

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION (EUROPE)

26<sup>TH</sup> EUROPEAN MEETING  
PRAGUE, 18<sup>TH</sup> - 20<sup>TH</sup> OCTOBER 2002

**Tape transcription (with slight editing) of the Sunday, October 20<sup>th</sup> Session on**

**THE STATE OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP**

Co-chaired by **Peter Sutherland & Thomas S. Foley**

**CHRISTOPHER PATTEN**, Member of the European Commission (External Relations), Brussels; former Governor of Hong Kong; former Member of the British Cabinet, London

**RICHARD PERLE**, Chairman, U.S. Defence Policy Board and Consultant to the U.S. Secretary of Defence; Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington

*COMMENTS BY*

**WILLIAM DROZDIAK**, Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States Transatlantic Center, Brussels; former Chief European Correspondent for “The Washington Post”

*REMARKS BY*

**GRIGORY YAVLINSKY**, Member of the State Duma; Leader of the “Yabloko” Parliamentary Group; Chairman of the Center for Economic and Political Research, Moscow

PETER SUTHERLAND, EUROPEAN CHAIRMAN

*If I may at the very outset, I would like to recognise our colleagues from other places who are with us here today. First of all, Tom Foley, who of course is here from the United States as our North American Chairman. Secondly we have Han Sung-Joo as the Pacific Asian Deputy Chairman from Korea, Allan Gotlieb who is here as the Northern American Deputy Chairman from Canada. Shijuro Ogata who is the Pacific Asian Deputy Chairman from Japan, and Lorenzo Zambrano who is the North American Deputy Chairman from Mexico. All have travelled, I hardly need tell you, very far distances to be with us – we will be having a Chairmen’s meeting later in regard to future events. But also Tadashi Yamamoto and Michael O’Neil are also here, respectively the Pacific Asian and the North American Directors: we are very grateful to have them.*

*With regard to the session which is now about to start let me also welcome Chris Patten in the first instance, and Richard Perle, who will be the first two contributors. I will come to the others later. I don't think we could have chosen better speakers to represent the state of the current debate between the United States and the European Union, in particular regard to the events which we all know are so obviously covered in our newspapers on a daily basis.*

*And I'm going to go straight into the debate by asking Chris Patten. I don't have to introduce Chris – he's always been a formidable member of the European Commission in charge of External Relations. He has shown great courage in expressing very clearly, I think, the views which are widely held in Europe in regard to External Relations matters. And I think he's the perfect person to start this discussion this morning. Chris.*

CHRISTOPHER PATTEN

Thank you very much. I hope nobody told the Cardinal Archbishop of Prague yesterday what you'd planned for Sunday morning. The idea of starting off Sunday morning with a discussion led by someone once described by the Chinese as 'a sinner condemned for a thousand generations' on the one hand, and on the other, the 'Prince of Darkness' is I guess, pretty much the equivalent of saying a 'black Mass'. But, I'm sure that Richard and I will behave like a couple of old tabby cats for the next hour or so.

I think what makes this such an interesting, in a Chinese sense, and important time, is that three issues have come together at pretty much the same time.

First of all there is the question of *how the rest of us deal with the United States, and how the United States deals with the rest of us*. America isn't just a super power, it is, as the former American Ambassador in London Ray Sykes pointed out: a super-doooper power. It's powerful militarily, it's powerful technologically, it's powerful economically. It has a global cultural impact and reach, its universities are magnets for the world's young, and we have to ask ourselves, again to use a Chinese expression, does this potent 'Hegemon' want partners and allies, or does it just want followers?

Secondly, I think we're at a juncture in international affairs where there is a real danger of the Huntington Thesis becoming self-fulfilling. I think *the gap, the gulf, between the Islamic world and Europe and North America is deeply troubling*; I think the degree of antipathy in the Islamic world to the West is very worrying. Of course hatred of America is wholly, wholly unjustified, but if I was an American I'm not sure that I would necessarily feel that it could be best dealt with by bombing the haters. And I have to say in passing that I've always been rather sceptical about the proposition that military action in the Gulf is the best way of making the whole region more moderate and the best way of making the whole region believe rather more passionately in Jeffersonian democracy.

The third issue which we face today, is *how we can deal with new challenges to international governance and the rule of law*. Henry Kissinger has reminded us that since the Treaty of Westphalia, by and large international law has been based on the

proposition that one State doesn't interfere in the affairs of another, another sovereign state, unless it is attacked. But now three different sorts of intervention are suggested: first of all you'll recall the speech which the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan made about three years ago, in which he argued the case for humanitarian interventions – a recognition that people, as well as governments, had rights under which the rule of law: and that I guess, is what we were attempting to do during the Kosovo campaign. Secondly, its suggested that intervention should be justified where a particular, particularly unpleasant regime has particularly unpleasant weapons, weapons of mass destruction: that, I think, is the justification being used at present in relation to Iraq, and who knows what we should think about North Korea, passing Pakistan by for the mean time. Thirdly, there is the proposition that we should intervene where a bad regime is using non-state actors – that is, terrorist organisations – to threaten another state: and I'm not sure whether that is the argument in relation to Iraq.

Whatever. In all these cases there are questions of context, there are questions of the scale of threat, there are questions of the alternative options to the use of force. And how can we provide a means of determining these questions, if not wholly objectively, at least in a way that commands the greatest international consent, if it isn't by seeking to work through the United Nations?

Since the Second World War, American leadership has woven together her two strands of policy which we've largely associated with the names of President Truman and Secretary, or General, Marshall. Containment on the one hand, and establishing an international rule-book on the other. A rule-book and a set of institutions from the United Nations to the World Trade Organisation that sought to sustain democracy, to open markets, and to uphold the rule of law. And by and large, that policy has worked spectacularly well. Compare the second half of the last century with the first half; compare the leadership which America gave us after the Second World War and the success of the leadership with what happened after the First World War.

A couple of weeks ago, I had to give on the West Coast yet another memorial lecture; this one dedicated to George C. Marshall. And in order to prepare to write this lecture (this is a man who occasionally writes his own speeches), in order to prepare for this lecture, I read, re-read the Harvard Commencement Address in 1947 and a great deal more of Marshall's contributions to policy making. And these three sentences I picked out of Marshall's speeches which seemed to me to be a pretty good intellectual infrastructure for the policies pursued by him and by the United States. First of all, Marshall again, quote: 'A security policy is not a war policy'. Secondly Marshall, quote: 'Our policy is not directed against any country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.' Third, Marshall quote: 'Democratic principles don't flourish on empty stomachs'. Now, applying these principles help to make the world a safer and a more prosperous place, not least for the United States. Those principles were applied through formal and through informal networks of international co-operation – its what very loosely, we all call *multilateralism*.

Of course the United States sometimes felt that it couldn't accept the rules by which everyone else wanted to play. We had arguments, I recall, with the last Administration, over anti-personnel landmines, over the torture convention. But those arguments were I think by and large the exception, rather than the rule.

For some years now in the United States there has been a new school of thought, I think increasingly influential, of which Richard has been a pellucid luminary. And it is a school of thought which has challenged the liberal internationalism and indeed the Realpolitik internationalism (think of the first President Bush of the post-Cold War years) – challenged it both in its more and its less liberal manifestations. This is a school of thought made up of politicians and journalists and academics who thought that we shouldn't trust Mr. Gorbachev. This is a school of thought which argued passionately against negotiating strategic arms reductions. This was a school of thought which believed that we should identify China as America's next enemy. Indeed, it is school of thought which shows a dispiritingly pessimistic tendency to hunt for as many new enemies as possible. If you read that distinguished book by William Kristol you would think that America had five wars to fight at the same time. It's a school of thought which strongly opposed the Madrid and the Oslo peace processes in the Middle East, a school of thought which believed that Benjamin Netanyahu was a wimp because he went along with some of those peace processes. A school of thought which argued in one or two cases that the Palestinians should be driven out of the West Bank – to borrow a phrase from a member of the present Administration, that the West Bank should be 'detoxified'. Above all it is a school of thought which believed that *any multilateralism* undermines America's sovereignty and America's ability to stand up for its own interests. So you know what the views are on Kyoto, on the ABM treaty, on the International Criminal Court, on the Small Arms Convention, on the Biological Warfare Convention.

The atrocities of September 11<sup>th</sup> seems to have convinced these distinguished unilateralists that they've been right all along. Now, I think we understand how those terrible events affected the American psyche and I think we should understand in Europe that, if anything, we fail to grasp the full impact of these atrocities on America. But are we wholly wrong to think that the 11<sup>th</sup> September made international co-operation *more* important, not less? That the 11<sup>th</sup> September should have made us realise that technological and military force don't and won't ever provide the whole answer if we want to live in a safer world.

It's interesting, as I hope William Drozdiak will point out later, that that remains the view of the great majority of the American public. When you look at the material provided for you, when you look at the material on the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Survey of American Public Opinion and European Public Opinion, its perfectly clear that outside the beltway, in the rest of America, in the mainstreets, Americans are just as multilateralist, just as supportive of the UN, just as supportive of working with the international community as they've ever been.

We're going to have to cope in the next few years with a witch's brew of problems. There are the consequences of the revolt of the dispossessed; the fact that we live in a world

where globalisation has benefited most people but left well over a billion behind, marooned in misery and poverty. We have to deal with the consequences of the revolt of the alienated, people who don't see the glittering prizes of the modern world in terms of freedom and the rule of the law, but see the brashness, the licentiousness and the greed of the modern world. Alienation, a reversion for example to religious fundamentalism, seems to me to be a very human reaction to these circumstances. Not least because poverty acquires a certain dignity if it can be recast as religious simplicity. But the issue I believe is not *Islamic* fundamentalism, the issue is *religious* fundamentalism. You only have to look at some of the Christian Evangelical websites to notice that. We also have to deal with the consequences of the dark side of globalisation – we referred to this yesterday: aids, drugs, international crime, environmental degradation. And we have to deal with the consequences of failed States - most of the problems, as a distinguished member of the US Administration said the other day, most of the problems these days comes from states that have failed, not from states that have conquered.

So how do we deal with these problems that emerge from the swamp? Should America, as the only super-power, camp on its own strength and sovereignty, setting and imposing the rules but not necessarily bound by them, in pursuit of its own national interest? But then I ask myself, how should we define the national interest without talking about international co-operation? American citizens want prosperity and want security. How, without international co-operation can you actually get those things? One of the speakers, one of our speakers yesterday I think in the discussion on the Trilateral Commission and its future, referred to the very senior American official who spoke the other day about the contrast between the allegedly firm ground of the national interest and the interests of an illusory international community? Try defining that allegedly firm ground of the national interest and for your next trick nailing jelly to the ceiling. It's surely better for the United States, supported more energetically by Europe – a point to which I want to return very briefly – to continue on a path laid down fifty years ago: trying to build a World Empire without a Emperor, a world where international rules set the parameters for the legitimate pursuit of national interests, but where the same laws apply to everyone – though admittedly the strong have more influence on their formulation and on their application.

I said 'supported more energetically by Europe' – just as there's a tendency in Europe to define our Europeanness in terms of our hostility to the United States, so there is also a tendency in Europe to confuse European foreign policy with being critical of the United States. Madeleine Albright said that the United States was the 'indispensable nation'; I think that Europe and the United States represent the 'indispensable partnership'. But it's crucial for us in Europe to be able to put more weight on our end of the rope if we're to be a serious player, if we're to be a serious counterweight and counterpart to the United States. Now of course, that involves us doing more on the security front – somebody spoke yesterday about the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI). I have to say that this is still alas, what Saint Thomas Aquinas called 'an idea in the mind of God'. We still haven't seen political leaders in Europe take on their electorates and argue for higher defence spending. Nobody supposes that we can match the United States, nobody supposes that a European politician could get re-elected proposing what President Bush

has just said ('14% increase in defence spending while cutting health and education spending'), but we should be able to do at least a little bit more. So that, for example, we don't have to depend on America or rented planes from the Ukraine to airlift our armed forces. Equally, if we're to play to our strength, economic trade and aid, we have to take a lead and we can't take a lead in that debate unless we reform, as I said yesterday, the Common Agricultural Policy.

Churchill said once that 'You need to have allies. But the problem about allies is they do tend to develop opinions of their own.' We have opinions in Europe, they are opinions which are strongly rooted in a commitment to multilateralism. But if our opinions are going to be taken more seriously then we have to be a lot more serious about the role we're prepared to play in the world – not with a *single* foreign and security policy (I don't think we'll see that as long as I'm on the pitch) but a more effective *common* foreign and security policy. Europe learning to use its weight more effectively, moving on from a position in which European foreign policy is communiqués full of strong nouns and strong adjectives but extremely weak verbs. We actually have to strengthen the verbs otherwise we're not going to be taken seriously.

THOMAS FOLEY, NORTH AMERICAN CHAIRMAN

*First of all Peter, may I say on behalf of the North American guests and perhaps also on behalf of the Pacific Asia guests, our gratitude for the hospitality and welcome which we've received here at the meeting of the European Trilateral Commission. I've always thought having a long association with the European Group of the Commission, with the Commission itself, that in every Triennium its relevance seemed to me to be reinforced, and I think that's its certainly true presently. There is no doubt that there has been a remarkable growth of tension, irritation, conflict between North America, particularly the United States and Europe, and I think this discussion is an example of the importance that Trilateral Commission continues to play in resolving major issues and problems, not only among its own members but on a broader scale.*

*The other side of this discussion, debate, is going to be presented by Richard Perle. Now you've seen his biography I'm sure, but just to recount briefly: he is a senior resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington and was the Director of its Commission on Future Defence Requirements. He has had a long association, interest and expertise in the field of arms control, defence requirements and security issues and he was in the Reagan Administration, the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy – that may not mean very much to our European friends but it is an extremely important post in the US Cabinet. Going back a while beyond that, in the 1960's, when we were both much younger, Richard and I served together on the staff of Senator Henry Jackson, so we have known each other a very long time and I have had a long-standing admiration, respect and friendship for Richard Perle whom I'm happy to introduce to you now.*

RICHARD PERLE

Tom, thank you very much. If I may, what I would like to do is to begin by responding to some of the things that you have just heard from Chris Patten and I'll try to do that more or less in the order that he made *his* points. And then I want to make one or two points of my own.

Chris began with the question: 'Does the US want partners and allies, or only followers?' That's an easy question to answer: we want partners and allies. We can't always find partners and allies for the enterprises that we consider vital to our national security interests. But the idea that we have a *preference* for acting without partners or allies is simply wrong. I know of no instance in which we have preferred, or there has been a serious argument that we *would* prefer, acting without partners or allies.

Chris referred to the 'clash of civilisations' almost as though we were somehow responsible for it. I very much hope that a clash of civilisations can be avoided – there's nothing inevitable about it. It was in part out of an apprehension that we might slide into a clash of civilisations that I believed, and others in the United States believed, it was essential that we intervene in Bosnia at a time when Muslims were the victims of mass murder approaching genocide. And many of you will recall that the American approach, which was admittedly rather more half-hearted than one would have wished, was rebuffed by Europeans who preferred first not to get involved and then when they did get involved, not to act in a sufficiently robust way.

Chris mentions the Treaty of Westphalia. It is ironic that an official of an organisation that is in the process of shedding sovereignty should invoke a treaty, the essence of which was the recognition of the fundamental underlined building block of the international community which was the Sovereign State. New concepts of sovereignty (and we see it in the European Union) often lead Europeans to believe that only collective action is legitimate – and I'll come back to that in a moment because it seems to me that there is a confusion between the charge of American unilateralism on the one hand, and the belief that only multilateral institutions can confer legitimacy, especially when the issue is the resort to force. There are alternatives, Chris says, to the use of force, and indeed there are, and by and large they are to be preferred. But this easily slides into the cliché which we hear all the time, that force must be a last resort.

In the case of Europe it is often not even the last resort because there's no capacity to apply force, and I certainly agree with Chris' assessment of the feeble defence capabilities of the European Union. And I must say the inability to act leads easily to an abhorrence of action. We are not so constrained in our ability to act and that's perhaps why we consider in the face of threats to our security rather more readily. But I want to raise this question of the notion that force must always be a last resort. What do we mean by a last resort? Do we mean that force must only be used after we have applied political and economic measures, sanctions for example, sanctions against Iraq for example, sanctions in the case of the former Yugoslavia for example? Did we save lives or improve the security of Europeans by the process of feeble sanctions in the case of

Bosnia? Sanctions that in that particular instance prevented the victim for defending itself.

Have we improved our situation or dealt effectively with Saddam Hussein by imposing sanctions that I think a great many people would recognise have in many ways strengthened Saddam within his own country. The question of the appropriate time and circumstances to use force has to be approached with greater sophistication than the cliché that it must always be the last resort. Sometimes the timely use of force may forestall a great many dangerous consequences and may avoid a prolonged period in which a situation, far from getting better, actually gets worse. So I would hope that the disparagement of the use of force would be treated in the real world in which we're living – there are sometimes situations that can only be dealt with effectively by the use of force and if that can be reasonably anticipated at the outset, it seems to me foolish, dangerous and costly to indulge in a prolonged period of ineffective political and economic measures.

Chris Patten said 'We must work through the United Nations' and I'm very troubled at the idea that the United Nations is the solely legitimising institution when it comes to the use of force. Why the United Nations? Is the United Nations better able to confirm legitimacy, than say a coalition of liberal democracies? Does the addition of members of the UN, like China for example, or Syria, does that add legitimacy to what otherwise might be the collective policy of countries that share our values? I don't think so. And I think it's a dangerous trend to consider the United Nations, a weak institution at best, one that includes a very large number of nasty regimes, is somehow better able to confirm legitimacy than other institutions like the European Union or NATO.

Chris puts a great deal of stock in containment and the rule-book and there are situations in which containment is an entirely appropriate policy. And we all wish I'm sure that there was a rule-book that was adhered to by everyone. But there are those who break the rules, we know that, and containment is not always sufficient. Containment of the Soviet Union would have meant the continuing existence of the Soviet Union – are we not better off because we wound up with something *other* than containment? I think the ideological challenge, the moral challenge to the Soviet Union that was characteristic of the Administration in which I served, the Reagan Administration – which took us beyond containment, which recognised that containment alone was not an adequate response to the totalitarian Soviet Union – I think that was right. So sometimes we have to look beyond containment because it isn't adequate. And if containment simply means that a country that is capable of doing great damage is left to prepare to do that damage, then I think we run unnecessary, foolish and impudent risks and this will bring us in due course to Iraq.

General Marshall is right – a security policy is not a war policy, but I have to point out that it took a war policy to get to the point where General Marshall was able to make that statement – we had to fight that war in order to make the transformation to the luxury of Marshall's principles.

Now Chris referred to a new school challenging some established notions and here I have to say that it is one of the common mistakes made by observers of American policy to lump together people whose views in fact vary substantially. I don't agree with everything that was entailed in the description of this new school to which Chris referred and I doubt that there's anyone *in* that school who would agree with everything he had to say. Shouldn't trust Gorbachov? Well some of us thought that Gorbachov was trying to save the system and we thought the world would be better off without the system and that Yeltsin at least at a time proposed a more fundamental challenge to a system that the world is well rid of. Anti-arms control? I negotiated some of the agreements that we entered into in the Cold War and the debate was never between those who were for and those who were opposed to arms control. It was always between those who believed that arms control agreements should serve a security purpose and those who developed an interest in arms control agreements for their own sake. And by the way, it might be worth some time looking back at the history and results of Arms Control Agreements of the Cold War. We now know that the Soviet Union has 50,000 nuclear weapons, 20,000 more than we ever knew and they hid far more weapons than were ever subject to limitation in the course of those negotiations.

China is the next enemy? I don't believe that Chris. Whether China turns out to be an enemy will depend on decisions yet to be made in China. But there's certainly no reason automatically to expect that China will be an enemy.

Opposed to Oslo? I don't think anyone can say that Oslo had a very happy ending – it got ultimately I suppose to Camp David and we saw what happened when it got there.

The idea that there is a school, a group of people, that believe that any multilateralism is hostile to American interests is simply wrong. We hear it all the time and the repetition of it only confuses matters. And given the importance of Chris Patten in interpreting the United States and representing Europe to the United States, Chris, I hope you can get beyond that stereotype of American thinking because I don't know anyone who would agree with it, including the people in the school that your refer to.

'The problem is religious fundamentalism... Look at the Christian evangelicals.' I'm not very sympathetic to fundamentalism of any sort but the Christian fundamentalists at least, in so far as I'm aware, are not killing civilians around the world. And it's an unfortunate fact but we have to face it that the terrorism the world is now experiencing is driven by religious fanatics, driven by a vision of Islam that is certainly not mainstream Islam, but is Islamic in origin.

'Defining the national interest is like nailing jelly to the ceiling' – well it's not that difficult. The American interest is in a peaceful world, a world in which we can do the things we do best. And those have to do with trade, with the development of technology, a world in which we can export and import and in which we are not threatened. I think that's probably a reasonable definition of the national interest for most countries, certainly all of those represented in this room.

And then we have the suggestion that the laws must apply to everyone as though the United States were lawless and did not regard that laws should apply to us. Let me just say that I think Chris would be hard put to cite an example in which the United States has acted outside the law. Even the contemplated military action in Iraq, were it to take place, would take place entirely within the structure of International Law, Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter for example which acknowledges, does not confer but acknowledges, the right of self defence. But in any case in the special situation of Iraq, we are dealing with violations of a ceasefire – and on *this* international law is very clear. Where ceasefires are entered into contingent upon the behaviour of the parties entering into it, where that behaviour is not forthcoming, the ceasefire ceases to exist. That would be clear, should be clear to everyone. It should even be clear to the United Nations and to the European Union and if it isn't clear I submit to you the reason is because there is a lack of will and resolve on the part of the United Nations to resolve its own resolutions, and on the part of the European Union to support the United Nations in supporting its own resolutions.

When President Bush challenged the United Nations to take seriously its own declarations, I think he put the challenge in exactly the right place: the UN is in grave danger of going the way of the League of Nations, by failing to rise to an obvious challenge – the expulsion of the inspectors, the violation of a dozen different resolutions and what has been the response of the international community? Nothing, it did nothing. And now we hear that we've got to give Saddam a last chance. How many last chances are we going to give Saddam Hussein? How many last chances is the United Nations going to offer to someone who is so obviously in violation of every one of its declarations. So we accept that the laws apply to us as well.

Chris referred to a tendency to define Europe in terms of its hostility to the United States – I'm afraid there's a lot of truth in that and I would ask Chris whether he thinks that's a healthy thing. He then said something that surprised me a little bit – I'm not surprised that he thinks it, I'm surprised he said it. Because he's not French! And Chris said in passing, if we are able to be a serious counterweight to the United States – you recall he began by asking whether we wanted friends and allies, or followers - now he proposes that our friends and allies in Europe should be a 'counterweight'. Will somebody explain to me the relationship between a friend and an ally on the one hand, and a counterweight on the other? The concept of counterweight suggests opposition, it suggests that you need to function in order somehow to limit, to restrain us. That's not my idea of an ally – but it is a deep underlying theme in European thinking.

A word or two about unilateralism and self defence. Clearly the most difficult issue straining the relationship between the United States and much of the world, has to do with the American attitude towards Iraq. And the charge is that if we were to act militarily, we would be acting in a unilateral manner. But everyone recognises the right of self defence. The question then is: is the danger from Saddam Hussein to the United States of such imminence that we are justified in invoking the concept of self defence with respect to any military action that we might take? And here I think we need to reflect on the notion of imminence because everyone would agree that if you were about

to be attacked and you can forestall that attack by acting first, it's entirely legitimate to act first – especially if the action you fear might entail weapons of mass destruction. But we hear the argument that it's not imminent.

In 1981 the Israeli air force destroyed a French supplied reactor at Osyrek not because it was about to produce a nuclear weapon but because the fuel, the nuclear material, was about to be inserted into the reactor and once that had been done it would have been impossible to destroy the reactor without spreading radioactive material in a populated area. So the Israelis debated, and I've talked to people who have participated in that debate: it was a bitter debate and a difficult issue. They debated whether to act *then*. And they acted because had they not done so *then*, they would have been prevented from doing so *later*, and in due course – probably years later – nuclear material produced in that reactor would have been available to Saddam Hussein for the construction of a nuclear weapon. So what is an imminent threat? When is it timely? When is it appropriate to take action? Do you have to wait until the threat announces itself with an attack and possibly an attack on a massive scale?

Chris said that Europe understands well the impact of September 11<sup>th</sup> on American thinking – I don't think that's right. I don't think Europe understands it very well, and I'm not sure Chris understands it very well. One of the lessons of September 11<sup>th</sup> was that it is possible to wait *too* long. We waited too long to deal with Osama Bin Laden. We knew what was going on in Afghanistan. We observed the training camps with overhead photography, we listened to conversations among the terrorists, and through various other means we were well aware that Osama Bin Laden was planning attacks on the United States. He had already carried out a number of attacks on the United States, to which by the way, the feeble American response was almost certainly an incitement to further attacks – resulting in September 11. What we did in Afghanistan *after* September 11 could have been done *before* September 11. And 3000 people, Americans and others – I think probably victims from every country in this room – would be alive today. So we don't want to make that mistake again of waiting too long which is why I believe you see what you're observing in America thinking about Iraq. It's not that we're lawless, it's not that we're unilateralist. I would be the first to concede that we are having trouble to get others to support us on this venture. I think that's a great shame and I think some of the countries that are failing to support us may not fully appreciate that one of the victims – if we in the end act with only a small number of countries supporting us – one of the victims will be the very United Nations, the importance of which Chris invoked. Because if the UN can't live up to the challenge, if it falls to coalitions of the willing to do that, the UN will marginalise itself and demonstrate its irrelevance.

I don't want to go on much longer. When we talk about unilateralism, let's remember German unilateralism. I mean how else should one interpret Chancellor Schroeder's argument that not only would Germany not participate, but even if the United Nations conducted an operation, Germany wouldn't participate in that – is that not unilateralism of the sort? Or French unilateralism? I mean there's plenty of unilateralism in the world. No one much likes it and it's a tragedy if the United States, in defending itself and in defending the common values of all of us, is driven to acting alone or something like it.

And let me say one last word about the impression that the United States is above the law because we have rejected a number of agreements that have either been completed or are near completion, agreements for which there is broad approval in the international community. Part of the problem was that the ‘globalists’ – multilateralism isn’t quite the right word – believed that the solution to some very difficult international problems was to get *all* the countries of the world to accept obligations in the form of treaties and conventions. The way to deal with an outlawed country was to get it to sign up to the same rules that would be adhered to by the non-outlaws. There is another approach to these matters which is to say that those countries, like the ones represented here, might from time to time get together to deal with the outlaws, and not pretend that bringing them into a set of legal obligations is the right way to manage their behaviour. So an attitude developed in the last Administration, which has been largely rejected by this Administration.

But when you look at the agreements to which Chris referred, I’m willing to bet with respect to several of them that no Head of State has read those agreements. Some of them are five and six hundred pages long. They were negotiated over a decade or more by people beavering away in Geneva, or Vienna, or elsewhere without adult supervision – if I can put it that way. Then when they’re brought forward and scrutinised, and new Administrations sometimes go back and scrutinise, we found them wanting. We found the Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention utterly without a verification capacity; we found Kyoto sufficiently damaging to our economic interests so that something better had to be done – and by the way that was a view shared by virtually the entire Congress of the United States and a less forthright Administration might simply have handed it to the Congress rather than exhibiting the candour the President did when he said we can’t accept this.

Chris mentioned the landmine convention. You know, when you put that together with his idea about us all being bound by the same rules, landmines are a terrible thing because they kill innocents. The landmines that the United States uses are self-destructing landmines: that is when they are no longer necessary for the military purpose for which they are deployed, they self-destruct. Those are not the landmines that are killing our children. The landmines that are killing children are the mines placed there by our adversaries, who some people think are going to be restrained by a set of rules.

I think we have to look at these questions in a more practical way, and if we went through the list of agreements (and I’m not going to do that now unless we get into it later), I think we can justify the position we’ve taken toward each and every one of those agreements after careful scrutiny. And so the question is really the *quality* of the agreements, and not whether we are somehow in a category of lawlessness because we don’t subscribe to the vision of a global set of regulations that lump together in a single arrangement both the liberal democracies that are protecting the values that are important to all of us, and the rogue state that challenges those fundamental values. Some of us think that there’s a better way to deal with the world.

PETER SUTHERLAND

*What we propose to do in regard to the debate now is to continue with two brief commentaries that are also important on what we've heard. First Bill Drozdriak, who I will shortly introduce, and then after him Grigory Yavlinsky. These will be commentaries on the debate that we've heard which I think is extraordinarily important for this group. And then we would propose to go directly into the question and commentary part.*

*I'd now like to introduce Bill Drozdriak, who is a very relevant participant and we are very grateful for his presence. He is the Executive Director of the Transatlantic Centre of the German Marshall Fund, which is the first independent American Policy Centre in Brussels. He has had a very distinguished past as Chief European Correspondent in Brussels for the 'Washington Post', Foreign Editor of the 'Washington Post' at various stages. We are very grateful for his attendance. Bill, please.*

WILLIAM DROZDIAK

Well I've known some of you for the past twenty years. I must admit when I took this job with the German Marshall Fund, I was quite struck by the first challenge that I faced, which was to lead this survey that we conducted on public attitudes on the United States and Europe towards each other. Now as a journalist, I suppose I had bought into the conventional wisdom that we'd been seeing played out in the newspapers for many of the past months: that the caricatures on both sides, that Americans perceived Europeans as Euro-wimps, so adverse to using military force partly for the reasons of their national history, but also because of their skittishness about projecting power. And from a European side, the perception of the Bush Administration as an arrogant, unilateralist force, trigger happy, willing to use military force because its powerful arsenal, military arsenal, was the only weapon, the only tool in its box.

But when we conducted this survey, and for thirty years the Chicago Council for Foreign Policy has been doing this survey in America, this was the first time that we decided to add a *European* component. And so we added the Mori organisation and conducted surveys in six European countries: Britain, France, Italy, Germany, The Netherlands and Poland. What was striking about these results was that the large sampling that we took – more than 9000 respondents – made this the most comprehensive survey ever conducted of public attitudes on foreign policy issues. And the results really were quite counter-intuitive when you judge them against the commentary we've seen.

Americans turned out to be much more multilateralist in their thinking than one would have assumed. That while there was support for an attack, if necessary on Iraq, a strong majority of Americans only wanted that to be carried out with the support of the United Nations and its allies. There is no doubt a greater sense of vulnerability as felt by Americans as will be born out in a couple of the findings I'll release. And there was also a greater awareness that foreign policy issues cannot be neglected. I found it striking

that, compared to 1998 when the last survey was taken, only 7% of the issues were foreign policy issues cited as serious threats to the national interests. This time foreign policy issues accounted for 41% so it was quite clear that Americans felt that far from becoming more isolationist they had to engage more in the world. And from the European side, we found greater sentiment, warm sentiment, towards the United States than one would have assumed. So there was a remarkable convergence on both sides of the Atlantic that reflected the shared values and shared affinity on both sides.

One of most interesting questions we asked was on *threat perceptions* – we posed ten possibilities over the next decade that would be seen as serious threats to your national interests and these included issues such as turmoil in Russia, the role of China as a world power, globalisation, India/Pakistan, the Israeli/Arab conflict and of course Islamic fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. And not surprisingly terrorism was sighted as the most grievous threat by Americans – 91%. In Europe it was seen at 65%. But terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and Iraq were all seen as the top three issues by Europeans and Americans. What was striking was the disparity in how many Americans saw these foreign policy issues as very serious, and I think this reflected the alarmism that we saw after 9/11. On only one issue was there a gross difference and that was the perception of China as an emerging world power: 56% of Americans said that in next decade China could become a serious threat to American national interest; only 19% of Europeans see China as a potential threat.

Besides the terrorism issue, the Iraq question no doubt has come to the fore for America. Now this survey was conducted over five weeks this Summer before Iraq emerged as a very serious crisis. But people said that they would only support an attack *with* the support of the United Nations: 65% of Americans felt that this was necessary, only 20% of the Americans surveyed said they thought the United States should go it alone. And on the other side, Europeans said they would be willing to support a military campaign against Iraq: 60% of them said it would be acceptable if this was supported by the UN Security Council; only 10% of the Europeans felt that the United States should go it alone. Another interesting question in this survey was to Americans: ‘What do you think is the most important lesson from the September 11 attacks?’ And here again the multilateralist theme is underscored: 61% of Americans said that the most important lesson is that the US needs to work more closely with other countries to fight terrorism; only 34% said the United States needs to act more on its own. And indeed one of the methodology aspects was that we followed through with five or six follow-up questions in order to confirm these results. On a follow-up question 71% said that the United States should do its share in solving international problems *together* with other countries; only 17% of Americans said that as the sole superpower, the United States should continue to be the pre-eminent world leader in solving international problems.

On some other scenarios that we posed such as North Korea invading South Korea, Iraq invading Saudi Arabia, Arab forces invading Israel, and China invading Taiwan, not in one case did a majority favour using US troops when no multilateral context was specified – so there was support for using these troops again *only* with support from the allies and from the United Nations.

Richard was referring to the conviction in the Bush Administration about the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol and also the International Criminal Court. To our surprise these were not shared by the American public: in fact 70% of the Americans surveyed said that the United States should sign the Kyoto Protocol even when a possible negative impact on the domestic economy is cited; and 65% supported US participation in the International Criminal Court even when the possibility of trumped up charges being brought against US soldiers is mentioned. So it shows that concerns expressed by the Administration are clearly not shared by many of the people across the country. And this pole, I might add, was conducted across a wide range of social and professional classes and we gave the detailed results to the Administration, President Bush was given this briefing two days before the United Nations speech. And I was told by Senior State Department Officials that the results had a clear effect in pushing the language of that speech toward a more multilateral context, and I'm sure – at least I've heard in Europe, as well as my partners in cases in the United States – that this was regarded as one of Bush's most effective public presentations.

On the clash of civilisations that was raised earlier, here again a large majority of Americans reject the notion, with 66% saying that most Muslims should be regarded as people everywhere that we can find common ground and that violent conflict is not inevitable. Only 27% disagreed and said that this kind of clash of civilisations is inevitable. Now as far as the assessments of the President Bush and his foreign policy team, 70% of Americans regard President Bush as doing a good job overall, but on several key foreign policy issues he gets very low marks. 33% of Americans say he's doing a favourable job on the Arab/Israeli process; only 32% approve of what he's doing in Iraq. Among the Europeans surveyed, the score is naturally quite lower: 20% for a favourable assessment for the Arab/Israeli conflict and also on Iraq.

Overall, Europeans are more critical than Americans of the Bush Administration's handling of foreign policy: while 53% overall say the Bush Administration are doing a good job among Americans who were poled, only 38% of the Europeans feel that way. And finally, we asked on the European side whether Europe in enlarging Europe should subscribe to achieve superpower status, commensurate with that of the United States: 91% of them said 'yes' this would be a desirable goal. But on follow-up questions they also reaffirmed that this should be done in ways that would be as a *partner* to the United States and not as a *rival*. This was again underscoring the general direction of the responses to our survey that indicated there is a yearning on both sides of the Atlantic for politicians to find co-operative solutions to common problems.

Another interesting finding was that in following up on the super-power status question, Europeans were asked whether they would be willing to strive for this status even if it involved increased spending on military budgets. And that's where we saw a precipitous drop in support for this achievement. In the case of finance for example, 91% want to see the EU become a superpower; that approval level drops to 48% when it involves spending more money. This is true right across the board in Europe; public opinion in Germany drops from 48% to 24% when it involves extra-military spending. So this is

clearly a challenge to the political class in Europe to make a strong case to the public, that if Europe is going to live up to its global responsibilities by acquiring greater military power its going to have to spend more money.

And finally I would like to just add, on a couple of economic issues there were some interesting results: a strong majority of Americans, 64%, said that the US should comply with the World Trade Organisation decisions even when they go against the United States. And on the controversial issue of biotechnology, 66% of Americans said the European Union and Japan should be able to require the labelling of genetically modified food, even if it keeps consumers from purchasing food imported from the United States.

So as a journalist looking at the results of this survey, I was really quite stunned to see the internationalist approach taken by the American public. And, as was pointed out in the briefing that was given to the President – and the audience also included his political adviser Karl Rove who has a great and significant role in preparing the mid-term election campaign – I think that this has been a kind of strong reminder to politicians in the United States and in Europe as well, that there are powerful majorities who believe in the strong foundations of the Atlantic partnership and want to see their politicians act accordingly.

THOMAS FOLEY

*Our final commentary before we open the discussion to questions is Dr. Grigory Yavlinsky – an elected member of the Russian State Duma. Dr. Yavlinsky was re-elected in December 1999 and is the co-founder and President of the ‘Yabloko’ group in the Russian State Duma, a group that has had considerable influence, being organised first as a responsible Opposition party to the Russian government. It has taken principle stands – I think stands that most would admire and respect – proposing economic reforms with a social face, opposing the war in Chechnya and taking a strong stand against corruption in Russian society. He is always a welcome guest at Trilateral meetings.*

GRIGORY YAVLINSKY

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, thank you very much to everybody. I’m really very pleased and very honoured to have time to speak to such audience like the meeting of the Trilateral Commission. And I’m very thankful for the interest in my country as well. I’m going to explain several things about Russia and Russian foreign policy.

Looking a little bit back in order to give you some insight which will help you to understand Russian foreign policy – to the extent it is possible, in principle, to understand Russian policies. Before the 11<sup>th</sup> September, even in August last year, Russian foreign policy under the new President was leading Russia to a complete dead end. The symbol

of our foreign policy was the travel of the President of North Korea – or the Chairman of North Korea – in a bullet-proof train three months across Russia, visiting all the cities and with special events at each stops in an absolutely communist fashion. And also visits of the Russian President to such countries like Cuba, a State visit, and so on and so forth. So that was a real concern and it was very difficult to see what would be the future developments of such things.

But after 11<sup>th</sup> September, things changed dramatically. It was really a very special period of time and I have to say that at that time Mr. Putin was taking decisions on his line himself. Certainly it was a tactical reason for Russia to take such a strong position and to become a member of the anti-terrorist coalition because it was in the vital interest of Russia itself. We had a real threat from Afghanistan and we especially had a threat in the Northern Caucasus. And maybe you remember even in 2000 we were declaring that we were preparing ourselves to start the bombing of the camps in Afghanistan, which were preparing the terrorists which then later came to the Northern Caucasus and were taking part in the Chechen war. So it was a tactical reason, maybe for the first time in Russian history, to use someone's force to protect Russian vital interest. With all the other Presidents of such type, Russia was used for the same reason; now that was the first possibility to do it in the vice versa way.

But also, after such tactical vision, and on the basis of such tactical vision and tactical decision, the President of Russia was trying to make a strategic line on the same issue. I want to give you one insight, one detail – it was a meeting in the Kremlin which he organised on the 20<sup>th</sup> September, or 24<sup>th</sup> September – where he invited twenty-one leading Russian politicians from Parliament and from the Regions. And his question was whether Russia had to join the United States in this operation. I was at that meeting and the answer was eighteen people said Russia must be neutral, one man said that Russia had to support the Taliban, and only two people in this meeting said that Russia had to unconditionally support the United States and anti-terrorist coalition. The same day he made his own statement which was saying that Russia was unconditionally supporting Americans and anti-terrorism and is prepared to give a real help. So I wanted simply to say in what kind of conditions he was taking such a serious decision.

And then later, Russia started a real, real practical step in foreign policy in order to strengthen this line. I would recall some of them very briefly. President Putin absolutely unexpectedly destroyed Russian military bases in Cuba and in Vietnam. Then he was very, very reserved in cancelling the ABM Treaty 1972 from the side of the United States. We stopped our rhetoric on expansion of NATO including to the Baltic Republics and other European countries, and we were even taking a very reserved position even on such a strange decision like not destroying the warheads, but storing the warheads. The 6000 warheads which are stored, are stored only against Russia – no other country in the world needed such a number of nuclear warheads.

So the end of this line – the developments of this line – came to the meeting, the Summit, which happened in May between Putin and Bush, where they signed a special document which is not very well known but it was signed publicly by the two Presidents. It is a

strategic declaration between Russia and the United States. This is the first document in history signed by two Heads of States which was saying that Russia and the United States share the same values, and understand the same values in the same way. And all these values were named – they are the well-known values about human rights, about human dignity, about market economy... This is a seven-page document which also describes the direction of strategic partnership and co-operation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in areas like missile defence, anti-ballistic missile defence, energy sector, co-operation in the Caucasus, co-operation in Central Asia, energy projects, creating alternatives to the OPEC energy force in Russia. So it is an extremely important document. It was not developed later and there are very serious concerns about that, and it is necessary to analyse it in a special way - but that document was signed in any case in May.

Before coming to the topic which we are discussing today, I want simply to say in which position at the moment the President of Russia is taking decisions. He is at a crossroads and is under the pressure of two major elements: one is the strategic vision of the future of Russia which is related to strategic co-operation with the United States, and, on the other hand, it is the former Nomenklatura and oligarchic elite which represents about 90% of Russians surrounding President Putin. So when you see contradictory decisions, you have to feel that there are two major problems: the real future of Russia and real future of the world, and the place of Russia in this future on the one hand, and the Russian system which was created by Yeltsin -- and despite all rhetoric -- was strengthened during the Putin Presidency in the last two or three years in domestic politics.

In a brief way, the Russian system is characterised by several important précis: it's a system where Business goes hand-in-hand with Power, a kind of incestuous relationship. Secondly, it's political pressure on the media and political censorship in the media. Thirdly it's the absence of an independent justice. And fourthly, it's manipulation of elections. These are the most important features of the Russian system which exists nowadays in domestic Russian politics: that's why it is so difficult to take the right decisions. From this point of view you have to observe Putin's negotiations with Blair the last time when they were negotiating the position of Russia in the Security Council. From this point of view you have to see the future decisions which Putin is going to take.

To speak a little about Russia and the Euro-Atlantic partnerships, I have to talk about Russia's attitude to Iraq, Russian attitude to the new security policy of the United States, and Russian attitude to Europe. For us in Russia, these are the three specific dimensions.

Firstly, on Iraq, I want to say that I have a feeling that the international community is losing time and that the debate on this issue is replacing action which is making the situation worse and more difficult for reaching a solution. What do I mean? I mean that Saddam Hussein is a Soviet-type, totalitarian leader which we in our country know very well. The only way to change things is a very strong pressure on him: it can be direct military pressure such as war, but it also can be indirect military pressure so he will see that a military strike is inevitable. So from our point of view, instead of all this discussion – not even instead, in parallel with all this debate – it is necessary as soon as

possible to deploy around Iraq substantial military international forces which would be prepared to stay in the region for a long period of time given its special characteristics and the situation there and which would be prepared to start a military attack if that were to be the political decision in one hour's instance. And Saddam Hussein has to know that the military step and military attack can start in one hour if the this political decision is taken. That would be a kind of very strong indirect pressure on him – but this is not the 'war' yet.

So taking part in the dispute on how to use force is the most important element: *how* to use it? May be war is the last thing to do, nobody wants war. Nobody wants to kill civilians, innocent people. But then 'para bellum', be prepared for war. That is necessary to do from the very beginning. For such action to be prepared, no resolutions of the UN or whatsoever are needed. I know that the United States is already doing these things but very slowly, and it is not announced in the proper way. It must be an *international* military force which should be deployed around Iraq for a long period of time because the situation in Iraq is not clear at all.

The other weak point of this operation, which is not clear until today is what would happen in Iraq the next day when the regime falls, if it were to fall. This is a very painful issue and it's still open for discussion. There are different articles in different newspapers but there is no clear vision, and it's very difficult for example in Russia, for the President to contemplate what would happen in Iraq the next day. Because we know the situation with Turkey and the Kurdish community there, we understand the situation with the Kurds, we understand the situation with the Tajiks, we understand the situation with all the other nationalities there, the situation of re-division and re-sharing oil there. All of these issues are very contradictory and very explosive.

And last but not least is to understand and to have some clear vision – even artificial – of what would happen with the oil and the oil markets. For Russia for example, it is one of the most important questions in our economy. Very often there are speculations about the price list and I can assure you it is not about the price list, and I am very happy the President of Russia is not using the price list and the bargaining of this issue, because he understands that it is a vital interest for Russia to have transparent and secure neighbours. But the issue of oil, and the price of oil, must be very clear for us.

Concluding on this issue, I strongly believe that Russia would support the United States in this operation and Russia would be on board. Maybe it would not happen in an easy way, maybe it would not happen tomorrow, but as far as I understand the Presidential language and as far as I see it in our meetings, in our discussions, Russia would support the United States. The real question would be how to explain this support to the Russian people – it's not a very difficult issue because Russian people have no sympathies for Saddam Hussein at all. The only thing Russian people really need is a clear explanation of what it is all about. Otherwise the people will be simply scared. If it is accepted that America can do what it wants to do, for ordinary people it sounds like tomorrow America would do the same with us Russians. So it's necessary to explain this policy in a

thorough, clear way - why it happened, what are the Russian positions therein: Putin can easily do this.

Now on the attitude to the new U.S. security strategy. Part of the political lead which I represent (including my voters for example, I have about ten million voters in Russia) thinks that the ‘preventative strategy’, preventative military strike, is possible for some reasons and under some conditions, but it is not possible to do it unilaterally. So, if we are talking about preventative military action then it must be combined with a multilateral decision on the issue. If military action after the aggression or invasion is taken, multilateralism is very welcome, but every country has a right to protect itself. But if it is a preventive action, it’s even more important to do it (multilaterally). We think also that it is important to go down this path and also to stress the combination of these two things because, from experience, we know that when we are talking about unilateralism, we are talking about three or four people in Washington who are trying to make decisions which can be optimal decisions, the right decisions for Europe and the other allies to the United States – but we do not believe that that is in fact possible. And we want also to say that we are sometimes concerned about that because it creates those figures which we heard in those polls leading to a kind of anti-American sentiment. We have a very negative attitude to anti-American sentiments because we know from our own history that anti-Americanism means anti-Westernism. There can’t be pro-Western European attitudes with anti-American attitudes – they simply can’t go together. And every development of anti-Americanism means the development of anti-Western, anti-Israeli sentiment and that is very, very worrisome.

Last but not least are the Russia-EU relations. First of all we want to stress our new relations with the United States and our serious attempts to be not only the *partner*, but to be the *ally* of the United States. It’s also very important for us to open the door to Europe. We think that the door to Europe is in Washington, whether we like it or not, if only because Europe has a very deep and well-established relation with the United States. Europe certainly can, like in a family, have some contradictions. Europe can be a little dissatisfied with the United States and even have a love affair with somebody else, but Europe is married to the United States. So all the other games are for a short period of time: at the end of the day, Europe will come together with the United States. So, for Russia, if we really want to be a partner of Europe and to be *in* Europe seriously, whether in ten years from now or in twenty years, we have to establish fundamental relations with the United States. That’s what we are trying to do in the last period of time. So it’s a prior condition, that’s why we are doing that now with the EU. And this is very important for Russian political leaders, for the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the Russian Minister of Defence, to forget that we can play games between Europe and Russia, sorry, between Europe and the United States. That is absolutely impossible. In reality, things are going in absolutely the opposite direction: we have to build *real* relations with the United States as a *precondition* to entering Europe.

Direct discussions with Europe are difficult at the moment because of problems within Europe itself. I’m not going to develop them – we heard yesterday all the debates on Europe’s institutional future – but for Russia it is very difficult to find a partner for

discussions on foreign policy with Europe, because it's not clear with whom to talk to and about what. When the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of different countries like Germany for example, come to Russia and we have some questions, 'what's going on' etc, they reply: 'We don't know! We are only the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of Defence of *Germany*, we are not of the EU!' Can you give any explanation? 'No I can't simply cannot. We are a small country within big countries and we don't know what's going on there'. And that happens with everybody. So in this situation we are saying 'OK', then we leave you alone because you want to go in one coach but you don't know where to! Not everybody has the same idea where you have to go. Europe will find its solution, we have no doubt, but for the moment it's very difficult to know with whom to communicate.

The best example is the Kaliningrad story just now. It's a very practical problem: we have no right to travel to Europe. Japanese have such rights, Columbians have such rights, Argentineans have such rights, Russians have none. I'm not speaking about Kaliningrad, I'm speaking about travelling to Poland, to the Czech Republic, to Germany, to France and so on. We have no right to do that, we need a visa. We need two to three weeks waiting in lines at embassies to get a visa to simply travel for one week in Europe. I understand that Europeans want to protect themselves from Russian gangsters and mafia but I can assure you that Russian gangsters and mafia are not staying in the embassy lines! These are normal people who come for two weeks travel to Moscow and then two weeks later they are asked whether their grandfathers paid taxes! Do the French need to answer such questions? Russian people should feel that they are simply allowed to come - - I'm not speaking about the jobs, I'm not speaking about entering Shengen zone -- I'm speaking about the possibility to use our foreign passport and simply to travel for whatever reason. This is for us a very important, topical and practical issue.

One last observation. Once again, thank you very much for having allowed me to speak about Russian policy. You saw that we have a very big differences in internal politics and foreign policy. Mr. Putin is a skier – and he has to understand that if for a very long time his skis are going in different directions, then they will break the construction that he wants to establish. Thank you very much.

PETER SUTHERLAND

*The methodology I would propose for the dealing with the balance of this debate will be broadly the following: first of all, I want to give, at the end, ten minutes each to the two major speakers to respond. There's been a great deal of debate on both sides. I will take them ultimately in the reverse order to that which we originally had. So irrespective of what happens at twenty to twelve on the minute, I'm going back to the panellists which means we have a limited amount of time for time for debate and obviously quite a lot of people may wish to contribute. So I would ask people to restrict themselves as best they can to clear questions, clear comments and not repetition of general European positions or whatever, or expressions of love for multilateralism which I'm sure we all feel. So in*

*any event, with that cautionary word in advance, let me start by calling on André Leysen to make the first comment.*

ANDRE LEYSEN (BELGIUM)

American-European relations could be compared a little bit with the structure of an opera: it's full of lyrics for long periods and then comes the leitmotiv which announces trouble: that is the period when one has to act. I have four questions: America "bashing" is popular in Europe but basically that does not hinder Europeans to ask for help from the Americans when they need it. They have the old uncle sympathy and this is their problem. The second point is, and that is more important, Europeans are more fearful of war than Americans. You had forty odd wars *outside* your borders and we had forty odd wars *inside* our borders which gives another perception of war. On the problem of Iraq: what is the limit that a country can have weapons, and others none? There must be some limit. Coming back to America, an American General told me one day: a war must be won in the first five days, otherwise the influence of CNN becomes too great. This is a very important question because we cannot foresee what happens. On the other side, it is understood that America has to defend its interest, where and when they feel that they are aggressed. But it is a very serious question which considers the whole of the region – it will not stop with Iraq, it will go on in the surrounding countries and that must be taken into account. A final point. Mr. Schroeder's attitude towards America is generally not considered very lucky in Europe and I think we need to present excuses for that because America has always been at the disposal of Germany to protect its rights, to agree when Reunification came – Americans were the first to do that – and the Germans have a debt of honour towards America and they should try to respect that.

LORD GILBERT (UNITED KINGDOM)

Thank you Chairman. I've just got a couple of points for Chris Patten with respect first of all to the United Nations. He knows as well as I do, that any British politician has to get on his feet and first of all start with a genuflection towards the United Nations whenever any international activity is contemplated. And I think we do ourselves a disservice if we don't acknowledge, in addition to the drawbacks the United Nations has (that Richard Perle identified a few moments ago), that it is a frankly corrupt institution. Votes are bought and sold in the United Nations: they are bought and sold in the Security Council, they are bought and sold in the General Assembly. We all know the level at which they are bought and sold in the Security Council and they are bought and sold in the General Assembly at a much lower and rather more grubby level. That does not mean to say that it's not an advantage to have the imprimatur of the United Nations on international activity but we ought to recognise it for what it is, a political advantage and not an essential, sacramental blessing before we engage in any international activities.

The second thing I want to say is about Chris Patten's distinction between *followers* and *allies*. I'm not surprised that the United States is occasionally fastidious in these matters. In my country, when I was at the ministry of Defence, I should think that about 70% of the papers that went across my desk would be headed 'UK/US eyes only'. Very few

were also headed ‘CANAUUKUS eyes only’, Canadian, Australian, US and UK eyes only. And anybody who had anything to do with the proceedings in Kosovo, knows perfectly that you have to have allies you can rely on to keep intelligence secrets. And I’m afraid to say that none of us, putting hands on hearts, can say that is true of every member of NATO to this day. My final point is on this question of allies. Chris Patten very fairly pointed out that Europe is not really pulling its weight with respect to military expenditure. The matter is far more serious than that, Chris, because we’ve got a state now where it’s not just if the Europeans show up – they can only do so in symbolic numbers. So far has Europe fallen behind the United States in its command and control capabilities that the presence of European forces in the battle space can present a very serious risk to the United States forces – and that is something that we need to recognise. Thank you.

FRANCO VENTURINI (ITALY)

I found the two rapports by Chris Patten and Richard Perle extremely interesting but perhaps too intellectual, too theoretical. The question I would like to raise is what happens when we are talking about democracies that have elections, that have political domestic interests and media problems? May I remind – and I believe to be right – that Saddam has become the enemy Number One for the White House and a military initiative has been contemplated seriously only after Osama Bin Laden was not captured or killed in Afghanistan. I’m not talking about Richard Perle’s positions that are known, have been known for years, so this doesn’t concern you personally. But it concerns the general problem of working democracies and if you have one working democracy that is the only super power, don’t you need what was called a ‘counterweight’ inside an alliance just to have a democratic debate and to limit, in a certain sense, what can be a purely domestic interest.

Second point is about what Richard Perle called “German unilateralism”. I agree that Mr. Schroeder’s position was wrong but I don’t think that we have to excuse ourselves, or that the Germans have to excuse themselves for that. There can be dissent in an alliance and while I think Mr. Schroeder was wrong, I wonder if it was *right* to send the American Ambassador to undertake a public diplomatic step that is highly unusual among allies. And this again is another example of perhaps a different behaviour we should have among allies unless we think that everything outside the British Isles is corrupt and dangerous. Thank you.

HERVE DE CARMOY (FRANCE)

Thank you Chairman. It’s a question to Richard Perle. The attack on the US is a terrorist attack financed by Saudi Arabia with Saudi nationals largely. We understand that the recent attack on the French tanker also uses Saudi money – so I have two questions: is your focus on Iraq an indirect way of getting to Saudi Arabia? Secondly, what role does oil play in your strategy? Thank you.

BILL EMMOTT (UNITED KINGDOM)

Thank you Chairman. A quick remark followed by a question. The remark is that one thing that I find strange about some of the bitterness that's characterised European commentary on the United States, particularly since September 11<sup>th</sup>, has been that, I should have thought, that with an ally of such proven capacity as the US and sharing such values, that the right principle would be to give it the benefit of the doubt and then kick it when it makes mistakes, rather than kicking it in advance in case it makes mistakes. And that seems to me to have been some of the oddity of the debate. Of course we all like debate, I'm part of the debate, but my proposition is that we should more often give the US the benefit of the doubt.

But my question is about North Korea. It seems to me that the issues surrounding Iraq are quite straightforward given the history and given the fact that what has changed since September 11<sup>th</sup> with regard to Iraq is that finally there is domestic political support within the United States for taking military action – that's the big things that has changed to make it possible, and to do exactly what Grigory Yavlinsky is proposing to build up the pressure. But what about North Korea? How do you deal with a country that has now admitted to a secret nuclear programme but that has a close ally in China and everything around it. It would be interesting to hear from the main panellists on that issue.

SERGIO ROMANO (ITALY)

Thank you Mr. Chairman. A remark on terrorism addressed particularly to Mr. Perle. After Bali we had lots of voices in the US saying that the Bali bomb and the Kuwait bomb proved that we were right – that is we had to declare war on terrorism. It seems to me that Bali throws a sort of sceptical light on the war in Afghanistan. It simply proves that you cannot really defeat terrorism with military means. I mean you can destroy a regime and make it more difficult for terrorist cells to operate, but its like smashing mercury with a hammer – all you do is transform it into a thousand different pellets, they just keep operating. So it seems to me that at this point the best things that you can do is to leave terrorism out of the Iraq operation because Bali, in a sense, destroys a part of the argument that you've used during the last few months. Leave it out of the Iraqi operations – of course you *do* rely considerably more on the nuclear argument and we've heard your remarks today among other things – but then of course, as is quite rightly implicit in the question we just heard, you have the problem of North Korea, because you knew about North Korea – or at least that is what we've read in the papers recently – and we are confronted with a sort of double standards. You treat North Korea differently from the way you treat Iraq and the doubt of course is that it is considerably more difficult to deal with a country that already has nuclear weapons than it is to deal with a country that doesn't have nuclear weapons. So you may very well defeat Iraq, but shouldn't you wonder how other people would react to this idea? They draw the conclusion that it is better to *have* nuclear weapons than not to have them. That is what some people may come to think of the whole operation.

Now Mr. Perle, on counterweight. I'm sure that I don't have to take anybody's defence, however let me assure you that alliances were always born out of a certain amount of

reciprocal diffidence. Countries do not join each other only to act together. They join each other to watch each other, control each other, restrain each other, so we can go on being alive by providing reciprocal counterweight. Thank you.

HORST TELTSCHIK (GERMANY)

Well, I was a little bit wondering why nobody mentioned NATO anymore. There is an upcoming meeting here in Prague within a month and I am a little bit concerned about the statements now, not only from the European side, from our American friends like Condoleezza Rice, by saying we are facing an unbalanced alliance. The growing gap between the Europeans and the Americans concerning military capacities is growing and this will harm NATO. Therefore the main question is: what is the future of NATO if we have an unbalanced alliance? Can an unbalanced alliance work for a long time? And this is a difficult issue because meanwhile Russia is part of NATO. It is not a full member – it is a second or third class member, but it is partly a member. What does it mean for the future of NATO? I think these are very important questions because there is no alternative to NATO – it is the only alliance keeping the Americans in Europe. And I think this should be a real concern.

Another issue I want to raise is that I think we have to discuss not only the question of Iraq or North Korea now. There is a fundamental one. How should we deal in the future with dictatorships, with authoritarian systems? Look at Pakistan: Suddenly it was a Coup d'Etat; we isolated politically Pakistan, we put sanctions on Pakistan, and after September 11<sup>th</sup> we immediately discovered an ally, a close ally to fight terrorism. Immediately the sanctions were lifted and so on, and so on. Even our Chancellor travelled to Pakistan, our Minister of Developing Aid asked for additional money. Suddenly Pakistan was a close ally. I think the question about Saudi Arabia is a similar question. How to deal with Saudi Arabia, with all these countries, how to deal with Myanmar? You are spending money on North Korea to prevent development of nuclear systems. You don't spend any money on Iraq to prevent something. I think we have to talk about this because in Europe we have a simple experience – we tried the same with the communist systems after the war, isolating, confronting the communists and after some time in the 1960's we decided it doesn't work. We changed the strategy within NATO by saying security is the priority but keeping care of the security is the one pillar of our strategy, the other one should be dialogue and co-operation, and it worked at the very end.

A last remark to Chris Patten. You mentioned, quite rightly, that fighting terrorism is not only a question of military means, but the Americans decided to increase their development aid by 50% next year. There is no similar move in Europe. We are always questioning what the Americans are doing – they are doing sometimes even more on

overcoming hunger and other things than the Europeans. And I want to recall to you – how convincing are we after Kosovo? The Europeans, all members of NATO, agreed to build up new capacities within NATO – this costs money. At the very same time we decided on a “European defence identity”, whatever that means, building up sixty thousand soldiers and an army – this costs money. At the very same time France, Germany and others all decided we have to reconstruct our armies – this costs money as well. But, at the very same time we are reducing our defence budgets! This is not convincing at all.

PETER SUTHERLAND

*Because of the large number of points that are being made, I'm going to now ask the two main speakers just to deal specifically and briefly with the points that have been made and then we will go on with further contributions. Would you like to start Richard?*

RICHARD PERLE

Thank you. And I'll try to be very brief. On the question of who can have nuclear weapons and who cannot? I think the answer is that we would rather that those who might use them against us not have them and we are a good deal less concerned about those who we're confident *aren't* going to use them against us. I don't think it makes sense to try to develop a general principle about nuclear weapons.

I'm very sympathetic to John Gilbert's comment on all the points he made. There is a problem at the UN and we shouldn't pretend otherwise – votes are bought and sold at the UN. It is an institution that I once heard Helmut Schmidt refer to as a 'sandbox for the Third World'; that's a patronising view of it – but it has not yet reached the point where anyone would be wise to rely on its ability to protect the interests of any one of us – it just doesn't have the means. On the reliability of allies, John is quite right and the situation is every bit as bad as he suggests where the presence of allies can actually lead to a net decrease in American military capability in the battlefield. There were moments in Kosovo where that was the case – it took more US aircrafts to support a French mission over Kosovo than it would have taken to perform that mission by ourselves. And that a very serious matter and Horst Teltschik is exactly right to point to the inadequacy of military spending, security spending on the part of the Europeans.

I think Mr. Venturini's point that Schroeder's was wrong but was the American response appropriate? I'm not sure how the United States should respond to a case in which a German Chancellor engages in some American bashing to improve his electoral prospects. I think we would be letting down those Germans who were appalled at his behaviour, if we were simply to kiss and make up the moment the election has past. So I would be delighted to entertain suggestions that I could take back to Washington with a

situation like this. If it's all over the day after the election, is that not an encouragement to others to behave in the same way?

Saudi Arabia, M. de Carmoy – it's a very serious problem. We know the Saudis have been very careless about how they have spent large sums of money; they have been financing institutions that have become the recruiting ground for terrorists. It's not poverty that's the recruiting ground for the terror we are now facing. It's the population of young Arabs, going through the Madrassas in Pakistan and elsewhere, who from a very young age are indoctrinated in a fanatical view of the world in which the imposition of Islamic law Sharia, is their *raison d'être*. And they are taught under austere circumstances, they are beaten when they fail to recite correctly, they are denied any associations with women through the whole of their adolescence and they are emerging as deformed personalities. And we need to face that reality – this isn't a question of poor people in the barrios or the slums of the world.

Is Iraq a surrogate for Saudi Arabia? No, it certainly isn't, we have to find a way to persuade the Saudis to stop doing what they've been doing, and it's not easy in part because they deny that they've been doing it. As for the role of oil in US strategy – obviously we want to be sure that oil will flow freely through the markets, even though they're not the markets we would prefer, free-markets. Grigory Yavlinsky referred to the US strategic co-operation; it includes, and in my view should include, encouragement to Russia in developing its own oil resources, which could be substantial. And I think diminishing dependence on the oil that comes from one region of the world, from the Middle East, with all its instabilities, has got to be at the heart of our strategy.

Thank you Bill Emmott for the benefit of the doubt remark. It seems to me that's the right way for friends to deal with one another. And I would say particularly to the French who have been giving us such grief in New York – surely Jacques Chirac can ask himself the question how important is the precise nature of this UN resolution to France compared to its importance to the United States and the situation in which we now find ourselves? And would not the better part of statesmanship be to recognise that our interest is vital and fundamental and the French interest, however important, is not nearly so fundamental to France.

About North Korea: I wish we had an easy solution. The solution we tried last time was wrong. I thought so at the time and testified at the time. You cannot buy off a regime like the regime of Kim Jong Il. We tried to do that and it has failed – he went right ahead developing nuclear weapons anyway. But I must say that I find Sergio Romano's comment that we're applying a double standard very curious indeed. Sergio, if we were now to say we have to deal with North Korea the same way we propose to deal with Iraq, there would be an uproar about how the United States is making war on everyone. Indeed that was the response to the 'Axis of Evil' speech – are we now going to go after everyone who poses a threat? We have to find a way to deal with North Korea; I like to think that on *this* issue at least, there will be a lot of international support, recognising that the North Koreans have violated an agreement in the worst way. It was very foolish of us indeed to agree to supply nuclear reactors to North Korea. I mean it's absurd on its

face – those reactors would provide more nuclear material than the ones that we were asking then to take out of service. So we're well rid of that agreement.

CHRIS PATTEN

I'd just like briefly to refer to Mr. Yavlinsky's remark about Visa's. As he was speaking I was just looking at my own passport and looking at my visa to travel to the Russian Federation and I was thinking we could begin with a deal: why don't we make it a deal that you charge us for visas the same as we charge you – and maybe issue them as rapidly – because there are problems I think, on both sides. But we are at least going to engage now in a long-term discussion about how we can create the conditions in which we have visa-free access for citizens of the Russian Federation to the European Union, and I hope that will lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

I just want to pick up a couple of points that Bill Emmott made because I hope I'm not misunderstanding him. I don't feel any bitterness about the United States. I happen to disagree with what some – not all – policy makers in the United States have been saying and doing. And it may be a professional deformation of mine, but I actually think that when there is a *serious* intellectual argument being put with which one disagrees, it's quite sensible to engage in it. As we all know, not everyone in the United States (you heard the opinion poll findings) not everybody in the United States agrees with what I take to be Richard's view of the world. So for me to express some criticisms of the views of Richard or others doesn't suggest bitter anti-American feeling, it just suggests that I agree with a lot of what an awful lot of Americans have to say. And I think it lets down our friends in America who belong to the multilateralist tradition not to put these points. I have to say, nothing I have said about some aspects of policy in the United States has been anything near as strong as things said by Brent Scowcroft and others who I don't think one would regard as anti-American. Entirely right to say that we should provide the benefit of the doubt, but there are issues on which I disagree: we disagree about Kyoto, we disagree about the International Criminal Court, we disagree about extra-territorial legislation. And I think we should put those arguments reasonably vigorously.

North Korea: I don't see any alternative but to try to pursue the sort of policy which William Perry has spent a great deal of effort trying to put in place: A mixture of very tough containment while at the same time trying to engage with that astonishing Stone-Age totalitarian society. Pyongyang is surrealist. I've never been anywhere like it in the world; it is an extraordinary place. I do think we now have to be pretty tough with the North Koreans over, for example, the Korean peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) into which we've all been contributing to provide some alternative energy. I think we have to relate the efforts we've been making to provide assistance to North Korea to their preparedness to talk seriously to us about nuclear issues; but there are others we have to talk to as well. I know that President Musharaff has denied in the last few days that he had anything to do with the provision of nuclear materials to North Korea. So where did North Korea get them from? Here again an example of the fact that

you can only deal with these sort of issues through international co-operation. For example, if you're trying to stop proliferation.

Briefly, John Gilbert and the UN (and I'll return to this point later). Imperfect. Conceivably not as imperfect as some other human institutions. He and I have both belonged to an institution which has its imperfections. My honourable and noble friend belongs to an institution which has its imperfections but it's the only one we've got. And I want to come back later onto this question of how you deal today when 17<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> century concepts of sovereignty are no longer relevant. I want to deal with the question of how you can actually frame International Law without trying to use and beef up the United Nations and use UN authority.

Finally terrorism and poverty and development assistance: you're wrong. You're right to say that there is a relationship – though not a causal relationship – between poverty, between need and violence. Not all poor people are violent but you're more likely to see violence in impoverished states. You're more likely to see failed states where there is no economic progress. Europe today provides about two thirds of the development assistance that's going. I'm not making a criticism, I am describing: we provide between four and five times as much development assistance as the United States. When the United States make a very welcome commitment to increase development assistance, not least to sustain good governance – and I think that is a very, very sensible way of delivering development assistance – we also announced a set of benchmark targets for European countries: for each one to increase the amount of development assistance as a proportion of GNP to the overall European average, which increases what everyone's doing. In some cases, it increases by quite a lot what's done – the aggregate gets bigger and then I hope, we'll be able to set a further target of the increased average of development assistance as a proportion of GNP as the next target for member states. That what we said at Monterrey and that's what we're going to do.

PETER SUTHERLAND

*I now have seven, or eight rather, further speakers. I would beg everybody not to repeat things that have already been said to make their observations as concise as can reasonably be the case.*

ANTONIO GARRIGUES (SPAIN)

Thank you. I think that most important of all we are finally talking to each other and that the disagreement between Chris Patten and Richard Perle is an important factor to be accepted. I mean, there is a clear disagreement about many things, and I think the time has come to talk. I'm not going to repeat many of the things that have been stated because the Chairman is right and we have to concentrate in our questions. And my question, and to me it's a very important one, is the following: Richard Perle has even stated that NATO could be a better forum to decide things than the United Nations. Well, that's an important proclamation and at the same time you have to explain to us that you

don't believe in the International Criminal Court the way it is established, you don't believe in the Kyoto pact, you practically don't believe in any of the multilateral organisations or multilateral treaties that are in force in the world. Which is understandable and probably you have good reasons. But to my complete surprise, the United States have decided finally to return to the UNESCO and I think that's good news. Because cultural dialogue – including religious dialogue – is something to be incorporated into the political dialogue. The political dialogue is very important, the economic dialogue is very important, but the cultural dialogue is also very important. But how is it so that a country like the United States, in the mood you are in today, is going back to UNESCO? When criticising UNESCO from the very beginning, you have practically not listened to it in any manner – and now you are returning to UNESCO. What are the conditions going to be that a country like yours is going to put forward to UNESCO, because UNESCO again is not a minor multilateral organisation? It's a very important question – in my opinion UNESCO has produced very important results and very important products, intellectual products. Your comments about *how* the United States are going to go back to UNESCO will probably clarify some of the problems with which we are dealing today.

SIR JOHN KERR (EU/UNITED KINGDOM)

Thank you. I agree with Richard Perle that containment isn't enough. And I agree with the example Richard gave of the moral leadership of the Reagan Administration playing a role which containment alone could not have played in bringing about the end of dictatorship in Russia. I agree with that. Even if you don't think that the link between the evil regimes and the threat from terrorism in the world is absolute or precise, it seems to me that we should accept that containment isn't enough in relation to either threat: the threat from evil regimes or the threat from terrorism. So we need to have something else. Richard and Chris have both proposed various principles – I think there is an urgent requirement for the development of these principles in the trans-Atlantic dialogue. I think we need a joint doctrine and I'm not sure that the National Security doctrine of the United States is quite there yet.

Two things: if we go for moral challenge, one it isn't enough Richard to say 'it isn't poverty' because there's no doubt that poverty does help create the swamp, in which these dreadful things grow. We have to do something about poverty and it isn't enough, Chris, to say that development aid matters – development aid does matter but it's at the fringe. Its trade that matters and we both really have to think about the CAP and the US Farm bill. I know Richard is a free trade liberal – and I want to know where are the other free-trade liberals in Washington today and across the United States? Marshall's great speech wouldn't have led to a Marshall Plan if he hadn't been supported by Vandenberg and the Republicans and the Senate. It was a bi-partisan plan, it was in the US interest, it was in the world interest. We really have to have an economic volet to up moral challenge and leadership.

Secondly, we have to have a political volet to it. We have to be prepared to consider Horst Teltchik's question. In the fight against terrorism, is my 'enemy's enemy my friend', whatever the colour of his regime? How do we persuade the world's greatest democracy, India, that it is perfectly right for Pakistan to go on inciting murder in Kashmir? The people in Kashmir who do that were trained in precisely the same camps in Afghanistan that the fighters who came to New York were trained in, precisely the same camps. And their transit through Pakistan was encouraged. It's not enough just to say it's the Sharia, it's the Madrasses – there is an economic volet, there is also a political volet. We have to make judgements. People have talked about Korea, I would just mention Iran. Iran in some ways, the link between Iran and the organised terrorist movements on say the West Bank, is much clearer as far as I can see than the link between Iraq and organised terrorist movements on the West Bank. On the other hand, inside Iran (unlike inside Iraq) there is a real Manichean struggle going on. There are elections, free elections every year inside Iran and the good guys win sometimes. There is a struggle in which we, the outside world, need to get involved in encouraging the good guys. Moral challenge applies. So an 'Axis of Evil' that declares *all* Iranians bad can't be right – we have to make difficult moral judgements.

Finally on the UN, I agree. Its extremely ineffective, it is really flawed and damaged but it is the only one we've got. What we need to provide is new doctrines to allow for rational, understandable debate in the Security Council on the limits and the conditions for intervention.

OTTO LAMBSDORFF (GERMANY)

Thank you very much Chairman. I would like to answer the question that John Kerr has just put. There is at least one convinced free trader, the United States, and a few more - other countries. But unfortunately when it came to agriculture subsidies the President was 'defeated' by Karl Rove – and that is background of American politics these days. Let me ask one question: I know it is an exaggerated, provoking question: we are talking about pre-emptive policies and that has been a long debate – how long do we have to wait? When do we finally have sufficient evidence? After the first nuclear device has exploded in Tel Aviv, or when?

Second, remark to Grigory Yavlinsky. Grigory, I think perhaps you should have made it even clearer than you did – I know that you did. The foreign policy of Putin is independently strong, the *domestic* position of President Putin is weak and he has by far not won the debate and the fight between the Nomenklatura - between Yeltsin's family, is still on the Kremlin. And one thing I think has to be said about President Putin: I don't think he is corrupt, but the corrupt system is still there. And the corruption has played a role – all these oligarchs who were on the side of Putin – their corruption was forgotten, the others were driven out of the country.

Finally I would like to turn to Mr. Venturini who raised the question of the German election campaign and, Richard, you have asked what should be done. First I would like to say to Mr. Venturini – do you really agree that an election campaign in a European

country is waged in this way? How did it start? It started with the question in an open market place in Hannover, put by Chancellor Schroeder, which he had never been asked: are you going to send German troops to take part in the war in Iraq. 'Under my leadership, that would never happen' – a question which he had never been asked! The second point was calling President Bush's policy an "adventure" – this second point was not American bashing, it was Bush and Cheney bashing in a campaign. If we do that, can we be surprised that our relations are damaged and are suffering? And of course, the peak was when the former Justice Minister compared Hitler's methods with President Bush's methods, and no firing on the spot. And that hurt in the United States -- or to be more precise and I know what I'm telling about, it was hurting in the White House, it was hurting in the Bush family. If we think that that will ever blow over, we deceive ourselves. George W. Bush is someone who doesn't forget - our American friends do know that. On a working level we have so many connections, we are so densely co-operational, that it will go on. But the telephone line between the German Chancellery and the White House is damaged, the door is closed. And I tell you from my own experience during my negotiations for compensation on slave enforced labour (during WWII) on behalf of the Chancellor I myself, on two occasions, had reached the point where it was now necessary to ask the President and the Chancellor to communicate and help us solve our problems, and it worked. I'm afraid if we would be in that situation now, we would not have the chance to use it again that way.

HEINZ REISENHUBER (GERMANY)

Richard Perle has mentioned Kyoto and, as I understand it, he is at a scissors against the American economic interest and that is why United States are not in the position to support this protocol. Now if the greenhouse effect is not real, the Kyoto Protocol is against everybody's economic interests – but if it is real, then we have to fight it as a threat. We are talking about global issues. This is a global issue. Its completely impossible that a nation on its own can fight the greenhouse effect. We could do it together, or we all will fail together. Of course at a price. In such a situation would you like to look into your principles: what shared principle do you have? I always understood that we shared the principle of living in a sustainable world, of fighting for sustainability, for global responsibility on global issues. Thus, I would be very thankful if Richard Perle could give us some advice: how could we proceed in a situation where most scientists in the United States believe the effect is real? How could we go ahead to fight this global problem? How can we can come to an end where we attract all the others which are economically much weaker than we are, to share their common endeavour, to save the world's climate. And if I look back to the discussions we had in the past years, all of us stick to the principles, all of us feel the responsibility for this wonderful world. But when it comes to the actions, we have severe problems and they are not solved by waiting, if the effect is real and most believe it is. Then the problem some years hence will be much more real than today and the chances to overcome them will be more limited then today. So Mr. Perle, I would be very thankful if you could tell us how, in this field, we could exercise Euro-Atlantic partnership to overcome the problem which we are talking about.

CARLO TREZZA (ITALY)

Thank you very much. I would like to come back to the Prague summit of the next month, which was already mentioned. Indeed this summit meeting takes place just one month ahead and discusses fundamentally the same issues. Indeed, issues like defence capacity, EU-NATO relations, terrorism proliferation, missile defence – will be on the table and it will be a fundamental moment of verification of trans-Atlantic relations. But also values will be very important and there Mrs Palacio yesterday mentioned that we are, after all, on quite solid ground not only with regard to democracy and human rights but also on the controversial issue of the rule of law. I think that there, sometimes, the American posture is put into question: are the Americans still attached to the rule of law and I would say -- that in general terms this is still absolutely true – they don't like certain agreements like the ABM or the ICC – I mean they are seeking modifications to them through legal means, and that is correct. But there is this question of legitimising international military operations which was mentioned by Richard Perle on which I have some doubts. He mentioned the EU and NATO being the 'legitimisers' of possible military actions. I think that an alliance like NATO or a super-national structure like the European Union cannot legitimise themselves – there has to be a collective instrument for this legitimisation. And unfortunately I don't see any better instrument than the United Nations and the Security Council. I am surprised that Permanent Representatives of permanent members of the Security Council put doubt into this instrument. An alternative could be a legitimisation by a regional structure like the OSCE as far as Europe is concerned, but I think that we cannot avoid this problem of legislation and I think that the US attitude at the UN right now is really to try to get this legitimisation.

LUIGI RAMPONI (ITALY)

Thank you. I absolutely agree with Mr. Perle when he says there is lack of willingness and the US have the resolution and respect it. But I think the lack of willingness is not correct to be referred to the United Nations. The lack of willingness is the lack of willingness of the partners of all the nations of the world, because two years ago we already had a couple of resolutions from the Security Council concerning the Taliban regime and Afghanistan. And these resolutions were saying that the Taliban had to eliminate any training of terrorism, eliminate any kind of organisation, stop to grow up the drug to support financially the terrorism, extradite Osama Bin Laden. So the United Nations made the right decision – those who were lacking in willingness were all the countries of the nations of the world, including the United States. You (the US) had a real different attitude at that time in comparison with your recent attitude, and thanks to your attitude we had Saddam Hussein deciding to respect United Nations resolutions.

So I think that what has to change is not the behaviour of the United Nations, but the behaviour of all the nations of the world – it's not correct to have them in the General

Assembly saying that they are open to participate in the war against terrorism and then, when they have to respect the Security Council resolution, they show a lack of willingness to respect this. In the mean time I agree with what my friend Trezza just said: you absolutely need, *we* absolutely need the shield of the United Nations, because the war against terrorism needs a general consensus and we can only get the general consensus if we have the shield of the resolution of the United Nations inside our nations. Public opinion is very sensitive to what the United Nations decides and is not so convinced if we take a decision inside the EU or NATO.

Third, I agree absolutely that you are not going to find any war to take any initiative alone, because you absolutely need the participation of all the nations of the world – if you are going for instance to take the decision to simply attack Iraq, you cannot, absolutely not, do it alone. You are a super, super power but frankly you don't have the capability to carry a war also against Iraq alone and you are running the risk of having big, big problems. I remember what happened in the Gulf war: during the Gulf war you had the support, practically the support of all the world, and it was so fundamental in the logistic part of the effort, in the economic part of the effort. If you are going to do by yourself the war against the terrorism, I think that you are running to a real disaster. We have to take *our* part; we have not to only talk, we have to make a bigger effort in the military expenses, and I hope and I ask you to put pressure on the European governments -- like you did on the United Nations -- to have them spending more.

Last question to Mr. Yavlinsky: you said that we should make a big military pressure, a believable, a credible military pressure on that (Iraqi) State for it to respect. There is the United Nations resolution on Iraq, but I don't think that we have to follow your suggestion to prepare everything in order to be able to intervene "in one hour", because its going to be a terribly expensive and a unreliable effort.

GENERAL LORD GUTHRIE (UNITED KINGDOM)

Thank you very much. I am not going to repeat what other people have said, I hope, but I ought to just mention three subjects which I feel I know something about because I was involved in them. First of all the military plannings and operations in Kosovo: if I was an American I would be fed up with the Europeans about Kosovo – they feel their European partner has brought anything to the party whatsoever except argument and debate and conditions. So it made it extremely difficult to run a military campaign. However, there's another side to it and that is that NATO was designed for the Cold War and it was also designed for strong American leadership, and certainly to begin in the Kosovo crisis we had very little leadership from the United States, particularly from the President, and throughout the campaign I don't think we had very good leadership. Now that's unfortunate because it was the first time NATO really had to do something, so there are two sides of it really.

The second point I would make is about Pakistan, because I know Musharaff well. Musharaff is no saint but he is by far the best person to be running Pakistan at the moment – the alternatives are awful. You would have an extremist general with nuclear weapons, you would go back to corrupt civilian governments with nuclear weapons and there would be another coup, or you would have a Taliban-type government with nuclear weapons - so take your choice. It is Musharaff I think, and we should back him. But he is not a ‘democrat’ and I think we have got to be very careful pushing too hard down the democrat route – we may already have made it a bit harder for him by encouraging him to have an election – which has produced an extremely difficult mixture in the Pakistan government for him to handle. And I think that, though we are concentrating today on Iraq, perhaps the most dangerous part of the world is not Iraq, its Kashmir and the end of Pakistan borders where you have two nations with nuclear weapons and not really any doctrines and concepts of deterrents.

My third point is about the Arab world within which I have lived. The Arab’s like winners and it’s quite quick for them to change sides when they see who is going to win. I actually am right behind the UN but I am very sceptical that they are actually going to be sorting this out and we must brace ourselves that we should conduct action ourselves – hopefully with UN approval. If we don’t, the message to other Arabs will be appalling and I think its in all our interests to do things sooner because the longer you leave it, the harder its going to become.

SHLOMO AVINERI (ISRAEL)

Thank you Mr Chairman. Coming from Israel I should tread very carefully, because we are neither in Europe, nor in the United states, nor in between – we are somewhere between Libya and Iraq which makes it a little bit of a dangerous place. So let me just make two or three brief comments. My first comment is to Richard Perle: hasn’t it been basically a mistake to lump Iran and Iraq together? I’m not as sure, as John Kerr is, that there were democratic elections in Iran, but there were elections of a sort that we haven’t seen in Syria, let-alone Egypt or Saudi Arabia – and they should be encouraged. And especially if one goes after Iraq (as I think one should go for all the reasons which you and others have elaborated), doesn’t one need allies in the region, and isn’t Iran the best ally against Iraq precisely because the Iranians and Iraqis have been at war? The Iranians are going through an interesting development politically – not a democracy – but there is more openness in Iran today than in any Arab country. And didn’t the ‘axis of evil’ speech which included Iran push the moderates in Iran into a difficult position?

A comment on what Chris Patten has said: I think you have characterised a lot of European policies the right way by saying strong nouns, strong adjectives, weak verbs; and since the Middle East conflict, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has not been discussed (and I’m very happy to be at a meeting for once where this is not being discussed) so let me bring it in by saying it is precisely because Europe has strong nouns and adjectives and weak verbs that Israelis are very sceptical about European involvement. Because the Americans have tried – it was a different Administration, it was a Clinton Administration – they have tried, they have tried to use all the muscles and America has failed. So any

American responsible for the Administration today would be very careful to go back to another Camp David, because the United States does have strong verbs and they failed. So perhaps we have to move – and this is my suggestion to our European friends – in the Middle East to a little more sceptical attitude that moves to conflict *management*, instead of conflict to a *solution*.

My third point has to do about pre-emption – this was again mentioned yesterday by John Kerr. I'm living in the only country where every child has a gas mask; my three grandchildren have a gas mask allotted to them by the government, so I think I'm one of the last people who would like to see a war in our region – and this includes a war against Iraq. However, speaking in Prague, wouldn't the world look slightly different if in 1936, all other things being equal, someone unilaterally would have gone to war against Hitler despite the fact that perhaps there was no international legitimacy, that perhaps concentration camps were an internal affair. Perhaps there was no clear proof that Hitler was about to invade Czechoslovakia, Austria etc... – the proof is never there. Iraq is not Germany, Saddam is not Hitler – I know the limits of historical analogies but I think we should concentrate our mind when we today criticise a weak West in 1938/1939. What exactly are we criticising? We are criticising a West that didn't have the kind of will to do something then which some people today don't have the will to do again.

ALLAN GOTLIEB (CANADA)

Thank you. I just wanted to address this very question of legitimacy, of the use of force and I think a key point is that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the only way the international community can require a state to use force is through a Chapter VII decision. This Chapter VII has the legally-binding power to require states to comply. Chapter VII does not prevent the use of the force outside of those provisions – not only are they legitimate but in a very historic event in 1950, the UN Security Council and the UN adopted the uniting for peace resolutions which authorised general assembly to use force. Final point – the United Nations does not have a provision that only democracies can belong to it. I think its regrettable but the consequence is that you do have the power of dictatorships which do not represent public opinion and probably there is no concept in International Law which legitimises dictatorships. So the question of legitimacy is a very complex one and it certainly does not require UN authority.

PANAGIS VOURLIOMIS (GREECE)

A very brief question to Mr. Perle. There is the view held among some people that the re-zoning in the West Bank and all that goes with it has something to do with terrorism and the attitude of the United States towards this event has also something to do with it. Would he care to comment on that?

PETER SUTHERLAND

*Thank you very much. That brings us to the conclusion of the initial comments. I'm glad that at the very end, although I must say I was somewhat surprised that it only came at the very end, that the relevance of the Middle Eastern issue and the differences between Europe and the United States on it were briefly touched upon, but I'm glad that at least some comment can be made on that. First of all, there have been a couple of specific questions addressed to Mr. Yavlinsky so I'm going to ask him to comment on them and then I would ask the two main speakers to come back.*

GRIGORY YAVLINSKY

Thank you very much. I will try to be as short as possible. First of all, responding to the question about the pressure on Saddam Hussein, I want to be crystal clear: I'm saying that Saddam Hussein and his regime is such a type that it only understands military pressure, and the military pressure in this case means to deploy substantial international military forces around Iraq and to execute this pressure in this way. And that would be much cheaper than starting the war itself, maybe that would give the possibility to reach the changes not through the war and that would be the cheapest way to do that. Secondly I wanted simply to make an observation that in many other cases it may be the other way round, but in this (Iraqi) case, that is the only way.

Now the question about the foreign and domestic policies of Mr. Putin: What I want to say is that up to now the foreign policy – after 11<sup>th</sup> September – of the Russian President was, from my point of view, correct and I support it. The domestic policy, which concerns the media, democracy, oligarchs and many other areas including the war in the Northern Caucasus, is wrong and I oppose it. It happens also because he is under the pressure from the oligarchic leaders who are still there, the Nomenklatura which is still there, and he is a successor of Yeltsin's regime himself. That's why it has happened.

What about the corruption? Corruption certainly for Russia is more than a problem because it has become, during the last twelve years, an institutional basis for the Russian state and Russian economy, and that is one of the major outcomes of Yeltsin's period of time. The only one thing I want to say: I want to open to you a state secret that Russian corrupted oligarchs and corrupted officials are not keeping their money in North Korea or Saddam Hussein's banks! I can tell you that they are keeping their money in New York, in Zurich, in Paris, in London, and many other places – so it's a joint venture! Thank you.

PETER SUTHERLAND:

*I now turn to Mr. RICHARD PERLE for his concluding remarks*

Well Mr. Chairman, I apologise for trying to respond in pretty rapid-fire sequence but there's not much time. Two or three people have made the point, John Kerr among others, that the UN is imperfect – but it's the only one we've got. And I was trying to

think of a metaphor to deal with that. And in the end it seems to me that if you've got a fire extinguisher that you know won't work, you don't approach a fire with it because it's the only one you've got: you find another way to put out the fire! And the UN has its role, the UN has its purposes, but the mistake is in relying on the UN to do things that the UN cannot do.

The EU may well provide two-thirds of the world's development assistance; I think that the statistics understate the American contribution because so much of our assistance is from the private sector, about equal to the public sector in fact. But I have a couple of reactions to that: first of all we can finance unlimited development assistance with the difference between what we spend on defence and what Europe spends on defence.

Secondly, there's real reason to doubt whether we are very good at helping countries with our development assistance and indeed you can make the argument that the recent history of development assistance is to perpetuate the State structures and institutions that are in fact the principle obstacle to the development of the countries we are trying to help. So I wish more development assistance would solve the problem, but I don't think it will, and in this I think John Kerr is quite right. Trade is the critical element and I regret as much as anyone in the room some recent American decisions to interfere with free trade, but there are also some Europeans with free trade interference and we really need to come to grips with those.

UNESCO – my impression is that we've rejoined because we think it has dealt with some of the problems that it faced in the past. I hope that's right.

Count Lambsdorff – I can only say, my regret is that he's not the German Chancellor.

Kyoto – the question was put 'what can we do?' I think we have to take greenhouse gases seriously, we have to take global warming seriously and we have to fashion a global response to it. The question is whether Kyoto was the most effective or minimally effective global response. And I'm not an expert on these matters, but it seems to me there was one very unfortunate development in the closing hours of the Kyoto court and that was the decision not to allow states to meet their quotas by reforestation outside their own national territory. I'm told by some very tough environmentalist friends that this was at the instigation of the EU, prodded principally by France. And it looks to them to have been petulant and wholly counter-productive. If we can make an appropriate contribution to the suppression of greenhouse gases by planting trees in Brazil, why should that be prohibited in Kyoto? We can't reforest in our own country because of the mature state of our forests – it seemed to me and to many others a very foolish limitation on the freedom to deal responsibly with these matters and let me just say that I think I'm not alone in lacking expertise on Kyoto. I don't know how much expertise there is in this room, but it has become the mantra that Kyoto was right and the reluctance to go along with it must therefore be wrong. It deserves serious scrutiny.

Is the US attached to the rule of law? Yes we are, but we have to recognise that International Law is weak, it is not as fully developed as law within civil societies. There

are no enforcement mechanisms that you can rely upon and it is the product of nations – some of whom themselves are law-breakers. So again, it has its uses but it has its limitations too and to treat it otherwise, I think, would be a great mistake.

‘There has to be a collective source of legitimacy and it must be the United Nations’ – I reject that. Why must it be the United Nations? Why is the United Nations a greater source of legitimacy than NATO? Horst Teltschik has asked about the future of NATO – here is a proposal: NATO has every capacity to become a legitimising international institution with respect to the use of force because it is composed of liberal democracies that have exhibited since its inception an absence of self-aggrandisement and a responsible effort to bring about peace and stability. Why shouldn’t NATO be as legitimate as the UN which happens to contain a lot of dictatorships?

It is quite true, as Signor Ramponi suggests, that the UN passed anti-Taliban resolutions and nothing was done to support them. Exactly my point, Sir. Nothing was done to support resolutions of the UN, including by the previous American Administration, I acknowledge that. We need the UN to get a consensus in the fight against terrorism, but the UN includes countries that harbour terrorists. So we certainly need co-operation if we’re going to deal with terrorism, but that means the co-operation of *nations*, frankly, and not the co-operation of the UN *per se*.

I’m grateful to Charles Guthrie for his comments on Kosovo; he understands that situation far better than I do, and for his comments on Pakistan. And I think the lamentable answer to the apparent dilemma of our associating from time to time with countries that don’t meet our standards, is that sometimes it’s simply necessary. Sometimes it’s necessary – we could not have dealt with the Taliban in Afghanistan without co-operation from Pakistan. And I’m afraid he’s quite right about the past failure of American political leadership in Kosovo, but if the Europeans are sufficiently successful in intimidating the American Administration we will repeat the failure of political leadership in difficult situations.

The question has been raised whether we are lumping – Shlomo Avineri and others have said are we lumping Iran and Iraq together. The ‘axis of evil’ was meant to point out that North Korea is a supplier of the instruments of terror to countries like Iraq and Iran. They are not all the same and we can’t threat them all the same. With respect to moderates in Iran, with all due respect, the moderates unfortunately are not in control of the instruments of power in Iran and every time they think they are, the Mullahs arrest their supporters, their members, the newspapers that editorialise in their support. So the dilemma that the West faces in my view is whether we can pretend that we can coax a weak Khatami Government to a substantially different Iran, or whether to encourage the very widespread opposition in Iran, on the part of the people of Iran, to the government that dictates every aspect of their lives. And my view is we should work with the people of Iran and hope that they bring about the change. Thank you Allan Gotlieb for what you had to say on legitimacy.

And finally, I think Shlomo Avineri was very eloquent on the comparison between the current situation with all its historical imperfections, and the situation in 1936. I wish we *had* acted unilaterally in 1936 and had not waited until we were attacked – the whole point about a doctrine of pre-emption is that you don't wait until its too late. And if we strike some of you as impatient, that may be the reason why.

CHRIS PATTEN

I want to start with the modesty, the becoming modesty of Richard Perle, at the outset saying that there was no “new school of unilateralism” in Washington or in the United States. I'm reminded of a great biography of the British Prime Minister, 19<sup>th</sup> century Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, by Robert Blake, in which Blake at the beginning of the book points out that Disraeli wrote a number of novels when a young man in which he advocated social responsibility. He became Prime Minister as a much older man and he acted on those principles and executed social responsibility. And Blake seems to argue, I always thought counter-intuitively, that there's no relationship between the one and the other. Now, I've read what a number of influential advisors to the Vice President and the Secretary of Defence have been saying and writing at the American Enterprise Institute and at other think tanks over the years. I pick up what the Number Three in the State Department has said about an issue we've been discussing here this afternoon. ‘There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is an international community that can be lead by the only real power left in the world and that is the United States, when it suits our interests and when we can get others to go along.’ I read those things and I see what is happening at least in part today, and I sort of wonder whether there is some relationship between the one and the other. And I hope this won't be regarded as an *ad hominem* remark and I hope it won't seriously blight the career of an international public servant who I admire as much as anybody I've ever met in political career, but I don't think we'd all have been having exactly the same discussion this morning with Colin Powell. I think there are different traditions in the American Administration and you mustn't be surprised if in Europe we feel more committed to one of those traditions than we do to a newer one.

Are things different? Have things changed? You can't have it both ways. You can't, on the one hand say “no”, nothing's really changed and then attack the vague globalism of Mr. Clinton. I read with some admiration the political commentaries of David Broder – who is not an extremist in the American debate – who talks about the fundamental change in American foreign and security policy thinking . So I do think that there are different arguments being put to those with which we have been familiar in the past and I don't say that with any bitterness. But I do think it is reasonable for concerned Europeans to put our own view of how we think the world can best be managed -- provided we are prepared to back up that view with a few resources.

Richard asked me whether I was arguing that the United States played the international role *outside* the rules. Let me define terms – does the United States exist under the rule of law? Absolutely. Does the United States believe in due process? Absolutely. But

what are we to make of extra-territorial legislation? What are we to make of Helms-Burton on Cuba? What are we to make of the legislation on investment in Libya and Iran? An enthusiasm for extra-territorial legislation affecting European companies, but no American Congress would dream of allowing extra-territorial legislation to affect US companies! What are we to make of the Small Arms Convention – a convention designed to try to stop weapons going into countries like Sierra Leone and the DRC, and the American leader of the negotiating team withdraws from the talks on the convention on the grounds that the convention would undermine an American citizen's constitutional right to bear arms! How does this play in Sierra Leone? How does that play in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

I am well aware of American concerns about the International Criminal Court – and more than a lot of other people understand those concerns – while believing passionately that we should set up the Court. We tried and are continuing to try to satisfy American concerns about the politicisation of that court and that legal process. But I ask this question – how easy it going to be for the next American public official who is trying to persuade the Croatians to send somebody to The Hague? And the Croatians are saying, no we can deal with this person in our own country. How easy is it going to be to argue that case with Serbia? I don't *begin* to suggest that there is any comparison between the United States and Serbia, or the United States and Croatia, but people do see when you have an argument like this, they do see just an itsy-bitsy bit of double standards.

I said that the “national interest”, in my judgement couldn't be defined without referring to international co-operation, and I repeat that. American citizens, American voters want prosperity, they want security; you can't have prosperity and security without working with other countries whether through the UN or the WTO or in other ways.

Now, Richard took exception to my use of the word ‘counterweight’ in talking about Europe's role in relation to the United States – I also said ‘counterpart’ and I also said that we needed to put more ‘weight on our end of the rope’. I just make this point in passing, but I am not one of those Europeans who would ever, ever express the ambition that Europe should become a “super-power”. I think it is crazy language and a crazed ambition and I think it is an exceptionally old-fashioned way, if I may say so, of looking at the world. There are places where we are at present an effective counterpart to the United States – I hope we will be in our development of our Doha Round on trade. And I've said twice already – I totally agree with what John has said: until we are prepared in Europe to reform the Common Agricultural Policy, we cannot be credible about international trade and helping poor countries – it's as simple as that.

On development assistance, we must make sure that we put in place the targets that we agreed at Monterrey, and I just say this: reversing what Richard said earlier – I am in favour of us spending more on security, but if Europe was to reduce the amount of development assistance that we give as a proportion of GNP to American levels and put all that money into security, would the world be a more secure place? Would it be a more secure place with more poverty? Would it be a more secure place with more environmental degradation? I happen to rather doubt that. There are European forces at

the moment in ten UN peace-keeping operations around the world. We are working, and I think working hard – but not as effectively as any of us would like – with the United States in Afghanistan and Afghanistan I assure you is by no means done and dusted. We are working in the Balkans, where I think we have managed, in at least *that* area, to demonstrate the credibility of a common foreign and security policy.

So in all those places we are a ‘*counterpart*’. But there are going to be occasions where we need to be a ‘*counterweight*’, where the United States and Europe don’t agree; where *we* have to take responsibility for making multilateral solutions work – that is the case on Kyoto. And one reason, one reason why the point about forests isn’t terribly relevant to the US situation, is the US has 4% of the world’s population, and produces 25% of the greenhouse gases. So it’s not unreasonable for people outside the United States to say, as 70% apparently are saying *inside* the United States, we should be part of this process. We want in Europe to make the International Criminal Court work. There’s no point in us haranguing the United States about that, there’s no point in us sitting in the Grand Stand shaking our fists. Again, we have to be an effective counterweight and actually make that aspect of multilateralism work as well.

Two final points: we’ve spoken a great deal about the UN – the only one we’ve got and so and so on. Imperfect, as John Gilbert rather graphically put it, though he must have seen more brown envelopes than I have! But I just want to make this point – we are talking as I said (sorry, I didn’t mean to John Gilbert, I meant ..., my God I could see John’s lawyers sue, grab it and run, on the phone within nano-seconds!) about a world in which post-Westphalia we have to look at sovereignty in a new way, we have to look at a world in which you justify humanitarian intervention, intervention to deal with mass destruction, intervention to deal with terrorism.

But if you simply do it without any reference to existing institutions, existing rule-books, what are you left with? If we think its so simply right to be able to intervene to deal with a state which has weapons of mass of destruction, and is perhaps helping terrorists and we do it without any reference to the UN – what do we say to India? How do we stop the Indians bombing Islamabad? There they are, there’s a state next-door which has weapons of mass-destruction and which is manifestly helping terrorists who are causing mayhem in parts of India. So you do need to try, hard as it is, to establish international rules. And if we can’t do it through the UN, what the hell else is there? And if the American Administration doesn’t believe that, why has it gone to the UN over Iraq? I don’t believe, I don’t take the cynical view that President Bush only made that remarkable speech in New York in September, because Karl Rove told him to do so. I think there is a clear understanding in the United States that in order to do what they believe is necessary in Iraq, they need the moral authority, the legitimising factor that is provided through working through the UN. And I just say this – I want to make this absolutely clear: if there is a Security Council resolution on Iraq, and if Saddam Hussein doesn’t comply, I will be one of those who advocates the use of force in order to make him comply. I have no difficulty with that. What I have difficulty with is working *without* that legitimating factor provided by the United Nations, imperfect though it is.

Finally, do I think America is responsible for the clash of civilisations? Of course I don't. Richard mentioned US intervention in Bosnia; he could have mentioned as well US intervention to save Muslim lives in Kosovo; he could have mentioned US intervention within an international alliance in the Gulf to save lives in an Islamic country. I do think that it's surprising that one dog didn't bark until late in the debate and we haven't talked much about the Middle East, because I do think -- whether correctly or not-- that the perceived American views on Israel and Palestine are one of the reasons for some of the hostility in the Islamic world to the United States. Fair or not, I think that one has to understand that that is the situation.

But what is the biggest, the biggest and most important example of American power and American authority? It is that America has been identified for decades above all with opportunity, freedom and democracy. And if you're the world leader and that reputation starts to fray at the edges, you can be in very serious trouble. And very serious difficulty indeed. Because as well as producing very warm feelings about all those attributes, if you're the Number 1, you also, I'm afraid, produce a lot of jealousy and a lot of resentment around the park. And we want to stop that and we want to stop a gulf opening up with the Islamic world because otherwise we will all have an extremely disagreeable future.

I want to finish on a positive point: I hope that Europe can work closely with the United States over Iraq, I hope we can work closely over Korea, I hope we can make a success of Afghanistan, I hope that we can have a more sensible debate about Iran – Iran is a great pre-Islamic civilisation and it's not simply enough to say that there are some extremist Mullahs and we can't deal with the moderates. I hope that we will be able, wherever possible, to co-operate multilaterally, but where we can't, I hope that we in Europe will take our share of the responsibility.

Final point: Charles Dickens said that he wasn't prejudiced about the United States except to be prejudiced in favour of it. That is entirely my point of view. Winston Churchill, again, said that you would always depend on the United States to do the right thing in the end, but not before it had tried all the available alternatives. I'm confident that America will continue to give the world beneficent leadership and will be the first great super-power which has ever done that.

PETER SUTHERLAND

*Thank you very much indeed. I think this obviously is a debate that will run and run, and we could be at it for the next week here and we wouldn't bring it to a conclusion. But I want to thank our speakers this morning for a very enriching and lively debate which I think has been really excellent.*

\*  
\* \*