overall trilateral approach to the Gulf region as well as in the context of European defense.

The Role of China

There is little likelihood that during the 1980s China will move into the orbit of trilateral security policies. Nor is it likely, despite recent Sino-Soviet exchanges, that China will move significantly closer to the Soviet Union, although this possibility—for instance in the form of renewed party-to-party relations—cannot be excluded. It is, however, quite likely that China will transform its recent highly adversarial relationship with the Soviets into a more normal, but still adversarial relationship. This does not mean that China has decided to reverse the trend towards better relations with the United States, even though its disapproval of certain aspects of recent U.S. policy, as well as complex internal political developments within China, may have stalled that trend.

China's current position as a rival of the Soviet Union with some links to the West is of major importance to the East-West strategic balance. The security policies of all the trilateral countries, but especially the United States and Japan, must be formulated with this in mind. This means three things: continuing and frank high-level bilateral discussions of security issues, notably between China and the United States; a consistency in U.S. policies sufficient to convince the Chinese that the United States can be relied upon to pursue the strategic and political competition with the Soviet Union; and a willingness, if the Chinese ask for this, to provide some assistance on reasonable terms to the military as well as the civilian modernization of China. More extensive cooperation (e.g., U.S. commitments for direct military support to China or periodic visits by U.S. air or naval forces to Chinese bases) seems unlikely to be called for by the Chinese. If it were, it would pose difficult issues for the United States, even though it could have a deterrent effect on the Soviets. Enhanced collaboration in other fields, not necessarily directly related to security, may also be possible. But on these matters the trilateral countries need not press a reluctant China in order to reap the primary benefit vis-à-vis the Soviets of their present relationship with the Chinese.

E. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF SECURITY

We have already stressed the importance of economic considerations for trilateral security. In many ways, economic dangers pose greater threats to security than do military dangers. Much has been written in reports to the Trilateral Commission about economic problems, so this report has concentrated on the defense and arms control dimensions of
security. But this focus does not mean that the importance of economic security can be overlooked. Three types of such issues will be examined here very briefly: those that arise among the trilateral countries; those that arise between the trilateral countries and the Soviet Union; and those generally labelled North-South issues.

Economic Problems Within the Trilateral World
The first type—those among the trilateral countries themselves—has been a primary subject for earlier Trilateral Commission reports. As we have already emphasized, the revitalization of the world economy is a precondition for any enduring improvement in the security situation. But beyond that, the continuing economic disputes on trade, monetary, and macroeconomic management issues are prejudicing our alliances, detracting from efforts to achieve greater support for trilateral security interests from other countries and giving encouragement to the Soviet Union and its allies. While all these issues are important in their own right, from a strategic perspective it is urgent that much greater efforts be made—not only by governments, but also by those private sector interests which are pushing for protectionism—to reach compromises in order to maintain trilateral cohesion and security. Finally, the effort to reduce the dependence of the trilateral countries on unstable sources of oil must be vigorously pursued, despite the current oil glut.

East-West Economic Policy
The second type of issue—those concerning East-West trade—has the most obvious security implications. Since they were examined at length and in detail in a recent Trilateral Task Force report, they will be treated summarily here.

The debate among the trilateral countries is often conducted, at least in public, as if it were between those who favor only the use of trade and financial carrots to induce changes in Soviet behavior and those who favor only the use of a stick. In practice, the most difficult task is to find the right combination of the two. Little can be said with certainty about the impact of any particular degree of stringency or laxity in the control of exports and export credits either on the internal organization and policies of the Soviet Union (notably in terms of the allocation of resources between the defense and civilian sectors) or on the relations between the Soviets and their satellites. A prudent strategy, bearing in mind the lessons of history, would be skeptical that any combination of policies would have a substantial effect in this respect.

It follows that there is little reason to restrict general trade in the hope that such restrictions would be likely to affect Soviet policies or behavior in a desirable direction. Exceptions should be made only where, on the basis of restrictive criteria, a clear security interest can be shown to be involved. Exceptions would, under such criteria, be justified for the export of high-technology and high-military-technology items, even of a fairly minor kind and with respect to the net transfer of resources to the Soviet economy through subsidized credit terms. As in other areas, the difficult choices are all at the margin, however fundamental the differences of view concerning them may at times appear. The Urengoi pipeline and its alleged creation of Western European ‘dependence’ on Soviet goodwill is, underneath all the debate, an issue of this kind. Certainly many of the hard cases of strategic exports have been in this category. From the point of view of security, it would be wrong to try to use the lure of favorable dispositions of even marginal cases as carrots to achieve desired patterns of Soviet behavior.

Use of economic measures in reaction to specific cases of Soviet misbehavior is a different question. A case can be made that the trilateral countries should make explicit provision for general trade sanctions to be imposed by themselves and other countries in the event of certain clearly unacceptable Soviet actions, to remain in effect until those actions ceased. Such an approach would, as the earlier Trilateral Task Force stated, have to be well coordinated among the trilateral countries and some provisions for sharing the burdens would have to be agreed upon. Even so, the likely contribution of sanctions to preventing or correcting such misbehavior is questionable. The aftermath of the Polish counterrevolution shows the political difficulties in the trilateral countries of adhering to such a policy. In practice, the best that may be achievable is the kind of ad hoc, relatively uncoordinated and delayed responses to Soviet misbehavior that were seen in both the Afghan and the Polish crises. But governments should continue to work for more effective coordinated actions.

North-South Issues
North-South economic issues are also the subject of a separate Task Force report and will only be touched on here in terms of their impact on security. The issue of development policy (including trade and

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investment, as well as economic assistance) has already been considered in connection with the Middle East. It is equally applicable to other areas. It would be wrong to see development policy as wholly subordinate to security goals, not least because it is hard in practice to establish a tight linkage between the two types of policy. However, the trilateral countries should consider explicitly and together the ways in which development policy can create a more favorable climate for realization of their security objectives. Japan, where the concept of a 'comprehensive national security' policy, embracing political and economic as well as military measures, has been widely analyzed and discussed, could have an important initiatory role in demonstrating ways in which the trilateral countries could give greater effect to this concept.

On all of these types of issues, the policies of the trilateral countries should be more explicitly related to security policy and made the subject of consultations among the trilateral governments. The most pressing and important matter of this kind is undoubtedly that of the degree of economic leverage that the trilateral countries should seek to exercise in East-West trade and how this should be done. Existing fora for trilateral consultation on economic issues, notably the seven nation summits of heads of state and government and ministerial meetings of OECD, should be used to consider the security aspects of these questions.

IV. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

A. GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

Security has many facets, as the Japanese concept of 'comprehensive national security' implies. This report, in accordance with our terms of reference, focusses primarily on two of those facets—defense and arms control policies. However, we emphasize at the outset that the revitalization of the world economy is a fundamental precondition of an improvement in our security position. Without it, sustained defense efforts will become harder, parochial attitudes will grow stronger, and confidence in the ability of our democratic societies to sustain the economic and social values which, among other things, security policies are designed to protect will be weakened.

The restricted focus of our report does not mean that we despair of reaching broader accommodations across the gulf that separates communist and free nations. While it is appropriate to stress Soviet military strength, we must not overlook the political, economic and international weaknesses of the Soviet Union. The trilateral countries and the Soviet Union stand at a crossroads. They can either reach accommodations which will make possible a reduction of their military competition or face an increasingly unstable world in which the economic burdens of defense will grow and the security of all nations will diminish. Our conclusions and recommendations outline defense and arms control policies which, without compromising trilateral security or failing to face up to the dangers that the Soviet Union presents, would create incentives for the resumption of a process of East-West détente if the Soviet leaders are prepared to share equally in the quest. We hope that these policies will also serve the vital purpose of achieving broader public consensus within our own countries than has existed in recent times.

B. THE PARAMOUNT ROLE OF ALLIANCES

Cooperation between the trilateral countries will be more important to their security in the 1980s than in previous decades. Faced with the challenges of the future, the security of the trilateral countries will be
much less divisible than in the past. There will be a greater need for consultation and action on a trilateral basis. The existing alliances among the trilateral countries are security assets of high value and instruments of great flexibility. The mutual commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty to regard an attack on one member as an attack on all and the very different undertakings in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (under which Japan may not exercise the right of collective self-defense) are political engagements of profound significance, the vitality of which must be constantly reaffirmed to our populations. The confidence of allied governments is a key element of security and its erosion in the recent past has heightened the general sense of insecurity. Governments must use their alliances and other available instruments more effectively to promote mutual security and to avert inter-allied disagreements which weaken Western unity and offer opportunities to adversaries. The trilateral countries should agree to refrain from the inflammatory rhetoric about each other's governments and policies which has been a prominent feature of recent years.

C. DEFENSE & ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

Aims

There should be four aims:

• Maintenance of strong deterrence of war of any kind.
• Preservation of inter-allied confidence.
• Achievement of stability in the nuclear balance in peacetime, crisis and war.
• Maintenance of the strongest possible barriers to nuclear proliferation.

The tensions between some of these aims must be recognized. They are unavoidable. Our recommendations reflect our judgements about the best trade-offs to be made among the four aims in the interest of reducing the risk of war, and especially nuclear war, which is what the publics of all the trilateral countries are looking to their governments to achieve.

A combination of defense and arms control policies is essential to trilateral security. Pursuing either in isolation will not yield lasting security; pursuing both in an uncoordinated manner will also not succeed. There is no short-cut to improved security. It can only come from the interplay of complex policies. Yet no security policy will succeed without the understanding and support of public opinion, which will focus more and more on security issues. The trilateral governments need effective public information programs to ensure that their inevitably complex security policies are supported by public opinion, as well as by informed specialists, in the face of proposals for simple 'fixes'.

The search for arms control and eventual disarmament remains basic to the health of the trilateral democracies. Only moderate progress can be expected from arms control negotiations in the near and medium terms. But this does not diminish the urgency of pursuing approaches which hold out hope—both to the public in trilateral countries and to those within the Soviet Union who may share this goal—of greater security at lower levels of armaments and defense expenditures. The prospect is that, in 1990, the trilateral societies and those of their adversaries will remain mutually vulnerable to nuclear attack and that large Soviet conventional forces in Europe and in Asia will continue to represent dangers to the trilateral countries. In this situation, nuclear weapons will continue to play an irreplaceable role in deterrence and must not be neglected or deprecated. The goal of arms control and defense policies must be to make this situation as secure as possible for all trilateral countries, with the minimum threat of war and with an enhanced promise of progress towards the reduction of armaments. We believe that, taken together, the policies set out here can help achieve these goals.

Nuclear Arms Control and Weapons Programs

Intercontinental Weapons
We recommend that, if it should become clear that the present U.S. START proposal will not provide the basis for an agreement, the United States propose a U.S.-Soviet agreement which would place a ceiling on, and thereafter progressively reduce, the total number of nuclear weapons (i.e. missile warheads and bombs) on each side on delivery systems with unfueled ranges greater than 1,000 nautical miles. This approach would involve changes in both sides' current negotiating approaches and would replace the complex, hard to understand, and potentially destabilizing U.S. START proposals with a simple and politically appealing goal of reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would leave the United States free, within the ceiling, to deploy weapons systems (such as sea-launched missiles and a new, single-warhead ICBM) which could help it to move away from the present theoretical vulnerability of U.S. land-based strategic forces, which may weaken deterrence and cause instability in crisis and war.

We recommend that the United States continue strategic force programs
that reduce the weaknesses of its present forces. We recommend that, if it is judged necessary to develop a new, more survivable ICBM, a single-warhead missile be developed to provide for this requirement. Such a missile would best serve the goal of reducing crisis and wartime instability.

We recommend that, as an interim step, the United States continue to observe SALT II provided the Soviet Union does so too, and, if necessary, negotiate in parallel with a new strategic arms control agreement (as proposed above) a transition agreement to make the SALT II provisions viable beyond 1985.

We recognize the importance of the strong public support for proposals for a freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons as a signal to governments, and especially the U.S. government, to get on with arms control. However, we do not favor such proposals for a freeze, which would inhibit a U.S. move away from the weaknesses of its present posture.

Theater Nuclear Forces
It is important for the North Atlantic Alliance that both elements of the two-track decision about longer-range theater nuclear forces taken in December 1979 be pursued with equal commitment. We recommend that:

• Negotiations about intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) be merged at an appropriate time with the START negotiation. If, in the interim, a separate INF agreement becomes negotiable in the current INF negotiations, even on a compromise basis between the zero level and the current levels of Soviet systems, and would contribute to intra-Alliance cohesion, it should be accepted. It is essential that such an agreement protect Japanese interests in not seeing a shift of Soviet systems from Europe to Asia.
• Pending agreed limitations on such systems and assuming continued European support for their deployment, deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles should proceed. Failure to deploy them in these circumstances would be a sign of weakness that would sharpen trans-Atlantic tensions. Requests by any of the host nations for ‘two-key’ arrangements for the release of these systems should be accepted in principle and subject to satisfactory negotiations between the governments concerned.
• NATO should move towards a gradual thinning-out of shorter-range ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons in central Europe, in combination with the conventional force improvements and arms control proposals set out below.

On other nuclear arms control issues, we recommend that:

• The United States continue negotiations for an agreement on strategic confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). This could cover pre-notification of certain tests and exercises, modernizing the Washington-Moscow hotline and improved U.S.-Soviet crisis management procedures (including procedures addressed to possible nuclear threats or attacks by non-allied countries or terrorist organizations).
• The United States urgently re-examine, and resume exploratory discussions with the Soviets about, limitations on the testing and deployment of space-based weapons platforms. Such limitations could promote crisis stability while averting an expensive weapons competition in the 1990s or thereafter.
• The United States ratify the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties and seek to negotiate a new threshold lower than 150 kilotons.
• The United States resume active negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban.

We recommend that the United States continue programs to develop survivable strategic command, control, communications and intelligence systems. The weakness of present systems could tempt a preemptive attack and is therefore potentially destabilizing.

We recommend that the United States propose regular talks between senior U.S. and Soviet defense officials and military staffs, which could promote better understanding of the concerns of the two countries.

Non-Proliferation Policies
Nuclear proliferation remains a paramount threat to international security. Efforts to prevent it deserve much higher priority from trilateral governments. In addition to showing a stronger determination by the superpowers to fulfill Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by means of the arms control measures discussed earlier, we recommend the following steps:

• The trilateral countries which are nuclear suppliers should make ‘fullscope’ safeguards a condition of nuclear cooperation and use all available means to promote this condition with other countries. Strengthening the regime for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an important condition of any effective non-proliferation policy.
• The trilateral countries should examine the possibility of agreeing in advance to take measures against any country which acquires a nuclear explosive capability, to last until it agreed to accept full-scope safeguards.
• The trilateral countries should promote nuclear-free zones where these might reduce the likelihood of proliferation, for example in Africa and also
as part of efforts to achieve a settlement in the Middle East. Such zones and other measures to increase security can be important in reducing the incentive for countries to develop nuclear weapons.

Non-Nuclear Force Improvement and Arms Control Policies

Strategy
A strategy and programs to implement it are needed to reduce Western reliance on the threat of first use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression. Strategic nuclear parity has made such a threat less credible and carrying it out suicidal. Deterrence can be strengthened by improving conventional forces, which would be a source of inter-allied confidence and of stability in crisis. In view of the growth of Soviet conventional forces in all theaters, the shifting balance of influence in the world and the increasing interests of the trilateral countries in several regions, especially in the Middle East, stronger conventional deterrence is required in potential trouble spots.

We recommend that the trilateral countries adopt a relatively low-risk approach, which involves strengthening their conventional forces to provide a stalwart capability to resist aggression even on a large scale, with diminished reliance on nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression. We believe this is preferable to the alternative, relatively high-risk approach, which would rely on smaller conventional forces to signal to potential aggressors the dangers they face, including that of nuclear war. The low-risk approach, which would not involve any change in current Alliance doctrine and strategy, will result in less insecurity among the trilateral countries and greater inter-allied confidence. We believe that the necessary programs are within the political and financial reach of the trilateral countries. In Europe, such an approach could have an impact comparable to that of the INF modernization decision of December 1979 by facing the Warsaw Pact countries with a choice between seeing an enhanced NATO conventional force modernization program and making significant concessions in arms control negotiations.

We recommend that the trilateral countries examine whether the political will to support these actions could be better galvanized if they were to make explicit the goals of not having to rely on the threat of early use of nuclear weapons and of progressively shifting onto the Soviets the onus of the nuclear first use decision, as SACEUR has suggested. If non-nuclear forces are not strengthened, we foresee a weakening of allied confidence in the strength of deterrence and a further growth of concern about the risks of nuclear war.

Force Posture
New understandings are needed about sharing the burden of providing conventional forces. The United States can best provide the forces needed for long-range power projection, wide-area sea control and possibly conventional strikes on an aggressor's homeland. Other trilateral countries can most appropriately focus on the direct land, air and maritime defense of their own regions. However, the United States and Canada must continue to provide substantial land and air forces in Europe and the United States must also do so in Northeast Asia. For these purposes, advanced technology weapons systems, improved force organization (including the use of reserves) and new tactics should be considered, and where appropriate, exploited by all the allies. For this reason, and because of demographic and other factors, military manpower policies of several allied countries, including the United States (which will remain a primary source of manpower reserves for trilateral defense), require review.

We accordingly recommend that the above principles be used in allocating defense tasks among the trilateral countries. In addition, we believe that the United States and the United Kingdom should seriously consider introducing some form of universal national service. We urge France and its allies to explore at a high political level ways in which France's participation in NATO's defense planning can be extended beyond existing understandings.

This program would require some increases in defense expenditure for Europe above the current Alliance commitment of three percent a year in real terms. Japan should also continue to increase its defense effort and lift the political ceiling of one percent of GNP on its defense budget in accordance with its constitution and the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. Japan should allow its defense budget's share of GNP to rise above one percent, but it should remain under two percent. More collaboration in weapons development and procurement among the defense industries of the trilateral countries is needed, especially if new technologies for conventional defense are to be exploited and waste of scarce defense resources minimized.

Arms Control
We recommend that:
- Negotiations on the limitation of conventional force manpower in Europe be pursued.
- Consideration be given to proposals for broadening these negotiations to include, once again, the most threatening battlefield weapons systems. These include short-range nuclear weapons and tanks. The goal of
such proposals should be to achieve reductions in the levels of systems deployed near the front line.

- Efforts be made to expand the confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) which were agreed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, during the first phase of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe covering a larger geographical area, including the Western Soviet Union.

- An examination be made of the applicability of the CSBM approach in the Far East (especially to reducing the risk of conflict in Korea).

Two Special Cases:
The Middle East and China

The Middle East, and especially the Gulf area, presents special challenges which should be addressed on a trilateral basis. Mutual adjustments of policies among the three regions are necessary and possible. We recommend three interrelated elements of a trilateral bargain:

- An explicit recognition by Western Europe, Japan and Canada that their security interests call for a military dimension of policy in the area. The forces for this should be primarily provided by the United States, with the Western European countries contributing by assuming responsibilities in Europe previously borne by the United States and Japan by increasing its self-defense capabilities.

- Vigorous and sustained pursuit by the United States of an Arab-Israel settlement consistent with United Nations resolutions. If Israel continues to implement policies, including policies concerning settlements in occupied Arab territories, which are incompatible with early progress in negotiations, the United States should place some limits on its support for Israel.

- Coordination on a trilateral basis of policies on economic assistance, trade and military supply to the countries of the area.

China's position as a rival of the Soviet Union with links to the West is unlikely to change soon. It is important to the East-West strategic balance. Security policies of the trilateral countries should seek to strengthen China's ties to the West, possibly including some assistance to its military as well as its civilian modernization.

D. ECONOMIC SECURITY

Economic dangers pose great threats to the security of the trilateral countries. Since other Task Forces have considered these subjects in detail, we treat them in summary form. However, it is past the time for recognition that economic disagreements among the trilateral countries damage their security interests.

We recommend that governments and private sector interests (especially those advocating protectionism) adopt a strategic perspective and show a greater readiness to compromise on economic issues in order to promote a revitalization of the world economy, which is a precondition for an enduring improvement in the security situation.

In East-West trade, we support the general conclusions of an earlier Trilateral Task Force that restrictions on trade should only be made where a clear security interest can be shown. We recommend that restrictive criteria, from the security viewpoint, be adopted in determining the scope of strategic export controls, that subsidized credit terms not be offered for East-West trade, and that the trilateral countries coordinate more closely their positions on the procedures and circumstances in which economic sanctions should be imposed in response to specific Soviet aggressive actions.

On North-South issues, we recommend that the trilateral countries consult on ways in which their development policies can also help promote the realization of their security objectives.

E. IMPROVED CONSULTATIONS

It is commonplace to call for more consultation. But that remains an important remedy for what ails the trilateral world. We therefore recommend that the trilateral consultative process as it affects security-related topics be strengthened. Improved consultations are not a panacea. But used with determination they can be of great value.

We recommend a progressive broadening of the agenda of the seven nation summits to include the elaboration of a broad strategy for improving security and to cover several security-related subjects. Among these are the assessment of the evolving East-West military balance; the prospects for arms control and improved East-West relations; all aspects of policy towards the Middle East, including the military dimension of security in the region, the effort to promote an Arab-Israel settlement and trade and aid policy; the relationship between security objectives and policy on development aid and military equipment supplies; trilateral policy towards China; non-proliferation policy; and East-West trade in all its aspects. Some of these subjects have been discussed at past summits, but few have been addressed regularly and systematically.

We recommend that the senior officials in foreign ministries responsible for political-military affairs or other appropriate senior officials meet regularly in advance of the summits to prepare a report and recommendations to
APPENDIX

Summary of Discussion at Trilateral Commission Plenary

ROME — APRIL 18-19, 1983

The penultimate draft of this report came before the April 1983 plenary meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Rome. The discussion it inspired was both useful in the authors’ final revisions and interesting in illuminating various points of view and issues in the wider debate of which the task force report is a part. It is with the second aspect in mind that this detailed summary has been prepared (by Charles Heck of the Trilateral Commission staff). Task force reports to the Trilateral Commission are the responsibility of their authors only. This summary reveals a considerable diversity of opinion in the Commission—which is certainly to be expected in such a deeply controversial policy area as defense and arms control.

The summary opens with two broad areas in which a number of interventions in the debate can be grouped. The first, which could be labelled the ‘no-first-use’ debate, is organized here under the heading of “effective deterrence of large-scale non-nuclear attack” from the Soviet Union. The second broad area is organized under the heading of “legitimacy and reassurance” and relates to the public support and understanding that are vital in our democratic societies. The rest of the summary deals with more particular matters, such as intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations and deployments in Europe, U.S. ICBM issues (notably the MX controversy), and the efforts and roles of particular countries (notably Japan, France, and Canada). The draft report found both admirers and critics in the Rome discussion. There is a natural tendency for critical points to receive more emphasis in a substantive summary such as the following, since we have omitted general statements of praise to concentrate on specific comments, and since even admirers in such a discussion—looking toward the authors’ final revisions—tend to concentrate on those aspects of the draft which they find in need of improvement for the final draft.

Several aspects of the Rome discussion are not included in this summary. For instance, we have omitted many comments about specific passages revised in the final draft where the issue involved was not a major focus of discussion. Where the issue involved was a major focus of discussion, however, such as formulations related to the no-first-use controversy, some such comments remain. Issues of format and procedure have also been omitted here to concentrate on the substance of the debate.

Effective Deterrence of Large-Scale Non-Nuclear Soviet Attack

Much support was expressed for improvements in conventional forces (particularly in Europe) that would permit less reliance on the threat of early use of nuclear weapons in response to a large-scale non-nuclear Soviet attack, but several members thought the draft report came too close to advocating a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and took the occasion to argue against such a policy.

There were several strands to the arguments presented. One was that a no-first-use commitment would remove the vital threat of unacceptable damage to the territory of the...
Soviet Union. Effective deterrence of the Soviet Union can only be accomplished by maintaining uncertainty with regard to a nuclear response, a German member argued—"in other words, the potential of damage to the territory of the Soviet Union." If we remove that uncertainty we might have a different situation in Europe. The long period of peace since World War II might come to an end. This member advocated working toward "no early use" of nuclear weapons, a stance on which he felt there is a consensus. He recognized the draft report did not advocate no first use, but he found considerable ambiguity in the draft, and thought the no early use formulation would help clarify a majority position.

A French member made a similar argument in more detail, adding other strands as well. He "entirely subscribes" to the "broad thesis" in the report that there should be an increase in the non-nuclear capacity of the Alliance in Europe. It appears that Soviet strategy is geared to a very quick victory probably through non-nuclear means. If we are in a position to deny the success of their strategy then there will be deterrence at the non-nuclear as well as the nuclear level. The question remains, however, of how long we should be able to hold out on the conventional level. This member disagreed with the formulation in the report that we should, as recommended by SACEUR, acquire non-nuclear forces of sufficient strength to shift the wartime onus for any decision to use nuclear weapons onto the Soviets. According to an article by General Rogers, the current SACEUR, in Foreign Affairs last year, the capacity of the Soviet Red Army and her satellites to fight at the conventional level is measured at least in weeks and probably in months. Europeans would not consider acceptable a fight on their territory that would last for months. That would mean a complete disaster for them, and is one of the reasons why the no-first-use proposal should certainly be refused. Europe would be condemned to a conventional war that would bring disaster to the whole of the continent.

Also, this member continued, in a time of crisis if we had a no-first-use commitment on our side, it would mean that European vulnerability would be absolutely enormous to non-nuclear fighting, whereas the Soviet Union would not have to fear the only weapons that can do her intolerable damage—nuclear weapons. In a crisis, the discrepancy in the respective vulnerabilities of the two sides would be such that it would bring the Soviets an enormous advantage in their capacity to exercise pressure on the West. Therefore, no first use is entirely unacceptable to the Europeans, this member concluded. He recognized that the draft report does not advocate no first use, but considers it an ideal. In this member's estimation, even as an ideal it should be rejected.

This member favors reducing the number of short-range tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, provided the necessary improvements in the non-nuclear field are accomplished. The Alliance can achieve a deterrent position in the non-nuclear field that would make the deployment of 6,000 such weapons in Europe in excess of what would be necessary. But he argued that, in order to be able to threaten intolerable damage on Soviet territory (and in order to establish coupling between the European theater and American strategic forces), the new intermediate-range nuclear weapons are critical. Aircraft have traditionally had this mission, but they will have increasing difficulties penetrating Soviet air defenses.1

1The report raised the question of non-nuclear long-range strike systems, including cruise and ballistic missiles with advanced munitions. Two members opposed this idea in the discussion. "Perish the thought that there would be non-nuclear cruise missiles," said one. The other had "great difficulty" with the idea. He thought the Soviets would respond to such a cruise or ballistic missile (which would almost inevitably look similar if not identical to a missile carrying a nuclear warhead) as if it were carrying a nuclear warhead.

Several North American members were also critical—for various reasons—of no first use or of the discussion in the draft of the value of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack. Others responded to these criticisms. We all agree, one American member stated, that we have an obligation to increase our conventional forces so that it is less likely we will need to call into play our nuclear forces. But the gut issue is what happens if the Soviets, by use of their conventional forces, are able to overrun the conventional forces that the Alliance has in Europe. It is very hard to believe that a political leader of Britain, France, or the United States who found his conventional forces overrun, and had another weapon, would not use it. Another member responded later to what he called this view of pulling the nuclear trigger as if it were a "sovereign remedy" for restoring the situation. This member has never seen any war game results that indicated that pulling the nuclear trigger would be to our advantage. The answer is not to continue to "suck on this opium pipe of a nuclear threat" to do our military business, but to get cracking on real non-nuclear improvements.

Another argument marshalled against no first use was that history indicates that total reliance on conventional forces, no matter how well-equipped, has repeatedly led to war. This is a conclusion we cannot avoid, an American member stressed. Another American saw a quite different lesson to be learned: While reliance on conventional weapons for deterrence has not prevented conventional war, reliance on nuclear weapons to prevent conventional war will prevent neither conventional nor nuclear war.

A joint statement from ten Canadian members argued that a commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons would not be taken seriously by the Russians and would confuse Western opinion.

An American member warned against the danger of seeming to argue that the usefulness of nuclear weapons will in the future be limited to deterring their use by an adversary. This member did not see how one can flatly assert that nuclear weapons will deter only one kind of Soviet attack. We do not know what goes on in the minds of the Soviet decision makers, and how they calculate the risks. Another American argued that one of the key factors in the absence of general war in Europe in the past has been the threat that Soviet aggression, whether nuclear or conventional, would trigger a nuclear war. A third American, however, defended the view that nuclear weapons don't really serve any purpose other than that of preventing the use, or the threatened use, of nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies. Ideas of extended deterrence, ideas of some sort of flexible response with nuclear weapons, are apocalyptic ideas that could lead only to the destruction of civilized society. It is true that the peace has been preserved as far as the major powers are concerned over the past several decades; but that is a product of the fact that we've followed a sound policy of deterrence of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons cannot be a substitute for a strong conventional defense. This member added a point about American politics: It is somewhat ironic, he stated, that those who favor deployment of more and more nuclear weapons are frequently those who call for the withdrawal of an American troop presence from Europe. If you scratch a hard-line nuclear weaponer, you will probably find an isolationist. The best deterrent against conventional war in Europe is the presence of a significant number of American troops.

An American member warned of the danger of a report to the Trilateral Commission appearing to recommend essentially the reversal of several decades of accepted policy. This should only be done with the greatest care, if at all. Referring to SACEUR's statements about shifting the onus of possible first use of nuclear weapons to the Soviets by improving our conventional forces, this member said that he was not aware that General Rogers had gone to the point of saying that we should never at any time and under any circumstances be in a position where we might choose to use nuclear weapons first. This member understood that the draft report doesn't quite say that either, although
it seemed to him the draft considers this a goal. The utmost care must be taken so that the bottom line that people take from the report will not simply be that it represents another advocacy of no first use. This member went on to support "less reliance on early first use" of nuclear weapons, which he called a salutary aim on which NATO can agree.

Responding later in the discussion, one of the authors stressed that the report does not call for a no-first-use doctrine. He referred in detail to key parts of the core of the draft report:

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has called for the acquisition of non-nuclear forces of sufficient strength to place the wartime onus on the Soviets for any decision to use nuclear weapons.... The authors of this report believe that the tripartite countries should work towards force postures that in time will permit them to avoid being the first to use nuclear weapons.... The governments should examine whether the political will needed for such an effort could be more readily galvanized if a target such as that proposed by SACEUR were adopted.... This policy would retain for the time being the option of first use as a deterrent to conventional attack and would not require any change in NATO doctrine, while initiating an allied study of the circumstances in which the onus of a first-use decision could progressively be shifted to the Soviet Union.

This indicates, he argued, that the report is quite responsive to the call for approaching a change in this doctrine carefully. The authors are not proposing any abrupt change in strategy. Our countries would be years in altering the present course.

Several members saw a weak link in the unlikelihood of the needed conventional improvements. A Japanese member noted that great attention was given in Japan to the part of the argument about no first use of nuclear weapons but the complementary aspect of strengthening conventional arms was disregarded in most Japanese newspapers. An American member made a similar point. His concern with the no-first-use debate is that all the emphasis is on "the first part of the equation" while the other part, the conventional buildup, is "lost in the shuffle." He was not persuaded by SACEUR's estimate that the needed conventional improvements could be accomplished with four percent real annual increases in defense spending, just one percent more than the current NATO target. And he was not certain that we have the political will or economic capability for the needed improvements in conventional forces. Another American found SACEUR's four percent estimate "very low", and wondered whether even this would be feasible for the Europeans. A European member recognized that the key problem in non-nuclear force improvement could very well be a problem of costs. Much more attention should be given in the report, he argued, to ways of stopping the cost-spiral of military improvements, through coordination, planning and competition. Here is a problem, he concluded, which seems eminently suitable for a trilateral solution.

Legitimacy and Reassurance

We not only have a problem of effective deterrence, as one European member put it, we have an equally important problem of maintaining legitimacy and of reassuring people in our democratic societies that policy reflects their wishes. In that sense, this member continued, the report takes a large step in the right direction, which he very much welcomed. If we can point out to people that there is an alternative to immediate nuclear conflict if war is to break out, this is helpful. Many of the people who oppose the system feel helpless and confused; they are not all pacifists who are not willing to listen. To navigate our way successfully here, however, we need courageous politicians who will do two things. First is to point out that there is an option available (non-nuclear force improvements), but that this option carries with it certain expenses. This member has been involved in a recent project which tried to estimate the cost, and came up with a figure of $20 billion (plus or minus 50 percent, including operating costs) over a period of seven to eight years. Considering the politics of it all and what the Alliance could achieve with the $20 billion, it is an acceptable sum, in this member's estimation, if it removes the necessity of early use of nuclear weapons. We need politicians to pick up this subject and present the choice to their electorates. Secondly, we also need courageous politicians who do not stigmatize nuclear weapons. We have to be honest with our electorates and tell them there is no way out of the Nuclear Age, at least not for the foreseeable future. There is no key available to lock Pandora's box; and nuclear weapons have had a certain positive impact in maintaining peace in Europe, despite all their awful destructive power.

Three other European members—each of them German, as was the previous speaker—also concentrated, in various ways, on problems of democratic legitimation and public support.

One of these members began by noting that in many Western European countries, government defense and security policies have become the object of mistrust and unease among important segments of the population, in particular the young and the educated. This unease goes far beyond the present electoral support for Green parties; it can be manipulated, and makes the formulation and implementation of security and defense policies quite difficult. These policies need broad democratic legitimation and support—and for this purpose it is important to try to communicate about security and defense issues with these skeptics and critics. Some of their mistrust is based on the notion (not always easy to counter) that defense, security, and even arms control policies have become ends in themselves, rather than means towards higher objectives.

In an effort to build the foundations of a dialogue with those skeptics, this member continued, the report should bring out more clearly that:

- The ultimate objectives for defense, security and arms control policies are to safeguard peace and freedom. The policies have to be measured constantly against those ends.
- The destructive potential of nuclear weapons will ultimately require their abolition or the transformation of the international system. While one cannot see an alternative to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in the near future, it is also difficult, if not impossible, to see nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons as part of human history for, say, the next 50 or 100 years. The potential for self-destruction implied by nuclear weapons leaves us no alternative but to transform the international system—hopefully before a major conflagration. Nuclear deterrence, in this member's view, can be viable only if it is linked to such a larger perspective of transition.
- This transition cannot be achieved through defense, security and even arms control policies alone. They have to be complemented with other types of policies—as indeed Western policy has recognized since the Harmel Report.


*"The Future Tasks of the Alliance," Report of the North Atlantic Council (December 1967). This effort was undertaken on the initiative of Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium. The report declared that the Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. The second function is "to pursue the search for progress toward a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary.... The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente."
This member related his concerns and proposals to the four aims of defense and arms control policies stated in the final chapter of the draft report. While he has no particular problems with any of the four points, they do not reflect the longer-term perspectives he outlined.

Another German member began by noting that one of the big dangers we are facing, especially in Europe (and especially in the Federal Republic), is the credibility gap. NATO and present NATO policy are very quickly losing credibility and support in our countries. There is a "window of political vulnerability," a gap which might prove very dangerous in the very near future.

He noted that a main thesis of the report is that a revitalization of the world economy is crucial for improved security, but the armaments race surely is working in the opposite direction. Deficit spending for armament programs leads to bigger budget deficits which are responsible for the too-high interest rates in the United States and even in Europe. The attempt of the Reagan Administration, in spite of the bad experience with the gas pipeline quarrel, to use economic means to fight communism can only end in the further restriction of world trade and will not help the economic situation. The attempt to look at the Third World through the lens of East-West conflict will make the debt problem even worse than it already is. In sum, we act in a way which will not revitalize the economy, and many people realize this.

Many things have been happening in the last years, this member continued, which make it very difficult to get support for NATO policy in European public opinion. The impression is spreading that the Reagan Administration is moving away from the Harel Report. The talk about "horizontal escalation" which is now going on is really hell for the discussion of NATO strategy in Europe. The 'Star Wars' speech of President Reagan depressed everyone and created fears that the ABM treaty might be breached and that we have another phase of destabilization before us. Too much is coming together. While the Soviets are talking peace and walking softly, some of our American friends do the opposite. There is a real danger that quite a large part of European public opinion now has the feeling that it is the United States which does not want to come to a compromise in the Geneva arms control negotiations. He recognized the one-sidedness in this, but it is a one-sidedness for which we have some responsibility. It's not coming out of nothing. The real process going on—as we discuss various technicalities—is that the people are losing faith in what we say on defense, and not only on the nuclear question. We are in a very dangerous situation. In this year, 1983, we will see an uproar in Europe. We are not doing enough—many people are doing the opposite—to really calm things down and to win new confidence from our own voters and citizens for the policy of the Alliance in which we all believe.

One of the authors later stated his agreement that we will face a very difficult situation at the end of the year in Europe. We must give credible answers on security in order to get the consent which is necessary in any democratic country, and he believes the report can be helpful in that process. He stressed the report's emphasis on the conventional imbalance, which has been the source of so much of our trouble and has never really been faced as such. He too is extremely disturbed by the possibility that, if we are not wise enough in dealing with the Soviets, those who today in Europe are doubtful about INF deployment might consider it due to a lack of political will on the U.S. side. If INF negotiations are interrupted. This would put us in an extremely difficult situation and make the necessary consent even more difficult to secure.

Another German member stressed that he is not one of those who preach unilateral disarmament for the sake of proving to the Russians that we are peaceful people and that they might just as well disarm themselves. But he does demand that negotiations on arms reduction and disarmament be carried forward on both sides with a more serious conviction than shown so far—to come to an agreement which leaves us safer because of a sizable reduction in nuclear arms on both sides. This member has serious doubts regarding successful negotiations in Geneva as long as each side dismisses the proposals of the other. The 'peace lovers' posture of the Soviets is not convincing as long as they continue to deploy week by week one more SS-20 missile. But American statements that the Soviets will only seriously negotiate after we have 'shown our teeth', meaning after we have deployed Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, do not attest to a devotion to come to an agreement either.

The arguments for deployment of more missiles and warheads might move more easily over the tongues of people far away from a likely battlefield, this member continued. But being situated in the heart of Europe makes it difficult to rely for peace on deterrence and to face theories of a regional limited nuclear war. A growing number of people in Germany are scared! What is called the peace movement is neither a bunch of starry-eyed kids you can ignore or a bunch of Communists. Simple arithmetic proves that the majority in the peace movement has nothing at all to do with Communists. In German elections Communists have never gotten more than 100,000 votes, but the 1981 peace demonstration in Bonn brought out more than 300,000 people. Is it an acceptable policy to dismiss those who demand substantial arms reductions and who strive for a nuclear-free Europe as starry-eyed neutralists and dreamers, and just to continue the arms buildup as before? The double-track decision of NATO never called for rearmament first of all, but for negotiations towards arms reduction.

This member reflected back on those years after the war when German rearmament was discussed. The Trade Union Movement had very strong reservations against Germany ever again being rearmmed. One of the slogans then was: "The best rearmament in social rearmament." It can be said with some pride that we in the Federal Republic have rearmed our country socially. Of course, we also have the Bundestag. But if you ask this member what was more important to save West Germany from communism, he will still claim that the improvement of the economic and social situation of workers made them immune against communists and fascists. A glance over the barbed wire at the social and economic conditions in the other part of Germany is more convincing than arms will ever be. Security and defense are not aims in themselves. Social, economic and cultural conditions have to be kept on a level worth defending. The existence of more than 30 million unemployed in the OECD area speaks for itself. Successful negotiations in arms reductions could at once set free billions of dollars for social and economic improvements, not only for workers in the West, also for the workers in the East, and in particular for the many hundred millions who are starving in the Third World. This, he concluded, is the logic of peace; not of dreamers, but of those who want life on earth to survive.

INF Negotiations and Deployment
We noted above, in the context of no first use, the argument of a French member that deployment of the new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe is essential in order to threaten intolerable damage on Soviet territory in response to a large-scale non-nuclear attack (a function aircraft are increasingly unable to perform) and to establish coupling between the European theater and American strategic forces. The truth of the matter is, he concluded, that even if there had been no SS-20s, we would need the new missiles in Western Europe.

This member was unhappy that the Geneva INF negotiations bear only on those weapons which have ranges of over a thousand miles—that is, the weapons that can reach the territory of the Soviet Union. This leaves out all the aircraft and all the shorter range missiles—SS-21s, 22s and 23s—which from the satellites can cover practically the
whole of Western Europe. That is fundamentally wrong. It followed that this member also opposed bringing together the INF and START negotiations (proposed as a goal within the report), which would reinforce the exclusion of those weapons which, by the thousands, are specifically meant to hold Europe under their threat. The effect on European public opinion of excluding these weapons, he argued, might be extremely serious.

An Italian member and a British member opposed writing now about eventually folding the INF negotiations into the strategic arms negotiations—not because the substance of the idea is wrong, but because it would divert attention from decisions that have to be made now. The folding of the INF negotiations into the START negotiations, one of these members stated, is logically, technically, and even perhaps politically what might well have to happen. But if you start now saying with a very few words that INF after all should become only one chapter of a much larger negotiation, what would be the consequences for our governments and with public opinion? We may very well not start deploying INF at the end of this year or not even in the middle of 1984, but wait until that bigger negotiation is completed. He recognized that the report does not propose delaying INF deployment, but urged caution in the presentation of related proposals.

An American member supported folding the INF negotiations into the START negotiations after an interim agreement. We can go nowhere in the INF talks as long as they are conducted separately. We don’t have all the cards at the same bargaining table. We’re not in a position where we can make the trade-offs that could bring about a substantial reduction or even the elimination of the Soviet SS-20s. If we can offer the Soviets—as in the ‘zero option’—is a decision not to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing IIs, that’s not going to be enough. We’re asking them to ignore not only the French and British forces but the Chinese forces as well, and we say nothing about sea-launched cruise missiles, of which some 4,000 are involved in the Reagan strategic program announced in October 1981.

If we set aside the zero option and talk about equal numbers of INF warheads, we still have a non-starter. They have about 1,200 warheads in their intermediate nuclear forces. If they cut them in half, what does this mean we are offering?—the full deployment of our 572 cruise missiles and Pershing IIs. The best that can be done, this member continued, is what the draft report suggests: Find some interim agreement, something perhaps that calls for a significant reduction in the SS-20s, and then move the entire issue into the START talks. In an overall negotiation, we might be able to get a lot further toward the elimination of these Soviet forces. We can only deal with the strategic balance if we deal with it as a whole.

With regard to the acceptability of INF deployments in Western Europe, a British member argued that it would help in Britain to work on the ‘two-key’ system of joint American-British control. As background to his point, he noted that there is a sizable portion of British opinion, going far beyond the peace movement, that is worried about reliance on America. A large majority in the polls supports the national nuclear deterrent and membership in NATO. The polls however also indicate a majority—a small majority—for removal of American bases in Britain and against deployment of the new cruise missiles. A great many of the top NATO people in Britain who want the cruise missiles to come in are not satisfied with what they have been told about control arrangements. Work on a two-key system would be extremely helpful.

A joint statement from ten Canadians favored proceeding with plans to deploy intermediate nuclear weapons in Western Europe, believing that serious negotiations with the USSR on disarmament matters will not occur unless the Soviets are persuaded that these weapons will be deployed.

U.S. ICBM Forces: MX, New Lighter Single-Warhead Missile

No one took issue with the support of the draft report for a U.S. effort to develop a new single-warhead ICBM. Some members did take issue with the draft report’s opposition to the MX. A joint statement from ten Canadian members used the ‘bargaining chip’ argument. They opposed the recommendation that the MX not be deployed “out of concern that this might not be helpful in achieving a START agreement… while not excluding that as a result of successful negotiations such deployment might not prove necessary or desirable.”

Three American members pointed to support for some MX deployment in the recent Scowcroft Commission report in the United States, a report which had appeared just before the Rome meeting (but after completion of the draft task force report). They emphasized the bipartisan character of the Scowcroft Commission and asked that its arguments be taken into account in the final report. The Scowcroft Commission approach is probably “the best chance we have of developing a bipartisan approach in the Congress,” one American observed. Another described the Scowcroft effort as providing “perhaps the first bipartisan recommendations on these matters that we have had in American history for at least two and a half decades.”

One of these three Americans posed a question to the Europeans in the room. At home in the United States, he noted, they’re told that “if we reduce or eliminate the MX option, this would have a very critical impact on our European partners; that they would feel that we are not sincere and that we cannot be relied upon.” What would Europeans think if the United States dropped the MX? One European responded to this question later in the debate: “Weakness of the United States is not our problem,” he stated. If the United States foregoes the deployment of the MX and has the alternative available (such as the smaller single-warhead missile), this member did not see any negative impact. In fact, he could see a positive impact.

Another European observed that the MX was supported for years because of the supposed ‘window of vulnerability’. Now the Scowcroft Commission, he stated, says there is no such window; but it is argued nevertheless that the United States should go ahead with the MX “to make it clear to the Soviets that we are able to decide the question, even if we decide it the wrong way.” Another of the three Americans objected to such “flippant” talk about the window of vulnerability. This is not like the disappearing ‘bomber gap’ or ‘missile gap’ of earlier eras, he argued. The Scowcroft Report does not deny the vulnerability of the fixed missile force. The whole point of it is how we are to cope with the vulnerability of fixed targets in the present circumstances and over the next twenty years.

The third of the three Americans developed the argument for the MX. For more than ten years, he noted, we have been trying to eliminate or at least to reduce the Soviet advantage that derives from their large force of multi-warhead ICBMs, which gives one side the destabilizing advantage of being able to knock out virtually all of the ICBMs on the other side using only a fraction of their own. While trying to negotiate on that subject, we began developing the MX—but we have not deployed a single new ICBM of our own while the Soviets have deployed anywhere from three to six. All we were able to do, finally, was to negotiate the SALT II Treaty which put a cap on the Russian large multi-warhead missile force but left ample room for us to go ahead and deploy our own MX force as a counterweight. Before President Carter went to Vienna in 1979 to sign the SALT II Treaty, this member observed, he went to the trouble of announcing that he had decided to deploy 200 MX missiles in one of the mobile basing modes. And when he

came back, although SALT II had its troubles, the Congress expressly approved the deployment of 200 MX missiles in what came to be known as the racetrack mode. Unfortunately, this member continued, President Reagan disapproved that basing mode, and since then no one has been able to work out an acceptable alternative, at least until the Scowcroft Commission came along. If we now put off deploying any new ICBM missile until a new untested single-warhead missile comes along in the 1990s, will we ever believe that we will have the will to deploy that drawing board missile when the 1990s come along and it's developed?

The argument, this member continued, has come down to a question of whether deployment of some MX in the same basing mode used by the Soviets for their multi-warhead missiles—admittedly not the best system by far, but the only one which has any practical chance of being adopted today—is better than none. There is at least one good military argument why some deployment is better than none: Whatever number of missiles survive the theoretical Soviet attack, which we all hope will never happen, it is much better to have those that survive do so with ten warheads per missile than with only three, as the Minuteman III now has. While putting MX in Minuteman holes is a tempting target which the Soviets could exploit at a low cost to themselves, even that cost is a great deal higher than destroying this target ourselves by not deploying MX at all.

The most important argument for the MX, this member continued, is a negotiating one. If we do not match the present Soviet advantage in multi-warhead ICBMs, how are we ever going to persuade them to agree on a new treaty with higher launcher limits, higher limits which we have to have for the single-warhead missile? How are we going to persuade them to agree to significantly lower warhead limits, and lead them toward a single-warhead missile force, if we don’t have a multi-warhead ICBM—meaning the transition over to single-warhead missiles could only advantage us. It’s been argued that we could use the Trident C-4 and D-5 as a negotiating counter instead. But it appears the U.S. government has no intention of using them as a negotiating chip, and would not be willing to give them up even if the Soviets were willing to go over to single-warhead missiles. This member was reminded of Alice Through the Looking Glass where the White Queen observed: “Jam yesterday, jam tomorrow, but never jam today.” Our predicament is that we are ready to build new ICBMs yesterday, we’ll be ready to build them tomorrow, but we’ll never be ready to build them today. In this member’s estimation, that is not a consistent or responsible position for the superpower that is safeguarding the liberties of us all.

One of the authors responded later that they would certainly examine the Scowcroft Commission arguments carefully. His difficulty with the MX is that he has never heard a reasonable description of its function. If it is to be a second strike weapons system, presumably it will be targeted on silos in the Soviet Union that are empty, which does not seem like a useful military exercise. If it is to be a matching of the Soviet capability, we seem to have reached a stage where we are imitative of Soviet deployments, which he is inclined to deplore. It is also said that the MX is a bargaining chip, a persuader of the Soviets to come to terms with us about decommissioning their 308 heavy ICBMs. This author’s experience with the Soviet Union has been that bargaining chips really don’t apply. This is not a game of poker. Bargaining chips historically have turned into indispensable weapons systems that we cannot concede. We’ve seen that on a number of occasions, not the least in the cruise missile programs.

Arms Debate Focus: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear War
An American member recalled an earlier comment that arms control has been proceeding at the intellectual capital of the 1950s, which has run out. This member argued that, in fact, there has been some development in this area—and much of it is shown in the draft report—but we have not packaged it very well. The public has turned to the Freeze movement in the United States and other movements in Europe partly because they have been frightened—frightened that there won’t be enough prudence in the use of nuclear weapons in their future. Also, this has not led to good arms control proposals. Both the Freeze and the current START proposal reflect the same kind of intellectual vacuum derived from the 1950s: a focus on numbers and reductions. A better focus—and one which is implicit in the report—is that arms control can be used to reduce the risk of nuclear war. (If there is one thing worse than nuclear weapons, surely it’s nuclear war.) A strategy to reduce the risk of nuclear war over time leads to a variety of steps which are quite different than reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons. Some of these steps are in the report, such as the emphasis on strengthening the conventional component of deterrence. Confidence-building measures—talks among military staffs, crisis-prevention talks, and so forth—are all relevant to reducing the risk of nuclear war as is slowing the spread of nuclear weapons so that we can manage the destabilizing consequences. This member emphasized most strongly integrating force structure changes and arms control proposals with this concept of reducing the risk of nuclear war—particularly with regard to crisis stability or avoiding a hair-trigger at a time of crisis. The Scowcroft Report is very interesting here. If we spend too much time debating about the MX, we’ll miss three very important things in the Scowcroft Report.

First of all, the Scowcroft Report says that, while the window of vulnerability for ICBMs does exist as a long-run problem, it has been greatly exaggerated in the short run. Essentially, the Triad works and we have time to work out the solution of what we do about these forces. That’s a very major change in the American domestic debate.

Second, the Scowcroft Commission advocates moving towards small single-warhead missiles as a long-run strategy of de-MIRVing.

Third, it says that arms control proposals have to focus on this type of stabilization, which means focusing on warheads rather than launchers. These are three quite major reversals in the current position of the U.S. Administration and also three quite major changes in the nature of what has been quite a sterile debate in the United States over the last half-dozen years about the role of arms control. We may be on the brink of improving the debate in the United States about arms control; and this trilateral report can contribute greatly to it if it takes those components which are really about reducing the risk of nuclear war and makes it clear that this is the kind of reassurance and hope that we can offer to the public. We need not get boxed into choosing between either the existing START proposal or the Freeze as the only alternatives. There is a moderate way of the middle, which is in this report, and has a strong claim on public attention.

The Definition and Persistence of ‘Parity’
An American was uncomfortable with the discussion of inevitable parity in the draft report. The problem of defining parity is a difficult one, he argued, and he stressed that we have been unable to agree with the Soviets about what constitutes parity. The Soviets claimed to be in a position of parity in 1971 and 1972—and still claim to be in a position of parity in 1983 some four thousand warheads later and three to six different missile systems later. So it’s a very flexible concept as far as they are concerned; and we ought to be careful not to fall into their definition, which leads to the conclusion that anything is parity. This member suggested that the report refer to the difficulty of assessing and measuring parity and to the history of this problem with the Soviets.

Another American disagreed that parity is difficult to define. Parity means that an attacker would have to recognize that if he attacked he would be destroyed by the
realtory forces that would survive. That was the case in 1972, if it's the case today, and it will be the case in the future. We can't evade parity. All we can do is either continue parity at a lower level of risk through negotiated agreement, or continue parity with more and more nuclear weapons and a consequent greater risk that the forces will go on hair trigger.

Another American noted a disposition to overlook the fact that the United States also has been in quite a dynamic phase of its buildup of strategic weaponry since 1971. In the Trident submarine program the United States has been engaged in the largest shipbuilding program in the history of the world. We have developed the most modern strategic weapons system of all—the air-launched cruise missile—and are deploying them now on our B-52 bombers. We have during a large part of the last decade been deploying three additional warheads a day and we have modernized our Minuteman force. So the persistence of parity is not unreasonable—both sides have been increasing their forces.

Non-Proliferation
An Italian member objected strongly to the insistence in the draft report on further measures to restrain nuclear proliferation—as if the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not sufficient. Whatever new measures are proposed will not be possible to carry out. They will only offend the countries who have not signed or ratified the NPT, and offend even more the countries which have signed and ratified. Those countries—like Italy—have signed and ratified the NPT without any particular gladness. He noted Italy's two main reservations when accepting the NPT. One relates to adherence to some future European Union which could have—certainly impossible for the time being—a European nuclear force. The second is that Italy does not consider itself bound by the NPT if there is a change in the strategic situation in the Mediterranean, a change which may very well be possible in these next years.

An American member emphasized that we must find more workable ways of bringing vaster front line equipment to other nuclear countries along with us in the pursuit of non-proliferation. The studies proposed in the report won't work unless some more nuclear states are involved. So far, what we have tried has not worked so well. Also, we need to employ an even hand when discussing the several errant countries which have strayed from what some of us might consider the "straight and narrow path of good nuclear behavior."

Another American stressed that he believes the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons is a more pressing threat than the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. So far that threat has been given rather secondary attention in most of the ministries responsible for it in the tribrilateral countries, as this member's personal experience in recent years attests. There should be a substantial increase in attention paid to this problem. He supported the idea of bringing key non-trilateral countries into consideration of the matter.

A Japanese and a European member argued that more attention be given to the proliferation of sophisticated conventional arms. The European referred to the sophisticated weapons provided to Argentina and used in the Falklands war.

Japan's Defense Efforts and Security Role
Several members commented on aspects of the report related to Japan. The first question of one Japanese member related to the implications for the Japanese defense program of the thrust of the report that, in an age of nuclear parity, strengthening of conventional forces is required for effective deterrence. The current effort that Japan is making to strengthen Japan's contribution under the U.S.-Japan security arrangement is one in which the United States provides the nuclear umbrella and Japan complements it through strengthening its self-defense (including coverage of Japan's immediate waters).

Are the authors of the report encouraging continuation of Japan's current efforts or are they proposing a sizeable change in the present defense expansion program?

This member's second question concerned the possible reaction—regional and domestic—to a sizeable increase in Japan's present defense program. This member agreed that the tribrilateral community shares security interests and that these security interests should be approached tribrilaterally, but there is a difference in defense arrangements in Europe and in Asia. NATO and the U.S.-Japan security treaty are different things. The 'threat concept' in Japan's region is not necessarily the same as in Europe. There are subtle, regional implications of Japanese defense expansion that are quite important from Japan's point of view—relating to the Soviet Union, to China, to Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian neighbors always have had very strong reservations about Japanese defense expansion because of past memories, Japan's great presence in Asia, and so forth. Japan has to move very carefully, and these regional implications should not be disregarded. As for the domestic reaction, while Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment is very well known, the Japanese public does not necessarily accept conventional weapons expansion either. The question of expenditures is a very serious one, especially at a time when the government's financial resources are extremely limited.

Another Japanese member was also not sure what the report is calling for in the way of expansion of Japan's defense efforts. One cannot on the one hand criticize Japan for doing too little and on the other hand note, without obvious dissatisfaction, that defense expenditures will not be rising rapidly. He then went on to describe impressive increases in the fiscal 1983 budget. Expanding defense spending is given top priority in this "ultrastere" budget. Defense spending is up 6.5 percent (4.3 percent in real terms—much higher than the NATO target), an increase met by decreasing other budget items since the general budget is not to rise at all. On the surface the 6.5 percent increase looks like less than the 7.8 percent increase in fiscal 1982, but this is misleading since the FY 1982 figure included a pay raise for defense personnel while the FY 1983 figure does not (without the pay increase, the FY 1982 increase was 5.4 percent). Particularly notable in the FY 1983 budget is a 21.2 percent increase in outlays for frontline equipment and a 24.5 percent increase in Japan's contribution to facilities used by U.S. forces in Japan.

This member was unhappy that, although it is stated that trilateral security is indivisible, very little space is devoted to Japan outside the perceptions chapter (Chapter II). Another Japanese member commented that the allegedly short space is perhaps an accurate reflection of the present role of Japan in these issues. Trilateral security will not become indivisible until 'comprehensive security' is tackled as a whole, so we can have a framework embracing and defining the different security roles of different trilateral countries. On a more detailed point, he wondered what the authors imagined as Japan's role in rationalizing the production of armaments among trilateral countries.

An American member also stressed that, while one of the striking things about the draft report is that it tries, for the first time, to consider defense and security issues from a trilateral perspective, it then fails to take adequate account of the Japanese point of view. In the central chapter (Chapter III) and the recommendations, Japan is rarely mentioned. This omission is striking and unfortunate, especially since a major reason why the issue of defense and arms control has not been addressed earlier in the Commission is the difficulty of defining Japan's role. No one calls for a Japanese defense effort equivalent to that of other trilateral partners. But when each American is paying almost $1,000 annually for security the report judges indivisible, how long can Japanese continue to pay less than $100?

One of the authors stressed later that the main purpose of the report was to seek a common posture rather than elaborate the specific roles of specific countries such as Japan. He felt that most Japanese participants would be ready to accept the essential
points of the report, which he then detailed. The final report does include in the Japan part of Chapter II an additional section concerned with filling out the idea of ‘comprehensive national security’.

Sharing the Burden

A European member agreed entirely with what the draft report had to say about sharing the burdens of defense among the trilateral countries. There is no doubt that against the Soviet global strategy only the United States is in a position to mount an opposing global strategy—and the United States will have to devote more and more of its resources to that global mission. This means that the Europeans and the Japanese will have to take a greater share in their own defense. Not that they can ensure their defense by themselves, but they should take a greater share of the burden. Europe’s GNP is now higher than that of the United States, and Japan’s GNP has risen dramatically. This is a powerful argument for the Europeans and the Japanese to take on a greater share in their defense than they did at a time when, as in the early postwar years, the GNP of the United States was twice that of Europe.

An American noted the dependence of Europe and even more of Japan on imported oil. Speaking as an American that has to struggle with the U.S. budget, he continued, sooner or later there’s going to be a debate in the United States as to why the United States should be spending so much money on conventional forces to keep those oils lines open from the Middle East when the U.S. imports so much less of its oil from that region than do Europe and Japan. He realizes that significant defense expansion is a difficult political issue in the case of Japan, but suggested that some of us go back and read the debate in the U.S. press at the time General Eisenhower went to Europe under the instructions of President Truman and made the report which convinced the American people that there had to be seven American divisions in Europe. For those Americans who grew up with a belief in no entanglements outside the Western Hemisphere, that debate was as difficult in the United States, he argued, as any debate would be in Japan as to whether Japan with its new economic strength ought not to be making a more significant contribution to the defense of the free world.

Alliance Cohesion and the Smaller NATO Countries

A Dutch member noted that none of the European speakers in the debate so far had come from a smaller member country of the Alliance. We should not forget that the strength of the Alliance depends on the cohesion of the whole—and some of the smaller members occupy extremely important strategic positions. The Benelux countries have from the outset been staunch supporters of the Alliance, this member stressed. They were members of the original core group in Europe which created the Western European Union, the forerunner of the Atlantic Treaty. At present, however, if you look at their position in the Alliance, you can have the feeling, as a citizen of those countries, that you’re a bit on the sidelines—a feeling he had reading the draft report as well.

There is more that one could do, this member continued, report as well. Give the smaller countries the feeling that they are practically written off. The Netherlands recently had a visit of the American Secretary of State. Many were extremely grateful for that sign of interest and for that contact. Such a contact we have not had for a long time. If you want the smaller countries to feel their way back to cohesion within the Alliance, you must give them the feeling that they are involved, that what they say is listened to, and that their contribution is valued. Their contribution is not nil. To take the case of the Netherlands, notwithstanding an appalling public borrowing requirement, we have increased our defense budget in real terms. Such facts are seldom acknowledged. It would be helpful if somebody were kind enough to mention them once in a while; not to treat us as neutralists or as people who would like to be Finlanized. We are not neutralists and we wouldn’t like to be Finlanized.

France and the Conventional Defense of Western Europe

A French member argued that the draft report was too critical of France, in particular with regard to the difficulties created for the defense of Western Europe by France’s absence from the NATO integrated command and its lack of commitment to increasing its conventional forces. This member has been deeply involved in these issues. He stressed that the French commitment to the defense of Europe if Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is called into operation was reasserted when France left the integrated military command, and it has been reiterated in terms which are more binding than those of Article 5 in the letter which the French government sent at the time to all other Alliance governments. This leaves absolutely no doubt about the military commitment of France in the event that Article 5 is invoked. Agreements have been signed for the cooperation of French armed forces with the forces of NATO in such a case. This member has talked to the last three Supreme Allied Commanders and all three generals have told him that they were satisfied that the arrangements made would allow France to take full part in the defense of the West. France keeps in Germany the second corps of the First French Army, which is a little larger than the British Army on the Rhine; and there is another corps that would join immediately, doubling French forces there. In Bonn earlier this year, the French President made a commitment that is as far-reaching as could be.

There is a French doctrine of deterrence that does not fit exactly with flexible response, this member recognized, but even if there is a discrepancy in doctrine, there is little current discrepancy in conventional capacities. General Rogers has written that NATO conventional capacity is measured in days. So is the capacity of the First French Army. So the capacities are pretty much the same, and France probably would not be the first to have to use nuclear weapons. Where there might be a problem is if the conventional capacities of NATO are greatly increased and those of France are not. In the future we might then find that discrepancy about which the authors are concerned—asked the authors to take into account here the new French defense program to be announced shortly. It is to include a new special force—mobile, anti-tank—designed to operate immediately once Article 5 is invoked.

An American member looked forward to seeing the new French defense program. He stressed that it would be helpful if France could take a more forthcoming approach towards planning and implementing a flexible response doctrine and hopefully in the long run a doctrine that would place the onus on the Soviets for having to initiate nuclear warfare. His friends who are military experts have suggested to him that the unavailability of French real estate is NATO’s greatest weakness in trying to conduct conventional hostilities against a Soviet non-nuclear attack.

Another European member later stated his opinion that one of General de Gaulle’s mistakes was taking France out of the integrated military structure—a mistake which successive French governments have had to live with. Being sensible and being politicians, these governments have made the best of a bad job—and being French, they have made some extremely cogent and logical cases for their position. We must remember, however, he continued, why we have the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as the alliance itself. This member recalled an earlier intervention about the concerns of smaller NATO countries. We are sometimes told by our French friends that everybody ought to be responsible for their own defense. Well, try telling Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg that they ought to be responsible for their own defense. They saw what happened to them in 1940 when they were responsible for their own defense—and they didn’t like it. Among the larger countries, France collapsed.
Britain was driven back onto its islands, and the United States hemmed and hawed until forced into war by Japan and Germany. So after the war we decided that we needed something more constructive to keep us ready and to provide the machinery for collective defense. This member stated that he is not unrealistic enough to think that France will come back into the integrated military command, but given what is happening in Greece and Spain, he is a little afraid that the French example is catching. We cannot change the French attitude, and it would be politically foolish to try, but our French friends should not be proud of something which other Alliance members in fact deplore.

**Canada: Cruise Missile Testing, Conventional Improvements**

A Canadian member noted that the major issue in Canada at the moment in this area was not raised in the draft report: the proposed testing of U.S. cruise missiles in Canada (given the resemblance of the terrain in part of Canada to that of the Soviet Union). This has become as significant an issue in Canada as the INF deployment issue in some other Alliance countries.

It is unfortunate, this member argued, that the critics have entirely dominated the debate so far. They argue that the cruise missile (small and easily hidden) would contribute to destabilization, and that Canada can contribute to disarmament by refusing testing. This member sees the cruise missile (given its slowness) as pre-eminently a second-strike weapon. He expressed concern that the government has chosen to stay virtually silent and hope that the problem will go away. These matters are better faced in the open, he argued, with public involvement in the choice to be made. Prime Minister Trudeau did indicate during the recent visit of Vice President Bush that, for reasons of solidarity, something will have to be done. The position of the Canadian government has been made more difficult by some of the rhetoric in the U.S. debate.

Another Canadian noted that a recent Canadian poll showed 52 percent of those questioned opposed cruise missile tests in Canada. The majority of Canadians concerned with the issue are not a fringe group of "crazies". They constitute a responsible and highly intelligent part of the national community. Put simply, these people do not believe that they are being told the truth and they tend to believe that whatever our nuclear strategy is, it is if it is ever used, it will destroy us all.

Canada has long taken the position that it should be a non-nuclear member of the Alliance, this member stated. Many Canadians argue that there is no difference in principle between arming with nuclear weapons and testing them. However, both the governing Liberal Party and the official opposition Conservative Party have supported cruise missile testing. Recently, no doubt as a consequence of public opposition, the Government has tried to move into a more qualified position, as this member sees the situation. It is seriously believed by some that public opinion becomes aroused enough the Government will find some excuse to refuse testing. The Conservative Party has recently, after difficult debate within its Parliamentary Caucus, adjusted its support of cruise testing and deployment to that of support only after real and sincere negotiations fail. The New Democratic Party remains officially opposed to testing and/or deployment under any circumstances. This member observed that the N.D.P. also, from time to time, advocates Canadian withdrawal from NATO and NORAD.

This member also raised another dimension of the debate in Canada: conventional forces. Canadians are increasingly critical of what they perceive as a long steady decline of the Canadian Armed Forces and a corresponding lack of Canadian influence and/or relevance in Western defense decision-making. Certainly some of those who publicly advocate a negotiated freeze feel that the decline of conventional military capacity makes resort to nuclear weapons inevitable. And some of these people are now ready to pay the increased cost of conventional forces if the result is less reliance on a nuclear response.

Ten Canadian members at the meeting jointly stated later that they "would support a decision by our government to proceed with navigation flight-testing of the cruise missile if asked to do so by our NATO allies in conformity with existing accords. As a prelude the Canadian public should be more fully informed of the nature and significance of the missile."

**Other Points**

Two British members noted the reference in the draft report to considering resumption of conscription in two countries which do not now have it—the United Kingdom and the United States. Both members stressed that, if a case were to be made for resumption of conscription, it would have to be more extensively justified. One member stated that while he favored conscription socially, he opposed it militarily. The other British member was convinced that conscription would have done his sons a world of good, but there are "profound psychological feelings" in Britain about conscription and the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces always say it's the last thing they want.

Another member stressed that we need to consider unexpected possibilities in other parts of the world besides Europe and Northeast Asia—and the role the United Nations can play in resolving these and other disputes. He noted that war can develop almost by accident, and mentioned the Falkland war—for which Britain had no contingency plans, and where the U.N. almost brought off a negotiated settlement. He also referred to the Indian Ocean and to Antarctica (where the treaty comes up for renewal in 1991).

Another European member discussed Soviet intervention strategy in a few areas outside the central front in Europe. The men in the Kremlin are not fools enough, as he put it, to engage in limited aggression if they cannot give a good reason for their intervention. He compared Soviet action with regard to Afghanistan and with regard to Iran. In Afghanistan, they went in with their forces telling the world—and they thought the world might believe it, though they didn't really care—that they had been asked by the Afghan government to intervene. In Iran, which offers to them an "enormous magnificent possibility" to intervene, they did not intervene because among Ayatollah Khomeini's many defects, being pro-communist is certainly not one of them. We would be well advised if we started thinking in which parts of the world the Soviet Union may be asked by a government (or by a fake government) to send in its troops. This member wanted to call the attention of everyone to the possibilities which the next years might offer the Soviet Union in Albania and in Yugoslavia.

An American member objected strongly to some of the language in the draft report about American policy in the Arab-Israeli problem, finding the section too critical of Israel. Another American said he did not favor changing a word of this section.

An American member talked about East-West trade. He argued that the definition of the problem deserves to be given more attention. That definition should focus on how the advanced industrialized countries can best avoid making it easier for the Soviets to maintain the priorities in their economy that enable them to allocate 12-15 percent of their GNP to military purposes. That is a reasonable and appropriate policy objective, this member concluded, even if we do not always agree on the precise ways in which we can accomplish it.

A European member supported the proposal to include key security issues in the annual Summits among the larger industrialized nations. He had proposed this to his government long ago. These Summits are indeed the occasion to have a fundamental discussion on political, strategic and even military matters among the trilateral countries.

A European member talked about the role of Europe in the defense area. He referred to a report on the future of the European Community recently released by five international
affairs institutes in Western Europe. It is the carefully considered judgement of this European report that we have arrived at a point in the postwar evolution of Europe and of NATO—and, in fact, of the role of Europe in the world—when the European Community must attempt to become the European pillar of the Alliance. The Community would function particularly in the policy-making field, not in the field of operational military affairs, which would remain NATO’s responsibility. Outside the NATO area, the Community should be present both at the policy level and at the operational level. Otherwise, others will act for Europe on matters that are of immediate interest to Europeans.

An American member addressed an element of security not addressed in the draft which he feels receives too little attention in our countries: the capacity for rapid industrial mobilization. We are now in an era in which a diversified industrial base can no longer be assumed. The rapidly increasing industrial specialization of the tripartite countries creates a new mutual dependence which has important consequences for our collective security. To be sure, in any major conflict which can now be envisioned (other than a nuclear holocaust which makes any plan irrelevant), collaboration among the tripartite nations can be expected to continue. In a period of greatly heightened tensions, however, priorities for critical materials and manufactures will be difficult to administer. A tripartite world in which Europe, North America and Japan each have on site the capacity for rapid expansion of military hardware and software is more secure than a tripartite world in which important capabilities are either concentrated in one, possibly vulnerable, location, or largely lost to less advanced countries. This member does not intend that national security be used to defeat the important economic and political advantages of a free trade system, but he does assert that tripartite security depends on this element, and not merely on those addressed in the draft report.

\[9\text{Karl Kaiser, Cesare Merlino, Thierry de Monbrial, Edmund Weilstein, William Wallace, The European Community: Progress or Decline? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983).}\]